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PnEFACE 
EsTABLISHING THE FIELD: CRITICAL MusicoLoGY 
Few books today are forgivable. 
- R.D. Laing[l] 
How forgivable is a musicological text on deconstruction two decades 
after its assimilation by the other "humanities" disciplines? Moreover, how 
forgivable is a discipline as a whole which has allowed one of the most 
challenging aspects of post-war critical theory to pass it by to this extent? 
Ju no other field are Laing's remarks more likely to resonate today than 
that of critical musicology. 
Even the adoption of the critical epithet itself is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. However, it is indicative of an emergent desire for musicology 
to finally engage with contemporary critical discourse in general. Such a 
call has been made from "outside" the profession by cultural critic Edward 
Said, who calls for an end to "the generally cloistral and reverential, not 
to say deeply insular, habits in writing about music." [ Musicnl 
Rla bora tions, p.58] From "within" the field, Sus an McClary laments that the 
crucial critical debates are "almost entirely absent from traditional 
rn usicology." [Feminine Endings, p.54] Likewise, what is increasingly 
[l] The Politics of Experience, p.ll. 
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unforgivable according to Ruth Solie is "our customary methodological 
behindhandedness [sic]" [Musicology & Difference, p.3]. 
Various routes away from the methodological backwaters have been 
suggested. For instance, in a conference paper in 1984, Richard Middleton 
defined a twofold approach which appears to combine aspects of 
struct uralisrn and Marxism. Middleton called firstly for a move in to 
"semiology, broadly defined and stressing the social situation of signifying 
practise: this should take over from traditional formal analysis." [quoted 
in Shepherd, Music as Social Text, p.209] Secondly, this should be 
supplemented with an "historical sociology of the whole musical field, 
slressing critical comparison of divergent sub-codes of the 'common 
musical competence': this should take over from liberal social histories of 
music" [ibid., p.209] As a method for introducing this new musicological 
mode, Middleton recommends the inclusion of popular music as a field of 
s l udy. Indeed, his implication is that such a challenge to the classical 
hegemony would naturally entail a move towards this twofold approach, 
and would by itself open up "a golden opportunity to develop a critical 
musicology" [Studying Popular Music, p.123]. In this sense, an expansion 
of the field of study could lead to a necessary adoption of new 
methodologies. 
In a parallel manner, Susan McClary has suggested that "The project 
of a critical musicology [ ... ] would be to examine the ways in which 
different musics articulate the priorities and values of various 
communities." [Feminine Endings, p.26]. McClary continues to point out the 
existence of such methods in the field of ethnomusicology, and recommends 
the adoption of this model for the discipline in general. As an example of 
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how to move into this field with a critical awareness, she also cites the 
work of Theodor Adorno, Michel Foucault, and Antonio Gramsci. For 
McClary, the critical epithet entails the self-critique of a discipline, an 
interrogation of "how various discourses operate to structure, reproduce, 
or transform social reality." [Feminine Endings, p.29] In her programme, 
a feminist approach leads to a questioning of the fundamental assumptions 
which musicology has made about our relationship with sound. 
The various proposals for a critical musicologyl21, despite thP.ir 
slightly differing accents, all imply certain paradigmatic inadequacies in 
the current state of the discipline. Significantly, there also appears to be 
a general consensus that whichever route is taken out of our present 
methodological impasse, the cue is likely to come from the incorporation of 
the critical techniques of other humanities disciplines within the 
framework of musicology. 
However, it is also clear that this will require an adequate awareness 
of those theoretical developments as they operate within their "source" 
disciplines- an awareness which is not always to be found in the writings 
of musicologists. As McClary has noted, even when musicology does reach 
out beyond its traditional boundaries, the influences are often anything 
but contemporary; 
For many complex reasons, music has been and continues to 
be almost entirely exempted from criticism as it is practised 
within other humanities disciplines: even those scholars who 
produce work resembling that of the old-fashioned New 
Criticism of literary studies still count as radicals in 
musicology. [Feminine Endings, p.20] 
[21 A recent English development is the Critical Musicology Group, which at 
time of writing is still highly formative (cf. Critical Musicology Newsletter 
1). 
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Middleton's proposed semiology of music, expressly designed to move 
us beyond formalist analysis, could possibly also move us beyond the New 
Cciticism phase which McClary criticises. Yet semiologists themselves 
hardly "still count as radicals" in literary criticism. Further, Middleton's 
call for a non-formalist, broadly (socially) defined semiology is an echo of 
a similar call made in the francophone world in 1975, with Jean Molino's 
crucial article Musical Fact and the Semiology of Music, which calls for a 
semiological dialectic within the analysis of the "total social fact". [ Musir:nl 
Fact, passim] (discussed more fully in Chapter 1). 
Yet if a small number of recent books are proving to be in Laing's 
terms forgivable, perhaps even believable, then the first actual post-
structuralist tremors are finally beginning to be felt within musicology [Jl, 
even if, as Said comments, "their work is both at a relatively early stage 
and, I have gathered, occupies minority if not marginal status" in this mo:-;t 
structurally inclined of professions. [Musical Elaborations, p. xil1 McClary 
in particular identifies her work as operating within one of the most 
crucial threads of post-structural thought: deconstruction. Few other 
musicologists have attempted to assimilate themselves to deconstruction on 
any level, and even those who have can seem reluctant to openly discuss 
[J] As will be argued in Chapter 1, quite how far Molino succeeds in 
breaking away from a structuralist framework is a moot point. 
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their use of its procedures[~]. 
For McClary as a feminist musicologist, there is an above-board 
political commitment in her adoption of deconstructive techniques. In ht!r 
introduction to Catherine Clement's Opera., or the Undoing of Women, she 
identifies several popular composers who rework material from classical 
operas, and claims that, 
rather than transmitting them as sacred objects, they are 
deconstructing them - laying bare their long-hidden 
ideological premises - and yet reenacting them, so that one 
experiences a shared heritage and its critique simultaneously. 
The sounds of whiplash, the masochistic rap, and the 
controlling phallus that bombard 11 Un bel di 11 in McLaren's 
.. Madame Butterfly .. tells us a good deal more about what is at 
stake in that opera than any traditional production. [Opera, 
p.xvii] 
For McClary, it is the combination of engagement with a heritage and 
its simultaneous critique which constitutes deconstructive compositionnl 
technique. Here, the political programme is one of exposing the (allegedly) 
underlying ideological structures of a tradition, precisely by invoking the 
processes of that tradition. Of Madonna's use of pornographic images, for 
instance, she comments that "it becomes necessary to invoke the image in 
order to perform the deconstruction 11 [ 51 [Feminine Endings, p.162]. To nn 
[~] The essays collected in Ruth Solie's recent edition, Musicology and 
Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship (1993) demonstrn tc 
a lamentably low level of engagement with the texts and techniques of 
deconstruction considering their publication under the term difference. 
What is even worse is the opportunistic usage of the term "deconstruction" 
in such slack attempts at critical trendiness as the title of Stradling & 
Hughes' recent book, The English Musical Renaissance 1860-1940: 
Construction and Deconstruction, which in fact has nothing to do with the 
field at all. 
(51 Leo Treitler has recently asserted that McClary, in employing similar 
strategies within the field of theory 11 adopts the very stereotypes that she 
has deplored .. [Gender & Other Dualities of Music History, in Solie (ed.), 
Musicology and Difference]. This form of critique against deconstruction 
will become increasingly significant throughout the current project. 
xiii 
extent, these statements ally McClary's conception of deconstruction with 
that of Jacques Derrida, whose formulation of deconstruction will be taken 
as the measure throughout the current text. 
A further example of Derrida's influence on a musicologist is 
Lawrence Kramer, particularly in his Music as Cultural Practise: 1800-1900 
(1990). Kramer's interest initially appears to be more at the level of 
significatory processes than does McClary's; "deconstruction [ ... ]proposes 
that texts find it difficult to restrict what they mean and that their very 
effort to restrict meaning often propagates it further." [Music as Cultural 
Practise, p.xii] However, both McClary and Kramer use deconstruction for 
the project of (respectively) "questioning the claims to universality by the 
'master narratives' of Western culture, revealing the agendas behind 
traditional 'value-free' procedures" [Feminine Endings, p.123], and, 
"minimizing the authority that may be invested in potentially monolithic 
slcuctures" [Cultural Practise, p.177]. Such statements obviously set up 
all kinds of political resonances, and also suggest some possible uses of 
deconstruction, but as will become clear, politics can also be found to 
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operate at the most ostensibly abstract of levels[6). 
It is just such a level with which much of the current text engages-
the "structural politics" of harmonic theory - and, in a modest attempt to 
[6] It should be noted, though, that both McClary and Kramer often make 
statements which risk being interpreted as counter to the whole agenda of 
deconstruction as laid out in Derrida's Of Grammatology. Kramer in 
particular would have done well to explore the metaphysical ramifications 
of the concept of "voice'' more fully in his final chapter, "As if a Voice were 
in Them": Music, Narrative, & Deconstruction. His coining of the tenn 
olher-voicedness leads to statements such as "One can speak the words of 
the same but in another voice, a voice that emerges from within language 
to spread itself throughout the whole system, fissuring it in every 
direction." [Music as C11ltural Practise, p.178] Kramer here asserts that t.he 
aspects of language which disrupts sameness· and promotes difference are 
forms of speech and voice: "othered" forms, but nonetheless speech and 
voice. Of Grammatology, however, spends its whole length showing that 
these two concepts are precisely the aspects of language which in hi bit 
difference and promote sameness, and are structurally opposed to the 
disruptive concept of writing (see Chapter Two). Given the power nf 
phonocentric thought in musical circles, a fuller account of this other-
voicedness as a form of "writing" itself would have been advantageous. 
McClary often makes equally metaphorical use of the term "voice" in 
relation to various women composers and theorists. However, as a feminist, 
slte is inherently implicated within the nexus of de bates around whether 
or not one can assimilate the deconstructive concept of authorial absence 
with the concept of the gendered author. (This problematic is also touched 
upon in Carolyn Abbate's informed paper Opera; or, the Envoicing nf 
Women [Musicology and Difference, pp.225-258]). Nevertheless, this 
problem in the writing of both of these voice-interested theorists requires 
fuller elaboration within their texts. Anyone engaging with deconstruction 
cannot afford to make even potentially equivocal usage of phonocentric 
concepts. (This is not to assert that Derrida's concepts cannot be reversed 
themselves to produce further deconstructions - what is required, 
however, is a careful elaboration of such a strategy, and just such a 
programme is attempted in Chapter 6.) Equally, McClary's conception of 
deconstruction as the "laying bare [of] long-hidden ideological premises", 
and "revealing the agendas behind traditional 'value-free' procedures", 
would to many critics imply more of an agenda of demystification than 
deconstruction per se. In other words, her lexis here suggests the:tt 
deconstruction is a form of analysis which uncovers an ideological sub-
structure beneath an obfuscating surface. Deconstruction in its "properly" 
Derridean mode would immediately set about interrogating the opposition 
between surface and sub-structure, as is argued in Chapter One. Equally, 
if ideology can only be conceived of as a sub-surface construct which must 
be analytically unearthed, then DeleuzejGuattari's statement that "there 
is no ideology and never has been" [A Thousand Plateaus, p.4] becomes 
significant (cf. Chapter Eight). 
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advance the programme of critical musicology, the field of Derridean 
deconstruction has been chosen as a salient theoretical site from which t.o 
operate. This is, however, not an arbitrary choice. In Of Grammatology 
(1967), Derrida engages with a series of theoretical differences which 
emerged in the Parisian intellectual milieu in the Eighteenth Century. One 
of the main disputes which he deals with is that surrounding the Genevnn 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of language. Within this theory, however, 
there is also a significant debate around the origin of music, as the full 
title of Rousseau's text demonstrates: Essay on the Origin of Languages, 
which Treats of Melody and Musical Imitation (1752). Reading within the 
ruo.rgins of Derrida' s text, then, we can find a means of locating 
deconstruction in musical discourse. 
However, a wider net will be thrown than one will find in Of 
Grammatology itself[71. Derrida's specific concern with the Parisian 
Enlightenment will be examined in the second chapter. From that point on, 
an alternative reading of Enlightenment music theory will be carried out. 
This will be informed by Derrida's text, but will also represent an 
increasingly divergent reading of certain key concepts which Derrida's 
reading itself relies upon. This alternative engagement will begin, for 
various pragmatic reasons, with a close reading of the equivalent debates 
within the Edinburgh Enlightenmentl8l. Deconstruction relies heavily on 
nuances of language, and as such, the status of the current project as an 
[71 In a pedantic mode, one can calculate that only 1/75th, or 1.33r% of Of 
Grammatologys 350-odd pages deals directly with the debates around 
Housseau's music theories. 
{Bj The contribution of theorists also working in the other metropolitan 
centres (particularly Glasgow and Aberdeen) should not be overlooked 
lightly, however. 
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English language text presupposes a closer intertextuality with other texts 
in that same language. Further, this text was written within the 
geographical space of metropolitan Scotland, and, in a time when a cultural 
revival was under way (particularly within classical music), it would have 
been a missed opportunity not to have engaged with this area's theoretical 
traditions. Not only as an initial recovery of a neglected and significant 
aspect of a general European tradition, but also, ultimately leading to the 
question of how the Caledonian strand could be read within a 
contemporary, post-structural theoretical milieu. Equally, the two crucial 
centres of the eighteenth century Enlightenment were, of course, Paris 
and Edinburgh; to therefore link these two centres in a single study is to 
provide a background for a fuller understanding of European 
Enlightenment in general. 
Although the intertwining of these two threads of Enlightenment 
theory has been well documented in other disciplines (notably philosophy 
and politics), only the Parisian thread has been unravelled in the context 
of musicology. The study of Scottish music aesthetics in general is still 
very much behind the study of Scottish composition, which has itself only 
recently emerged as a credible force [91. It is thus necessary to briefly 
pose a historical question, and to consider its implications for a text which 
will form a crucial starting point of our engagem.ent with Enlightenment 
[9] While studies of Scottish popular musics (particularly folk) have been 
undertaken in earnest for some time, study of the classical traditions hns 
traditionally been neglected on the false (and often ideologically-
motivated) premise that they barely existed. This spurious 
historiographical manoeuvre has been debunked in particular by the 
diverse findings of Kenneth Elliot, Helena Shire, David Johnson, Iso hcl 
Woods, D. James Ross, and John Purser, whose publications (listed in the 
Bibliography) span a musical history across two millennia. 
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harmonic theory. 
TRACING A pATH: A s COTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT FIG URH 
What are Scottish music aesthetics?[lO] Firstly, it must he 
understood that none of the texts discussed below were written in a 
cultural vacuum. Scottish thinkers have never been impeded by their 
geographical distance from the traditionally-acknowledged "centres" of 
Continental research. Since the establishment of the first Celtic 
(particularly Gaidhlig) monasteries around 500 A.D., they have travelled, 
studied, and taught widely, exchanging knowledge with their counterparts 
throughout Europe, and often being crucial to the development of Western 
traditions in general. 
A full archaeology of Scottish aesthetics will probably find that, 
initially, music largely appears in a series of footnotes to the philosophicol 
and literary traditions (even if those traditions are encapsulated within 
the concept of music itself at many junctures). However, this would merely 
conform to a more-or-less general pattern throughout most countries in 
pre-Renaissance Europe. What is certain is that many Scottish manuscripts 
(lO] A sequel to the current volume is currently being planned, which will 
specifically engage this question, under the heading of Musical Thought 
in Scotland, 900-1900. 
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have been lost or misappropriated throughout history[llJ. Many texts 
mr1y also be currently available, but, for a variety of reasons, remain 
bibliographically o bscure[12). 
A further problem facing any historian of Scottish culture is that of 
language: the first song-texts to have survived from the first millennium 
are those of Aneirin and Taliesin, written in Cumbrian, a northern dialect 
of Old Welsh [IJ]; then, of course, we have the Latin traditions of the 
Gaidhlig monasteries and the later scholastics, Gaidhlig itself, the Scots 
language, and finally, English. Any thorough historical survey of Scottish 
writings on and in music requires a linguistic dexterity of phenomeni'll 
proportions, (particularly considering the geographic size of the culture 
in question). 
Fortunately for the anglophone scholar, Scottish Enlightenment 
(ll] For loss, cf. the Cllth scholar, Aaron Scotus, whose treatise De Utilitate 
Cantus Vocalis (amongst others) has been lost, not to mention the C13th 
Simon Tailler's De Tenore Musicali, and other works. For misappropriation, 
cf. the Cl3th St. Andrews Music Book and the history of its reception i'lS 
either an English or a Continental manuscript since its removal from St. 
Andrews to the Wolfenblittel Library in the C16th. For instance, the 
following description of this MS., from the New Grove Dictionary, 
demonstrates considerably muddled scholarship - "Date and provenance: 
mid-13th century, English (or Scottish). [ ... ] It was almost certainly 
compiled for, if not in, St Andrews, Scotland" [New Grove, Vol.17, p.653] 
Equally instructive in this respect is the reception history of the Cl 7th 
composer To bias Hume, often referred to as English (cf. New Grove article, 
etc.), but now known to be Scottish (and this on the authority of 
contemporary English court sources which have been available for 
scrutiny all along). Unfortunately, inadequate scholarship of this kind can 
severely restrict perceptions of a given culture. 
(1 2] cf. the C13th Sprouston Breviary, well-known to scholars of Latin 
literature, but only recently discovered to contain the accompanying 
plainchant [Purser, 1992]. It is now acknowledged as one of two known 
examples of Celtic plainchant from Scotland, a genre said for many years 
no l to exist. 
(lJ] cf. Vol.I of A Guide to Welsh Literature, ed. Jarman & Rees Hughes. 
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theorists expressed themselves predominantly through the medium of the 
English language(HJ. This is indubitably one of the major reasons why 
historians have concentrated on this period above all others, in their 
considerations of Scottish politics, philosophy, historiography, sociology, 
etc. What we lack, however,.is an adequate body of research to provide a 
context for the study of the music aesthetics of even this most studied of 
periods. The current project attempts to begin a remedy to this situation, 
and deals in some detail with the often neglected music aesthetics of Adam 
Smith. Despite his current reputation as an economist (and certoin 
spurious political associations which have been alleged of late from St. 
Andrews and Westminster), his contemporary reputation and employment 
was based on his work within moral philosophy and aesthetics. Indeed, 
Smith's lectures on literature in Edinburgh and Glasgow eventually led, 
through his student Hugh Blair, to the establishment in 1762 of a Chair of 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres in Edinburgh University- effectively the first 
[H] A notable exception is A dam Ferguson' s A Sermon Preached in the Ersh 
Language (1746), a pro-Hanoverian Gaidhlig address (albeit anglo-titled for 
publication). 
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Chair of English Literature in the worldf151. Almost inevitably, then, we 
will have recourse to Smith's theories about the relation between music and 
the linguistic arts, providing a large intertext with Rousseau's work. 
However, Smith's work is also contextualized by an extended reading of 
Thomas Carlyle's reaction against him. Carlyle marks a significant moment 
in the shift from the Enlightenment to Romanticism, not only in Scottish 
terms, but also within the wider anglophone field. Along with the English 
poet Coleridge, Carlyle was responsible for introducing certain key aspects 
of Cl8th German thought into anglo-discourse which were to gain 
increasing ground in the organicist, dynamical definition of Romanticism, 
as against the mechanistic theories of the Franco-Scottish Enlightenment. 
Equally significant in this respect are the various politico-aesthetic 
strategies which Carlyle adopted to remove any remaining traces of the 
auld alliance between French and Scottish culture which the Enlightenment 
revived in philosophical terms, and the various Jacobite and Republican 
[l5] The linguistic selectivity of scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment 
often takes an ideologically insidious form, as exemplified in the following 
remarks on Hugh Blair by F. W. Bates on, a respected academic from Oxford 
University: "Blair was the Professor of Rhetoric at Edinburgh and spoke 
broad Scots, as we know from Boswell, and his comments [on Addison] need 
not therefore be taken very seriously." ["Addis on, Steele & the Periodicol 
Essay" in ed. Lonsdale, Dryden to Johnson, p.l48] (Evidently, a French-
speaker would also be disqualified from commenting on Addison?) Serious 
investigation of actual theoretical tracts in Scots is not at an advanced 
stage to date. Even an excellent writer such as Alexander Broadie, in The 
Tradition of Scottish Philosophy, is not unsusceptible to the avoidance of 
Scots. In the chapter titled "The Mirror of Wisdom: Philosophy in the Scot.s 
Tongue", he discusses John Ireland's The Meroure of Wyssdome (1490) with 
few quotations, and those which are included are translated into English 
anyhow. A notable exception to this rule is the critical edition of the 
anonymous treatise The Art of Music Collecit out of all Ancient Doctouris 
of Music ( c.1580) by the American scholar Judson Maynard. 
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struggles revived in political termsU61. However, we begin our Scottish 
sojourn with a reading of a text on music theory by a more obscure figure 
than Smith or Carlyle, and for this reason, it may be fruitful to preface the 
main body of this study with a historical positioning of this figure who is 
nevertheless crucial to the whole project. 
Chapter 3 opens with a quotation from a theoretical tract on music 
by one Alexander Malcolm. Malcolm was born a .. son of the manse 11 in 1685, 
probably in Edinburgh. His profile is in many respects typical of 
Edinburgh's Enlightenment intellectuals, having several parallel 
professions. He held an M.A., presumably (but not necessarily) from 
Edinburgh University, and was primarily a mathematician. His three books 
in this field were the New Treatise of Arithmetic and Book-keeping (1718), 
the New System of Arithmetic, Theoretical and Practical (1730), and the 
Treatise of Book-keeping, or Merchant Accounts (1731). However, his most 
important work for current purposes was undoubtedly the Treatise of 
Musick, Speculative, Practical and Historical, published in Edinburgh in 
1721. Several commentators have discerned the influence of his 
mathematical training in this textU71. 
Like his father, he was also a minister in the Kirk, and on emigrating 
to the New England colony in 1734, this was his main mode of employment 
[l6) cf. in particular Peter Berresford Ellis & Seumas Mac a' Ghobhainn's 
ground-breaking study, The Scottish Insurrection of 1820 (1970), Willinm 
Donaldson's The Jacobite Song: Political Myth and National Identity(1988), 
Christina Bewley's Muir of Huntershill: A Scottish Patriot's Adventures 
!\round the World (1981), and Thomas Crawford's Boswell, Burns and the 
French Revolution (1990). 
[l?] Hawkins noted that Malcolm's training as a mathematician "enabled him 
to discuss, with great clearness and perspicuity, the doctrine of ratios, 
and other abstract speculations, in the language of a philosopher and a 
scholar" [quoted in Maurer, Alexander Malcolm in America, p.231] 
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(albeit within the Anglican, rather than Presbyterian or even Episcopalian 
traditions). In 1749, he moved South to Maryland, finally settling at 
Annapolis. Here~ he joined the "Tuesday Club", where he was in demand for 
his abilities on flute and fiddle. This gentleman's club had been established 
in 1745 for the furtherance of music and sociability by fellow-expatriot 
Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton was a doctor, but also an amateur artist who~ 
in club style, had been nicknamed "Loquacious Scribble" for the sketches 
he made of the other members- beneath Malcolm 's portrait, the musician's 
nom de plume is recorded as "Philo Dogmaticus ". After a turbulent dual 
career in Maryland as a rector and schoolmaster, Malcolm died in 1763[181. 
The Treatise is one of the largest texts on music published in 
Enlightenment Edinburgh, and was certainly widely read [191 • Its 
reception history begins with Thomas Bruce 's The Common Tunes; or 
Scotland's Church Mu sick Made Plain (1726), which states that music is 
"fully largely and learnedly described and treated upon, by the judicious 
and learned Mr. Alexander Malcolm a Scots Gentleman, an exact Master of 
Mu sick's Theory, if you will please read his Book upon Mu sick, intituled, 
A Treatise of Mu sick Speculative, Practical and Historical." [The Common 
[181 According to Maurer Maurer's article Alexander Malcolm in America 
(1952), which is the key reference for Malcolm in this context, the obituary 
in the Maryland Gazette for 30th June read: "A few Days ago Died, in an 
advanced Age, in Queen-An ne 's County, the Reverend Alexander Malcolm, 
A. M. Rector of St. Paul's Parish in that County: A Gentle man who has 
obliged the World with several learned Performances on the Mathematics, 
Music, and Grammar." [Alexander Malcolm in America, 1952] 
(l91 However, Kid son's remarks in the 1970 edition of Grove's Dictionary that 
it was the first important Scottish music theory text are misplaced in the 
light of, at the very least, the anonymous C16th The Art of Music Collecit 
out of all Ancient Doctouris of Music (which, despite being written in 
Metropolitan Scots, is often mistakenly referred to as an English treatise). 
cf. also fn. 15. 
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Tunes, p.37] 
Subsequently, two English editions appeared, the first in 1730, and 
the second "abridged, by an Eminent Musician" in 1776, the same year in 
which John Hawkins published his General History of the Science and 
Practise of Music. The potential relevance of this coincidence may lie in the 
fuct that Hawkins used Malcolm's work as a reference throughout his own 
book, and wrote of it as "one of the most valuable treatises on the subject 
of theoretical and practical music to be found in any of the modern 
languages". Malcolm's work was still being used as source material in the 
1780's edition of Chambers' Cyclopaedia. According to Roger Lonsdale, the 
latter (ironically) was in turn used as a source by Hawkins' great rival, 
Charles Burney, for his contributions to Rees' New Cyclopaedia (1802-
20) [201. Evidently, this savant ecossais, as Fetis described him, had a 
wide, if somewhat dispersed, influence. 
In 1904, Malcolm's contribution was again being acknowledged by 
J.A. Fuller-Maitland, in The Age of Bach and Ha.ndel. In the final chapter, 
1'he State of Music in England[sic], Fuller-Maitland writes of a British [sic] 
theorist: 
In 1721 Alexander Malcolm published A Treatise of Music [sic], 
speculative, practical, and historical, at Edinburgh, in which 
the facts of just intonation, and the necessity for 
establishing equal temperament, were explained a year before 
the appearance of Bach's Wol1ltemperirtes Clavier. [p.346] 
However, by grafting Malcolm to an English identity, and then 
implying some significance in him being well ahead of Bach on equal 
[20] Lonsdale claims that 11 Burney did not, of course, have to supply entirely 
new articles for the Cyclopaedia. His definitions of musical terms were 
often based on those (by Alexander Malcolm) in the 1781-6 edition of 
Chambers' Cyclopaedia." [Dr. Charles Burney: A Literary Biography, p.4l 2] 
xxiv 
temperament, Fuller-Maitland is being slightly (yet doubly) disingenuous. 
Although Malcolm was indubitably a Modern in his adherence to eqlJal 
temperament, the whole debate had been continuing (in Europe) since at 
least the time of Henricus Grammateus in 1518(211. 
Perhaps the grandest claim made for Malcolm's achievements, 
however (and one which today carries more weight than Fuller-Maitland's) 
is that made by the American scholar Norman Phelps in the Harvard 
Dictionary article on "Theory". Phelps places his note on Malcolm 
immediately prior to that on Rameau, and states that the Treatise is 
"notable for including the first \correct' table of key signatures, essent.iol 
to the full development of the major-minor key system." [Harvard, p.847] 
However, Phelps does not elucidate on whether he considers that it wos 
actually Malcolm's table or simply the key signatures themselves which 
were "essential .. for the development of the tonal system. Whichever is the 
case, Phelps' claim for Malcolm's precedence in this respect is nevertheless 
a salient point. 
The Modernity of the Treatise was further testified to in Michael 
Tilmouth's 1971 review of a facsimile edition. Here Tilmouth descrih,~s 
Malcolm as "a product of the new scientific age of the time .. , and "a 
creature of the Age of Reason" [ Musick Theory]. However, as will become 
clear in Chapters 3 and 4, Malcolm was not a Modern through blind faith. 
Herbert Schueller writes that his position on the Ancients and Moderns 
debate was interesting, 
1211 Grammateus' book, published in Nuremberg, had a surprisingly Seats-
looking title: Ayn New Kunstlich Buech (this trivial point merely indicates 
the similarity of two teutonic languages, however). Here, Grammateus 
recommended a system of ten equally-sized semitones and two slightly 
s~naller ones. 
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not only because it probably expresses the opinion of most 
people who think the quarrel [ ... ] about trivialities, but also 
because Malcolm came half-way between Sir William Temple 
and Burney. He intended to answer the one, and he 
an licipated the historical writing of the other. Malcolm's 
language reflects his impatience: the contenders in the 
quarrel [ ... ] "fight at long Weapons, I mean they keep the 
argument in generals, by which they make little more of it 
than some innocent Harrangues and Flourishes of Rhetoric." 
[The Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, p.329) 
Of course, Malcolm was not so much anticipating Burney's position, 
as forming one of its basic points of influence, if we are to accept 
Lonsdale's arguments (cf. fn.20). 
Yet there is another sense in which we could make a claim for the 
significance of Malcolm's Treatise. From the information given above, it is 
evident that it had an international reputation as a reliable reference text. 
It would therefore be rather surprising to discover that the philosophers 
of the Edinburgh Enlightenment who wrote on music had not consulted it 
(significantly in this respect, several were also amateur musicians l221). 
Indeed, in Chapter 3, a case is made for a less than accidental intertext 
between a passage in Malcolm, and one in a key text by Francis Hutcheson, 
the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725). 
Reading through the literature, Malcolm has had little coverage to 
date, and practically none since the 'seventies. Yet when he does appear, 
often in texts which deal with canonical issues, his work is presented as 
l221 For instance, James Beattie appears to have had a strong interest not 
only in classical music, but also folk and church music, publishing a short 
open letter in 1778 titled On the Improvement of Psalmody in Scotland. 
However, his main contribution to music was the Essay on Poetry and Music 
as They Affect the Mind (1776). He was also a member of the Aberdeen 
Musical Society, and continued to play the 'cello despite an accident whir.h 
severed the tendon of his middle finger on the left hand. His publication 
on psalmody would most likely have lead him to read Thomas Bruce's work, 
in which Malcolm's Treatise is strongly recommended, but it is probable 
that he would have been aware of it without Bruce's reference. 
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i11l irncdely implicated in the great debates of his time. His agenda was the 
writing of a hjstor·y and general study of music, and in using his wor~k i1S 
representative of the Enlightenment approach to harmonic theory in 
part:iculor, this study has as a supplementary agenda: the rehabilitaliun 
of u text - and more importantly, the tradition which frames it - deserving 
of further consideration within its own (and other) cultural contexts. 
"Finally", a note on the epigraphic quotations which head up each 
chapter, section, etc. Where these are in Scots, Gaidhlig, Cumbrian, oc 
Lfltin, the Anglo-monoglot reader will be able to find translational and 
textual notes in Appendix I. The translations which are given there ar·c by 
i.lll! author, except where stated to the contrary. 
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PART 
IIARMONY J\Nn 11ELODY 
In his passage amang the planeitis all, 
he hard a hevinly melody and sound, 
pussing all instrumentis musicall, 
causit be rollyn of the speiris round; 
Quilk armony of all this mappamound, 
Quilk moving seiss unyt perpetuall, 
Quilk of this warld pluto the saule can call. 
Thair leirit he tonis proportionat, 
as duplare, triplare, and emetricus, 
enolius, and eik the quadruplait, 
Epoddeus rycht hard and curius; 
off all thir sex, sueit and delicius, 
rycht consonant fyfe hevinly symphonyss 
componyt ar, as clerkis can devyse. 
ffirst diatesserone, full sueit, I wiss 
And dyapasone, semple and dowplait, 
And dyapenty, componyt with the dyss; 
Thir makis fyve of thre multiplicat: 
This mirry musik and mellefluat, 
Compleit and full of nummeris od and evin, 
Is ea us it be the moving of the hevin. 
- Orpheus & Eurydice, Robert Henryson (f1.1450-1505) 
CHAPTER ONE 
()PENING ])ECONSTRUCTION 
I'll ha'e nae hauf-way boose, but aye be whaur 
Extremes meet - it's the only way I ken 
To dodge the curst conceit o' bein' richt 
That damns the vast majority o' men. 
- A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle, Hugh MacDiarmid, 1926. 
CHAPTER 
()PENING ])ECONSTRUCTION 
1.1 Courting PhilosophY_ 
In approaching the term 11 deconstruction .. , we can initially 
distinguish it from other current theoretical terms, such as post-
s lructuralism and postmodernism in particular. While the texts which 
articulate these terms have many complex connections, it is important to 
note at the outset that they are not wholly cognate terms. Equally, 
different readings of them inevitably yield different alignments of their 
relationships. For instance, Christopher Norris has recently attempted an 
ideological separation of deconstruction from any association with eith<:r 
post-structuralism or postmodernism [The Truth About Postmodernism, 
passim]. On the other hand, Richard Harland alleges that the arrival of 
deconstruction 11 mark[ed] the arrival of Post-Structuralism" 
[ Superstructuralism, p.125], and even if we only consider this position, we 
cun see that deconstruction could be further read as either a subset of 
post-structuralism, or a precursor of a post-structural situation. It is 
important to note, however, that a post-structural text need not 
necessarily be a deconstruction (or vice-versa), particularly if one accept.s 
Norris' position. Similar points hold with respect to postmodernism. 
However, it is worth noting that the term post-structuralism rarely occurs 
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in the writings of the Parisian theorists who are normatively taken to 
constitute its nexus. Significantly, a philosopher who, since the publication 
of The Postmodern Condition (1979) has been closely associated with the 
concept of postmodernism - Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard - has written of 
The weariness with regard to 'theory,' and the miserable 
slackening that goes along with it (new this, new that, post-
this, post-that, etc. The time has come to philosophize. [The 
Differend: Phrases in Dispute, p.xiii] 
Yet in the context of the anglophone reception of Parisian thought, 
engagement with the de bates around what constitutes "post-structuralism •• 
is almost inevitable. Nevertheless, it will be crucial to be aware of the 
constant threat of this "miserable slackening" which such arguments 
around labelling entail, and every effort will be made "to philosophize", as 
far as this is possible (or relevant) within a musicological context. 
It is thus also important to resist the temptation to reduce 
deconstruction to the idea of a movement or a theory. It is better 
understood as a specific mode of critique emerging from the tradition of 
critical philosophy. This tradition traces a path through the whole of 
"modern" Western philosophy, normatively understood to be that from the 
Cl 7th Breton philosopher Rene Descartes onwards, including John Locke, 
George Berkeley and David Hume (the Englishman, Irishman and Scotsman 
of philosophy), and the Germanic tradition of Rant, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, etc. It is, however, the Germanic critical tradition, with its 
circuitous roots (via Kant) in the Enlightenment scepticism of Hume, which 
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is one of the main pre-texts for deconstruction [1]. 
Another pre-text of deconstruction is undoubtedly the discipline of 
structuralist linguistics, particularly the francophone tradition of 
linguistic analysis. This was precipitated during the Enlightenment by the 
Gene van philosopher, litterateur and musicologist, Jean-Jacques Roussea u, 
and its themes can be traced right up to the discipline of semiology 
inaugurated by fellow Genevan, Ferdinand de Saussure. Indeed, Rousseau 
forms one of the cornerstones of deconstruction's intertext with music, 
specifically in the context of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of his 
theories. However, the relation between deconstruction and semiology is 
perhaps over-amplified within anglophone commentaries on deconstruction. 
As will be argued below, there is in fact a more crucial precedent which 
comes from within the anglophone tradition itself. Not Swiss semiology, but 
American semiotics; specifically, the pragmatist philosophy of Charles 
Sanders Peirce. Equally, Peirce invokes yet another precedent of some 
significance for the final chapters - the Cl3th realist philosopher John 
[1} Kant's famous comment on his critical debt to H~rne is to be found in the 
preface to the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to 
Present Itself as a Science. Following a list of various other Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers (Reid, Oswald, and Beattie), Kant writes - "I freely 
admit: it was DAVID HUME'S remark that first, many years ago, interrupted 
my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my 
enquiries in the field of speculative philosophy ... [Prolegomena, p.9] Hume's 
scepticism was the "cause" of Kant's desperation to provide a post-
sceptical philosophy. According to Norris, "Hume is the strong (though 
unacknowledged) precursor" [The Truth About Postmodernism, p.82) for 
postmodernism and post-structuralism, and would therefore function as a 
precedent to Harland's conception of deconstruction, rather than his own. 
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l>uns Scotusl21. If account is taken of Peirce's influence on current 
francophone thought, then the generally held belief that Parisian theory 
is somehow alien to or incomprehensible to what Harland calls "Anglo-Saxon 
ways of thinking" is, at the very least, a racial aberration on more than the 
obvious level [ Superstructuralism, p.9]. 
What is certain is that theories of language weigh heavily on the 
context of deconstruction, whether it moves within the philosophical or 
linguistic fields as such. However, what is attempted here is not a m0.ce 
"application 11 of certain theories of linguistic representation to the musical 
domain (even if the project occurs on the surface of a written text). 
Huther, several strategies will be employed in order to gradually uncover 
the application of musical concepts within certain deconstructive and post-
structural texts, but also in order to interrogate the very ideas of 
representation, imitation, and signification in general. Inevitably, the 
programme will continually intersect with writings outside the musical field 
(literature, language, philosophy), but at no point will there be any 
transcendent claims for any field to be capable of operating as an 
interpretative meta-discourse for any other. The direct transmission 
(rather than circuitous translation) of one field or another into music 
121 Peirce at several key points identifies his project as avowedly Scotist. 
For instance, in the introduction to his Principles of Philosophy (where his 
proto-deconstructive theory of language achieves its full expression), he 
writes: "The works of John Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. If his 
logic and metaphysics, not slavishly worshipped, but torn away from its 
medievalism, be adapted to modern culture, under continual wholesome 
reminders of nominalist criticisms, I am convinced that it will go far toward 
supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physicol 
science. 11 [Principles of Philosophy, p.ix] Indeed, Scotus' famous concept 
of haecceitas becomes of crucial importance to Peirce, just as it does in the 
writings of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, discussed in the final 
chapters. 
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U1eory can only result in what Lyotard has described as a differend: 
A case of differend between two parties takes place when the 
"regulation" of the conflict that opposes them is done in the 
idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the 
other is not signified in that idiom. ( ... ] What is at stake in a 
literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bent' 
witness to differends by finding idioms for them. [ The 
Differend: Phrases in Dispute, p.9/13] 
How should we, as musicologists, approach such phrases by this and 
other writers who trace their work across the fields of philosophy and 
linguistics? How should we approach this problematic- the interconnection 
of differing discourses while bearing witness to their specificity? It wns 
once said that philosophy was the universal meta-discourse, but this 
philosopher now embraces an "incredulity toward metanarratives." [The 
Postmodern Condition, p.xxiv] In order to establish some basic paths of 
translation between our discourses, then, let us begin to read within the 
idiom of philosophy itself, ever mindful of Derrida's comment that "It is 
precisely the limit of such a tribunal - philosophy - that is in question 
here." [Margins of Philosophy, p.39] 
1.2 Difference and Differance 
Being and non being is the central theme of all philosophy, 
East and West. These words are not harmless and innocent 
verbal arabesques, except in the professional philosophism of 
decadence. We are afraid to approach the fathomless and 
bottomless groundlessness of everything. 11 There's nothing 
to be afraid of ... The ultimate reassurance, and the ultimate 
terror. [R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, p.33] 
In Plato's Republic, we find the classic formulation of philosophy as 
the meta-discourse for interpreting the underlying truths of all reality. 
In the section titled 11 The Allegory of the Cave 11 , we find Plato describing 
humankind as a group of prisoners in a dark subterranean cavern. The 
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prisoners are held in devices which ensure their sight is perpetually 
trained on one wall of the cave. At the top of the cave, there is a fire, and 
l>etween the fire and the prisoners there is a ramp, along which various 
objects are moved to and fro. The prisoners, however, cannot turn their 
heads to look at either the fire or the objects, but the whole situation has 
been organized so that the light of the fire projects the moving shadows 
of the objects onto the wall which the prisoners constantly watch. The 
prisoners have been there since birth, knowing nothing else, and 
therefore assume that the shadows on the wall are in fact the real objects. 
Thus, the meaning of the allegory is that humankind, prisoners to their 
ignorance, believe false images to be real. Plato defines the philosopher as 
a prisoner who has escaped from the cave and has experienced the pure 
sunlight of the world above. In this new freedom, the philosopher will 
begin to understand that shadows are only the representational images of 
real objects, and that the prisoners in the cave have thus been living with 
a false perception of reality. This movement from the darkness below to the 
light above is the process of enlightenment- gaining knowledge of the real 
source behind phenomena. Yet to stay in the realm of the light and to 
forget the rest of humanity still imprisoned in the cave is an act of 
selfishness. Plato stipulates that the philosopher must descend once more 
into the cave, and with the knowledge of the underlying reality behind 
false images, must act as the interpreter of the shadows for the ignornnt 
prisoners, divining for them the true meaning of all that they see. For this 
reason, the philosopher is defined as the best possible ruler of society: 
"There is no one else." [The Republic, p.325] 
The truth of which the enlightened philosopher is the sole dispenser 
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rests on a series of binary oppositions which Plato infuses into the whole 
text of the allegory: light-dark; above-below; reality-illusion; knowledge-
ignorance; enlightenment-slavery; object-image; etc. It will be readily 
acknowledged that each of these oppositions has the overall structure of 
positive-negative. In other words, a certain structural priority is granted 
to one of the terms over the other - a difference is established between 
two terms, a difference which is fixed and which controls the relation 
between the two terms. This form of difference is known in philosophy as 
ontological difference. Ontology is normally defined as the science of 
Being, in other words, it is the study of the essence of an entity, this 
essence being that which defines what the entity is in distinction to that 
which it is not. This form of difference between two terms can be readily 
understood to operate along oppositionallines. For instance, term A is term 
A because it partakes of the essential Being of A-ness, whereas term Z is 
not term A, because it does not partake of the essential Being of A-ness; 
term Z's essence is other than term A's essence, and could be defined 
within the terms of A as a negative term, or nonbeing. All the other terms 
along the A-Z axis can also be understood within the structure of the 
opposition A-Z - they are simply points along the axis as one moves from 
the original term to the final term. Thus, we can also see that necessary 
components of ontology are the ideas of definition, labelling, and 
categorization, normally within a hierarchical, static structure. Ontological 
difference, then, operates according to rigid structural oppositions, and 
is the form of knowledge which grants Plato's enlightened philosopher a 
certain political power over humankind's intellectual darkness. 
Deconstruction challenges such philosophy on many levels. As a 
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philosophical term, it emerges in Derrida's writings as a translation of 
Heidegger's destruktion, a term signifying the concept of a positive de-
slructuration of ontologyl31. Heidegger refers to the idea of a "positive 
destruction" [Being and Time, p.46] which would "loosen up" the structure 
of philosophy, and Derrida develops this motif into the idea of "the 
destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-
construction" of ontology. [Of Grammatology, p.lO] (Indeed, in the first 
edition of Of Grammatology, Derrida used the Heideggerian destruction 
rather than deconstruction throughout). 
However, as Derrida has pointed out, Heidegger's destruktion does 
not necessarily go far enough, and actually leaves ontology intact: "The 
Heideggerian de-limitation [of Being] consists sometimes in appealing to 
[ ... ]a more original thought of Being as presence (Anwesenheit)" [Margins 
of Philosophy, p.65]. In other words, Heidegger sometimes attempts the 
destruktion of Being by reducing it to the concept of presence, which is 
merely a more fundamental ontological form, and is still caught within ,1 
binary opposition- presence vs absence. 
Yet there is a second, more radical possibility within Heidegger's 
destruktion of Being-as-presence, which consists in "questioning this 
original determination itself" [Margins of Philosophy, p.65]. Derrida claims 
that this interrogative form of destruktion is "the one for which we are 
least prepared, [and] only permits itself to be sketched, announcing itself 
(J] According to the Oxford Dictionary, "deconstruction" as a vernacular 
term has been in use since 1882, meaning "the action of undoing the 
construction of a thing". However, the term is relatively obscure until 
Derrida's re-derivation of it from Heidegger. It is in the Derridean contP-xt 
that the word has been re-introduced into contemporary discourse, and it 
is in this context that the term is measured here. 
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in certain calculated fissures of the metaphysical text." [ibid., p .65] 
Heidegger never fully follows this second strategy through, and it is this 
possibility that Derrida will pursue in his move into deconstruction. 
Rather than re.verting to the stability of a more fundamental 
ontological category, such as Heidegger does in his inscription of Being as 
presence, deconstruction ruptures the stability of ontology by the 
destruktion of the very idea of any fundamental level. In deconstruction, 
the operation of an opposition is shown to be based not on (for instance) 
the generation or determination of a term by a more originary term, but on 
an undeclared principle which frames and runs through the opposition. 
Difference still exists, but is thrown into a new mode which transgresses 
the structuralisms of ontological difference. When appositional difference 
is transgressed, differences become multiplied, and are no longer to be 
seen in terms of arranging all terms along a straight line between A and Z~ 
between Being and non being, or presence and absence. Thus, the idea of 
one term of an opposition being structurally prior to another, derivative 
term, is fundamentally challenged in all the senses of that phrase. 
This new form of difference which transgresses ontology is termed 
by Derrida differance, a neologism which, in French, signifies both 
differing and deferring- ie. both spatial and temporal difference. The 
ontological difference which appositional structures are based upon is 
itself an attempt to limit the transgressive power of differance, to de-
temporalize it, and make it static. However, part of the deconstructive 
programme can often be to uncover the operation of differance within 
ontological difference despite itself. In this sense, it is often argued that 






deconstruction, and this is in effect what Derrida's reading of Heidegger 
achieves. Thus, while Derrida evokes a difference which is of anoth,~r 
order to that of the difference between Being and non being, or presence 
and absence, this difference is nevertheless suggested by the critical 
attitude which Heidegger opens as an agenda and yet leaves suspended: 
the second mode of destruktion, which announces itself "in certnin 
calculated fissures of the metaphysical text 11 [Margins of Philosophy, p.65]. 
Hence, Derrida's strategy is to turn the critical resources of Heidegger's 
text upon themselves - he effectively destrukts destruktion, thereby 
discovering its potential radicality as deconstruction. The idea of n. 
fundamental level in an ontological system is rejected, and ontological 
difference is shown to have been a restricted form of difterance. 
Such a differance would at once, again, give us to think a 
writing without presence and absence, without history, 
without cause, without archia, without telos, a writing that 
absolutely upsets all dialectics, all theology, all teleology, all 
ontology. [Margins of Philosophy, p.67] 
Another crucial point about the deconstructive concept of differance 
appears here: not only is it 11 not" ontological difference, but it is "not" 
dialectical difference. As Derrida comments in Out work, "the movement of 
differance [ ... ]cannot be 'relieved' [releve], resolved, or appeased by any 
philosophical dialectic" [Dissemination, pp.6/7] Basically put, any 
dialectical resolution of two terms presupposes their prior opposition to 
each other along ontological lines. In dialectics, a binary difference is in 
a sense overcome, resolved back onto a single, unified point- "relieved". 
This resolution can occur in more than one way, as a contrast between the 
J-Icgelian and Marxist models shows. In the Hegelian dialectic, we find the 
initial opposition is normally described as thesis-antithesis. The first term 
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(thesis) proves incomplete, and thus produces its opposite (antithesis) as 
a compensation for this inadequacy. However, the second term is also 
incomplete (having been produced in effect as the negative or shadow of 
the thesis), and thus the two must be resolved into the completed third 
term, or synthesis (Auf'hebung; "sublation", "lifting up", "closing", 
"resolution", "capture"). Yet, if the synthesis is effectively viewed now 
from a new angle, it may be seen once more as incomplete, and can thus act 
as the thesis of a new dialectic. In this way, the finality of the synthesis 
can be seen as merely provisional - a repetition of the thesis in a new 
register. Marx described his dialectic as the materialist opposite of He gel's 
Idealism [Capital, p .102]- further, it operates through the violent struggle 
(not synthesis) of two opposed terms, with the victory of the stronger over 
fhe weaker. Again, however, the victorious term can then become split by 
a further internal opposition which leads to a further dialectical struggle. 
Differance, on the other hand, operates "according to a relation that 
no speculative dialectic [ ... ] can master, for the simple reason that such a 
dialectic always remains an operation of mastery." [Dissemination, p.S] In 
deconstruction, a binary difference (an opposition) is overthrown, shown 
to rest in fact on a more pervasive form of difference - differance- which 
is not limited to two points in space, but also articulates differences across 
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time. It is in this sense that Derrida writes of differance as "without 
history", if by history we mean the Hegelian or Marxist conceptions of 
history as logical, determinable "progress" from a thesis, or point of origin 
(archia) to a synthesis, or ultimate goal (telos). This version of "history" 
is thus deterministic, ontological, and against the alternative idea of time 
which inscribes itself within differance. 
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In this, it is worth noting a further problematic area of debate. One 
must be wary of a confusion of the space between Marxism and 
deconstruction which is prevalent particularly in literary criticism, but 
also has manifestations within musicology. For instance, John Shepherd 
suggests that "The De construction of Music as Social Text" can be 
developed from a dialectical synthesis of structuralist semiology and 
Marxist culturalism [Music as Social Text, pp.85-92]. As we have already 
seen, however, deconstruction ( differance in particular) works very 
precisely to unhook the ontologies of structuralism and dialectics, and 
therefore also Marxism. Shepherd appears to associate deconstruction 
primarily with the semiological work of Roland Barthes, although care must 
be taken here, since Barthes' work marks the beginnings of a transition 
fr-om structuralism to post-structuralism. Christopher Norris claims that 
"to enlist him on the side of deconstruction is perhaps misleading in view 
of his elusiveness from any theoretical standpoint." [ Deconstruction, p.10] 
On the other hand, Richard Harland makes the distinction between on 
early, structuralist period, and a later, post-structuralist period in 
Barthes arguing that the "later Barthes" is found in writings such as l~e 
Plaisir du Texte (1973), [ Superstructuralism, p.2]. In The Pleasure of the 
Text, Barthes introduces the post-structuralist concept of jouissance, 
which Shepherd interprets as a "meaningful dialectic between music and 
listener [ ... ] an appreciable assertion of subjectivity through an active 
role in meaning construction." [ibid., p.163] However, it is important to be 
aware of the distinction which Barthes makes between jouissa.nce and 
p/aisir(pleasure). To consult Stephen Heath's notes on translating Barthes, 
it is plaisir which is linked to identity and ego, whereas jouissa.nce is, on 
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contrary, "a radically violent pleasure [ ... ] which shatters - dissipates, 
loses - that cultural identity, that ego ... [Image-Music-Text, p.9] Indeed, 
Darthes asserts that it is in fact against the very nature of jouissance to 
attempt to make a "fine dialectical movement of synthesis" between it and 
plaisir. (The Pleasure of the Text, p.21] Such an attempt to arrest the 
forceful movement of jouissance is to make it "merely the logical, organic, 
historical development of the text of pleasure" [ibid., p.20] He asserts "that 
pleasure and bliss [jouissance] are parallel forces, that they cannot meP.t, 
and that between them there is more than a struggle: an incommunication" 
[p.20]. In this sense, it is plaisir which attempts to capture jouissance in 
"a dialectics of desire" [p.4 ], whereas jouissance, if captured, will actively 
attempt to rupture such a dialectic. It is not that jouissance cannot be 
made dialectical, but Barthes states that we have a choice of either 
attempting to dialectically capture jouissance against its nature, or to be 
carried along within its own disruptive and non-dialectical movement. 
Thus, jouissance does not resolve onto a synthesis, but onto "some other 
term: a third term, which is not, however, a synthesizing term but an 
eccentric, extraordinary term." [p.55] Barthes writes that on this choice 
of our approach to jouissance "depends the way in which we shall write 
the history of our modernity." [Pleasure, p.20] Further, he claims thnt 
"doubtless it is in one of the greatest thinkers of dialectics, Marx, that it 
would be the most interesting to verify the undialectical nature of 
language: Marx's discourse is almost entirely paradoxical" [Image-Music-
Text, p.200]. If Shepherd misreads Barthes as a dialectician, Barthes also 
provocatively suggests that similar readings of Marx may be equally 
mislead. 
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This is not to deny that there have been a number of theorists, 
particularly in the so-called "anglo-american 11 tradition who claim that 
deconstruction is dialectical. For instance, Roger Poole writes that 
"deconstruction continues in what could be an infinite regress of 
dialectical readings" [ Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, p.206]. 
Christopher Butler has argued that deconstruction demonstrates "that any 
attempt to come down on one side or the other disregards the dialectical 
interdependence" of the terms of an opposition [Interpretation, 
Deconstruction, and Ideology, p.63]. Further (although with more 
credibility), Jonathan Culler describes differanceitself as an "irresolvablc 
dialectic" [The Pursuit of Signs, p.41]. 
However, a more sober account can be found in Michael Ryan's work, 
which claims the relationship between deconstruction and dialectics "is not 
unambiguous" [Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation, p.65]. 
Hyan charts Derrida' s writings, highlighting the points at which Derrida 
appears to use specific dialectical tools, mapping these against points at 
which he critiques the use of those very tools. As we have seen with 
Derrida's reading of Heidegger, deconstruction operates according to t.hc 
slructures of the text which it critiques, and is therefore inherently bound 
up in the movement of that text. For this reason, when deconstruction 
deals with dialectics, it will inevitably use the tools of dialectics against 
dialectics, in order to show the fissures within the structure, the points 
of leakage where the system overspills its territory and identity. Yet a 
deconstruction of dialectics will only provisionally proceed with dialecticaL 
concepts, and precisely in order to show how they overflow their 








above, "deconstruction corrects classical dialectics" by identifying the 
differance suppressed within its ontological differences [Marxism and 
Deconstruction, p.81]. Let us attempt, then, a provisional formulation of 
deconstruction following all of the above. 
1.3 The "Structure" of Deconstruction 
If one were in the analytical business of structured summarization, 
one could reduce the process of deconstruction to a sequence of three 
stages - engagement, reversal, and displacement: 
(1) Engagement - connect with the internal terms, concepts and 
processes of the text, identify the metaphysical oppositions upon which the 
text is based, and hook into their workings. As Derrida has written, one 
"operate[s] according to the lexicon of that which one is de-limiting" 
[Margins of Philosophy, p.17]. However, this engagement is carried out in 
order to locate the so-called undecidable term- the indecidable- the term 
which is given a negative determination within the appositional structure: 
one "borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the 
deconstruction of that heritage itself ... [Writing and Difference, p.282]; 
(2) Reversal - reverse the polarity of the text's metaphysical 
oppositions, having the effect of provisionally maintaining the structure, 
but desta bilizing it from within its own terms. Derrida writes of the 
appositional metaphysics which provide the foundations for traditional 
theories being based on "a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls 
1.he other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To 
deconstruct the opposition is first [ ... ] to overthrow [renverser] the 
hierarchy ... [Of Grammatology, pp.lxxvi-lxxvii] Thus, to overthrow by 
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reversal is to provisionally prioritize the indecidable. 
_(3) Displacement - here the destabilization of the opposition from 
within carried out during the stage of reversal is extended by using this 
instability to overspill the structure of the metaphysical opposition. 
Derrida describes this stage as "the irruptive emergence of a new 
'concept,' a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms 
of the previous regime [system of oppositions]." [ibid.] The scarequotes 
around the term "concept" here designate that the term is placed SOilS 
rature, or under erasure. This practise is derived from Heidegger, where 
a term to be destroyed, such as Being, is placed under erasure by crossing 
it out: Being (in Heidegger and Derrida, with an X). The translator of Of 
Grammatology into English, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, writes that since 
deconstruction engages extant terms and concepts, their continued usage 
becomes "Inaccurate yet necessary". [trans. pref. Of Grammatology, p.xiv] 
Thus, erasure denotes the continued usage of a term, while also pointing 
to its changed (de constructed) status. 
Deconstruction consists, then, in: (1) locating the indecidable of an 
opposition - the secondary, negative, derivative term; (2) provisionally 
reversing the structure of the opposition so that the negative term is now 
seen as positive; and (3) doing away with the opposition, reinscribing both 
terms as non-negative indecidables. To summarize: deconstruction hooks 
into the delineation of an opposition, reverses, and displaces it. 
Yet this structural model of deconstruction, and others which 
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resemble it, should be treated with a healthy suspicion (~J. As we will sec, 
there is no totalizable "system" of deconstruction, since each 
deconstructive process is based entirely within the fissures of its ho~t 
structure. Further, there is no necessary order in which these procedural 
elements need occur. Derrida's Of Grammatology in particular can be seen 
as a text in which these strategies (and others) are constantly refracting 
between each other. 
None of this, it is clear, is a declaration of conceptual open season 
or of outright anarchy: "this definition of the deconstructionist is false 
(that's right: false, not true) and feeble: it supposes a bad (that's right: 
bad, not good) and feeble reading" [Limited Inc., p.146]. In fact, 
deconstruction demands a certain conceptual rigour, one which, while 
questioning philosophy, can never truly leave it. There is no proposal here 
for a philosophical carte blanche; 
What I want to emphasize is simply that the passage beyond 
philosophy does not consist in turning the page of philosophy 
(which usually amounts to philosophizing badly), but in 
continuing to read philosophers in a certain way. [Writing 
and Difference, p.288] 
The themes of care, attentiveness, and responsibility constantly 
recur in the deconstructive field. As we will see later, though, there are 
markedly differing positions on what these themes constitute themselves. 
[~] This model derives very much from Derrida's own account of the 
"structure" of deconstruction given in Positions, although Spivak warns 
that even the "master's" model is "perhaps a little too formulaic". [trans. 
pref., Of Grammatology, p.lxxvi] David Wood also follows this basic thrce-
sluge outline, but puts it in the following terms: "(1) the display of what 
has been called the infrastructure of a text, 'leaving everything as it is' 
[ ... ]through (2) disruptive intervention[ ... ] (3) to parasitical production" 
[The Deconstruction of Time, p.407]. Wood calls this the "methodological 
level", pointing out that it "is perhaps a misnomer", and one which, even 
if Derrida himself categorized in Positions, "he later regretted the 
simplifying lever it gave to others" [ibid., p.304]. 
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).. .4 Analyzing Immanence 
In considering the distinctions between deconstruction and other 
fields, it is also important for us to recognize a conceptual difference 
which must be noted in its application within musicology. In musical 
academia, the term deconstruction is often misused as a more impressive 
(and supposedly trendy) way of saying analysis. However, it will be 
valuable to look at the distinct definitions that can be ascribed to these 
terms - deconstruction and analysis. 
I an Bent defines analysis as follows: "Musical analysis is the 
resolution of a musical structure into relatively simpler constituent 
elements, and the investigation of the functions of those elements within 
that structure." [Analysis, p.l] Note the closure suggested by the term 
"resolution". Note also the implicitly reductive nature of the process 
whereby this closure is achieved. Bent's comments suggest that analysis 
is a form of structural and functional summarization of a text, a form of 
explanation, setting itself up to more or less objectively describe the 
workings of a text (much as the simple model of deconstruction's 
"structure .. offered above). 
However, consider the following definition of deconstruction by 
literary critic, Barbara Johnson; 11 The de-construction of a text does not 
proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful 
teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text itself. 11 
[Dissemination, p.xiv] Here, Johnson makes two significant departures 
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from the concept of analysis as proposed by Bent 151. With deconstruction, 
we are not concerned with the resolution of a text into constituent 
elements, but with the 11 Careful teasing out" of significatory fissures 
.. within the text itself ... This location of deconstructive praxis is a 
significant difference to music-analytical thought. Deconstruction positions 
itself not as an objective meta-discourse, as analysis often does, but at the 
same level of signification as the text. 
There are, however, several points which must be made in this 
context, since while it is often claimed that deconstruction operates at a 
level immanent to the textl61, the same claim is often made for music 
analysis, particularly in the field of semiology. For instance, in Musical 
Fact and the Semiology of Music, Jean Molino writes of beginning analysis 
at the "immanent" level of the .. symbolic object" (ie. a score). However, this 
"symbolic object" should first be separated off from the context of its 
production and reception, so that a "neutral level of analysis" can occur 
[Musical Fact, p.146]. As Jonathan Dunsby comments, this "neutral level" 
is to be considered as the "autonomous organization that exists in the work 
and [ ... ] that has nothing to do with the conditions of the creation of the 
music and nothing to do with the choices, habits or intuitive 
understanding in our response to it." [Music Analysis, p.217] Molino argues 
that after the stage of decontextualization, the "neutral", formal level 
[S] However, Johnson's remarks preceding this quotation point to a further 
rupture in the definition of analysis, this rupture perhaps evoked through 
the precise technical meaning of the term in a musical context, as opposed 
to the more vernacular usage within literary theory. It should be noted 
that the usage of the term in the current text implies the prefixed form 
music analysis. 
[61 See David Woods on the idea of "an immanent deconstruction" [The 
Deconstruction of Time, p.302]. 
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should be reinserted into the contexts of production and reception 
through the action of "an unintP.rrupted dialectic" (ibid., p.146]. This 
i.lwee-fold dialectical approach constitutes the famous "tripartition" of the 
"musical fact" into: (1) the poieticlevel; (2) the neutral, immanent level; (3) 
U11.~ esthesic level. 
Molino is careful to stipulate, however, that this semiological 
dialectic cannot be contained within "a single formalism that exhausts the 
properties of a domain of what exists" [p.147]. This lack of formal closure 
means that "analysis of the musical fact is an infinite process" [p.146]. f11 
such statements, Molino begins to inhabit the space between structuralism 
and post-structuralism, not least when he asserts that "there is no reason 
to uccept the hypothesis of an underlying structure" [p.131]. Craig Ayrey 
has claimed (Introduction to the English translation of Molino's article) 
i.lrat post-structuralism in the field of music analysis has its "seminal 
origin" in Molino's theory [Introduction to Musical Fact, p.105]. Further, 
1'1olino also questions the celebrated Chomskian concept of deep structure; 
the phenomena under consideration are all surface phenomena 
(including, of course, if we adopt the framework of 
transformational generative grammar, the deep structure; in 
fcH~t, this constitutes an objection to the notion of deep 
structure, the sole merit of which is to be posited in order lo 
solve surface problems). [Musical Fact, p.144] 
In other words, Molino appears to be suggesting that deep strucll1re 
is dO effect of surface phenomena, rather than vice-versa - a position 
which, as we will see, has wide post-structural resonancesl71. Equally, 
Mnlino also calls for a semiology which is not bounded by the "muddled 
[?] Shepherd writes that music can be "properly penetrated, 
deconstructed" [Music as Social Text, p.162], but this particular association 
of ueconstruction with the analytical penetration of surface is particularly 
rnisplaced. 
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pathos" of Marxism, and in this he asserts yet another strand of post-
structuralist thought [p.150]. 
However, most work which has followed this article has tended 
towards structuralism rather than post-structuralism, and this is no doubt 
due to the emphasis on the "neutral" level which characterizes what 
Dunsby has called the "Nattiez phase" of musical semiology, after Franco-
Canadian analyst Jean-Jacques Nattiez [Music and Semiotics: The Nattiez 
Phase, passim]. Nattiez himself would appear to suggest that the 
semiological tripartition is ln fact allied to post-structuralism when he 
writes that "The flight from structure, characteristic of post-
structuralism, involves turning away from the immanent, in order to 
rediscover the author and the reader" [Music and Discourse, p.27]. After 
Molino, he suggests that this alleged post-structural rediscovery of the 
esthesic operates through a "dialectic of text and reader" [ibid., fn.28]. 
However, as we have seen, dialectics are anathema to post-structuralism, 
and the idea that it is all about "rediscovering the author" is well-nigh 
inexplicable, as Barthes' famous essay The Death of the Author 
demonstrates concisely [Image-Music-Text, pp.142-8]. 
Equally, Nattiez makes many statements which demonstrate a highly 
traditional approach to the identity of the "immanent" level: "Analysis of 
the neutral level is a kind of crib, or mnemonic, uncovering a unity" [Music 
and Discourse, p.31]. With this assumption of an inner unity to the "neutral 
level", as with many other passages from Nattiez, one realizes that the 
metaphysical tropes of structuralist formalism have not been overthrown 
a l all, but simply re-emerge hedged around with qualifiers and an 
admission of certain inadequacies of the idea of autonomy. What the 
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tripartition allows is the continuation of autonomy, as long as the 
.. provisionality" of its status is acknowledged ("Analysis of the neutral 
level is perpetually subverted .. [ibid., p.31 ]). As Duns by writes, "Nattiez 
admits that what is regarded as neutral, as systematic, as verifiable, is not, 
literally, entirely neutral, since it concerns intellectual categories that 
have no absolute claim to reality." [Music Analysis, p.218] One c.:-u1 
therefore easily use the tripartition to justify a structuralist semiology of 
the score, as long as one admits that it is not a discovery of absolute 
truths, or based upon a fundamental verity (even if the revelation of unity 
is the aim). Not surprisingly, the concern for working through the 
problematics of structural analysis at the "neutral" level in fact 
represents the provisional suspension of the "uninterrupted dialectic .. 
with production and reception outlined by Molino as the central concern 
of the tripartition. For instance, McClary has claimed that Nattiez, 
semiology 11 operates entirely within a self-contained, formalistic context 
with scrupulous disregard for social signification." [Feminine Endings, 
p.170] Equally, in a consideration of "The Cultural Message of Musical 
Semiology", Rose Rosengard Subotnik writes unequivocally of "an 
essentially structuralist critical method like Nattiez,s" [Developing 
Variations, p.169]. Thus, the shift from Molino,s Musical Fact to Nattiez, 
Fondements d'une semiologie de la musique (also 1975) can be read as the 
shift from the "surface phenomena" suggested by Molino,s provisionaJly 
sceptical attitude towards deep structure, to the 11 fundamentals 11 
suggested by the title of Nattiez, text; in other words, the re-
slructuralization of a (very) tentative post-structural opening. 
In both theorists, however, the dialectical reintegration of the 
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"immanent" level back into the play of production and reception is only 
possible as <:1 consequence of establishing an a priori opposition between 
th!~ "inside" of the text and its "outside": the whole theory depends on the 
opposition between what is intrinsic to the text, and what is extrinsic to j t. 
NrdJ.iez himself points to the "origin" of this opposition in Molino's 
tripartition: 
the principle of his analysis of the neutral level inscribes 
itself within an epistemological filiation that originated in 
Snussure, since the distinctions between external and 
internal linguistics and between langue and parole in the 
Cours de Linguistique generale enable us to identify the 
internal and immanent [Music and Discourse, pp.28-9]. 
Yet this apparent analogy between the langue-parole distinction and 
the intrinsic-extrinsic opposition is not unproblematic [81. Mol ino 
specifically writes that "we prefer to speak not of a langue as opposed to 
a parole but of a message level, a neutral level of analysis." [Musical Fact, 
p.1'•6] The analogy is not completely symmetrical, but nevertheless, the 
"epistemological filiation" remains: one first posits an a priori opposition, 
a structural schism of the intrinsic and the extrinsic, only in order to 
effect a dialectical return. This form of structuralist "immanence", then, 
despite all the dialectical qualifiers which put it back into play with the 
social "extrinsic", is in fact immanence constituted as formalist autonomy. 
[8) A further example of the structuralist usage of "immanence" is to be 
found in tl1e theory of Algirdas Julien Greimas, who opposes the concept 
<• lf~vel of immanence to that of a level of manifestation, as a translation into 
serniotics of the linguistic notions of langue and parole. [cf. Ronald 
Schleifer, A.J. Greimas and the Nature of Meaning, pp.85-7] In other words, 
Greirnas' idea of immanence is that of a transcendent structural systcrn 
behind reality, just as Molino and Nattiez conceive of it within the 
structure of a dialectically mediated autonomy. 
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1.5 The Immanence of the Text 
What, then, of that tentative post-structural opening which 
nevertheless leaves its mark at certain points in Molino's text? If there 
were a set of credentials which qualified a text as post-structuralist, then 
one of them would certainly be a relationship with the theory of 
pragmatism which emerges most fully in late-nineteenth century America. 
As Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard has written, one of the contexts of contemporary 
Parisian thought is "The 'linguistic turn' of Western philosophy [ ... ] the 
penetration of Anglo-American philosophies into European thought" [ T!Je 
Differend, p.xiii]. The crucial element in this American invasion is 
indubitably the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), inventor of 
the very term semiotics (or, as he had it, semeiotics). For Peirce, language 
constitutes reality in a very specific way -
my language is the sum total of my self; for the man is the 
thought. It is hard for man to understand this, because he 
persists in identifying himself with his will, his power over 
the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is 
only an instrument of thought. [Selected Writings, p. 71] 
In this, Peirce radically challenges the biological definition of 
humanity so central to all of the organicist metaphysics of the nineteenth 
century. He claims that the organism is not the fundamental component o E 
a person's identity. Rather, it is their language which defines them as 
thought itself, and their organism is only a component of the linguistic 
system. What, then, is the operation of this language which defines us? In 
answering this question, we find Peirce effectively assembling the 
conceptual framework which opens the whole post-structural field, almost 
a century prior to its alleged inauguration. 
Peirce's theory of language can be found in the Principles of 
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Philosophy, a collation of various writings from the end of the nineteenth 
century. Here, he elaborates a general theory of structures in terms of 
tr-iadic relationships, and it is in the concept of thirdness that we will find 
him at his most proto-post-structural; "By the third, I mean the medium or 
connecting bond between the absolute first and last. The beginning is 
first, the end second, the middle third. The thread of life is a third; the 
fate that snips it, its second." [Principles of Philosophy, p.170] Thirdness, 
then, is the condition of that which is between two other terms, and is thus 
the instable point of passage which breaks an initial stability and resolves 
onto a final stability. Musically, elements such as turns, suspensions, 
dominant regions, etc., could be read as being examples of thirdness. 
However, Peirce makes a specific point in describing language which 
effectively uproots all conceptions of significatory stability as represented 
by Plato's theory in "The Allegory of the Cave". In Plato's Cave, real 
objects would count as examples of firstness, and the enlightened 
perception of their reality would count as examples of secondness. The 
shadows on the wall, however- the representations of real objects- would 
have the condition of thirdness. In this sense, then, we have already seen 
how Plato defines thirdness within the same conceptual milieu as darkness, 
ignorance, falsehood, slavery and illusion. Plato would have his 
philosopher banish the thirdness of representation by revealing, through 
reasoned arguments, the ultimate reality of firstness. The revelation of the 
firstness of a real object would then close off the instable movement of 
representational thirdness, to produce a final, stable secondness -
enlightened perception. 
Transposing from Plato's to Peirce's terms, we have the following 
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triad: object (real object) - representation (shadow) - interpretant 
(enlightened perception). Peirce, however, makes a very simple point which 
effectively explodes the whole stability of Plato's well-structured model, 
and has reverberations throughout the whole of metaphysical and 
ontological thought- "The object of representation can be nothing but a 
representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. [ ... ] 
there is an infinite regression here." [Principles of Philosophy, p.171, 
emphasis added] In other words, the term "object" only has provisional 
slutus; no object is an absolute origin in itself, but is instead a sign of that 
which gave rise to it. The "object" is thus a "representation 11 of a prior 
11 object", which also refers back to a prior entity, and so forth ad 
infinitum. Equally, "the interpretantis nothing but another representation 
to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has 
its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series." [ibid., p.171, emphases 
added] One can provisionally illustrate this by considering a series of 
terms, such as 0 - P - Q. Assuming that they form a representational 
series, the Platonist would probably allege that 11 0 11 is the real object, "P" 
is its representation, and "Q" is the interpretant. Peirce, however, would 
point out that while this is true, it is true only in an instrumental fashion, 
since there are other representational series which precede and follow this 
one (eg. F-G-H; R-8-T, etc.). Hence 11 0 11 can not only be seen as an object 
represented by 11 P", but also a representation of its preceding term 11 N 11 • 
This would then make "P" not only the representation of 11 0", but also the 
interpretant of 11 N11 , and so forth, endlessly in both directions (unlike the 
alphabetical series, however, signification has no "A" or "Z"). 
In this way, the firstness of the object, the secondness of the 
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interpretant, and the overall structural closure which they represent as 
the Alpha and the Omega of a system, are all radically compromised by the 
frlct that they can also be considered as representations of terms outwith 
the borders of their allegedly closed structure. Thus, the condition or 
thirdness seeps into all areas of signification, with every thing caught up 
in an endless cross-reference: in a certain sense, there are no real objects, 
if by that we mean a unitary point of origin which is preceded by nothing 
else. There is, then, no ultimate beginning and no ultimate ending - n ll 
things are caught in the middle, and this includes those things which are 
commonly assumed to represent either a beginning or an end. Everythjng 
is swept along by the movement of signification. 
From the post-structural perspective, this is the key claim of 
Peircean pragmatism. As we will see in Chapter 2, it has a great impact on 
Derrida's deconstruction. Indeed, Derrida effectively uses Peircc's 
semiotics to deconstruct the structuralisms of Ferdinand de Saussure's 
semiology. 
In his project of semiotics, Peirce seems to have been more 
attentive than Saussure [ ... ] Peirce goes very far in the 
direction that I have called the de-construction of the 
transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would 
place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign.[ ... ] 
The so-called "thing itself" is always already a representamen 
[ ... ] The representamen functions only by giving rise to an 
in terpretan t that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity. 
[Of Grammatology, pp.48/9] 
In Derrida's reading, Peirce's concept of the infinite significatory 
series moves, on the philosophical level, towards "the destruction of onto-
theology and the metaphysics of presence." [ibid., p.50] This in itsrdf 
indicates the significance of Peircean pragmatism for contemporary theory, 
but Derrida is hardly alone in making this crucial reference. For instance, 
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I.yotard writes that "the society of the future falls less within the province 
of a Newtonian anthropology (such as structuralism or systems theory) 
than a pragmatics of language particles." [The Postmodern Condition, 
p.xxiv, emphasis added] Further, Deleuze and Guattari write of Peirce os 
"the true inventor of semiotics", and identify their own form of post-
Peircean pragmatics as identical with their celebrated theory nf 
schizoanalysis: "we can borrow his terms, even while changing their 
connotations." [91 [A Thousand Plateaus, pp.531, 146, 531] It is significant, 
then, that Molino also refers to precisely the same component of Peircc' s 
theory of representation which opens Derrida' s deconstruction of 
semiology: "structuralisms, too, are allegorisms, forgetting the fundamental 
fact highlighted by Peirce: that the cross-reference of the sign, in the 
movement of the interpretants that generate one another is an infinite 
process." [Musical Fact, p.127] It could be suggested, however, that 
Molino' s reference to Peirce does not follow the concept of infinite 
regression through to its necessary (in)conclusion as represented by the 
deconstructive turn of Derrida. This is not least because Molino's emphasis 
here is not on the thirdness of the representamen which Derrida draws 
out, but on the concept of the interpretant- the "second" which denotes 
the end of a significatory series, its teleological arrest. As Peirce points 
out, secondness is the termination of life, "the fate that snips it". One only 
l91 In the context of these statements of Peirce's importance by Derrida, 
Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari, it is hard to understand the racial 
undertones of Harland's claim that "This is a paradoxical way of thinking, 
and especially paradoxical in relation to Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking." 
[ Superstructuralism, p.9] However, what is inexplicable is the following 
idea: "C.S. Peirce, whose version of semiotics ties in with a general 
philosophical position quite alien to the Superstructuralist [sic] episteme." 
[ibid., p.4] 
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moves on from an interpretant to another term by opening its signification 
up once more, and this can only be done by reinscribing it as another 
representamen (signifier). For Derrida, it is all signification. For Molino, 
it is all interpretation. Does Molino's hermeneutics represent an attempt to 
save us from the endless proliferation of signifiers in Plato's Cave, or does 
he confuse the condition of secondness with that of thirdness? 
Additionally, Molino's themes of provisional autonomy and dialectical 
return to the social field are almost duty bound to arrest a full delimitation 
of Peircean thirdness. Post-structuralism in general would challenge the 
fundaments of the idea of autonomy, no matter how dialectically 
"provisional", and would further question the mechanisms of dialectics in 
general. Notably, these objections to such a theory as Molino's tripartition 
are formulated precisely within the field of signification which Peirce 
opens: dialectics or differa.nce? 
Once more, it becomes a question of immanence, and the distinction 
between its semiological and post-structural faces can be illustrated by an 
example from the later, broadly post-structural writings of Roland Barthes. 
In the essay From Work to Text (1971), Barthes puts the traditional 
conception of the "symbolic object" under the term work, and the post-
structural conception under the term text. The idea of the Work in Barthes 
corresponds closely to that used in traditional music aesthetics -it "refers 
to the image of an organism which grows by vital expansion, by 
'development'" [Image-Music-Text, p.161]. This organic development is 
nevertheless internal to the Work, and its prime external connection is the 
composer, with listener as secondary. The Text, on the other hand, has as 
its image "that of the network; if the Text extends itself, it is as a result 
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of a combinatory systematic" [ibid.]. In contrast to the binary connections 
of the Work with either composer, listener or performer, then - or their 
dialectical synthesis - Barthes alleges that "the Text is plural [ ... ] not a 
coexistence of meanings but a passage, an overcrossing; thus it answers 
not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a 
dissemination." [lO) [ibid., p.159] In this way, textuality is not the 
condition of being autonomous or isolated from other texts, even if one 
construes this within a dialectical provisionality - as Derrida writes in 
Plato's Pharmacy, "The text excludes dialectics." [Dissemination, p.122] 
Hather, textuality is the condition of being caught up in a passage through 
the combinatorial system of "the intertextual in which every text itself is 
held, it itself being the text-between of another text" [ibid., p.160]. The 
condition of the text, then, is not one of autonomy from a general textual 
system, but of intertextuality. This concept, as Derrida acknowledges, 
follows on from Peirce's "endless series" as much as his own concept of 
differance- what has occurred is "the reconstruction of the textual field 
out of the workings of intertextuality or of infinite referral" 
[lO) Some readers may assume that Barthes' conception of the text is 
analogous to that of Umberto Eco's conception of the "open work". 
Certainly, both refer to concepts of musical indeterminacy. Barthes writes 
that "The Text is very much a score of this new kind: it asks of the readec 
a practical collaboration." [Image-Music-Text, p.163] For Eco, "works like 
those of Berio and Stockhausen are 'open'" [The Open Work, p.4]. However, 
caution must be applied in aligning Eco with post-structuralism as 
currently defined: "The theory of the open work is none other than a 
voetics of serial thought [ ... ] seriality is dialectic thought" [ The Open 
Work, pp.218/245]. Just as much as Molino or Nattiez, Eco writes of, foe 
instance, the open work's operation through "a fresh dialectics between 
the work of art and its performer" [ibid., p.3]. This contrasts sharply with 
Barthes' idea of "explosion" and "dissemination", which are distinctly 
aligned with the non-dialectical ruptures of jouissance, and Derrida's 
specifically deconstructive text Dissemination (1972). As Derrida writes, 
"There is no first insemination. The semen is already swarming. The 
'pr-imal' insemination is dissemination." [Dissemination, p.304] 
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[Dissemination, p.43] As a term, intertextuality was developed by Julia 
Kristeva, initially as a development of Bakhtin's concepts of dialogue and 
ambivalence. In Bakhtin's theory of signification, these terms represent 
two axes of cross-reference between signifiers. Dialogue occurs along a 
horizontal axis between a signifying subject (ie. writer) and an addressee 
(ie. reader). Ambivalence takes place on a vertical axis between the "text" 
of the word and an "external" text or set of texts. As Kristeva writes; 
In Bakhtin's work, these two axes [ ... ] are not clearly 
distinguished. Yet, what appears as a lack of rigor is in fact 
an insight [ ... ] any text is constructed as a mosaic of 
quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of 
another. The notion of intertextuality replaces that of 
inlersubjectivity [Desire in Language, p.66]. 
In other words, in her reading of Bakhtin's terms, we can move away 
fr·om the subjectivities of author and reader, even beyond positing a 
dialectical interplay between them, and towards the processes of 
signification itselfl111. However, if intertextuality signifies the 
"transposition of one (or several) sign-system(s) into another", one must 
to.ke care that it is not misconstrued "in the banal sense of \study of 
sources'" [Revolution in Poetic Language, in The Kristeva Reader, p.lll]. 
Rather, the condition of intertextuality rejects the notion of textual 
internality or externality- formal autonomy- showing that all texts cross-
refer endlessly, not necessarily just in the simple senses of quotation or 
citation, but also in the more complex senses of the cross-referencing of 
significatory processes in general which Peirce demonstrates. 
A further important ramification of this intertextual condition is that 
[ll] It is at this point that Kristeva's intertextualitycomes close to Derrida's 
differance- both inscribe an articulation of axes, and both lead away from 
intentionality towards the pragmatics of signification. 
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each text is 11 in itself 11 an intertext, not only in the sense which Barthes 
draws out (that of a text between other texts), but also in the sense of an 
"internal 11 textual multiplicity. In this theory, each text is considered to be 
divisible into other texts, and so on indefinitely. For instance, if "text" is 
understood here in the sense of "discourse", then, as Kristeva writes, we 
could examine "the formation of a specific signifying system - the novel -
as the result of a redistribution of several different sign-systems: 
carnival, courtly poetry, scholastic discourse." [ibid.] Thus, "text" in this 
usage cannot be reduced to the idea of a collection of printed pages, any 
more than "Work" can be reduced to "labour" (indeed, to put the temporal 
activity of "work" back into the "Work" would be to demonstrate one side 
of its textuality). 
Hence, textuality is not the sole province of literature, even if some 
literary critics understand it in this limited fashion in order to privilege 
their activity as some kind of meta-discourse of the order that philosophy 
once believed itself to bel121. As David Carroll comments, 
If American 'deconstructionists' have, as Gasche claims, 
turned Derridean deconstruction into a 'newer form of new 
criticism,' then anti-deconstructionists have accepted this 
[l2) Significantly, Molino argues a similar point when he questions the 
application of communicational theories to music, concluding that "the root 
of the error is believing that language constitutes the model of all symbolic 
phenomena." [Musical Fact, p.127) His reason for asserting this is that 
within communicational theories, the concept of the referent (the "real 
object" of Plato's Cave) is the point of difficulty for music. Post-structural 
(and even some structuralist) theories, however, would question the 
existence of the referent even in language; as Derrida has written, "Even 
though semiology was in fact more general and more comprehensive than 
linguistics, it continued to be regulated as if it were one of the areas of 
linguistics. The linguistic sign remained exemplary for semiology" [Of 
Grammatology, p.51] Derrida then advocates the "Barthesian reversal" 
[p.52] of the relationship between semiology and linguistics, and along with 
using Peircean semiotics as a deconstructive lever against semiology, 
begins to assemble the post-Peircean concept of grammatology. 
version of Derrida's work in order to attack it for being a 
literary formalism. But it is only when writing has been 
equated with (the form of) literature and textuality with 
specific literary texts that ldeconstruction' (as criticism) is 
open to such attacks. [ Paraesthetics, p.82] 
With the limited notion of "text", we find that the "immc.nence" of 
literary deconstructionism is the same as that of music analysis. In this, 
one should be wary of confusing the deconstruction of Parisian philosophy 
with the deconstruction-ism of anglophone literary criticism, for the 
latter's conception of "text" is potentially retrievable into the metaphysics 
of what Barthes terms the "Work" l131. Just such a reading of the term 
"text" in the context of music is made by Carl Dahlhaus, who defines the 
"Work" as temporal sound, and "text" as static notation or "paper music" 
[ Rsthetics of Music, p.13]. For Dahlhaus, textuality is bound up in the same 
theoretical system as the concept of the Work, this system being defin(~d 
as ontological. Significantly, Nattiez follows Dahlhaus' (and Roman 
Ingarden's) line of thinking in his attempt to move towards a structuralifo5t 
semiology of music; 
The work's physical mode of existence is, then, divided 
l131 Equally, one should note that the term "deconstruc tivism" is reserved 
for the architectural movement which represents a reaction against the 
earlier constructivist movement of artists in Soviet Russia. Significantly, 
however, similar problematics inscribe themselves within deconstructivisrn 
as in deconstruction. As Mark Wigley has written, in Deconstructivist 
Architecture (1988), "The form is distorting itself. Yet this internal 
distortion does not destroy the form. In a strange way, the form remains 
intact. This is an architecture of disruption, dislocation, deflection, 
deviation and distortion, rather than one of demolition, dismantling, decay, 
decomposition and disintegration. It displaces structure instead of 
destroying it. What is finally so unsettling about such is precisely that the 
form not only survives its torture but appears all the stronger for it. 
Perhaps the form is even produced by it. It becomes unclear which came 
first, the form or the distortion, the host or the parasite. [ ... ] No surgical 
technique can free the form, no clean incision can be made. To remove the 
parasite would be to kill the host. They comprise one symbiotic entity ... 
[quoted in Frampton, Modern Architecture, p.313] 
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between score and performance. The work's ontological mode 
of existence is situated in the realm of pure intentionality, 
beyond the score, yet guaranteed, rendered possible by the 
score. [Music and Discourse, p.82] 
Unlike this transcendent, dialectical, ontological model which 
invokes the limited, literary notion of "text", post-structuralism would 
consider the activity of performance, the experience of audition, and even 
sound itself as texts just as much as the notational text of the score. 
Following Kristeva, it would no longer be a question of the "study of 
sources", the tracing of a sign back to a "realm of pure intentionality", 
but, along with Barthes, it would be a case of moving through an 
intertextual "field without origin" [Image-Music-Text, p.146], with the 
"critic" and the "social" as immanent parts of that field at all points 
during, before and after engagement. Under these conditions, Gilles 
Deleuze and FtHix Guattari write that "exterior and interior are relative; 
they exist only through their exchanges", and these exchanges are not 
dialectical, but intertextual [A Thousand Plateaus, p.49]. Even within the 
ostensibly limited field of a single piece of music, however, the discourses 
of form and genre are textually heterogenous. At a very simple level, 
Kristeva's idea of novelistic intertextuality could be transposed into music, 
to identify, for instance, the intertextuality of The Pogues' album If I 
Should Fall From Grace With God (1988) as redistributing the significatory 
systems of big band jazz, punk, and Irish folk, or William Kinloch's The 
Bat ell of Pavie (late Cl 6th) as redistributing the discourses of musick fyne, 
martial music and Catalan folk. This simple observation may be construed 
as tending towards the obvious, but with intertextuality, a number of 
subtle shifts occur on the critical field which nevertheless have far-
reaching consequences. As John Frow writes in Intertextuality and 
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Ontology, "intertextual analysis is distinguished from source criticism[ ... ] 
by its rejection of a unilinear causality" [ Intertextuality: Theories and 
Practises, p.46 ]. This applies also to the text which constitutes an 
intertextual analysis, as much as the "object" of the analysis. Thus, the 
boundary, the limit of each text (including the "analysis") is always 
already provisional, and this is due to the endless cross-referencing of all 
levels of signification. 
As Derrida has written, "the text is no longer the snug airtight 
inside of an interiority or an identity-to-itself" [Dissemination, p.36] fn 
other words, textuality effectively deconstructs the limits of identity, so 
that "The Outside ts the Inside" [Of Grammatology, p.44]. In this context, 
the erasure of the word .. is" refers to the deconstruction of the opposition 
between "is" and "is not", Being and non being- this opposition being the 
fundamental means of establishing ontological difference. To assert, then, 
that the outside is the inside is to reject the ontological difference between 
internality and externality, and rein scribe it as a difference outwith the 
structure of opposition - ie. differance. If there is a provisional limit, or 
horizon, in any given intertextual system, it is only ever a matter of the 
relativity of one's position. The map of intertextuality is curved- we can 
never get a "total" picture of the whole field, but we shift the horizon as 
we move through a textual network (and we never stop moving). 
In contrast, Nattiez writes of the underlying unity of the text, and 
that analytical exploration (which has the revelation of this unity as its 
telos) must systematically exploit its tools "until they are exhausted" 
[Music and Discourse, p.13]. Nattiez writes of the "delimitation" of the 
neutral level through this analytical exhaustion [ibid.], but this is a highly 
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limited form of de-limitation, one which can only occur on a field with 
specific boundaries- a limited field. As we will see, however, the notion of 
intertextuality posits a lack of fixed boundaries and the impossibility of 
establishing them in any absolute sense. Much of Derrida's deconstructive 
work (and much of the current endeavour) assumes that, in tracing 
through the various significations of a text (for instance, a particulnr 
concept) there will be an endless number of books, events, figures, images, 
other concepts, etc. which constitute its field of intertextuality. In this 
context, the idea of de-limitation takes a fuller form: the transgression of 
limits, rather than their dialectical transcendence. 
Thus, we can place the immanence of the Work, which remains within 
the boundary limitations of autonomy, in contrast with the immanence of 
the Text, which continually circulates in an intertextual network without 
border controls. The immanence of semiological music analysis remains 
caught within the most basic of structuralisms - the segmentation of the 
text from a general field of immanence in order to reconstitute it as 
autonomous, and analyzable "within itself", within its own interiority, its 
self-unity, without reference to extrinsic factors. The means by which the 
text then re-engages with the general textual field is by a dialectical 
return. On the other hand, the immanence of deconstruction, which allies 
itself to the concept of intertextuality, rejects the structuralization of the 




• This textuality by its very nature is not a discrete 
formalism, but is inherently caught up a movement which questions the 
limitation of textual signification- the movement of the intertext[lS]. 
1 .6 Unleashing the Text 
It remains the case, however, that two rival readings of 
deconstruction have emerged in the "anglo-american '' tradition. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak identifies these readings as "general'' and "narrow'', 
depending on their proximity to Parisian deconstruction or their 
"domestication 11 to 11 the existing ideology of American literary criticism'' 
respectively [In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics, p .16]. 
Domesticated deconstructionism, she argues, places signification in the 
autonomous "inside'' of the text, and "allows the critic authority", rather 
than following through the ramifications of "general .. deconstruction, 
[l4] The presentation of such post-structural concepts to musicology 
conferences several times yielded the question as to whether Hans Keller 's 
"analytic scores 11 could be considered deconstructive. Certainly, they are 
immanent to their texts, but only in the structuralist sense of Molino and 
Nattiez. The following dialectical statement hardly qualifies Keller as a 
deconstructionist working within the field of intertextuality: 11 What, then~ 
does my method analyse? The unity of contrasts" [Criticism, p.147] 
[lS] The precise questions of how deconstruction may be intertextually 
translated into the field of music analysis would, if engaged adequately, 
indubitably inaugurate a completely different field to that which we 
currently understand under the sign "music analysis" , and would 
potentially lead to further displacements in the theories of signification in 
general. However, this does not fall within the remit of the current project, 
concentrating as it does on aesthetics. Extant examples of attempts to 
either combine analysis with deconstruction, or to analytically uncover the 
operation of a deconstructive compositional process in a piece of music can 
be found in Subotnik 's "Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: 
A Critique of Schoenberg, Adorno, and Stravinsky 11 (in Explorations in 
Music, the Arts, and Ideas, ed. Narmour & Solie), Kramer's Music as Cultural 
Practice, and McClary 's Feminine Endings. A fully delineated theory in this 
field is yet to be taken up. 
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which "puts into question the grounds of the critic's power .. [ibid]. Of 
course, this in effect slices through the immanence of intertextuality and 
locates the text at something akin to the semiological 11 neutral level .. of 
analysis. 
A similar, but more complex divide has been noted by Christopher 
Norris, in The Truth About Postmodernism (1993). Here, the two readings 
of deconstruction are identified as on the one hand, that which places 
deconstruction within the context of post-structuralism, postmodernism, 
or literary deconstructionism - "wild" deconstruction- and on the other, 
that which places it well outside of all those territories - "rigoro11s" 
deconstruction. According to Norris, the distinction is also that between 
11 textualism 11 and 11 facticity"; both the post-structural tendency and 
literary deconstructionism are roundly condemned as .. textualist", in 
distinction to the "factual .. nature of Derridean deconstruction. In more 
philosophical terms, the opposition between the textual and the factual is 
also that between nominalism and realism, between scepticism and the 
search for truth [The Truth about Postmodernism, passim]. Conversely, 
eleven years earlier, Norris is to be found claiming that "deconstruction 
works at the same giddy limit" as Hume's scepticism, and that it is 
"likewise an activity of thought which cannot be consistently acted on -
that way madness lies" [ Deconstruction, p.xii]. In this, we could assume 
that in 1982, by aligning deconstruction with scepticism, Norris was a]so 
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aligning it with post-structuralism (judging by his 1993 distinction l161). 
However, already, we can discern a certain hesitance to go all the way and 
fully accept the ramifications of Derrida's statement that deconstruction 
produces "a force of dislocation that spreads itself throughout the entire 
system, fissuring it in every direction and thoroughly delimiting it." 
[Writing and Difference, p.21] In 1993, Norris does indeed champion his 
reading of Derridean deconstruction, but specifically in order to attempt 
its liberation from any association with the post-structural or the 
postmodern. He writes of "the gulf that separates Derrida's work from the 
currency of postmodern-pragmatist thought" [p.301], and chides critics 
who assemble a "highly partial (not to say distorted and opportunist) 
reading of Derrida" as a "laid-back textualist" [p.283). The problem is that 
"new textualism is merely old scepticism in a geared-up rhetorical guise" 
[p.227], and thus, just as Kant's philosophy was an answer to Hume's 
scepticism, so too it will serve as an answer to postmodernism, and re-
iustate the value of truth (at the same time also saving Kant from various 
post-structural "misreadings"). Norris claims that what is required to save 
deconstruction from the clutches of the post-structuralists is "to push the 
argument much further back, to the point where deconstruction in effect 
joins company with other (as it seems less sceptical or troublesome) 
variants of the linguistic turn." [p.224] In other words, what Norris 
desires is to utilize the radical force of deconstructive technique, but 
(l6] Butler also makes the sceptical association in Interpretation, 
Deconstruction, and Ideology [pp.60-65], and laments that "if Derrida is 
right, all interpretation which respects the nature of language is 
condemned to indeterminacy." [p.65] Yet, interpretation is not the only 
critical mode available, as the whole agenda of deconstruction 
demonstrates. 
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without "going all the way down" into the logical (in)conclusion of a full 
textuality. 
Just as there are Marxist readings of deconstruction which take it 
as dialectical, then, there is also a certain humanist-realist reading which 
takes it to be the arena of "truth" and "fact" as opposed to the textuality 
of post-structuralism. Nevertheless, these two approaches - the grand 
narratives of truth and dialectics with their common ground in ontology -
are subject to interrogation even by the smallest of clauses in Derrida's 
work; as he writes in Plato 1s Pharmacy, "dialectics (or ontology) [ ... ] is 
always guided by an intention of truth." [Dissemination, p.166] The 
question is, does the deconstruction of truth, dialectics, or ontology in 
general constitute its wholesale obliteration, or a reinscription of its 
terms? If the latter is the case, then, as Norris points out, it may be a 
matter of how far we go. Once more, what is perhaps at stake here is an 
issue which can be seen to arise from the double strategy of 
deconstruction: 
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures 
from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can 
they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those 
structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one 
always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect 
it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the 
strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old 
structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without 
being able to isolate their elements and atoms [analysis], the 
enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls 
prey to its own work. This is what the person who has begun 
the same work in another area of the same habitation does not 
fail to point out with zeal. [Of Grammatology, p.24] 
Here Derrida acknowledges a serious ramification of the immanence 
of the deconstructive process to its critical subject - although the text 
may become deconstructed, the resultant deconstruction is itself inevitably 
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bound up to a degree in the lexis and conceptual framework of the original 
structure. This is what the detractors of deconstruction often "point ont 
with zeal" [l7]. 
The current project is to investigate this problematic within the 
context of Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau's music aesthetics in Of 
Grammatology. It will be demonstrated in Chapter Two that Derrida relies 
implicitly, but most significantly, on certain normative concepts of 
Enlightenment music theory in order to carry this programme through. 
However, rather than "zealously pointing this out" in order to detract from 
Derrida's efforts, the exposure of this fact will be directed towards 
supplementing his programme further. This supplementation will therefore 
reject Norris' proposal to push deconstruction "much further back" 
towards "less sceptical or troublesome" theoretical moments. In other 
words, Of Grammatology will itself "fall prey to its own work", and become 
the subject of a further deconstructive interrogation. While Norris rails 
against the blander American versions of deconstruction(ism) as much as 
Spivak, he nevertheless comes perilously close to another form of 
"domestication". If, in his terms, deconstruction can be either "wild" or 
"rigorous", could we not also conceive of a rigorous post-structuralism, as 
an alternative to the Norris' determination of it as "wild"? (And what is the 
significance of the fact that what Norris calls "wild" is claimed by Spivak 
[l7] David Wood, in an extensive interrogation of "Derrida's self-
understanding" of what is at stake in the deconstruction of Hegel, 
comments that the immanence of Derrida's deconstruction to Hegel's text 
means that "a teleological dialectics has itself been transformed 
dialectically." [The Deconstruction of Time, ,p.316] What should be borne 
in mind, however, is the point of the deconstruction: that, utilizing 
Hegelian language, it "nonetheless works a displacement with it - one both 
infinitesimal and radical." [ibid.] 
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to be "domesticated"?) 
Two post-structuralists who Norris singles out as particularly 
dangerous are Deleuze and Guattari, who nevertheless claim that their 
post-structuralism is precisely not achieved by .. wildly de stratifying" [A 
Thousand Plateaus, p.160]. One does indeed 11 destratify 11 , but not wildly: 
.. how necessary caution is, the art of dosages, since overdose is a danger. 
You don't do it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file ... [ibid., 
p.160] It is this conception of a rigorous and attentive post-structuralism 
which is embraced below. Much will therefore hinge on the strategies by 
which the intervals between deconstruction and post-structuralism are 
articulated. In the context of Harland's contention that Of Grammatology 
"rnark[s] the arrival of Post-Structuralism", the significance of the role of 
Enlightenment music theory in Derrida' s text should not be 
underestimated. If Of Grammatologyis implicated in the emergence of post-
structuralism, then so are the music theories bound up in its textual 
fr·amework. From this perspective, Of Grammatology potentially holds a 
long-neglected key for connecting musicology to two of the most 
challenging aspects of contemporary thought. It becomes a question of the 
following: 
in the song melody is originally corrupted by harmony. 
Harmony is the originary supplement ·of melody. [ ... ] 
supplement [is] another name for differance [Of 
Grammatology, pp. 214 & 150] 
What leads Derrida to connect his famous deconstructive concept of 
differance with the musical concept of harmony? Additionally, what is the 
significance of the fact that the specific opposition of harmony to melody 
which he deconstructs is that within the debate between Rousseau and 
Hameau over the very origin of music- the debate which became known as 
the "Quarrel of the Buffoons"? In short, what is the connection between 
Enlightenment theories of music and post-structuralism - specifically' 
deconstruction? It is this question which forms the strategic opening of 
the current text. However, the articulation of this question cannot afford 
to be overly direct. In Derrida's text, the concept of differance is 
gradually formulated through a reading of Rousseau's conception of 
melody. This concept is in turn is formulated by a reading of Rameau's 
theory of harmony. In order to finally engage with Derrida's writing on 
music, then, we will begin to trace through this chain of readings not so 
much at its beginning, but at least at its provisional harmonic root. 
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CHAPTER Two 
THE HrNGE OF DrFFERANCE 
Now let ilk man his way avance: 
Let sum ga drink and sum ga dance. 
l\1enstrell, blaw up ane brawll of France: 
Let se quha hobbils best! 
- Ane Satyre of the Thrie Estaitis 
David Lindsay, 1552. 
CHAPTER Two 
DrFFERANCE 
2.1 Intervallic Logi~ 
Rameau's mistake corresponds to the model of all mistakes and 
all historical perversions as they take shape under 
Rousseau's eyes [Of Grammatology, p.211] 
Music is the science of sounds; therefore sound is the 
principle subject of music. Music is generally divided into 
harmony and melody, but we shall show in the following that 
the latter is merely a part of the former and that a knowledge 
of harmony is sufficient for a complete understanding of all 
the properties of music. [Treatise, p.l] 
In this initial short passage from the Treatise of Harmony, Rameau 
gives a definition of music which contains the first principles requisite for 
a full understanding of musical theory as he sees it. Music is to be studied 
scientifically, beginning with the concept of its division into the two 
branches of harmony and melody. Underlying this division, however, is the 
structural derivation of melody from harmony. In other words, harmony is 
the origin of melody, and as such, a study of the fundamental structurP.s 
of harmony can yield an understanding of music in general, "without 
considering either its loudness or its duration" [Treatise, p.3]. It is 
Hu.meau's prioritization of the vertical, spatial parameter of harmony over 
the horizontal, temporal parameter of melody, which defines his aesthetic. 
Rameau's theory in the Treatise has a significant intertext with early 
Greek theory. In particular, he takes up the Pythagorean theme of t.he 
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monochord as the experimental source of the knowledge of harmony, a 
knowledge based on the reflexivity of harmonic and physical space. This 
combines with the Pythagorean concern with Number as the prime 
generating force of all things, and can be traced in the first quotation in 
i.he Treatise- significantly, from Rene Descartes' Compendium Musicae: 
Sound is to sound as string is to string. Each string contains 
in itself all other strings shorter than it, but not those which 
are longer. Therefore, all high sounds are contained in low 
ones, but low ones, conversely, are not contained in high 
ones. It is thus evident that we should look for the higher 
term in the division of the lower; this division should be 
arithmetic ... [quoted in Treatise, p.11] 
This notion of the containment of the higher term within the lower 
term, the containment of the higher harmonics within the lower (longer) 
length of the string signifies a specifically Pythagorean mode of spatial 
knowledge. Within this schema, the relation of an open string to the higher 
harmonics it can produce is one of derivation by arithmetic proportion, 
made known to the musical scientist through empirical data [1]. 
However, Rameau makes several departures from Des cartes' harmonic 
theory, singling out his explanations of the origin of certain intervals os 
structurally suspect. For instance, Rameau interrogates Descartes' 
(l] This must be distinguished from a knowledge of the overtone, or natural 
harmonic series. The first scientific proof of the overtone series was in 
fact given in a paper by Joseph Sauveur titled Principles of Acoustics and 
Music published in Paris in 1700. Although published 22 years prior to 
Hameau's Treatise, it would seem that in his preoccupation with Descartes' 
Pythagoreanism, Ram eau was not aware of Sauveur' s work until 173'7. 
According to Philip Gossett in the preface to his translation of the Treatise, 
it is only then that Rameau's Harmonic Generation discusses the practical 
similarity of the two viewpoints. Here, Rameau begins to use Sauveur's 
term acoustique, a term which Sauveur had derived from the visual 
analogue of optique. He also makes the distinction, however, that while his 
work previously invests Nature within the vibrating string of t.he 
experimental monochord, Sauveur's scientific theory invests Nature within 
the pitched sounding body produced by the monochord. 
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slatement that "the major sixth proceeds from the major third". The theory 
here is that the octave should be divided at the major fourth, thus 
allowing the major sixth to be seen as a repetition of the major third in the 
upper half of the octave. According to Rameau, "This completely upsets the 
order of harmony, since the octave, which should naturally be divided on 
the lower side by the fifth, is here on the contrary divided on the lower 
side by the fourth." [Treatise, p.21] 
From this position, then, Rameau asserts the perfect fifth as the 
effective second term in harmonic division from the fundamental, thus 
clearing the way for a theory of inversion to explain the relationship 
between the intervals in the lower and upper halves of the octave. Thus, 
he can write, "The fourth is generated by the fifth only through the power 
of the octave, however, just as the minor sixth by the major third, and the 
major sixth by the minor third." [Treatise, p.17] 
However, the reverse of this pattern of derivation is not true - "the 
minor third does not originate in this manner" [ibid.], for the reason that 
.. only the octave, the fifth, and the major third are directly generated by 
the fundamental sound" [ibid. p.15]. In this sense, the minor third is an 
inversion of the major third, moving downwards from the fifth, rather than 
an inversion of the major sixth. The latter would effectively involve a 
strategic "boot-strapping" in the spontaneous generation of two intervals 
by each other, rather than generating them within the sequentinl 
fr·amework of origination which Rameau is proposing. This wrap-round 
quality of inversions mirrored in the fifth thus opens the possibility of a 
coherent theory of major and minor triads. Extending the principle to 
inversions around other, further axes, it is possible to systematize more 
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and more complex chords with smaller intervals, and still retain the basic 
generative principle: "This inversion is found more and more as we 
penetrate into the secrets of harmony. For example, if we begin with 
numbers, which naturally increase in size, we see that in harmony they 
decrease ... [Treatise, p.14] In this sense, as the numeric space which 
describes the harmonics beyond the length of the monochord increases, 
the inversion of intervals around a shifting axis is required to allow the 
harmonics to remain physically accessible on the monochord. Inversion, 
then, allows the continuous, intervallically expanding linear series of the 
natural harmonic geometry to remain a scientific tool of explanation even 
with the smallest movements within the octave - the octave being the first 
harmonic, and therefore the first axis of inversion, followed by the fifth, 
and so on. 
The power of Rameau's concept of inversion, however, goes further, 
facilitating a new, streamlined economy of chord theory with respect to 
function. Throughout the Treatise, he accuses his theoretical 
predecessors, particularly Zarlino, of a wasteful expenditure of terms 
within harmonic theory in respect of the practise of labelling each 
inversion of a chord as a separate harmonic entity. 
Those who have been aware of inversion have not looked into 
its origin, as their rules and their examples prove; for they 
give as many different examples and different rules as there 
are chords. [ ... ] This is how sciences are made obscure. Each 
part is cited separately when all could be brought together. 
[Treatise, p.82] 
According to Rameau, the principle of inversion, and the continual 
articulation of intervals around axes within the octave, effectively means 
lhat the true musical value of a note within a chord lies in its relation to 
the fundamental, rather than in a proportion to an adjacent proportion. 
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This fundamental being either its near or distant source of generation in 
terms of the numeric aspect of harmonic space, but always its immediate 
point of reference in terms of the musical function of that harmonic space. 
Rameau's extension of the theoretical remit to scientize experience itseJf 
provides a theory of aesthetic function which refers back to the theory of 
proportional generation. What he makes clear is that while the proportiono l 
theory of harmonic generation has a significant intertext with aesthetic 
experience, it nevertheless requires a fine-tuning to include the 
psychoacoustic phenomenon which makes a new set of relations between 
the parts of every new heard chord, and yet recognizes the functionol 
unity of different inversions of each chord. 
All the difficulties that Zarlino creates in his harmonic 
operations would not have existed, had he remembered the 
source which he had first proposed. Far from pointing it out 
everywhere, however, he immediately abandons it. Though he 
recalls it in the octave, it is only in passing; though he says 
that this octave is the origin of all intervals, he forgets that 
it is also the origin of the inversion of these intervals, of 
which he speaks in his Harmonic Demonstrations; though he 
acknowledges this inversion, he forgets the inversion of 
chords which is simply its consequence. [Treatise, p.25] 
And again, 
How wonderful is this source in its simplicity! So many 
chords, so many lively melodies, such boundless variety, such 
beautiful and fitting expressions, such well-rendered 
feelings! All this flows from two or three intervals arranged 
by thirds whose source subsists in a single sound. [Treatise, 
p.142] 
Rameau's theory facilitates the classification of different inversions 
of a chord as functionally identical with each other. This is possible 
according to their relationship to a common fundamental which produces 
several possible permutations of a given number of terms, each 
permutation fulfilling the same functional value in a purely vertical sense, 
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11 Without changing the substance of the chord" [Treatise, p.25]. This relies, 
however, on the action of inversion, which must also be seen as the 
condition of possibility for the spacing which constitutes harmony: 
11 inversion is basic to all the diversity possible in harmony" [Treatise, 
p.13] 
The concept of inversion, then, can be seen as a strategy for 
rationalizing the origin of intervals, for assembling a series of spaces and 
distances between points which produce each other according to an 
additive logic, where each new term supplements its previous generative 
origin, in turn becoming the provisional origin of the next supplementary 
term, and so forth. 
Rameau's Treatise, in its Cartesian application of a rigorous 
methodology working outwards from an assumed set of first principles, 
nevertheless makes a significant methodological departure from Descartes 
(aside from the observational dispute over the division of the octave). As 
Charles Lalo has written; 
It is all there; the methodical and even hyperbolic doubt; the 
revelation of a cogito which is here an audio. Only this 
allegedly Cartesian method leads Rameau, contrary to 
Descartes, to experience and to a principle of certitude whose 
value lies entirely in that it exists outside him. [ Esquisse 
d 'une esthetique musicale scien tifique, p.86] 
Descartes, in his famous attempt to doubt the existence of all things, 
posits an (allegedly) irreducible cognating mind at the centre of 
experience, an entity which cannot be doubted into non-existence, since 
it is the source of that doubt itself. This is encapsulated in the phrase 
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cogito ergo sum: "I think, therefore I am .. [2] [Discourse on the Method, in 
Selected Philosophical Writings, p.36]. In place of Descartes' rationally-
derived cogito, however, Lalo claims that Rameau places audition - the 
audio- at the centre of experience. In this sense, Rameau has introduced 
an interval as the source of knowledge -the interval or space which exists 
between the mind and the sounding phenomenon. As the cogito requires 
only itself as both its subject and its object, the displacement produced 
within the audio requires a mind as its subject and a sound as its object. 
This introduction of an "inside" and an "outside" to the action of 
knowledge, a One and an Other, is also the possibility of an introduction 
of dialectics, with audition forming the mid-term, the duct or space of 
passage, between the first and final terms. 
In this refutation of the absoluteness of the cogito, Rameau 
demonstrates his theoretical links with other thinkers of the post-
Cartesian period, specifically the empiricist writings of John Locke, made 
known to francophone theorists largely through Voltaire's Philosophical 
Letters (1734). Of the mind, Locke wrote: "Whence has it all the materials 
of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience. 
In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives 
itself." [Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p.89] However, Rameau 
is not so easily classified as a 11 TotaL" Empiricist; his theory hinges on a 
dual articulation of Lockean experience and Cartesian reason. This is 
[2] H. is easy to see how a linguistically-based theory such as Peirce's 
would immediately posit that this is not an absolute foundation, since in 
order for the cogitating self to propose the thought of the cogito, it has to 
rely on the existence of signification. The self is, then, the sum of its 
language, as Peirce would have it. In this way, it can be argued that the 
self is not an irreducible unity, but an irreducible multiplicity of 
signifiers. 
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asserted in the Treatise of Harmony, 
We may judge music only through our hearing, and reason 
has no authority unless it is in agreement with the ear; yet 
nothing should be more convincing to us than the union of 
both in our judgements. We are naturally satisfied by our ear, 
while the mind is satisfied by reason. Let us judge nothing 
then except by their mutual agreement. [Treatise, p.138] 
This need for a harmonization of the interval between perception 
and judgement in musical matters has a distinct manner of operation from 
the physical sciences, by virtue of the fact that music is an aesthetic 
science. The action of judgement not only distinguishes music from the 
"technological" sciences in the precise positioning of its concept of 
experience, but also opens the way to the social aspect of music, and the 
distinction of music's sociality from the material advancement of humanity 
which science purports to provide. We can also sense a resonance in the 
following of a position which claims that while the scientific realm is that 
purely of numerical quantity, music, by its aesthetic aspect, comprises not 
only number or quantity, but the energy of qualities. Music is the Art of 
Science. 
Now although experience alone is capable of convincing us, 
music is not like many other sciences, in which our senses 
perceive things in an unambiguous manner. Someone may 
approve of a chord which displeases someone else. Hence 
arise conflicting opinions [ ... ] and who can vouch that the 
man who is boasting of his consummate experience enjoys 
perfect accuracy of hearing? [Treatise, p.119] 
Rameau's interest in basing the science of music on the spatial 
phenomenon of the vibrating string, therefore, does not open the way to 
a sensual anarchy. Rather, a need for generalized principles and standards 
is felt; a sensus communis of some order is necessary to this science. 
Gentlemen devoting their attention to the experience of sound must have 
an objective rule. In this sense, reason tempers experience. Indeed, 
Hameau writes that "reason may supplement it" [p.xlviii]. Reason and 
experience, then, are at the dual origin of our musical knowledge, and it 
is their articulation which brings forth the perceived acoustic moment. The 
motif of origination is also strong in Rameau's mind when he writes of the 
harmonic fundamental, that "reason has no power when we are separated 
from the source, and in such a case, experience can only deceive us" 
[Treatise, p.120]. 
In specifically musical terms, however, this particular concept of 
experience leads us directly back to Pythagoras, and to the various 
narratives of his discovery of harmony within phenomena themselves. 
Rameau's own version of this narrative is an allusion at the beginning of 
the Treatise to the monochord: "In order to understand the relationship 
between sounds, investigators took a string, stretched it so that it could 
produce a sound, and divided it with movable bridges into several parts." 
[p.lf] l31 It is the results of this empirical observation which lead to the 
possibility of the discovery of the laws which control harmony, and this is 
achieved when experience is "supplemented", as Ram eau has it, by reason. 
However, the object of reason's operation is the Pythagorean concept of 
Number, thus invoking all the allied notions of arithmetic, accumulation, 
addition, and supplementation; "everything is thus based on the rules of 
arithmetic" [Treatise, p.5]. From this numericism, a complete ontology of 
harmony can be deduced: "The order of origin and perfection of these 
consonances is determined by the order of the numbers" [p.6]. 
()]However, Iamblichus, in his Life of Pythagoras, narrates a version where 
Pythagoras discovers harmony while walking past a brazier's shop and 
investigating the relationship between the size of the beating hammers and 
the pitch of the sound produced. [Pythagorean Source book, p.86] 
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However, once more the fringe between the rational and the 
experiential is displaced when the specifically Pythagorean conception of 
Number (which relates very closely to Rameau,s) is taken into account. 
Unlike the pure abstraction of many other conceptions of Number, the 
Pythagorean reading maintains that Number is immanent; it is not locked 
away in some noumenal realm "behind" reality and only accessible by 
virtue of a tortuous entelechy- a Fall into actuality. Rather, Pythagorean 
Number inheres within phenomena as they present themselves to 
perception. Most significantly, this actualized numericism is made possible 
and evident through the phenomenon of musical harmony, which then 
becomes a model of proportionality for the whole cosmos. As Sto baeus 
relates a fragment from Philolaus; "By means of sensation, Number insti11s 
a certain proportion, and thereby establishes among all things harmonic 
relations 11 [Pythagorean Sourcebook, p.171]. Number, while yet remaining 
a controlling factor (and only in this sense of control could Number be said 
to "produce") is nevertheless present and accessible to the senses [41. rn 
this way, the Pythagorean conception of Number breaches the divide, 
harmonizes the interval between the abstract and the actual, providing a 
kind of continuity between the two, through which the generation of the 
cosmos - the Pythagorean cosmogenesis - becomes possible. Thus, in the 
Pythagorean moment, the absolute division of reason and phenomenon 
which is represented in the Cartesian moment does not occur; the two are 
l41 It is not only Number, however, which is immanent to reality, but also 
the forms of geometry which Plato and others would later separate from 
actuality. As the doxographers recorded: 11 Fire is composed of twenty-four 
right-angled triangles [ ... ] Air is composed of forty-eight triangles [ ... ] 
water is composed of one hundred and twenty triangles" and so forth. [The 
Pythagorean Source book, p.314] 
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bound together in a kind of originary dialectic. 
Rameau's theories are further complicated in respect of the reason-
experience axis in their use of the concept of .. implication... Here the 
themes of appearance and a transcendent reality behind the appearance 
are repeated. Implication is the principle whereby 11 every sound is always 
implied in its octave.. [Treatise, p.ll], so that the function of the 
fundamental remains intact if it is represented by, or transposed to its 
octave. And although Rameau writes of such a chord as 11 less perfect", this 
signifies less of a judgement as to the status of the chord than a statement 
that the chord is less simple, for "the upper sound of the octave should in 
no way be regarded as a source different from that by which it was 
directly generated 11 [p.12]. Through the principle of implication, then, the 
fundamental can retain its proximity to, and generating force over, the 
other intervals despite its absence; not merely through a form of 
structural repetition, but in a similar way to the immanence of Number, the 
fundamental is, it seems, almost involved in what acousticians now call a 
psychoacoustic presence. 
This aspect is presaged in Rameau's text by yet another reworking 
of a passage from Descartes. As is the case with many parts of Descartes' 
Musical Compendium, he often appears to be compelled, by a Pythagorean 
position on music, to be distant from many of his later purely rationalist 
writings, by being forced to admit of the controlling factors of perception 
at the very heart of harmony. As Rameau writes; "Descartes partially 
agrees, saying: 'We never hear any sound without its upper octave 
somehow seeming to strike the ear.' 11 [Treatise, p.ll]. This explicit 
statement of a psychoacoustic image, however, has its terms inverted by 
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Rameau, with the upper sound structurally implying the lower. It is at this 
specific point that Rameau's theory bridges the interval betwc,~n 
appearance and underlying reality, since this perceptual phenomenon is 
generated by the action of already manifest Number, with Number and 
sound in an immanent symbiosis. 11 Experience, in addition, which makes us 
feel that a chord consisting of the third and fifth is always perfect and 
complete without the octave, still permits us to consider this octave 
implied, since it is the first interval generated." (Treatise, p.12] This 
psychoacoustic moment offers the post-Pythagorean system the possibility 
of an actualized virtual; an immanent abstraction gained, admittedly, by an 
inference, but a dual inference which is equally experiential and rational. 
Thus, in the concept of harmony, at its very root, is the originary 
articulation of an interval, an articulation which can be characterized as 
dialectical in its resolution of the difference between one side of a space 
and the other, but also a dialectic which is generative, accumulative. This 
dialectic is operative within the Pythagorean cosmogenesis, the originary 
dialectic which assembles the whole cosmos, and in which is given the 
image of all Pythagorean systems, whether of music, politics, justice, 
morality, physics, or medicine. The cosmogenesis is the process whereby 
the Monad, representing unity and limitedness, splits into the Dyad, 
representing multiplicity and unlimitedness, and generates the third term 
which represents the harmony of unity and multiplicity, the harmony of 
the limited and the unlimited. Across this cosmic axis, we can also find 
inscribed, as Timaeus puts it, the "mixture of two forces, the Same and the 
Different, [which] became the origin of motion 11 [The Pythagorean 
Sourcebook, p.289]. However, there remains an originary difference 
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bclween the Same and the Different, which is nevertheless broached, or 
articulated, by the dialectical action of harmony, there by ensuring the 
priority of the Same, the Monad, which comes before all, and gives rise to 
all in a sense by tapping the possibility of the interval between it and t.hc 
Different, or the Dyad (which it produces). In the cosmogenesis, then, the 
Same reproduces itself by utilizing the power of harmony to access the 
power of the Different, and subordinate it to its own law. Yet this 
Pythagorean articulation is achieved without destroying the originary 
interval between the two principles upon which the whole process depends 
and can begin once more; "The true nature of existence, how everything 
passes and returns" [The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p.164] 
A highly significant aspect of this cosmogonical "true nature" is a 
certain anthropomorphism which operates at its centre, made explicit in the 
writings of the doxographers; "the first principle of numbers is in 
substance the first Monad, which is a male monad, begetting as father all 
other numbers. Secondly the dyad is a female number, and the same is 
cctlled by the mathematicians even. Thirdly, the Triad is a male number." 
[The Pythagorean Source book, p.312] [S] It is highly significant here, as 
a general component of dialectical structures, that the original term 
produces its opposite precisely in order to replicate its own structure at 
the final level, thus (in this instance) enclosing the whole dialectic withjn 
a male order. The originary difference which is represented by the 
production of a female Other by a male origin gives rise to the famous 
[51 Further elaborations of this process exist, however, with images of 
numbers right up to 10, the Decad. However, differing accounts of these 
principles exist, as Iamblichus' Theology of Numbers gives the Monad as 
male-female, which nevertheless could imply that the male contains the 
female, given that the Monad is the "first" term of the series. 
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Pythagorean .. Table of Opposites ... Here, a series of essential attributes are 
delineated according to their association with one or the other gender. In 











Of course, this table is the prime generator of all the dualisms which 
we encounter in Plato's Cave, with real objects being aligned with the left 
column, and their representations on the right. Enlightened perception of 
an object, which involves the interpretation of its representation, would 
then be the dialectical reproduction of the original object within the 
perceiving mind. In Iamblichus' Theology of Numbers, the third term which 
is produced from the originary difference between the male and the female 
principles is given the names of Harmonia, Marriage, Knowledge, The Mean 
Between Two Extremes, and The All [The Pythagorean Source book, p.322]. 
It is in this cosmic marriage that a long history of dialectics can be read, 
from Pythagoras through Plato, to Hegel, Marx, etc. The problem of 
dialectical anthropomorphism, however, is not confined to, does not have 
its 11 origin 11 in Pythagoras, and it seems to have been prevalent across 
cultural boundaries during his era as well as subsequent ones. A 
doxographer's account of Pythagoras' meeting with Zoroaster, the 
historical inspiration of an opera by Rameau, as well as a book by 
Nietzsche, has the two ancients agreeing on the anthropomorphic 
cosmogony: 
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there were from the beginning two causes of things: father 
and mother. The father is the light and the mother darkness; 
and the parts of light are warm, dry, light, swift; and of 
darkness are cold, moist, heavy, slow; and of all these the 
universe is composed, of male and female. And he 
[Pythagoras] says that the universe exists in accordance with 
musical harmony, so the sun also makes an harmonious period. 
[ ... ] Zaratus spoke as follows: There are two divinities, one of 
the heavens and one of the earth... (The Pythagorean 
Sourcebook, p.313] 
The complicity of the concept of musical harmony in this 
anthropomorphic dialectic cannot be underestimated. Harmony is indeed, 
within the Pythagorean system, the single universal principle of order, the 
"marriage" of the axial terms of the Table of Opposites. The principle of 
harmony is the reason for the famous Pythagorean concept of the Music of 
the Spheres, by which all heavenly bodies are given their proportions, and 
just intervals are established between them in order that the cosmos be 
arranged without dissonance. This celestial harmony, then, is derived from 
an anthropomorphic image of production, wherein all terms are rationally 
brought within the limits and the law of a single, fundamental term. For 
Pythagorean theorists, music becomes a means of empirical and rational 
research into the structure of Nature, a means of disclosing the 
mechanisms of the universe, discovering the Father at the origin. 
2.2 Voice and Presence 
it is very difficult not to suspect that all our harmony is but 
a gothic and barbarous invention, which we should never 
have followed if we had been more sensible of the true 
beauties of art, and of music truly natural. Mons. Rameau, 
however, pretends that harmony is the source of the greatest 
beauties in music; but this opinion has been contradicted by 
facts and reason. [ ... ] Every thing that only expresses the 
physic of sounds, being greatly bounded in the pleasure 
which it gives us, [has] very little power over the human 
heart. [Dictionary, pp.191-2] 
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In his Dictionary of Music, Jean-Jacques Rousseau characterizes the 
concept of harmony in directly opposite terms to those of Rameau. For 
Housseau, empirical facts and cognitive reason lead one to view harmony 
as a deviation from the true line of Nature, rather than the means of 
uncovering its fundamental structure. Here, the science of "the physic of 
sounds" can only produce a limited knowledge, and this knowledge con 
only produce a limited power over the passions when put into its 
"barbarous" practise. 
Rameau's Treatise opens with the claims that "music is the science 
of sounds", and that therefore 11 sound is the principle subject of music". 
As Rousseau states above, however, sound is not his primary concern. 
Indeed, it is the "power over the human heart" which Rousseau wishes to 
establish as a central concept, and his total opposition to Rameau is 
characterized by an avoidance of the fact that Rameau himself sees this 
"science 11 not in physical, but in aesthetic terms. Rousseau refuses to 
acknowledge the synthesis of reason and feeling which Ram eau establishes. 
In this sense, it is not so much Rameau per se that he objects to, but his 
own specific reading of Rameau; 
So long as one insists on considering sounds only in terms of 
the shock that they excite in our nerves, one will not attain 
the true principle of music, nor its power over men's hearts. 
The sounds of a melody do not affect us merely as sounds, 
but as signs of our affections, of our feelings. It is thus that 
they excite in us the emotions that they express, whose image 
we recognize in it. [Essay, p.60] 
Just as Ram eau proposed that melody has its origin in harmony, 
Rousseau will propose the inverse - the origin of harmony in melody. It is 
through this manoeuvre that Rousseau will achieve his aim of explaining 
r.tusic's "power over men's hearts". At the root of the theory is the concept 
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of representation. His claim is that melody does not affect the body 
through some form of harmonic resonance, but that melodic affectivity is 
governed by the signification of "feelings 11 , which are transmitted from a 
source to a destination. He states that the melodic "signs of our affections 
[ ... ] excite in us the emotions they express, whose image we recognize 11 • In 
order to unravel Rousseau's theory, then, it is necessary to engage with 
his positioning of the concept of representation. In Derrida's 
deconstruction of Rousseau, the most crucial aspect of his representational 
aesthetic is that within the theory of language, although certain musical 
resonances are never wholly absent: 
Languages are made to be spoken, writing serves only as a 
supplement to speech. [ ... ] Speech represents thought by 
conventional signs, and writing represents the same with 
regard to speech. Thus the art of writing is nothing but a 
mediated representation of thought. [Essay, quoted in 
Grammatology, p.144] 
In this elaboration on Plato's Cave, Rousseau defines language as the 
representation of thought. However, language is itself divided into two 
components: speech and writing. Further, each component of language has 
its own representational mode, defined according to the order of the 
interval between thought and representation. Speech represents thought 
directly, but writing only represents thought indirectly, given that 
writing is primarily a representation of speech, which is in turn a 
representation of thought. Thus, with Rousseau, representation has two 
modes; the one authentic and the other inauthentic. What is crucial here 
is that the determination of a representational system as one or the othP-r 
is dependant on the proximity of representation and represented object; 
in other words, the key factor in the structure of inauthent.ic 
representation is the existence of an intervallic mechanism, whereas the 
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key factor in the structure of authentic representation is the lack of an 
interval. 
The theory of language which is implicated in the above quotation 
goes well beyond the aesthetic level of representation, becoming involved 
in a series of much wider metaphysical concerns. For instance, if we now 
consider the dynamics of this system in relation to the agencies which 
initiate either speech or writing, we find ourselves within the metaphysics 
of Being. Simply put, speech (authentic representation) is made possible 
by the presence of the speaker who represents their thoughts to the 
listener directly. On the other hand, writing (inauthentic representation) 
is possible in the absence of a writer who represents their thoughts to a 
reader in a mediated fashion. Let us trace the dynamics of these two 
circumstances through a series of texts. 
In French, the word meaning "to hear", entendre, carries on 
additional meaning: "to understand". It is the action of this simultaneous 
hearing-and-understanding which elevates the spoken word above the 
level of writing; the reflexivity of the word with the thought ensures a 
kind of hermetically-sealed package of communication, one which 
circumvents the intervallic dangers of the Platonic shadow. As Derrida 
writes (paraphrasing and thus assembling a reading of Rousseau), the 
spoken sign can authentically represent an absent object, through the 
metaphysics of vocal signification; 
Voice penetrates into me violently, it is the privileged route 
for forced entry and interiorization, whose reciprocity 
produces itself in the "hearing-oneself-speak," in the 
structure of the voice and of interlocution. [ ... ] The 
self-presence of the voice and the "hearing-oneself-speak" 
conceals the very thing that visible space allows to be placed 
before us. The thing disappearing, the voice substitutes an 
acoustic sign for it which can, in the place of the object taken 
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away, penetrate profoundly into me, to lodge there "in the 
depth of the heart. 11 It is the only way of interiorizing the 
phenomenon; by transforming it into akoumene ... 
[ Grammatology, p.240] 
However, within this forceful semiotic penetration of sound into the 
body, this interiorizing of the phenomenon by "transforming it into on 
akoumene", the Pythagorean spectre is raised once more, this time within 
Rousseau's system. The Pythagorean term akoumenon invokes a whole 
series of associations within the structure of the Table of Opposites. As one 
may imagine from Derrida's characterization of the term as a penetrational 
element, it can be placed on the originary side of the Table, as a masculine 
term. It is worth noting here that, according to the doxographers, 
Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle all claim that both "sound is immaterial" 
and "the power of seed is immaterial" [Pythagorean Sourcebook, p.311, 
ernphases added]. Thus, both sound and seed fall within the same 
structure, and vocal signification begins to take on a phallocentric aspect: 
semiotic insemination. 
The very structure of Pythagorean education was based on this 
principle, involving a division of students into two categories according 
to their relationship to the voice of the lecturer. The mathematikoi studied 
at an advanced level, and were expected to engage in research of their 
own. They were also expected to de bate points with each other and their 
lecturer. In other words, there was for them an exchange of vocal power 
with the lecturer - the possibility of disputation. However, the less 
advanced group, the akousmatikoi, were forbidden any vocal power of 
their own. According to Iamblichus, 
The philosophy of the Hearers [ akousmatiko11 consisted in 
lectures without demonstrations or conferences or arguments, 
merely directing something to be done in a certain way, 
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unquestioningly preserving them as so many divine dogmas, 
non-discussable, and which they promised not to reveal, 
esteeming as most wise those who more than others retained 
them. [Pythagorean Sourcebook, p.77] 
Thus, the akousmatikoi were the passive receptacles of seminal 
knowledge, and the propagation of this knowledge was achieved through 
the vocal authority of the lecturer. This Pythagorean system is a complete 
study in the voice-politics of authenticity and continues today in the 
lecture-seminar distinction. In a commentary on Nietzsche, Derrida 
describes the metaphysics of the lecture schema; 
the student writes as he listens [ ... ] dangles by the umbilical 
cord of the university [ ... ]Dream this umbilicus: it holds you 
by the ear which dictates to you what you presently write 
when you write according to that mode called 'taking notes .• 
In fact the mother- the bad or false one whom the teacher, in 
his capacity qua functionary of the State, can only simulate-
yet the mother dictates to you precisely that which, passing 
through your ear moves along the cord as far as your 
stenography. This in turn links you, like a leash in the form 
of an umbilical cord, to the paternal belly of the State. Your 
pen is its pen; you hold its teleprinter as you hold those 
ballpoints in the post office which are attached to chains. And 
all the motions are induced through the body of the father 
representing (figurant) the alma mater. How can an umbilical 
cord create a link to this cold monster that is a dead father-
or the State? This is what is unheimlich. [All Ears: Nietzsche 's 
Otobiographies, pp.247 /8] 
Rousseau •s aesthetic relies on precisely these mechanisms of direct, 
organic communication, and specifically at the moment where the written 
sign is caught within the law of the phonic sign. His d_efinition of vocal 
signification turns upon the concept of sound as an indicator of presence, 
coupled with the unity of sound and meaning; 11as soon as vocal signs 
strike your ear, they announce to you a being like yourself. They are, so 
to speak, the organs of the soul." [Essay, p .63] Vocal signification, then, 
is an authentic representation of thought, wherein the soul can 
communicate, through the immediate medium of sound, directly with 
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another soul. In other words, the voice can overcome the interval between 
speaker and listener, reducing space to a single point of meaning 
experienced at absolute proximity by two souls drawn together in a unison. 
It is this metaphysics of the voice which sets it against the structure of 
harmony and of spacing. 
At the centre of this system is the action of the logos, or "unified 
utterance" of the Ancient Greeks[6]. It is in this sense that Derrida 
characterizes Rousseau 's theory as logocentric. Equally, we can describe 
it as phonocentric, in its prioritization of the phonic power of sound, over 
the sonic. Derrida reads Rousseau as invoking 
the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a 
phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice 
and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of 
meaning. [ ... ] phonocentrism merges with the historical 
determination of the meaning of being in general as presence 
[Grarnmatology, pp.ll-12] 
In Rousseau 's system, then, the metaphysics of presence lead to the 
concept of speech as the origin of language. By a parallel move, and one 
which derives from Rousseau 's position contra-Rameau, the origin of music 
is given as melody rather than harmony. This is the move characterized by 
Paul de Man as rnelocentric [Allegories of Reading, p.88] This prioritization 




1 In James Hutton 's translation of Aristotle's Poetics, logos is translated 
as 11 unified utterance"; ''A unified utterance is a composite significant 
sound" [Poetics, p.67] cf. footnote 20.2: "By 'letter' Aristotle here means 
the sound and not the written symbol. The word translated as 'unified 
utterance' is logos, which, as defined by Aristotle below in accordance with 
Greek usage, includes every significant combination of words from the 
single phrase to the complete poem or oration." Logos therefore combines 
the written and spoken parts of a word, and subjects them to a unification 
with other words where there is a uni-vocal meaning throughout those 
words. In this sense, it is less of a harmonizing action, since that depends 
on a chaining of differences, than an attempt to bring several components 
into absolutely unified space. 
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the debate known as the Querelle des Bouffons (Quarrel of the Buffoons). 
Both Rameau and Rousseau were implicated in this argument which turnP-ci 
on whether or not the Italian or the French style of operatic composition 
was superior, with the former characterised as melodic and thus vocally 
based, and the latter as harmonic, and thus more instrumental in 
character. Within this context, Rousseau wrote of Rameau's harmonic theory 
as a scientific pseudo-art, devoid of the "organs of the soul" which can 
only be accessed through the phonocentric power of vocal melody; 
What are we to say to a painter sufficiently devoid of feeling 
and taste to think like that, stupidly restricting the 
pleasurable character of his art to its mere mechanics? What 
shall we say of a musician, similarly quite prejudiced, who 
considers harmony the sole source of the greatness of music? 
Let us consign the first to house-painting and condemn the 
other to doing French opera. [Essay, p.55] 
In aesthetic terms, Rousseau's phonocentrism leads him to develop 
a theoretical alliance between language and music. As we will see, a 
component of Rousseau's theory is the grafting onto music of a 
representational capacity, accessed through the communicational power of 
the logos. This is inspired by a nostalgia for Ancient Greek music, and is 
established in opposition to the "scientific" aspects of Rameau's Modern 
harmonics. This phonocentric view of music, however, is counter-historical, 
even sentimental, in its attempt to reinstate the condition of a past epoch. 
In a move which places him in line with the familiar theory of the union of 
poetry and music in Ancient Greek times, he claims that "in a language 
[like ... ] the Greek at the beginning, the difference between the speaking 
and singing voices would be nil. We should have the same voice for 
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speaking and singing."[?] [quoted in Grammatology: p. 108 J 
In this, we can read yet another of Rousseau's attempts to reduce 
the differential space of two terms. Just as speech can reduce the interval 
belween two souls, the historical concept of the originary singing voice 
can bring the media of language and music into an aesthetic unison. Tli\JS, 
a:-:; language has its origin in speech, and music in melody, their mutual 
origin is in a form of melodic speech; "at first, there was no music but 
melody and no other melody than the varied sounds of speech." [Essay, 
[?] Hume's reaction to the Rousseauist concept of an ideal past is as follows: 
"The state of nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not 
unlike that of the golden age, which poets have invented; only with this 
difference, that the former is describ'd as full of war, violence and 
injustice; whereas the latter is painted out to us, as the most charming and 
most peaceable condition, that can possibly be imagin'd. The seasons, in 
that first age of nature, were so temperate, if we may believe the poets, 
that there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with cloaths and 
houses as a security against the violence of heat and cold. The rivers 
flow'd with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and natur.-c 
spontaneously produc'd her greatest delicacies. Nor were these the chief 
advantages of that happy age. The storms and tempests were not aln11e 
remov'd from nature; but those more furious tempests were unknown to 
human breasts, which now cause such uproar, and engender such 
confusion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never heard of: 
Cordial affection, compassion, sympathy, were the only movements, with 
which the human mind was yet acquainted. Even the distinction of mine and 
thine was banish'd from that happy race of mortals, and carry'd with thcrn 
the very notions of property and obligation, justice and injustice. This, no 
doubt, is to be regarded as an idle fiction" [A Treatise of Human Nature, 
pp.193/4] Here, Hume pillories the Rousseauist concepts of ontological unity 
and sameness, suggesting instead the reality of difference; the differen1.;e 
bclween the "mine" and the "thine", the difference between justice and 
injustice, etc. Note also the scepticism about the particular conceptio11 of 
virtue which binds itself in to sameness. For Rousseau, virtue is to be 
found in sameness, in continuity, but for Hume, it is found in difference. 
As Derrida himself has said, even if deconstruction is not a scepticism per 
se, "Hume [ ... ] proposed a kind of philosophy of difference - that inter0.~:;1 s 
~r~e greatly." [ed. Wood, Derrida and Differance, p.145] As Simon Critchley 
points out, scepticism does not operate through dialectics, and this in 
itself results in a form of differance [The Ethics of Deconstruction, 
pp.159/60]. Much hangs on the post-structuralism or otherwise of 
deconstruction, and the Humean moment which Norris problematizes is one 
crucial point of articulation to which we return at various later points. 
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p.50] The network of connections which Rousseau establishes is held 
together by the concept of a speech-melodic origin, where intervals are 
reduced to a unison. We saw above in connection with the phallic law of the 
Pythagorean akoumenon, that the unison of sound and meaning is absolute. 
As Derrida points out, Rousseau,s nostalgia is for a golden age which was 
"an epoch of natural languages, of the neume." ( Grammatology, p.279]. This 
epoch is to a degree recoverable for Rousseau in his time through the 
agency of vocal music. In song, the penetration of the phone into the 
organs of the hearing body are a reassuring reminder of the certainty of 
presence. The particular order of the voice which is at the undivided 
origin of both language and music is, according to Derrida, described by 
Housseau in the Dictionary article on "Neume"; 
It is on this onto-theological model that Rousseau regulates 
his repetitions of origin. With this exemplary model of a pure 
breath (pneuma) and of an intact life, of a song and on 
inarticulate language, of speech without spacing, we have, 
even if it is placeless [atopique] or utopian, a paradigm 
suitable to our measure. We can name and define it. It is the 
neume: pure vocalization, form of an inarticulate song without 
speech, whose name means breath, which is inspired in us by 
God and may address only Him. The Dictionary of Music 
Defines it as such ... [ Grammatology, p.249] 
In this way, we can discern the gradual unfolding of Rousseau,s 
general system, with its base in the ultimate origin of a mysterious 
"inarticulate song" (the breath of God), followed by a division of the 
originary category into speech and melody. These two categories retain 
their proximity to the source, and therefore remain authentic derivatives 
of neumatic song. For Rousseau, the gradual disintegration of his mytho-
historical schema occurs at the point when the two derivatives of the 
origin are themselves further divided, thus splitting their products off 
from the origin. As we have seen, the disaster for language occurs at the 
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point when writing cuts the immediacy of the connection between thought 
and representation which speech offers. There is thus a positive and a 
negative form of language. In music, the disaster occurs when the science 
of harmony comes to replace the natural state of melody. Rousseon 
describes the disaster as a Fall from the paradise of Greek aesthetic unity; 
Melody being forgotten, and the attention of musicians being 
completely turned toward harmony, everything gradually 
came to be governed according to this new object. The 
genres, the modes, the scale, all received new faces. Harmonic 
successions came to dictate the sequence of parts. This 
sequence having usurped the name of melody, it was, in 
effect, impossible to recognize the traits of its mother in this 
new melody. And our musical system having thus gradually 
become purely harmonic, it is not surprising that its oral tone 
[accent] has suffered, and that our music has lost almost all 
its energy. Thus we see how singing gradually became an art 
entirely separate from speech, from which it takes its origin; 
how the harmonics of sounds resulted in the forgetting of 
vocal inflections; and finally, how music, restricted to purely 
physical concurrences of vibrations, found itself deprived of 
the moral power it had yielded when it was the twofold voice 
of nature. [Essay, p.71] 
With Rameau's assertion that "melody arises from harmony", in short, 
with the advent of harmonic signification, music has become truncated with 
respect to its vital force, the moral power of the melodic voice has been 
displaced by a representationally silent algebra of vibrations. The sin of 
harmony is its scientific materialism, its negation of the metaphysical 
essence and vitalism of the voice. Writing specifically of Rameau, Rousseau 
comments that "what is worse, in all his music, is that harmony is the 
unique foundation of art, that melody derives from it, and that all the 
grand effects of music are born of harmony alone." [Examination, in 
Grammatology, p.211/2] According to Rousseau, harmony, not only in itself, 
but also in an action upon meaning, places a distance, a space, at the 
centre of music, which partakes not only of an immorality which defaces 
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the maternal body of sound which is melody, but equally dislocates the 
representational integrity of that maternal body. To allege that harmony 
precedes melody is tantamount to declaring that the child gives birth to 
its mother. 
Rousseau's reading is of a Rameau who has totally rejected the 
horizontal parameter which is the medium for the continuity and 
self-proximity of the undivided, original and authentic articulation of the 
voice in its representation of the affections. By concentrating on harmony, 
Rameau has debased music by castrating it of its natural vitality (which is 
based in controlled reserve rather than expenditure), and by placing the 
space at the centre, rather than the line. In other words, placing harmony 
at the centre of music silences the melodic voice, substitutes the derivative 
term for the originary, places absences where there should be presence 
(pure, undivided, and univocal), and opens the condition of possibility for 
instrumental music. 
For Rousseau, harmonic or instrumental representation signifies a 
precipitous danger. That is, the representation of the source, the 
fundamental, the origin, by distant, a-proximate means. Rousseau's fear is 
a fear of the repetition of the origin in a new register. His authentic 
representational apparatus would have the origin made absolutely 
proximate to the destination. He would 11 excite in the soul the same 
movement 11 , or in Pythagorean terms, excite the movement of the Same in 
order to inhibit the movement of the Different. This limitation of difference 
is the closure of the interval to deny the spacing action of harmony. 
Rousseau's proposal is that we return as closely as possible to the 
originary voice, but not only by prioritizing speech and song over writing 
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and instrumental music. In a theory of evolution, Rousseau alleges a 
southern origin for humanity, the ramification being that as one moves 
from the south to the north, one moves from originary languages towards 
derivative languages. Thus, the more originary, melodic qualities of the 
li.rJlian style are to be preferred to the more northerly, supplementary 
qualities of the French harmonic style. Once more, we have a recurrence 
of lhe narrative of the Fall from paradise: 
for as there are languages more or less harmonious, whose 
accents are more or less musical, we take notice also, in these 
languages, that the speaking and singing voices are 
connected or removed in the same proportion. So, as the 
Italian language is more musical than the French, its speaking 
is less distant from song [quoted in Grammatology, p.198] 
Here, we begin to discern the two series of opposing terms which 
Derrida locates at the axiological centre of Rousseau's thinking, born from 
the dual origins of Pythagoras' Table and Plato's Cave: 
At the pole of the origin, at the greatest proximity to the 
birth of language, there is the chain origin-life-south-
summer-heart-passion-accentuation-vowel-metaphor-song, 
etc. At the other pole, to the extent that one departs from the 
origin: decadence-illness-death-north-winter-cold-reason-
articulation-consonant-correctness-prose-writing. [Margins 
of Philosophy, p.147] 
The whole debate between Rousseau and Rameau turns on the 
question of the intervals between these series, the interval in general. For 
Rousseau, there must be a stylistic reduction of the interval in music by 
adopting southern melodic techniques, for this brings us closer to the 
odginary unison of language and music, and thus to the voice of Nature. 
In asserting the presence of the voice, Rousseau ensures the negation of 
absence. In other words, through closing off difference, the farther 
reaches of harmony as represented by dissonance are not possible. 
This closure of all intervallic movements is contrasted to Rameau's 
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rationalisation of dissonance and thus multiplication of intervals; as 
Rameau writes of the harmonic origin: "dissonances are also related to this 
source. Since all dissonances are generated by adding a new sound to the 
first chord, which always subsists in its full perfection, this is easily 
tested. Reason alone, therefore, suffices to authorize dissonance and to 
determine its use." [Treatise, p.l40] According to Rameau, the fundamental 
in fact produces, by virtue of its serial, additive capacity, all sounds, 
whether consonant or dissonant. The values are classified according to 
their proximity to the original fundamental: the closer to the origin, the 
more consonant, while the further the distance to the source gets, the more 
dissonant. It is the logic of additive derivation which produces all 
discards, and it is reason which creates, in tandem with audition, the 
conditions for the judgement of these sounds. It is this extensional 
possibility within harmony which Rousseau cannot face. 
In the following quotation from Rameau's Treatise, it becomes clear 
that the great Querelle not only encompasses an opposition of rival claims 
to the concepts of the Natural, the Ancient, the Rational, and so forth, but 
also a contest over the concept of music's representation of the passions; 
"Harmony may unquestionably excite different passions in us depending 
on the chords that are used. There are chords which are sad, languishing, 
tender, gay, and surprising. There are also certain progressions of chords 
which express the same passions." [Treatise, pp.154/156] It is important to 
note, then, that Rameau does not deny music's "power over men's hearts". 
Rousseau's reading of Rameau yields a Rameau who has not so much done 
away with all representation in music, but one who initiates a different 
departure, a mode of representation in a new register, further away from 
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the voice. Rousseau 's Rameau produces a musical representation which, in 
its harmonicity, is in the inauthentic mode, and is thus the structural 
equivalent of writing. Just as "writing serves only as a supplement to 
speech", so harmony is derivative of melody - harmony "supplements" 
melody. Rameau 's crime against Reason is to place music within a system of 
representation which is a supplementary one~ which acts within the 
orchestra and places the voice in an absence - the voice is negated by 
instrumental music through the mediumship of distance, being 
inadequately represented by the instrument. Rameau 's representation of 
the passions through harmonic means is therefore an artificial ruse 
depleting, diffusing, the immediacy of authentic Nature. Thus, for 
Rousseau, harmonic mimesis is sophistry rather than rhetoric, and 
instrumental music is the ontological equivalent of writing. 
Another issue should be addressed here within this lexis of mimesis, 
one which appears equally problematic for Rousseau 's critique, but is 
actually accommodated by him within the concept of supplementarity ~ 
through the doubling of the meaning of a concept to incorporate both an 
authentic and an artificial face. It remains a fact that Rameau not only does 
suggest an aesthetic, affective power in music, but that he also cites the 
power of the melodic aspect of music. In a passage which could almost be 
looking forward to a time when Rousseau will read it as a direct 
provocation, Rameau writes that; 
Melody has no less expressive force than harmony, but giving 
definite rules for its use is almost impossible, since good taste 
plays a greater part in this than anything else. We shall leave 
to privileged geniuses the pleasure of distinguishing 
·themselves in this domain on which depends almost all the 
strength of sentiment. We hope that those able men to whom 
we have said nothing new will not bear us ill-will for having 
revealed the secrets of which they wished perhaps to be the 
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sole trustees. Our little knowledge does not permit us to 
argue with them about this last degree of perfection, without 
which the most beautiful harmony may become insipid. 
[Treatise, pp.155/6] 
Within a Rousseauist reading, this melody of which Ram eau writes is 
still nevertheless debased by the action of the supplement - it is a falJP.n 
kind of melody, which Rousseau will read thus: "this sequence having 
usurped the name of melody, it was, in effect, impossible to recognize the 
traits of its mother in this new melody" [Essay, p.71]. This usurpation is 
complicitous with the unnatural derivation of this deformed melody, with 
the origin of melody lying, for Rameau, in harmony, as a continuation of the 
above quote testifies: we begin with harmony, and "derive from it a 
melody". Still further on, Rameau provides us with a theatrical metaphor 
for this representational supplementarity: 
A good musician should surrender himself to all the 
caracteres he wishes to portray. Like a skilful actor, he 
should take the place of the speaker, believe himself to be at 
the locations where the different events he wishes to depict 
occur, and participate in these events as do those most 
involved in them. He must declaim the text well, at least to 
himself, and must feel when and to what degree the voice 
should rise or fall, so that he may change his melody, 
harmony, modulation, and movement accordingly. [Treatise, 
p.156] 
Through this supplementary ruse, then, the instrumental musician 
skilfully deceives the onlooker by his substitutional science into believing 
the false representation to be the real thing. What makes matters worse 
here for a Rousseauist reading is the instrumental actor,s complicity in his 
own deception - his deception can only trick the onlooker if he first tricks 
himself. Of course, it is obvious that on Rameau,s stage, we will indcP.d 
witness melody, but again the action of the supplement charges these 
terms with a positive aspect and a negative aspect- the actor supplements 
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the speaker, he should "take the place of' the authentic source, and 
displace it, generate a representational interval between the originary 
voice and its expression. 
Rameau's "voice" is here an instrumental metaphor substituted for 
the organic referent. In this sense, Rameau raises the possibility of a 
reading of the concept of the voice which assembles a full supplementarity, 
reinscribing the term outwith the structure of the origin. This is whnt 
Housseau attempts to attenuate in his constant repetitions of originary 
structures, and yet, as Derrida's deconstruction will now indicate, this is 
also what his system will inevitably fail to avoid. 
f·3 The Originary Interval 
Either writing was never a simple "supplement," or it is 
urgently necessary to construct a new logic of the 
"supplement." [ Grammatology, p. 7] 
As we have seen above, Rousseau's main interest is in polemically 
assembling the logic of the origin as a positive force and the logic of the 
supplement as a negative force. What Derrida proposes is to begin the 
deconstruction of Rousseau's theory by reinscribing the concept of the 
supplement in order to displace its position within originary logic. It is 
important to realise that Rousseau's whole system (in Derrida's reading) 
depends on the opposition of the concepts origin and supplement. It will 
therefore not be adequate to simply repeat this opposition at another level, 
merely by reversing the system to provide a "positive" reading of the 
supplement (an undeconstructed return to Rameau). Neither will it be 
adequate to synthesize the two terms through the action of a dialectic - os 
we have seen, dialectical structures rely on the repetition of the structure 
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of the first term through the body of the second term. Thus, if the 
opposition is to be deconstructed successfully, other strategies will have 
tu be put into place, and the structure of opposition itself will have to be 
transgressed. Just as Rousseau sets up the series of ontological 
oppositions between melody and harmony, origin and supplement, presence 
and absence, the logic of the deconstructed supplement must result in a 
formula of the following order: 11 the supplement is neither a presence nor 
an absence. No ontology can think its operation. 11 [ Grammatology, p.314] 
This deconstructed logic of supplementarity can be thought of as being an 
alternative (but without opposition) to the logic of origination. However, 
in its rethinking of supplementarity outside of the structure of opposition, 
it is equally an alternative to the logic of Rousseau's undeconstructed 
supplement, which is contained within the originary system as a negative 
term. Nevertheless, deconstruction occurs at the level of the text itself, 
and so a further layer of reading is required in order to achieve a 
redistribution of Rousseau's terms. 
As we have seen above, Rousseau is concerned with a history of 
music's Fall from an Ancient original state of melodic Naturality to a 
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Modern, supplementary state of harmonic perversion[&]. However, a close 
reading of Rousseau's texts will yield a seemingly innocent but 
nevertheless devastating slippage which occurs at several points. For 
instance, in the Dictionary of Music, Rousseau admits that, with regard to 
the theory of his beloved Ancients, "[in] the ancient treatises we have 
remaining [ ... ] harmony would be very difficult to distinguish from 
melody." [pp.186-7]. Such an admission that the opposition of melody t.o 
harmony may not always have been so clear cut, and that this elision 
occurs precisely during the historical context for the mythical Golden Age, 
means that we have to proceed carefully. Much rests on Rousseau's 
insistence on the opposition of melody to harmony, and by implication, 
speech to writing, nature to culture, virtue to evil, and so forth. However, 
a further passage from the Dictionary, and one from no less a source thon 
the article on "Melody", extends the degree of the problematic yet further; 
Melody has reference to two different principles, according 
to the manner in which we consider it. Taken in the 
connection of sounds, and by the rules of the mode, it has ils 
principles in harmony; since it is an harmonic analysis which 
gives the degrees of the gamut[ ... ] but when taken as an nrt 
[B) In this context, it is interesting to note the apparent acceptance of 
certain Rousseauisms by his latter-day namesake, Jean-Jacques Nattiez, 
particularly in the article Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music? To begin 
with, a distinction between the concept of narrative modes in literab1re 
and music is defined as "a clear ontological difference" [p.242]. Further, 
Nattiez asserts that while linguistic narrative can "speak directly to us" 
[ihid.], musical narrative is "an ontological illusion" [p.245]. What is also 
striking is the idea that listeners and readers supply a presence in the 
in Lervallic space of a representational absence- they act as "a 'gap-filler'" 
[p.249]. This, of course, is the action of "reconstruction" which marks 
Nc:tttiez out as a semiological structuralist very much in the Rousseauist 
tradition. In this article, Nattiez also describes a critical approach to 
Schumann as an attempt to 11 penetrate the mysteries of his creative 
process." [Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music, p.256, emp. add.] With 
this least post-structuralist of sentiments, one wonders if Nattiez could 
even manage to penetrate to the deep structure of a "universal constant 
of human pleasure" [ibid., p.257] in Derrida's work. 
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of imitation [ ... ] another principle must be sought for it [ ... ] 
the same which makes the tone of the voice vary when we 
speak [Dictionary, pp.227-8] 
Rousseau attempts to define the most crucial aspect of melody as its 
imitative aspect - that which operates through the phonocentric action of 
the voice. This is the aspect of melody and of language which he definP.s 
as the essential and the originary. However, note the admission that, 
regardless of his historical desires, melody is structurally based on 
harmony. This simple admission which is so seemingly obvious to anyone 
acquainted with the basics of musical theory, nevertheless has a 
devastating effect for Rousseau's metaphysics, where so much rests on the 
integrity of the vocal origin. Rousseau at once defines melody as the 
historical and even moral origin of music, but also mentions that harmony 
precedes melody in the structural sense. In other words, he admits 
(effectively in parentheses) that there is an origin prior to the origin. 
If this is the case, then the melodic origin is in fact the supplement 
of a harmonic origin. Furthermore, if harmony is the origin of melody (as 
Rameau asserts), and if harmony has an essentially supplementary 
slructure which always threatens to rupture originary logic (as Rousseau 
asserts), then there can be no origin at all, only ever an endless 
supplementarity defined by intervallic, harmonic mechanisms. Derrida 
writes; 
in the song melody is originally corrupted by harmony. 
Harmony is the originary supplement of melody. But Rous sea u 
never makes explicit the originarity of the lack that makes 
necessary the addition of the supplement - the quantity anci 
the differences of quantity that always already shape melody. 
[ Grammatology, p.214] 
This character of the harmonic quantities which 11 always already 
shape melody 11 in fact contains a trace of the version of Greek harmonic 
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thinking which is such a pervasive force throughout Rameau's text. For 
within the writings of the Pythagorean theorists, harmony is read as a 
resource for the condition of the possibility of melody - in treating of the 
harmonic structure of the modes, for instance, one is at the same time 
describing the reserve which the economy of melody calls into expenditure 
and exchange. In this sense, harmony is certainly the "originary 
supplement~~ of melody. And as Derrida points out, while Rousseau 11 never 
makes explicit .. the supplement in this sense 11 prior" to the origin and thus 
producing the origin as its own supplement, the trace of this thought 
cannot help appearing in Rousseau's text, almost despite itself. 
The possibility of the structural contradiction suggested by the 
11 0riginary supplement 11 creates a theoretical fissure within Rousseau's 
text; a fissure that, in his deconstructive programme, Derrida works wider 
and wider, in a gradual spreading out of Rousseau's melocentrism into a 
pragmatics of signification. In this sense, Rousseau's text is constituted by 
the condition for its own deconstruction, and this condition is the very 
intervallic structure of harmony -
This fissure is not one among others. It is the fissure: the 
necessity of interval, the harsh law of spacing. It could not 
endanger song except by being inscribed in it from its birth 
and in its essence. Spacing is not the accident of song. Or 
rather, as accident and accessory, fall and supplement, it is 
also that without which, strictly speaking, the song would not 
have come into being. In the Dictionary, the interval is a part 
of the definition of song. It is therefore, so to speak, an 
originary accessory and an essential accident. Rousseau says 
it without wishing to say it. [ Gra.mma.tology, p.200] 
The origin as author effects his own effacement- the very textuality 
of his writing effects the displacement of the authorial voice- 11 Rousseau 
says it without wishing to say it. 11 Elsewhere, Derrida pulls a similar move 
on Aristotle, who 11 says it without saying it, lets it say itself, or rather it 
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lets him say what he says" [Margins of Philosophy, p.56]. In other words, 
it is not the author who speaks through the text, but the condition of 
textuality which opens itself out to write the "author". This deconstructive 
strategy of invoking the condition of intertextuality allows the 
indecidablesto leak out of the text's structural fissures- the textual body 
is displaced from the margins. 
What Derrida does is to reverse the origin to show that it is nothing 
other than one supplement among many; its central role is inherently 
undermined as soon as the flow of signification begins, in that it becomes 
a supplement to its "ensuing" supplement, and invariably the production 
of a "preceding" supplement, and so forth. The flow of harmonic 
signification is constant, and can never be stopped - it is, as Derrirla 
claims, "always already" in motion, and if signification is always already in 
motion, then the origin is always already a supplement, and can never have 
been an origin in actuality. In this sense, the great metaphysical quest for 
the actual origin can only deliver the virtual origin; the origin which is 
teleologically inferred. The actual origin is in fact no origin at all; "The 
supplement is always the supplement of a supplement. One wishes to go 
back from the supplement to the source: one must recognize that there is 
a supplement at the source." [ Grammatology, p.304] Thus, the history of 
the philosophical canon as defined by the search for the origin becomes a 
grand narrative of ontological failures. 
In more explicitly semiotic terms, the trinity of signifier-signified-
referent which derives from Plato's Cave and has the structure of a logic 
of origination, is deconstructed when one reinscribes the referent and the 
signified as signifiers in themselves. The structures of the referent and 
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the signified are totally transformed by their redeployment as signifiers; 
in other words, the origin becomes reinscribed as a supplement. As Derrida 
writes, "the signified is originally and essentially (and not only for a finite 
and created spirit) trace, that it is always already in the position of tl1e 
signifier" [ Grammatology, p.73]. Thus, there is no referent, no signified, 
only signifiers endlessly flowing onto each other in a system which is 
always already in motion and expanding. "The play of the supplement is 
indefinite. References refer to references." [ Grammatology, p.298]. This is 
the Peircean moment of Derridean deconstruction: the movement of the 
supplement. 
It has already been mentioned that the supplement is engaged in a 
certain spacing, in contrast with the authenticity of proximity required for 
the presence of the voice. The supplement represents through displacing 
the immediacy of communication, it is a mediating barrier placed between 
other supplementary units which in turn interrupt and redirect the flows 
of others. It displaces intentionality by releasing energy from a source, in 
turn constituting that energy as a unit in itself, a provisional origin to the 
next supplement, and so forth. This distancing of units across a space is 
of great importance in understanding the disjunctive nature of the 
supplement, since it is this spacing which allows the movement of 
signification across, between and through an intertextual network. 
It may be that the supplement can achieve all of this through the 
structure of the space and the interval. However, if we are to avoid a 
simple reversal of Rousseau's opposition of space to time, harmony to 
melody, then a further strategic layer must be invoked in the 
deconstruction of the supplement. Again, we must be wary of risking a 
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synthesis of musical space and time which is bounded by the structure of 
the dialectic if we are not to simply repeat the priority of harmony in a new 
register. It is time now to assemble the temporality of the supplement, and 
to recall that Derrida states of this indecidable that the "supplement [is] 
another name for differance" [ Grammatology, p.150], and that at other 
points, he writes of "differance as temporalization" [ Grammatology, p. 71 ]. 
Inscribed in the Derridean action of temporalization, is the 
articulation of the opposite terms harmony and melody beyond their 
ontological structures into the space of the deconstructed supplement (the 
supplement under erasure). Within the trace of differance is the condition 
of the possibility of connective movement, of a synthesis which is always 
already in operation, and which finds a point of fusion between the two 
parametric axes. Equally, this synthesis is never completed as a 
programme; it is always in motion, ever partaking of an active 
temporalization; the "movement of differance, irreducible arche-synthesis, 
open[s] in one and the same possibility, temporalization as well as 
relationship with the other" [ Grammatology, p.60]. Supplementary 
differance, then, is a point of articulation between the temporal and the 
spatial: the hinge of differance- La Brisure [ibid., p.65]. And if this is "the 
hinge [ brisure] of language as writing", then it is also the hinge of music 
as harmony [ibid., p.69]. This hinge at the origin is the origin under 
erasure: 
To say that differance is originary is simultaneously to erase 
the myth of a present origin. Which is why "originary" must 
be understood as having been crossed out, without which 
differance would be derived from an original plenitude. It is 
a non-origin which is originary. [ Writing and Difference, 
p.203] 
Here, it is important to not only distinguish between the Rousseauist 
supplement and its deconstructed counterpart, but also between the 
structure of ontological difference and the "arche-synthesis" of 
differance. Ontological difference is that within which the concepts of 
origin, structure and hierarchy are inscribed. This difference has no time, 
or rather, it has a transcendental, rather than actual time. It is this 
economy of static spatiality (as opposed to the serial spatiality of the 
deconstructed supplement) which is deconstructed by the particular 
synthesis of time and space inside the economy of differance. 
Origin of the experience of space and time, this writing of 
difference, this fabric of the trace, permits the difference 
between space and time to be articulated, to appear as such, 
in the unity of an experience [ ... ] This articulation therefore 
permits a graphic ("visual" or "tactile," "spatial") chain to be 
adapted, on occasion in a linear fashion, to a spoken 
("phonic," .. temporal") chain. It is from the primary 
possibility of this articulation that one must begin. Difference 
is articulation. [ Grammatology, p.66] 
This "origin", however, is of the same order as the instrumentnl 
11 voice" which Rameau has his performer act out- it is metaphorical, a pun 
on the fact that the origin is plunged into the supplementary abyss of 
movement by the time of differance. In the terms of the Cartesian graph, 
the origin o which is the meeting point of the x and y axes is severed; 
Rousseau's hope for an undifferentiated origin uniting melody and 
harmony within a melodic synthesis is ruptured by a space at the origin. 
The two lines then move and connect with each other at different places at 
different times; they are free to slide through, across, and between each 
olher, creating an indeterminate, inherently connective genesis. Unlike the 
graphic origin, then, this hinge flexes. It is the so-called 11 originary" 
supplement; the supplement which produces other supplements, but which 
is always already produced itself, and always already unfixed and moving. 
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The temporality of this hinge of differance, or as Derrida also 
describes it, this "trace", cannot be contained within the classical concepts 
of time. While it would be true to say that the generation of supplements 
occurs in one temporal 11 direction 11 , and that Derrida often invokes the 
metaphor of the chain of supplements, it can be inscribed within the trace 
of differance that a serial concept of time is inadequate, even if Derrida 
himself often 11 avoids" this issuel91. Notions such as a series of presents 
which approach and recede from this present, or notions of events coming 
into the present from the future to slip away into the past, in other words, 
those theories of time which rely upon the concept of a temporal horizon, 
a limit or peras in Greek lexis, are potentially deconstructed by the force 
of the supplementary trace of differance; "The concepts of present, past, 
and future, everything in the concepts of time and history which implies 
evidence of them - the metaphysical concept of time in general - cannot 
adequately describe the structure of the trace." [ Grammatology, p.67] 
As we have noted above, Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau's 
musical ontology depends on his hooking into the workings of the concept 
of harmony in order to demonstrate its operation as the indecidable within 
the body of melody. This derives from the agenda to uncover the movement 
of the supplement within the structure of the origin. Equally, he makes a 
claim here for the concept of the trace (arguably, another spatial term in 
.. origin 11 ) as a step towards the deconstruction of "the metaphysical 
concept of time". All of these points of deconstruction depend upon the 
structure of the space, yet Derrida attempts, through the "arche-
l91 cf. Derrida's description of Heidegger's "avoidance" of the concept of 
Geist in Of Spirit. Derrida equally engages "avoidance" with respect to 
serial time. 
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synthesis" of the concept of differanceto assemble a non-dialectical fusion 
of the opposing strings of spatial and temporal terms. The hinge of all this, 
however, remains the concept of spacing, which he tries to assemble as the 
simultaneous verbing of time and space into each other. As Derrida put.s 
il; 
Spacing (notice that this word speaks the articulation of 
space and time, the becoming-space of time and the 
becoming-time of space) is always the unperceived, the 
nonpresent, and the nonconscious. As such, if one can still 
use that expression in a non-phenomenological way; for here 
we pass the very limits of phenomenology. [ Grammatology, 
p.68] 
This deconstruction of ontologies, then, is not reducible to a 
phenomenological programme, not least because of the ontological action 
which invariably presents itself within phenomenology. "Phenomenology 
in general, as the passageway to essentiality, presupposes an anticipation 
of the esse of essence, the unity of the esse prior to its distribution into 
essence and existence." [Writing and Difference, p.134] But equally, it is 
not reducible to an empirical programme, since the discourse of this 
deconstruction is necessarily poised on the brink of a metaphysical 
foundation. Indeed, as has already been noted, this forms one of the 
possible dangers of Derrida's deconstructionist programme: that by its 
very nature, it must couch itself within the lexical and conceptual confines 
of the system which it is attempting to rework. Thus, it is possible to raise 
various accusations at Derrida's work which may in fact be residues of an 
alternative critique better levelled at the systems he targets. The very 
incompletability of a deconstructive reading runs the risk of ensuring that 
it operates "within" its target: in Of Gra.mmatology, Derrida's initial points 
of deconstruction always involve a prioritization of a spatial term in 
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JH·eference to a temporal term, even if this prioritization is only 
(successfully) provisional. The crucial point is whether or not the 
df~c..:onstru.ction goes far enough to displace the ontological structure's 
gravitational pull on the concepts which Derrida attempts to loosP-n, 
whether the deconstruction can resist the pull to reconstruct at the 
original, or a secondary level. Does the deconstruction of a structure make 
it Lremble enough to not only dissolve its foundations, but also the 
possibility of a reconstruction around a new fundament? 
At this juncture, let us summarize Derrida's implied investments in 
Rameau's harmonic theory. Rameau's name appears in OfGrammatologyonly 
twenty times: eight times in statements by Derrida; seven times in 
statements by Rousseau, thrice in book titles, and twice in statements by 
others[lOJ. The first. mention of Rameau exists, as they all do, to 
contextualize the deconstruction of Rousseau's phonocentric theory of 
language in the Essay. Having just covered aspects of chapter 13 of the 
Essay, Derrida supplements his discussion of Rousseau' s melodic theory 
wilh the following: "It is difficult to understand what is at stake in 
Chapters 13 - "On Melody" - and 14 - "On Harmony" - if one does not 
perceive its immediate context: the polemic with Rameau. [ ... ] But this 
context serves only to reveal a systematic and permanent necessity." [Of 
G'rummatology, p.210] It is a question, then, of the necessity which 
Roussf!au systematizes into permanency; the ontological difference betwe1·~n 
[IO] pp. 107 (1 mention); 193 (1); 194 (3); 210 (4); 211 (4); 212 (2); 213 (1); 345 
(3); 346 (1). It is pertinent to note here that, with the exception of pages 
31,5-6 which are end-notes, Rameau's name only appears in Derrida's 
statements across four pages, from p.210 to p.213. In this sense, only one 
seventy-ninth of Of Grammatology is devoted to overt discussion of the 
Querelle as it intersects specifically with Rousseau and Rameau. 
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melody and harmony. The Querelle with Ram eau only serves to delineate 
that which is at stake within Rousseau. Immediately, Derrida cites 
Rousseau's description of the Fall of melody and harmony into a modern 
separation which negates the true Ancient origin of music as an absolute 
proximity of the two axial forms. In "the ancient treatises we have 
remaining, [ ... ] harmony would be very difficult to distinguish from 
melody." [Dictionary of Music, pp.286-7]. In this Fall into differential 
separation, we can read the return of the concept of a space between 
Space and Time, a void or abyss between the two ontological axes which is 
comprised of the very substance of the vertical axis itself. This precipitous 
danger for melody is abhorrent to Rousseau - he reads it as an attempt by 
Rameau to state that the origin of Melody is in fact Harmony. Derrida 
slates: "Examining that [system] of Rameau, Rousseau reproaches him for 
passing off as natural what is purely conventional" [Of Grammatology, 
p.210]. 
Again, Derrida's techniques imply that Rameau only signifies to him 
as Rousseau's fear of the supplement. Yet we must remember that it is 
precisely the events of this fear which Derrida is introducing as a series 
of indecidables into Rousseau's text throughout Of Grammatology. Indeed, 
it is the injection of this theoretical virus into the logic of the origin which 
constitutes the body of Derrida's deconstruction. Rameau may not be a 
cause, therefore, of Derrida's programme, but that very programme is an 
effacement of the notion of origin or cause. In this sense, the symptom 
within Rousseau's text which is Rameau gives a powerful resonance. For 
Rousseau, the possibility of Rameau represents the death, the annihilation 
of Rousseauism. For Derrida, Rameau is a metaphor for the whole 
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collectivity of Rousseau's fears: 11 Rameau's mistake corresponds to the 
model of all mistakes and all historical perversions as they take shape 
under Rousseau's eyes 11 [Of Grammatology, p.211]. The recurrent factor in 
Derrida's mentions of Rameau is the paraphrase of Rousseau's position: 
11 Rameau's fault 11 [p.210]; 11 Rameau's mistake 11 [p 211] . 11 Rameau's . ' 
abberation" [p.212]. Yet if Rameau represents the 11 model of all mistakes", 
"faults", 11 aberrations 11 , and "perversions 11 to Rousseau as Derrida sees it, 
and if Derrida is intent on undermining Rousseau's system with precisely 
that concept of spacing which he (Derrida) draws from Rameau's theory of 
harmony, then there is evidently a more significant position for harmonic 
theory within the systems of Of Grammatology than the scant mentions 
across four pages might suggest. 
In short, the problem lies in the fact that Derrida uses the image of 
harmonic theory only as it appears in Rousseau's fearful delineation of 
Hu.meau. Thus, while Derrida initiates a deconstruction of Rousseau's 
system from within its own terms, the concept of harmony upon which so 
much turns - for both Rousseau and Derrida - remains uninterrogated 
within its own context. While rival aesthetics of melody have been 
subjected to a critical delimitation, only one theory of harmony has been 
delineated, and not yet delimited. The possibility of more than one 
harmonic aesthetic has crucial repercussions if the musical programme of 
Of Grammatology is to be fully elaborated, and the beginnings of the 
deconstruction of harmony itself will lead to a significant new perspective 
on that text. Even within Rameau's theory itself, what are we to make of the 
assertion that harmony is capable of .. penetrating to the soul and affecting 
it according to [the composer's] intentions 11 ? [Observations, p.92, emphasis 
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added]. What is the status of a penetrational, intentional harmony for 
Derrida's programme? 
The ramifications of all this for Derrida' s deconstruction are 
extensive. The Pythagorean opposition works, it seems, from the centre of 
harmonic, as much as melodic theory, and (by dangerous implication for 
Derrida) the theories of Rameau. This invokes the power of dialectical 
production which would appear to constrict the free significatory 
movement proposed in the reworked concept of the 11 supplement .. (if we are 
to take supplementary logic as more than a vaguely radical concept of 
serial dialectics). The question becomes a serious one when the action of 
self-containing repetition within a dialectical system is addressed, in the 
sense that the first term, the origin, exists only to reproduce exactly itself, 
and utilizing the mediumship of the second term as a ductile means of 
entelechy in the production of the third term. This third term, however, 
remains entirely a reproduction of the first. From this it can be seen that 
there is precious little movement outside of a highly specific universe of 
two terms which merely provisionally switch roles in order to maintain the 
stasis of the whole. If a chain is possible, it is only in the sense of a chain 
of ontological repetition, a chain of sameness, not of difference. In no way 
can it be described as a chain of free production such as the term 
supplementary logic proposes. 
Derrida's approach is to take two opposing ontological claims and 
provisionally prioritize one over the other. He escapes the accusation of 
claiming harmony as the express origin of melody only by his particular 
approach to harmony, which states that harmony is non-originary by its 
very mode of operation. In this sense the anti-origin becomes the origin, 
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and, despite attempts to do otherwise, the privileging of the term 
"supplement" over the term "origin" from Rousseau's lexis only serves (ot 
worst) to invert the system which Rousseau proposes. And if Rameau and 
harmonic theory are "the model of all" sins to Rousseau, th(~n 
deconstruction as represented by Of Grammatology may be only a slight 
extension of a well-worn theoretical area in the mathematics of music. 
It will become important throughout what follows to consider and 
question the possibility of the interval, spacing, and all allied concepts, os 
a kind of originary dialectic, whether operating across an axis of 
presence-absence, space-time, reason-experience, etc. From this point on, 
we shall be concerned with working towards this question which Derrida's 
text always seems to precipitously risk, and which, as we have seen, 
Derrida acknowledges as a constant risk in deconstruction. 
What is required is a disinvestment in the specific lexis and 
metaphysical modes of Rousseau's Essay, and a reinvestment, at first 
cautious and circumlocutory, into other discourses, rival and otherwise, 
which will nevertheless have a particular series of intertexts with 
Derrida's reading of Rousseau. In this way, not only the concept of melody 
can be interrogated, but also, and more crucially for Of Grammatology, we 
can establish a course for the deconstruction of harmony. For Baroque 
harmonic theory can hardly be considered any more or less 
"deconstructive" than Serialism, Indian Ragas, the Sonata principle, or 
Punk. It is the supplement itself which requires deconstruction, and to 
this (non) end, let us first approach the concept and theory of harmony 





-the large rhythm that undulated through that of the great 
masters antient and modern- the sustained note of informing 
purpose - the deep vibration of some unifying undertone I 
now rising to accent and emphasis - now sounding faintly, 
beneath the multifareousness of accompanying motives -
- Charles Rennie Mackintosh, 1902. 
CHAPTER THREE 
HARMONIC METAPHYSICS 
3.1 The Axiology of Soun~ 
dialectics is the indefinite movement of finitude, of the unity 
of life and death, of difference, of original repetition 
[Derrida, Writing and Difference, p.248] 
TUNE and TIME are the Affections or Properties of Sound, 
upon whose Difference or Proportions Music depends.[ ... ] the 
Power of Musick [is] heightened, when the Differences of 
'l'une and Time are artfully joined: 'Tis this Composition that 
can work so irresistibly on the Passions. [A Treatise of 
Mu sick, pp.385/6] 
Alexander Malcolm's A Treatise of Musick was published in 
Edinburgh in 1721, one year prior to Rameau's Traitelll. Rather th11n 
proposing a grand new harmonic theory, however, Malcolm's Treatise 
represents an attempt to collate extant knowledge on music- mathematical, 
practical, and historical. In this text, the aesthetic tropes of the 
[1] To avoid confusion between these two Treatises, the French form will 
designate Rameau's text from this point on. 
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Enlightenment are fully operativel21. In particular, the idea that music 
operates along an appositional ontological axis becomes the theory upon 
which all else hinges; according to Malcolm, there are two planes or 
dimensions which are proper to sound - tune and time. That is, the 
vertical, spatial aspect, and the horizontal, temporal aspect. In other 
words, Malcolm here states the classic Enlightenment formulation that 
music aesthetics is based on an originary opposition of harmony and 
melody. This axiology is assembled according to a similar Cartesian, 
graphic approach to the metaphysical geometry of music as we find in 
Rameau. Thus, it becomes a question of the connection of two metaphysical 
entities, space and time, and of the mechanics of their mutual connectivity. 
For Malcolm, this connectivity is encompassed by the concept of 
proportional difference, signifying the interval at the origin of the two 
planes which, when bridged by an 11 artful joining" of harmony and rhythm, 
creates the Powers of music to stir the passions. 
Throughout this reading of Malcolm, the concept of Proportional 
Difference will be shown to inscribe a space at the very origin of space and 
time. It is through this graphic hinge - the geometric point of articulation 
of harmony and melody - that music's affective power which works "so 
(l] In the Introduction to Edinburgh in the Age of Reason (1967), Douglas 
Young asserts that "It was in Edinburgh, in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, that the Scottish Enlightenment kindled into flame ... 
[pp.7 /8] This is a remarkable statement even if one considers the 
publication dates of David Hume's texts (1739-) or Francis Hutcheson's 
(1725-), and the publication of Malcolm's Treatise in 1721 clearly 
demonstrates the idiosyncrasy of Young's sentence. In contradistinction 
to this position, for instance, Paul Scott (Andrew Fletcher & the Treaty of 
Union) points to the existence of Enlightenment traits in the even earlier 
figure of political theorist, Andrew Fletcher (1653-1716). Equally, to limit 
the whole of the Scottish Enlightenment to Edinburgh seems to fly in the 
face of Adam Smith's work in Glasgow, as well as the work carried out by 
many others in Aberdeen, St. Andrew's, and so forth. 
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irresistibly on the Passions" can be assembled. This proportional hinge 
thus has its deconstructive equivalent in Derrida's hinge of differance, the 
"originary" interval between harmony and melody. However, the significant 
question of the distinction between these two differential hinges turns on 
i.he form of structural priority which Malcolm's proportionality operates. 
The space at the origin, at the juncture between time and space, is also the 
means by which space can tap into and even capture the power of time for 
its own use. This is achieved by the spatialization of time as units of 
rhythm. The primacy of spatiality in the ontology of music is the recurrent 
prioritization of Malcolm's writings, and of many other Enlightenment texts 
which deal with concept of harmony. As will become clear, this concept 
marks the point of departure for the following, by inhabiting the margins 
of Derrida's deconstructive practices, tracing the various significations of 
metaphysical terms which are at issue in deconstruction. 
3.2 The Harmonic Dialectic 
the universal Character where by Concord and Discord are 
distinguished, is to be sought in the Numbers which contain 
and express the Intervals of Sound: But not in these Numbers 
abstractly; we must consider them as expressing the very 
Cause and Difference of Sound with respect to Tune, viz. the 
Number of Vibrations in the same Time [A Treatise of Musick, 
p.71/2] 
The "Cause and Difference" of music here is in the immanent numeric 
articulation of harmony with rhythm. The idea of difference being an 
originary generator of music depends on this articulation of the two 
ontological planes at their graphic origin. The possibility of the affective 
difference which operates within the sensations of concordance and 
discordance is underpinned by a proportional difference of quantities c"it 
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the origin of music. It is through this process that the classification of 
intervals into those which are and are not proper to musical harmony is 
achieved. In other words, this originary difference which is articulated 
across a proportional space generates the ontological determination of 
music and its Other: noise, which proceeds by inharmonic degrees. 
Yet there is the possibility that musical harmony can dialectically 
access and even appropriate the power of noise for its own ends. As Helene 
Cixous states, 
what is called "other" is an alterity that does settle down, 
that falls into the dialectical circle. It is the other in a 
hierarchically organized relationship in which the same [le 
propre] is what rules, names, defines, and assigns "its .. 
other. [ ... ] The other is only there to be reappropriated, 
recaptured, and destroyed as other. [The Newly Born Woman, 
p.70] 
In this way, the condition of Otherness within the dualistic or 
dialectical system is, contrary to all internal theoretical claims, not a 
natural condition. It is, indeed, constructed as an a priori appositional 
category. Yet, the Other is necessary for the transmission of the energcin. 
of the dialectical movement. As Susan McClary comments, it is "the 
dissonant Other who is necessary for the motivation and sustaining of the 
[tonal] plot." [Feminine Endings, p.57] In his dialectical rationalization of 
the interval between music and its noisy Other, Malcolm invokes the Latin 
categories of the concinnus and the inconcinnus as the tools of measuring 
the proportionate values of dissonances; 
The indefinite Number of other Ratios being all Discord, 
belong not essentially to Musick, because of themselves they 
produce no Pleasure; yet some of them are admitted into the 
System as necessary to the better being of it, both with 
respect to Consonance and Succession [ ... ] such are called 
concinnous intervals, [ ... ] all other Discards are called 
inconcinnous. [A Treatise of Musick, pp.217 /8] 
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The acceptability, the properness, of each vertical or horizontal 
interval falls into categories firstly of concordance and discordancel31. 
From this point, discords divide into those which are proper to music and 
those which are not. Significantly for deconstructive discourse, Malcolm 
gathers dissonances under the heading of "other Ratios". The practical 
result is that the tone and semitone are acceptable (although "in harmonic") 
because they are produced in tolerable harmonic proximity to the tonal 
source, whereas the quarter tone is both in harmonic and radically distant 
fr·om the source in harmonic terms, and is thus unusable- it is Other in its 
ratio. This is expressed as a function of experience; we have those which 
"produce pleasure" and those which do not. In this way, harmony becomes 
intricately bound up with the theory of affectivity, and accesses a rational 
basis for emotional and sensual mechanisms. The imaging of discordance as 
a device of the senses is a common enough motif in the Enlightenment, and 
as we have seen, Rameau's Traite provides other examples. For instance, 
after having clearly defined the aesthetic judgement of music as a dual 
articulation of hearing and reasoning, of the ear and the mind, Ram eau 
immediately extends the theory to a discussion of the properties of 
concordance and discordance. In the following passage we have an image 
of anarchic multiplicity being tempered by the action of a sceptical mind: 
[J] Elsewhere, Malcolm writes of the Pythagorean root of these divisions, 
and provides an equivalent Greek terminology; "The abstract Reasonings 
of i.he Pythagoreans about the Ratios of the Concords" [p.508] which mean 
that "DISCORDS are either ( Emmeli) concinnous, ie. fit for Musick [ ... ] or 
( Ecmeli) inconcinnous." [p.510] The New Grove article "Emmeleia" gives the 
meaning of emmeles as "in the melos", and associates it with the harmony 
of rnusic and dance. Malcolm, however, uses the term not in this temporal 
sense, but in a specifically harmonic, spatial sense. The Grove gives this 
spatial definition as one associated with intervals smaller than a P4th, 
whereas the Harvard Dictionary cites Engelbert of Admont's (d.1331) 
definition as "the difference between two consonances". 
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"Experience offers us a large number of chords susceptible of an infinite 
diversity, in which we shall always lose our way unless we search for the 
source elsewhere. Experience sows doubts everywhere( ... ] Reason, on the 
contrary, presents us with only a single chord" ( Traite, p.139]. SheP.r 
unmediated perception - the experimental ratio of harmonic Otherness -
signifies the danger of a loss, and the occasion of a scepticism. Multiplicity 
is meaningless unless ruled by the law of unity. As we saw with Rameau in 
Chapter 1, it is reason which allows the possibility of the sociality of music, 
in the sense of its complicity in the determination of judgement, and the 
establishment of a sensus communis. 
Dissonances must be judged proper according to sound and source, 
and in Malcolm, this dual experiential and rational origin for dissonance is 
also made dialectical. "We know by Experience how much the Mind of Man 
is delighted with Variety" [Treatise, p.218] However, this variety must he 
tempered, since the mind "can stand no Dispute, whether we consider 
intellectual or sensible Pleasures" [ibid.]. An appropriate balance must be 
struck, then, between the disputing extremes of each axis; the difference 
implied by variety must be tempered by a general organizing rule. 
Of variety and its complicity in this notion of the harmonic dialectic, 
Francis Hutcheson wrote, four years later (1725) that; 
There is indeed observable, in the best compositions, a 
mysterious effect of discards: they often give as great n. 
pleasure as continued harmony, whether by refreshing the 
ear with variety, or by awakening the attention, and 
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enlivening the relish[~) for the succeeding harmony of 
concords, as shades enliven and beautify pictures, or by 
some other means not yet known. Certain it is, however, that 
they have their place, and some good effect in our best 
compositions. [An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of 
JJea uty and Virtue, I,2,xiii.] 
Hutcheson perhaps is less reserved in his praise of discards here, 
and certainly Malcolm gives more formal consideration to the issue. 
Nevertheless, the concept of variety as a dialectic means of harmonic 
procedure is evident. Malcolm's implication is also that the greater the 
differences, the greater the pleasure, "unless it proceed to an Excess; for 
so limited are our Capacities, that too much or too little are equally fatal to 
our Pleasures." [Treatise, p.218] Here we read of the space in which our 
pleasure exists, surrounded by a boundary, for this space is "so limited". 
It is a territory, whose "capacity" is propriety, where the discordant, the 
irrational, can only signify within the law of the concordant, the rational. 
"Fatal" danger is signalled by the possibility of an "excess", an overflow 
from the Otherly region beyond the space of pleasure - the danger is that 
(~) The identity of lexis between Hutcheson and Malcolm is perhaps 
significant here: both write of discordance in terms of "variety" and of 
"relish" as aspects of its dialectic. If one were in the business of 
inference, perhaps it would not be too outrageous to suggest that the 
philosopher was aware of and perhaps informed by the mathematician's 
treatise. cf. Malcolm's statement concerning "a more exquisite Relish of the 
perfecter Intervals" [p.220], and also; "to move by no other than 
harmonica} Intervals, would not only want Variety, and so weary us with 
a tedious Repetition of the same Things; but the very Perfection of such 
Relations of Sounds would cloy the Ear, in the same manner as sweet and 
luscious Things do the Taste, which are therefore artfully seasoned with 
the Mixture of sowr and bitter: And so in Musick the Perfection of the 
harmonica} Intervals are set off, and as 'twere seasoned with other Kinds 
of Intervals that are never agreeable by themselves, but only in order to 
make the Agreement of the other more various and remarkable." [p.219] 
Here, not only the lexical intertext between Hutcheson and Malcolm is 
apparent, but also the precise function of lexis, with the dialectical 
conception of "variety" becoming a matter of onto-culinary taste, as weJl 
as aesthetic Taste. The dialectical movement of structural tensions then 
becomes a matter for the gourmet ear which prepares an aural fricassee. 
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of the discordant enforcing its own law on the concordant, overspilling the 
proper "capacity" of this space. To this end, the concord must establish 
i ls power dialectically in order to harness the energy of this danger. 
Here, we have the myth of the appropriation of the indefinite, or in 
Pythagorean terms, the apeiron, which represents motion, this 
appropriation being carried out by the limited, peras. As David R. Fideler 
puts it in his introduction to The Pythagorean Sourcebook, "The idea of 
order is intimately connected with Limit (peras), the opposite of which is 
i.he Unlimited ( apeiron), and these are the two most basic, and hence 
universal, principles of Pythagorean cosmology... [ Pythagorciin 
Sourcebook, p.22] For Malcolm, the manner of operation of this dialectical 
capture of unlimited by the limited is the application of the geometric law 
of the ratio to those components of the irrational which can be moulded to 
provide a contrast with the concordant, and yet never too much of a 
contrast: the dissonance must be concinnous in all respects; the 
inharmonic must be within reason-able proximity to the harmonic source. 
Malcolm's composer attempts to represent the Other of music, the 
chaos of inharmonic sound or noise, but this representation is carried out 
with components within the system which stretch its limits without 
breaking them. Indeed, this stretching is precisely the means of 
establishing the boundary. The dialectic between music and its Other, 
between harmony and in harmony, then, does not concern itself with the 
actual Other - the abyss of noise - but with the danger of the Other, the 
represented possibility of the system's annihilation. This possibility of 
absolute discordance is the concinnous dissonance. The prospect of the 
annihilation of music by an overflow of noise into the former's territory, 
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then, must be exorcised in the dialectical and repetitive ritual of harmonic 
resolution: concord-discord-concord. The dissonance involved, however, 
being an appropriated representation of music's Other. Only the action of 
this appropriation can make the presentation of the possibility of 
annihilation (its representation) a properly proprietous affair. 
This means of using representation to appropriate an 11 outside 11 , to 
bring it under the systematic control of an "inside" operates by a spatial 
connectivity; the origin creates its Other through the same logic which 
brings it into being, that logic being the action of a space, an interval, a 
harmonic action at the origin itself. The One produces the Other, and then 
harnesses it back into its own dialectic. As Malcolm wrote: "The Word 
Harmonia signifies more generally the Agreement of several Things that 
make up one Whole" [p.579], and these several things are produced by a 
source, given their own space within the economy of that source, only in 
order that the source can revitalize itself by capturing their space as its 
own mechanisms. In this way, the fundamental produces a harmonic series 
where each individual frequency serves not to proclaim its own identity, 
but to signify a spatial relation back to the original frequency, to proclaim 
its identity within the encompassing identity of its source. 
Considering the mechanics of discordance from this point of view, 
we can understand that perhaps the very discord which represents to us 
the supposed antithesis of the concord is absolutely integral to the 
establishment of the concord's identity. It allows us to think of it in terms 
of what it is not, to establish an ontological space between it and its OthP.r. 
The discordant negation of concordance, then (the concinnous dissonance), 
does nothing in the way of actual negation, but rather supports - and 
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performs an absolutely integral role in - the affirmation of concordance as 
the law which is the context of all musical sound. The concinnous 
dissonance can do this by its relative proximity to the consonant origin. 
The dissonance's momentary dissention is inevitably overthrown by the 
greater structural power of concordance, which it is there merely to prove, 
rather than truly threaten or assail [51. 
Thus, despite even inconcinnous dissonance's production by the 
source, it proves a danger to the source by the fact of its great distance, 
a distance over which the source has no real power of control. The 
inconcinnous dissonance is therefore an excess product of the origin.1l 
fundamental; it represents an instance of over-production, a waste-
product which cannot be stopped, unless all ceases, but can at least be 
excluded from the system by tightening the grip of the origin on lesser 
forms of its Other, in an attempt to create a narrative of absolute ordcc 
and control - taxisl61. By tightening the grip of the fundamental, the 
harmonic waste-product is effectively evacuated. The question for ,'l 
deconstruction which allies itself with the concept of harmony then 
becomes one of how to "oppose" this dialectical closure of sound. In 
[51 In the Dictionary of Music article "Concinnous 11 , Rousseau states 11 when 
the music is silent, and we feel nothing more than a continuance of not~s 
without an unison, there is no general object to which each one connects 
his part, and the execution proceeds always in a disagreeable strain. For 
this reason it is, that the French music is never concinnous. 11 
[6] taxis can signify order in various forms, political, natural, but 
particularly structural. It can also signify a boundary or battle-line, as in 
"him who left the line of battle [ taxin] or threw away his arms" [Plato, 
Republic, 468a, translated in Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, p.162]. It 
forms a particular mode of connectivity which can be described as stable, 
predictable, and proportioned. It, along with the concept of limit [pernsl 
fur·ms a lexical network in opposition to indeterminacy, anarchy, and so 
forth. 
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J>cr-rida's words, "Dialectics is always that which has finished us, because 
il is always that which takes in to account our rejection of it." (Writing and 
JJi[ference, p.246] In the "light" of this, we should proceed cautiously. 
The dialectical "Variety" which operates through I he~ 
rf~presentat.ional threat of music's Other generates a tension within a 
harmonic system, a gravitational pull, as it were, towards a goal. This 
TliHTative is expressed in the Enlightenment through diverse images, but 
the intertext with Freemasonry is particularly significant PJ. Not only 
through the symbolism of the number 3, which immediately falls into the 
structure of a dialectical narrative, but also the idea of enlightenment 
itself as a systematic narrative - the journey from darkness to light, 
expressed most fundamentally in Plato's 11 Allegory of the Cave". For the 
composer John Clerk., these images were seamless with the architectural 
aspects of Freemasonry, as the metaphysicaL model which he built in his 
gi:1r-den demonstrates. It consisted of a tunnel through a small hill, the end 
l7l The concept of harmony in the Enlightenment has a significant intertext 
with the rise of the Masonic movement. As Purser has noted, many Scottish 
composers of the period were members, not only Clerk (1676-1755), but also 
Thomas Erskine (1732-1781), John Reid (1721-1807), and James Oswald 
(1711-69), most of whom were involved in establishing the "Temple of 
Apollo" as expatriots in London. The members of this secretive masonic 
society were exclusively musicians [Scotland's f\-1usic, p. p.173-196]. Later 
Burns also wrote songs in honour of fellow masons such as The Farewell. 
To the Brethren of St. James's Lodge, Tarbolton, where the image of the 
"Sons of light" coincides with stanza three; "May Freedom, Harmony anci 
l .ove 1 Unite you in the grand Design, I Beneath th' Omniscient Eye above, 
1 The glorious ARCHITECT Divine!" [Poems & Songs, p.217] The idea of the 
universe as a vast piece of architecture is an inherently spatial concept, 
and always combines in masonic writings with terms such as "harmony", 
"order", "design", etc., but significantly, the image of what Derrida calls 
Jogocentrism is prevalent in the complicity of these terms with those such 
as "light", "omniscient eye", etc. The masonic anthems of Oswald from the 
1740's in particular also introduce textural symbolism in being set for a 
i.r·i uity of voices, and making structurally pivotal use of unisons as an 
image of the final metaphysical unison of all things [Purser, p.180]. The 
significance of the vocal unison as ultimate telos is elaborated on later. 
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of which represented metaphysical completion of the masonic-harmonic 
programme: 
No-one can get across to it but by the mouth of a frightful 
cave. To those who enter, therefore, first occurs the memory 
of the Cuman Sibyl, for the ruinous aperture, blocked up with 
stones and briars, strikes the eye. Then comes upon the 
wayfarer a shudder, as they stand in doubt whether they are 
among the living or the dead. As indeed certain discards set 
off and give finish to musical cadences in such a way as to 
render the subsequent harmony more grateful to the ear, so 
does the mouth of this mournful cave with its long and shady 
path followed by the lightened prospect, make the exit more 
delightful. For suddenly the darkness disappears, and as it 
were at the creation of a new world. [Clerk, quoted by Purser 
in Scotland's Music, p.171] 
Plato's Cave resonates in every turn of this passage. The threat of 
annihilation is present here, and it is this possibility which provides the 
impetus for motion towards the final cadence of enlightenment: 
"metaphysics, unable to escape its ancestry in light" [Writing and 
Difference, p .118]. Equally, note the image of erotic danger implied by the 
"mouth of the frightful cave", and the redemption from its grip in the 
rebirth at the end of the tunnel. The determination of the tunnel's realm 
as a threatening absence or lack, and the final "lightened prospect" as full 
presence or completion, mirrors perfectly the musical narrative of the 
cadential overcoming of dissonance. 
A further component of this neo-Hellenic model of consonance is the 
' 
complicity of the concept of Virtue with its axiology. This binding of 
dialectics with morality is controlled by musical images, as in the 
Pythagorean fragment by Theages, On the Virtues; 
The soul is divided into reasoning power, anger and desire. 
Reasoning power rules knowledge, anger deals with impulse, 
and desire bravely rules the soul's affections. When these 
three parts unite in one action, exhibiting a composite 
energy, then in the soul results concord and virtue. When 
sedition divides them, then discord and vice appear. [The 
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Pythagorean Sourcebook, p.225] 
The division of the soul into three components introduces a spacing 
within its body. However, this spacing is overcome in a unity which has a 
"composite energy". The integration of parts is only possible from an 
initial division, and it is the fact of this division, or spacing, which gives 
the momentum towards unity its motive power. Thus, concordance becomes 
the correct tuning of the composite parts, or rather, the harmonizing of 
those parts into a situation where they realize their full systematic 
potential in relation to each other, all working together to uphold the 
greatest power which their union is capable of. Thus, the full realization 
of a thing's specificity does not depend on the annihilation of difference, 
but on its dialectical temperance, the correct hierarchization of parts. 
Theages continues, 
So too, health, which is an adjustment of the bodily powers, 
does not consist in expelling the cold and the hot, the moist 
and the dry, but in adjusting them suitably and 
symmetrically. Likewise in music, concord does not consist in 
expelling the sharp and the flat, but in exterminating 
dissonance by concord arising from their adjustment. [ibid., 
p.227] 
In this sense, music is the model of all things to the Pythagorean 
mind. Concordance becomes a matter of justice, virtue, health, power, and 
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society in general (BJ. 
In the Treatise of Musick, Malcolm also connects the necessity of the 
concinnous dissonance to a biological origin. Taking his cue frorn 
l>cscartes' Musical Compendium (also one of Rameau's sources), he ascribes 
the intervall.ic movement of a solo voice to physio-affective expediency. 
He (Descartes] observes, that an acute Sound requires a 
grefller· Force to produce it[ ... ] and hence he concludes, th;·tl 
acute Sounds, or the Motion of the Air that produce them 
immediately strike the Ear with more Force. [ ... ] From whi·~h 
Observations he thinks may be drawn the true and primary 
Reason why Degrees (which are Intervals less than 11ny 
Concord) were invented; which Reason he judges to be this, 
Lest if the Voice did always proceed by harmonica] Distances, 
there should be too great Disproportion or Inequality in the 
Intenseness of it [ ... ] which would weary both Singer and 
Hearer. [A Treatise of Musick, pp.219/20] 
Proceeding by tone or semitone, rather than octave, fifth or third, 
then, not only makes the physical effort on the singer's part less, but also 
makes the effort on the listener's part less. This parity exists by virtue of 
the fact that the force required to produce the sound and the force which 
that sound effects on the receiving ear are proportionate. 
[B] C.G.Jung gives an account of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil and Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra which is significant in its tracing of the concept of 
opposites back to Pythagoras, rather than reading Nietzsche as anti-
Platonic, as many post-structuralist critiques do. In his Psychological 
Types, Jung comments: "that dichotomy which Nietzsche laid at the door of 
Zarathustra: the discovery of pairs of opposites, the division into odd and 
even, above and below, good and evil. It was the work of the old 
Pythagoreans, and it was their doctrine of moral responsibility and the 
gn:tve metaphysical consequences of sin that gradually, in the course of 
centuries, percolated through to all strata of the population, chiefly owing 
to lhe spread of Orphic and Pythagorean mysteries." [Selected Writings, 
p.136] Nietzsche himself writes that "The fundamental faith of the 
metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values.'' [Beyond Good and Evil, 
p.16] The tradition represented by Nietzsche is dealt with in a latcc 
chupter. For present purposes, it is enough to note the interlinking of the 
concepts of consonance, virtue, and metaphysical method, particularly thdt 
of dialectics. A reading of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy which 
takes consonance, rather than phonetics, as a key operator would yield ,,_ 
new understanding of its attitude towards both literature and music. 
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However, this step-wise additive movement which aims at a balance 
of efforts also opens the possibility of intervallic contrast and could be 
characterized as operating within a certain image of the dialectic, and 
therefore of spatiality. In this sense, Descartes, as related to us by 
Malcolm, appears to be suggesting the possibility of a representational 
integrity, despite the displacement, the rupture, caused by the interval. 
The use in the following passage from Malcolm of the word "medium" is 
therefore interesting, given the additional meaning of hermeneut, druidic 
interpreter of the Beyond. "Hence it appears, says he [Descartes], that the 
Degrees are nothing but a certain Medium contrived to be put betwixt the 
Extremes of the Concords, for moderating their Inequality" [p.220]. Once 
more, we find the narrative of a dialectical possibility operating upon a 
series of terms in a generative capacity, generating endless chains and 
combinations of events from a limited set of units with specific 
combinatorial values (one could almost write valencies or potential 
differences). 
At every stage of the process, however, there is a periodic return 
to the overarching law of the concord; the discord only functions t.o 
provide a route of passage from one concord to the next. The discord is 
encompassed by the law of the concord, it is "within" that law. Malcolm 
describes the articulation of the voice across intervallic space thus: "when 
the Voice has moved one Degree, the Ear is not yet satisfied until we come 
tu another, which therefore must be Concord with the first Sound." (p.220] 
In the same way that the first term of a dialectic frames and controls the 
movement of the whole process, producing for itself an Other through 
which to appropriate an energy which will allow it to reproduce its O\vn 
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reflection in the third term, Malcolm has concordance appropriating the 
power and force of discordance in order to reach a further level of 
concordance. A journey is embarked upon only to discover a return; "by 
a fit Division of the concording Intervals into lesser Ones, the Voice will 
puss smoothly from one Note to another, and the Hearer will be prepared 
for a more exquisite Relish of the perfecter Intervals, whose Extremes arc 
Uw proper Points in which the Ear finds the expected Rest and Pleasure." 
[A Treatise of Mu sick, p.220] Thus a whole theory of musical structure and 
per·iodicity can be generated from this theory of harmony, with repetition 
of the original concord being bridged by intrusions of that which allows 
1.he return: the concord's Other, only ever given as an image or 
representation of the Other. To do otherwise -to go the way of the Other 
and place oneself within the milieu of the outer harmonics, the 
inconcinnous - would be to risk the annihilation of the whole system. 
It is this repetitive function, perhaps, which allows what Malcolm 
suggests Descartes is intimating to operate as a self-proximate 
displacement. The inevitability of the return ensures integrity and the 
displacement ensures, through its complicity in a dialectic, the very self-
proximity which it only appears to rupture. The return allows the source 
to exorcise difference, and annihilate annihilation. It is a question of the 
seminal centre maintaining its self-sameness, despite its intervallic 
dispersal throughout remoter structural regions. This dialectical limitation 
of difference is that which, according to Derrida, returns the 
intertextuality of the excess product- the outwork- to the framework of 
-the ontological self-centric Work: "The effacement or sublimation of seminal 
difference is the movement through which the left-overness [restance] of 
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i.he outwork gets internalized and domesticated into the ontotheology of 
the great Book." [Dissemination, p.45] Thus, harmonic ontology, just like 
Housseau's melodic ontology, can return us to the Great Book of Nature 
written by God's breathy logos. Through introducing the concept of the 
harmonic, Derrida interrogated the idea of the fundamental root. However, 
harmonic theory itself, in introducing the concepts of the concinnous and 
the inconcinnous provides the possibility of an orthodox dialectical closure 
of harmonic differance. We must trace our way through this field wit.h 
ea uti on indeed. 
~.3 Space of Melody and Voice of Harmony 
Malcolm's Treatise, in its determination of the composition and 
operation of the theory of harmony, demonstrates a significant intertext 
wilh Descartes' Compendium Musicae[91, the writings of the ancient 
Greeks and its contemporary continental music theory [lOJ. However, the 
position of the concept of narrative in Malcolm's text introduces another 
layer into the theory of harmony, which serves to demonstrate the 
symbiosis of the relationship between harmony and time. 
[91 While it is not clear whether either Malcolm or Rameau were fully familiar 
with the original Latin version, it is clear from their references that they 
direct the reader's attention to the English and French translations 
respectively; the Musical Compend (tr.1653), and the Abrege de la Musiq11e 
(tr.1668). It is also worth noting that the full title of the French translation 
which Rameau uses, by Fr. Nicolas Poisson, is Traite de la mechanique, 
compose par Monsieur Descartes. De plus l'Abrege de musique du mesme 
autheur mis en franr;ois. The use of the term "mechanics" is significant. 
[lO} One of the distinguishing features of Malcolm's A Treatise of Musick is 
the detailed application of mathematics to musical harmony, and awareness 
of many contemporary scientific developments. Indeed, he demonstrates a 
greater knowledge of French scientific theories of music than does Rameau, 
bu l given his background as a mathematician, this is hardly surprising. 
11.0 
In Malcolm's descriptions above of the movement of a voice across 
intervallic space can be discerned an idea of melody as an essentially 
harmonic activity. The fact that melody, the horizontal parameter, is 
comprised of intervals, points to this. Melody, being governed by 
harmony, is thereby equally spatial: the voice moves "from one Degree of 
Tune to another" [p.218]. In quantitatively differentiating one moment nf 
time from another, one necessarily has recourse to a spatial movement. The 
possibility opened by this horizontal spacing is that of harmony being 
conceived as not only an operator in the vertical parameter, but also in the 
linear realm of time. Thus, musical form becomes governable by the 
harmonic laws of repetition, permutation, proportion, and so forth. We are 
faced with the action of a segmented temporality, a spatialized time. 
In particular, the concept of repetition is introduced as a means of 
structuring time through limiting the infinite variability of the succession 
of events. The idea of the return to a single point provides a coherent law 
around which diversities can be arranged within the same set of 
significations. In a rhetorical metaphor, Malcolm compares the structure of 
tonal narrative to that of literary narrativel111. In a literary narrative, 
there is a Subject, viz. some Person or Thing the Discourse is 
referred to, that ought always to be kept in View, thro' the 
Whole, so that nothing unnatural or foreign to the Subject 
may be brought in; in like Manner, in every regular and truly 
melodious Song, there is one Note which regulates all the rest; 
the Song begins and at least ends in this, which is as it were 
the principle Matter, or musical Subject that demands a 
special Regard to it in all the other Notes of the Song. 
[Treatise, p.266] 
The subject of the tonal narrative, then, actually forms the object 
(ll] The specific mode of narrative which Malcolm refers to here is oration, 
and the resonances of this potentially phonocentric image will be explored 
more fully in the following chapters. 
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of the audience's gaze, to be "kept in View", in close proximity to the 
gazing subject. Yet it equally forms the measure of that proximity, the 
gravitational centre of the narrative's formal structure, this measure 
defining the narrative's ontological mechanism along the axis of natural-
unnatural, as well as its territorial claims of belonging and being 
structurally foreign. 
The musical correlate of this is as follows: the object of the 
audience's aural gaze is the tonic key-note, which also forms the 
gravitational centre of the piece, its subject, in specifically structural 
terms; we will begin here, depart keeping our gaze directed towards our 
source, and return to the source after having experienced the distances 
between "the other Notes" and this One note which "regulates" these 
Others. The musical subject, the object of the gazing subject's gaze, 
subjects the Others to the condition of being its objects. 
Of course, the concept of the gaze points to a further spatializing 
metaphor in Malcolm's imagery; the visual is tacked on to the 
literary ;aural. The concept of the gaze occupies an axial position in much 
recent theory relating to the visual arts. Representation always implies a 
certain positioning of components into an assembled format which at least 
structurally dislocates the exact alignment of signification in the "original .. 
which is being represented. In this sense, representation has a further 
signification which lies in the intertext of the "original" and the "copy 11 , 
the juncture between two related and yet different systems of 
signification. This intertext can give rise to various ideological analyses 
of why the representation has realigned the "original" network of 
signification in the way which it has, and so forth. Further, there is the 
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question of which audience is being targeted by the representational 
network, and this gives rise to the possibility of another layer of 
ideological analysis. In other words, the modification of the world in a 
representation begs the question of what is being signified about the 
world and to whom? In Vision and Difference, Griselda Pollock writes; .. The 
sexual politics of looking function around a regime which divides into 
binary positions, activity /passivity, looking/being seen, 
voyeur /exhibitionist, subjectjo bject. 11 [Vision and Difference, p.87] From 
this critical position, Pollock renegotiates the concept of the gaze in the 
direction of the possibility of a non-appositional system. In the paintings 
of Mary Cassat and Berthe Morisot, she finds that "One of the major means 
by which femininity is thus reworked is by the rearticulation of traditional 
spuce so that it ceases to function primarily as the space of sight for a 
mastering gaze, but becomes the locus of relationships. The gaze that is 
fixed on the represented figure is that of equal and like" [ibid.] In 
Malcolm's statement above, he claims that the 11 subject" of narrative must 
be "kept in View", and that the same applies to the tonal centre of a piece 
of music. The appositional and dialectical language which Malcolm's theories 
assemble cannot but become enmeshed in precisely the kind of structures 
which Pollock delineates. The "subject/object" division which she poinls 
to as a major component in misogynist painting also operates in the 
structure of Malcolm's harmonic theory derived from narrative. In this 
sense, there is a structural intertext between the male gaze and Classical 
harmony. 
However, what occurs in Malcolm is that the signifying centre of 
tonality - its "male 11 essence - effectively becomes a "feminized 11 other for 
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tl1e listener. As we will see, though, this does represent a simple reversal, 
inversion, or negation of what Pollock describes. In harmonic theory, the 
dialectical force of structural modulation (asserting a new chord I within 
an Other region) means also that the anthropomorphic images of gendc~r 
attributes are also transposable. Thus, the subject-object relation, the 
acting and the acted-upon relation, the measuring and the measured 
relation, all have provisional status with regard to a relation "before" them 
and "after" them in terms of structural priority. Each One-Other relation 
is but one relation in a chain of relations, each relation intervallically 
supplementing those on either side. 
This is worth stressing: the supplementarity of Malcolm's semiotic 
derived from a literary /visual image is as follows - within the context of 
the musical performance situation, the key-note is the object of the 
listener's "gaze", but within the context of the piece of music alone, the 
key-note is the subject which subjects the Other notes to its law, thus 
marking them as its tonal objects: "masculine" and "feminine" 
determinations are provisional, and relative to the direction in which a 
term faces. 
Equally, we find here the narrative of a structured temporality made 
possible by the dialectic of consonance and dissonance. The return to the 
origin of consonance is not only an attempt to dialectically span time, but 
also to temper the possibility of total change or annihilation. The return 
signifies completion, and the reduction of temporal force, the "killing" of 
time. This narration acts to reinstate original consonance, and i t.s 
mechanism is the ritual of repetitive closure; "The given Sound is applied 
as the principal Note or Key of the Song, by making frequent Closes or 
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Cadences upon it [ ... ] by a Close or Cadence is meant a terminating or 
bringing the Melody to a Period or Rest, after which it begins and sets out 
anew" [Treatise, pp.268/9]. The cadence, then, periodically terminates the 
dialectic narrative - but merely provisionally, in order that the whole 
process may begin again, continually repeating the same structures of loss 
and return. It represents the structural limit (peras) of the narrative of 
music's supremacy over noise. The final cadence would be the ultimate 
limit, the highest closure, the final demarcation of the ontologicaL 
difference between music and noisell21. In dialectical lexis, it is the 
concluding term which rises above the first two, which have merely 
prepared the ground for its heroic appearance. The cadence, indeed, is c1 n 
absolute necessity to the narrative under consideration here. Its operation 
is in perfect symbiosis with the transitions from consonance to dissonance 
[l2] Structural closure is one of the great metanarratives of the 
Enlightenment. For instance, Malcolm quotes the English theorist John 
Wallis in the Philosophical Transactions (1698) reporting that the scale is 
a closed octave: there are "13 pipes within an octave" [Treatise, p.314). Tn 
this, the octave runs from C to C, rather than from C to B. This means that 
the energetic leading-note (B) is not allowed to keep the octave open and 
suggesting movement into the next octave. Rather, the leading-note opens 
merely onto C, the octave is closed, and any potential for motion is 
arrested. 
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and back [lJ]. Equally, it functions as a revelation with respect to 
concordance, which uses the cadence to "discover itself" [ibid.]. The 
journey, then, on which music "sets out" is a means of continual self-
definition. An image of Otherness is explored in order to "discover" the 
unity of the origin all the more markedly. It is this structural narrative of 
tonality which McClary has noted: "Tonal music is narratively conceived at 
least to the extent that the original key area - the tonic - also serves as 
the final goal. Tonal structures are organized teleologically, with the 
illusion of unitary identity promised at the end of each piece." [p.155] The 
mechanism described by Malcolm supports and is made possible by a serial 
ontology which categorizes sounds according to their proximity to a source 
which is unified and complete in itself, and yet is continually exceeding its 
capacity to produce an infinite harmonic series. This ontology is made 
explicit in the following passage, where again, the lexis is spatial, invoking 
the image of boundaries which divide and separate capacities: 
l131 As Rousseau states in the Dictionary, "there can be no dissonance 
without a cadence" [article on "Cadence"]; it is the imperative law of the 
harmonic dialectic. Equally, Malcolm writes: "Aristotle in his treatise 
concerning the world [ ... ] answers that question, if the world is made of 
contrary principles, how comes it that it is not long ago dissolved? He 
shews that the beauty and perfection of it consists in the admirable 
mixture and temperament of different things [ .. ] ie. musick, by a mixture 
of acute and grave, also of long and short sounds of different voices, 
yields one absolute or perfect concert. Again, in Lib.6. explaining the 
harmony of the celestial motions, where each orb, says he, has its own 
proper motion, yet all tend to one harmonious end, as they also proceed 
from one principle, making a choir in the heavens by their concord, and he 
carries on the comparison with music thus: as in a choir, after the 
prrecentor the whole choir sings, composed sometimes of men and wom0.n, 
who by the different acuteness and gravity of their voices, make one 
concinnous harmony." [Treatise, pp.577 /8] This passage is a fine 
demonstration of the complicity of the concepts of ontology, dialectics, 
origination, and anthropomorphism all to the single end of enforcing the 
irnage of the law of harmony, in the immediate context of Malcolm's 
presbyterian experience. For a connection with Rousseau's vision of 
universal harmony represented by presbyterian song, see Chapter 5. 
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the Octave contains in it the whole Principles of Musick, both 
with respect to Consonance (or Harmony) as it contains all the 
original Concords, and the h8rmonic8l Division of such 
greater, as are equal to the Sum of lesser Concords; and with 
respect to the Succession (or Melody) as in the concinnous 
Division of the Octave, we have all the Degrees subservient to 
the harmonic8l Intervals [A Treatise, p.267] 
Within this ontological determination of sound, we find a whole 
slr·uctural theory of music. The 11 harmonical intervals .. are those which 
occupy a privileged position within the hierarchy. These are the pitches 
which form intervals from the source which are in close proximity to it in 
the harmonic series. They are those quanta which, in their structural 
immediacy, are capable of forming additional structuring points, 
provisional "sources" with regard to the concinnous degrees which form 
bridges between them. As with Rameau, the harmonic pitches are intervallic 
additions, supplements, to the originary fundamental, but are immediate 
expressions of it, and are thus endowed with its mark. This mark allows 
them to act as carriers of the ontological law of the source while yet being 
increasingly distant from that source: "that note is called the key of the 
melody, because it governs and regulates all the rest, putting this general 
limitation upon them, that they must be to it in the relation of the seven 
essential and natural notes of the 8ve." [Treatise, p.269] The law, then, 
subjects its objects to an ontological determination. Their structural 
proximity to the source allows their own provisional originarity with 
respect to the more distant expressions, the more intervallically distant 
representations, of the fundamental. However, they form a different orcier 
of originarity to the fundamental origin; they are not the "cause" of the 
concinnous inharmonic intervals, they have no generative capacity (in the 
sense that the source generates them). Rather, they provide structural 
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points around which the further intervallic representations of the origin 
can be arranged and brought under the law of the origin. The harmonic 
iutervals are thus the mechanisms of capture and regulation with respect 
to the lesser intervals - as they face the fundamental term, they show 
their "feminized" aspect, but as they face the remoter harmonics, they are 
endowed with a derivative "masculinity". 
In the terms of the structure of a piece of music, this means that, 
while the whole "begins and at least ends 11 on the key-note, the provisional 
cadences within the outer limits of the piece can rest on pitches other than 
the tonic. In the same way that, in theoretical terms, the harmonic pitches 
provide points on a grid which arrange the structure of the whole 
according to harmonic supplements to a single origin, so the intermedinte 
cadences can occur on these pitches. This allows for a further layer of 
departure and return, with cadences on the tonic framing cadences on the 
fifth (the most proximate harmonic point) in particular. At this point, the 
dialectical mechanism which spreads the structure of harmony out along 
a serial temporality provides the possibility of modulation. However, the 
narrative of the return must still apply in this new register. This is the 
law which provides all movements and all closures within the territory of 
the piece of music. It is also the law which multiplies itself through o 11 
levels of the process. Even at this point of modulation, the law reasserts 
its ontological imperatives; "a regular Piece must not only return to the 
first Key, these other Keys must also have a particular Connection and 
Relation to the first" [Treatise, p.270]. The return is inviolable so long as 
the object of the departure is in close enough proximity to the source to 
provide an image of the Other without risking the annihilation which comes 
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fcom too great an harmonically intervallic space, whether in terms of chord 
progressions, or modulatory sequences. 
Thus, the molecular is mirrored in the global - the law operates at 
all levels and at all points. Its success is due to the structure of 
harmonicity which allows it to first produce spaces and then subject them 
to its law by a highly structured serial distribution of jurisdiction. The 
theory of harmony is used as the basis of a structural narrative which 
operates within all music, according to this reading. 
First, the harmonic machine is ass em bled in theoretical space, 
refining its component mechanisms of generation and legal distribution. A 
great vertical chain of priority, derivation and control. Each component 
relates to its immediate neighbour through a connectivity based in 
proportional difference. This provides the tight efficiency of the harmonic 
machine's gears and cogs, where everything operates according to a 
universal mapping of a single principle (in an almost proto-fractal sense). 
Next, this tall machine is collapsed sideways into the realm of time, 
in order to capture the potentials in that domain for movement and change. 
However, these potentials are called upon only to enact and reenact the 
narratives of a structured spatiality. Time is turned into a series of spaces 
which are organized in the image of the vertical derivation of the original 
law. 
The advantage of this sideways collapsing as far as the harmonic 
chain is concerned is the possibility of the return to the origin, the first 
principle of the system which is contained in the harmonic value of the 
root. In this, the dangers of the distance between music and noise arc 
exorcized, and the law of the single sound asserts itself in an absolute 
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manner. Noise appears to be tamed, because there is only One sound in the 
system's reality, and it is harmonious, encompassing all Other sounds as 
its near or distant harmonics. Harmony is that which produces and 
regulates discord as an image, a representation· of noise. In this, noise is 
not actually, but symbolically tamed. The extension of the harmonic law of 
the originary root to the distant harmonics provides a kind of structural 
talisman against noise, a ritual whereby the real threat of the overspill of 
noise into music is warded off. As Derrida notes, dialectics dictate thnt 
"exclusion is an inclusion .. [Dissemination, p.48] 
Equally, time, as well as noise, is symbolically tamed, through the 
process where by the root, the single sound at the origin which drives all 
the Other subsidiary sounds, demonstrates its capacity for maintaining 
itself intact across any temporal territory. However, the idea of dividing 
time harmonically or spatially immediately presupposes that time is 
originally continuous and undivided. If this is so, then the taming of this 
temporality can only be either provisional or symbolic in itself. The most 
that can be maintained is that the movement of space into time which 
harmonic theory suggests, creates its own spatialized temporality, whether 
out of continuous time, or from itself. The question of precisely how space 
can be held to be that which produces time will become crucial to the 
consideration of these axes. In this spatial moment, however, all the 
requisite materials are assembled for the structures of Western tonality. 
We are also in close proximity to the laws of Pythagoras. 
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3.4 Minding Intervallic Temporality: 
by some secret Conformity of the Organs of Sense with the 
Impulse made upon them in these Proportions [ ... ] the 
Necessity of such simple Proportions in Time is the more, that 
we also have the Intervals of Tune to mind [Treatise, p.391] 
The first real intimation of a theory of musical time in Malcolm's 
Treatise of Musick occurs on page 323. Here, Malcolm has already laid the 
general principles of his "Theory of Sounds with respect to Tune" [p.323], 
and now feels compelled to mention and then suspend the project of doing 
the same for rhythm, "but tho' this be very considerable in Practise, yet 
there is much less to be said about it in Theory'' [ibid.] He states, then, 
that he will continue with an essay on composition, "where I shall have 
Occasion to say what is needful with respect to the TIHE." [ibid.] Already, 
then, as a component of its derivation from, and simplicity in comparison 
to harmony, we have melody, rhythm, and time defined as less theoretico 1 
and therefore more practical. The origin of time - harmony - is a matter of 
knowledge, but time itself is a matter of material action. In this way, 
rhythm can be read here as the technical mode, force or energy, of the 
entelechation of harmony; through rhythm, harmony is made manifest -
time is a medium through which space expresses itself[1~1. 
In the twelfth chapter, entitled "Of the Time or Duration of Sounds 
(1~] entelekheia is a term attributed to Aristotle by Simplicus; "entelekheia 
is a word which is Aristotle's own; it means the form that is actualized." 
[ Physics278.6, quoted in J.O. Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, 
p.55] Entelechy is normally considered to be achieved through an energy, 
or energeia, which becomes the medium of actualization. As Aristotle writes, 
"the word energeia is used with reference to the function and it itself 
tends to the entelechy" [Metaphysics, 1050a 22, Greek Philosophical 
Vocabulary, p.55] Significantly for later developments in this reading of 
Malcolm and harmonic theory in general, Aristotle also makes a connection 
between the soul and entelechy; "soul is the first entelechy of a naturo l 
body that potentially has life" [De Anima 412a 27, Greek Philosophical 
Vocabulary, p.55] Thus, entelechy becomes a central term in Vitalism. 
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in Musick" [p.385-413], Malcolm makes a statement which echoes that 
quoted above where he gives an image of a semiotic chain of harmonic 
intervals stretching from one subject to the next and alternating the 
subject-object, male-female polarities at every connection: "THINGS that are 
designed to affect our Senses must bear a due Proportion with them; [ ... ] 
nor can we easily judge of the Difference of Parts where it is great; 
therefore, that the Proportion of the Time of Notes may afford us Pleasure, 
they must be such as are not difficultly perceived" [Treatise, p.390]. There 
must be a relation of harmonic proportions between the rhythm and our 
capacity for perceiving that rhythm; this is achieved by a close proximity 
in terms of proportion between one rhythmic value and the next. Thus, the 
proportionality involved in the interval between two temporal units is 
i lself in proportion to our senses and pleasure. 
Again, it is a matter of proportion with regard to time which 
motivates Malcolm's theory, invoking the law of the spatial interval as a 
means of ontologically determining time by the same harmonic mechanisms 
as space. Additionally, further along the intervallic chain, it would be 
possible to conceive of a harmonic regulation operating within the 
mechanisms of perception and pleasure -in short, a harmonics of the affect 
(just such a possibility will become extant in relation to the writings of. 
Adam Smith in Chapter 5 onwards). 
Spatial harmonics therefore offers a rule for the operation not only 
of the sonorous body (or corps sonore in Rameau) and its distribution 
throughout time, but also its reception by the human body, and further, 
the production of an affect within that body. In a sentence the like of 
which is to be found in almost all music treatises of this era, Malcolm 
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writes: .. Pythagoras is said to have had an absolute Command of the human 
Passions, to turn them as he pleased by Musick" [p.495]. This passage 
continues by detailing the precise action of Number within time; "the only 
Ratios fit for Mu sick, besides that of Equality, are the double and t.he 
triple, or the Ratios of 2 to 1 and 3 to 1 ; of greater Differences we could 
not judge, without a painful Attention .. [p.390]. Malcolm reduces musical 
time to an alchemy of three terms: 1, 2, 3, which are permutable into three 
combinations - 1:1 ; 2:1 ; 3:1 - always, it is a question of two quanta 
connected by their proportional relation, "of Two Notes immediately next 
other" [p.391], supplementing each other according to a law of mediated 
difference [lS]. 
There is, then, a harmonious relation between these numeric 
rhythmic divisions and our sensory judgement; a question of the 
judgement of sounds 11 Without a painful Attention ... Yet, just as these 
rhythmic harmonies differ from their tonal counterparts which Malcolrn 
immediately states as 2:3 ; 3:4, etc., so our perception of musical time 
[lS] There is a significant intertext between harmonic theory and alchemy 
at all points in its articulation. No doubt, the common reference point which 
each theory finds in Pythagorean thought is a component of this, but the 
question goes further into the dialectical operations of each. As Malcolm's 
dialectic divides sound into two categories only in order to re-articulate 
their connection according to the law of one end of the opposition (in the 
theory of the concinnous and the inconcinnous), so too alchemy divides an 
unstructured reality in order to re-synthesize it according to a specific 
component. In the words of C.G. Jung, 11 The alchemical operation consisted 
in separating the prima materia, the so-called chaos, into the active 
principle, the soul, and the passive principle, the body, which were then 
reunited in personified form in the coniunctio or 'chymical marriage.'" 
[ Paracelsus as a Spiritual Phenomenon, in Alchemical Studies, pp. 122/3] 
The complicity of the soul-body duality of this action is also resonant for 
what has already been discussed of Descartes, and of the concept of 
entelechy as applied to harmonic theory. 
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differs from our perception of musical spacel161. Once more, we have ~n 
implied complicity of reason and experience in generating knowledge; 
'Tis true, that in the Proportions of Tune the Ratios of 2:3, of 
3:'', &c. produce Concord; and tho' we conclude these to be 
the Proportions, from very good Reasons, yet the Ear judg~s 
of them after a more subtil Manner, or rather indeed we are 
conscious of no such Thing as the Proportions of the 
different Numbers of Vibrations that constitute the Intervals 
of Sound, tho' the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of our 
Sensations seem to depend upon it, by some secret Conformity 
of the Organs of Sense with the Impulse made upon them in 
these Proportions; but in the Business of Time, the good 
Effect depends entirely upon a distinct Perception of the 
Proportions. [Treatise, pp.390/1] 
Here the problematic relation of space to time becomes moce 
complexly layered, and is no longer a question of a simple materialization, 
or entelechation from one domain to another. Rather, the entelechation of 
spuce into time is given a further spacedness in that a difference between 
two forms of perception is delimited; the perception of harmony and the 
perception of rhythmic time. This implication of two modes of perception in 
the process of harmonic space's materialization into the temporal world 
l16l cf. Appendix I for a consideration of proportional ratios in Henryson's 
Orpheus and Eurydice. Equally, writing of meter, rather than "time", 
Rameau states: "We may derive meter from the source of harmony, for meter 
consists only of the numbers 2, 3, and 4, numbers which also give us the 
octave divided arithmetically and harmonically. Furthermore, since meter 
depends upon an equal series of movements, we may reduce it to two beats, 
as the space of time placed between the first and the second movements 
continues naturally with regularity" [ Traite de l'harmonie, pp. 164/5]. This 
is in complete agreement with Malcolm, representing the organization of the 
next level of temporality up from "time" as an equally spatial order, but 
with a more truly "harmonic" set of numeric terms. Equally, Rameau's 
further analyzing down of meter to a movement across two units, or "times .. 
is the same move which Malcolm makes in stating the object of his analysis 
as "two notes immediately next other". This determination of the prime 
component of rhythm as a two-term "phrase" is of great significance in 
terms of a dialectic of musical rhythm, as well as opening the possibility of 
an anthropomorphic image of temporality, as is discussed later with 
respect to the theories of de Momigny. It will also be noticed that this bi-
polar division is at work in late nineteenth century theories of rhythm, 
such as Riemann's. 
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leilds Malcolm into the area of psychological aesthetics: for Malcolm, the 
perception of tonal harmony is not conscious; it comes from a secret design 
of the ear, whose sensory capacity is mystically endowed with a 
proportionality corresponding to that of the harmonic intervals 
themselves. Thus, tonal harmony is a more veiled form of the universal 
principle of proportion, whose affects can be experienced in an immediate 
manner and without the necessity of rational reflection, although reason 
can supply us with a rationale for the phenomena, and indeed should be 
used. Note the return of a PlatonicjCartesian theme: the energeia which is 
transmitted from source to receiver is transmitted intact across an 
interval. As we have seen from Descartes, 11 an acute Sound requires a 
greater Force to produce it .. [Treatise, pp.219/20], and thus 11 acute Sounds 
[ ... ] strike the Ear with more Force .. [ibid.]. For this reason, the voice 
proceeds by small intervals to avoid "Disproportion or Inequality in the 
Intenseness .. [ibid.]. Thus, voice, sound and ear are all linked together by 
a common proportionality. Malcolm elaborates this point through the 
concept of .. secret Conformity": the integrity of the unit of sound 
transmitted across the space between source and listener is based in the 
"secret Conformity" of the ear with the "Impulse made upon" it. The 
common proportionality of the sonic transmitter and the receiver ensure 
that the unit of sound retains all of its original characteristics. 
Rhythm represents a simpler form of the principle, and relies on 
smaller, closer harmonic proportions. In rhythm, the differences between 
one note and its consequent are not so great as they are in harmony. It is 
as if the inherent danger of motion must be arrested by narrowing the 
degree of proportional difference, but it is also a matter of time's 
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subservience to space, since 11 the Necessity of such simple Proportions in 
Time is the more, that we have also the Intervals of Tune to mind [l71 
along with it." [Treatise, p.391] It is also a question of our sensory 
capacity, since Malcolm writes: "of Two Notes immediately next other, these 
[si1nple proportions] ought to be the Ratios, because only the Notes in 
immediate Succession are or can be directly minded" [p.391]. The object of 
the listening "gaze", then, is the proportionality of harmonic space, with 
an originary root at its base. Our attentions must be turned towards this 
par·ameter above consideration of all others. Rhythm is merely the 
instrument of harmony's entelechy: of course it is segmented according to 
the same principles as harmony, making it a harmonic time, but this is 
merely expedient in providing a temporal structure into which the more 
pressing matter of harmonic structure can be inserted. Rhythmic structure 
l171 Here there is indubitably a strong resonance of the Scots verb mind, 
meaning "remember 11 , although Malcolm has put it into a present, rather 
than past, context, so that 11 to mind" is to cognate - to call to the mind, 
rather than to recall to the mind. Malcolm's first language would almost 
certainly have been Scots, along with other Edinburgh intellectuals such 
as Hume. The latter is particularly noted (along with Boswell) for his 
repeated attempts to eradicate "scotticisms" in his written language. 
Indeed, there was a fashionable industry in Enlightenment Edinburgh 
devoted entirely to rooting out the Scots language amongst the intellectual 
classes, even if English remained more of a written than a spoken language 
for many of them. Paul Scott notes that 11 in the 18th century the literati of 
the Scottish Enlightenment still spoke Scots but for writing they had 
developed an effective, but Latinate and sometimes ponderous, English 
prose." [An drew Fletcher and the Treaty of Union, p.69] He goes on to 
quote an English traveller to Enlightenment Edinburgh: "I shall only say, 
that they appear to me, from their conversation, to write English as a 
f ureign tongue; their mode of talking, phrase and expression, but little 
resembling the language of their works." [ibid.] It was only after the Act 
of Union with England in 1707 that the English language began to have an 
effective power within even the Sects-speaking capital, and much of the 
education system continued to use Scots as a medium for some time. Indeed, 
the philosopher Francis Hutcheson (an Ulster Scot) is credited as being 
the first Glasgow University professor to lecture through the medium of 
English following his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1730. 
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is, then, only an expressive vehicle for harmonic structure. 
Composition becomes the implementation of the entelechy of harmony. 
The composer arranges sound in time in order to sequentially express the 
natural principles at work within the sonorous body. Yet while we ar~c 
compelled always to express the same imperatives of proportional 
structure, our invention wills ever new permutations of the terms which 
remain ontologically constant. "The Length of Notes is a Thing merely 
accidental to the Sound, and depends altogether upon our Will in 
pr·oducing them" [p.391]. In the region of the practical and of composition, 
there are two kinds of rules which should be followed, or at least two 
modes of the same law which should be taken into account. Just as Malcolm 
claims that there are two mechanisms of aural perception- one for harmony 
(unconscious), one for rhythm (conscious) - there are two kinds of 
procedural constraints for composition. 
As far as the temporal aspect of music is concerned, Malcolm writes 
that "Melody is chiefly the Business of the Imagination; so that the Ru lcs 
of Melody serve only to prescribe certain Limits to it, beyond which the 
Imagination, in searching out the Variety and Beauty of Air, ought not to 
carry us" [p.420]. The theoretical territory under whose jurisdiction 
melodic composition falls, then, and whose boundaries may not be crossed, 
is inhabited by the imagination. To this extent, there is a freedom within 
this absolutely defined space, but only those freedoms which are 
prescribed as alternatives by the rules can be pursued. Our compositional 
freedoms in the domain of melody are legitimated by our compliance with 
the "ought" which Malcolm inscribes over our movements. In the same way 
that the law of close proximity defines which sub-harmonic intervals can 
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be called concinnous and utilized for mediating the spaces between 
harmonic intervals, there are only a limited number of movements possible 
in melodic composition, and these are contained within the proximity of this 
theoretical space. 
We have already discerned that within Malcolm's writings on musical 
temporality there is an originary harmonic space which assembles all the 
requisite laws for temporal ontology. As we might expect, the laws which 
operate within the harmonic component of composition are less flexib.Je: 
"But Harmony is the Work of Judgement; so that its Rules are more certain, 
extensive, and in Practise more difficult" [ibid.]. The theoretical space of 
harmonic composition turns out to be more "extensive". However, its 
practical territory is narrower, more strictly defined by a series of 
legitimizing clauses, more self-proximate and more efficient in producing 
its affects than that of melodic composition. The directives are clear, but 
require a harder resolve, calling once more upon reasoned judgement for 
their execution. Harmony's affects may operate in a "secret conformity" 
with the ear, but it is necessary to make this conscious on the part of the 
composer, to bring the reason behind the experience to the surface, 
thr-ough judicial knowledge. "in Harmony, the Invention has nothing to do, 
for by an exact Observation of the Rules of Harmony it may be produced 
without that Assistance from the Imagination." [ibid.] These laws are 
absolute and universal - our imagination, our will, our desire for varied 
innovation, all hold no ground at all with respect to the harmonic 
directives. The inviolability of the harmonic rule of law is necessary- here 
is the first term of all subsequent compositional dialectics, if the origin is 
nothing more than harmony, then in the space of harmony, innovation 
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cannot move. Only in this way can the various layers of harmony's 
entelechy be kept under the same generative principle as the source itself. 
At every stage in the production of music, then, the harmonic 
proportions which underlie the mathematically verifiable phenomenon of 
the sonorous body are imprinted onto the next stage. The composer 
expresses the structures of harmony by arranging them in a time turnt~d 
to an image of harmonic space. A piece of music inscribes this same image, 
by virtue of a "secret conformity" of the receptive proportions of the cnr 
and the "impulse" which strikes the ear. There is then a further "secret 
conformity" between the ear and the passions, which are impulscd 
proportionally with the soul. The significant aspect of this particular 
harmonicity is that the content of the original information unit- that which 
is being expressed - remains absolutely intact in its passage from one 
layer of the system to the next. Perhaps the hyper-efficiency of this 
aspect of the Malcolmist system stems from the total conformity of the 
"containing" terms which pass the original unit from the source to the 
destination - time has been compartmentalized by the same rule as 
reception, and so forth. Thus, intention and structure are absolutely 
maintained in a system which draws analogies between Plato's enlightened 
philosopher and Malcolm's composer of the Enlightenment. 
At this point, it would be all too easy to imagine that within this 
axiological determination of harmony and rhythm, the "virile" component 
would be unpro blematically the harmonic one, if it were a question of an 
anthropomorphic image operating within the terms of the Pythagorean 
Tn ble of Opposites. Yet, this is not the case; the dynamics of this system 
are again, more complex than one first imagines. First, note that the idea 
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of the "gaze" immediately comes complete with all the baggage of a semiotic 
gender divide: the object of the gaze is classically feminized and passive, 
the gazing subject masculinized and active. Secondly, we could note that 
while it is the law of harmonics which the rhythmic domain is captured by, 
complies with and is assembled under, once this has taken place, the 
rhythmic structure functions to contain the harmonic within its 
boundaries. Thus, rhythm becomes a highly active mode of the 
dissemination of the sonorous body, which is now, in a sense, acted upon 
by time, even if the law of sonority has previously arranged the mechanism 
of this mode. Thirdly, let us recall Malcolm's serial semiotic which involved 
a switching of subject-object polarity at every new level of connection. 
What is occurring at all levels is an archetypal process which constantly 
modifies the definition of input and output, which moves through levels of 
signification to keep the dialectical motion in action, redefining each level 
as each stage in the process is completed. 
It is for these reasons amongst others that Malcolm, after having 
stated that rhythm "is a far more simple Subject" [p.386], can now state 
that "AGAIN, it must be minded, That the Rhythm us is a very principal Thing 
in Musick" [p.548]. The distance traversed by Malcolm between these two 
statements lies in the specific aspects of his system which he has 
assembled prior to each: the first statement is embedded in t.he 
consideration of theory. At this point, the absolute seat of power is in the 
harmonic origin. The second statement, however, comes after the section 
on the rules of composition. Thus, the practicalities of the entelechy of 
harmony have now been assembled, and the production of music has been 
shown to operate by the semiotic codes described above. 
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Mnlcolm can now deal with the affective, temporal aspect of music, 
and in discussing the ancient Greek approach to this, he demonstrates that 
even though we can consider the harmonic origin to be the "male" 
component during the theoretical assembly of music, the opposite can be 
true during the practical stage of the process. Rhythm is a "very principle 
Thing" in this stage, 
for 'tis this Variety of Movements in the quick or slow 
Successions, or Length and Shortness of Notes, that's the 
conspicuous Part of the Air, without which the other 
[harmony] can produce but very weak Effects; and therefore 
most of the Ancients used to call the Rhythm us the Male, and 
the Harmonica the Female. [Treatise, p.548/9] 
From this we can understand the particular way in which Malcolm's 
harmonicity works as a serialized dialectic; a chain of dialectical processes 
with terms from one linking on to terms in the next, ever re-polarizing 
each other. There is therefore no absolutely stable definition of one stage 
in the process -the limited pragmatics of each situation must be taken into 
account. 
First, we have an original source, the first term of the dialectic. This 
is the virile, controlling term, because it generates an essence, or 
ousial111, and transmits it into the second, middle term - time. At this 
point, the second term is merely an empty capacity, incomplete and 
therefore territorially indefinite prior to the arrival of the ousia. The 
dialectic is closed when the first term inseminates the second with the 
ousia, thus creating the whole of the third term, specifying its boundaries, 
[lB] This term is also translated from the Greek as Being; "in relation to the 
true being [ ousian] which you say always remains in every way the same" 
[Plato, from the Sophist, 248a, translated in Greek Philosophical 
Vocabulary, p.120] Equally, in a non-technical capacity, the term can be 
translated as "possessions". This immediately links it into the network of 
meanings surrounding property, propriety, properness, and so forth. 
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and stabilizing it. 
The second stage of the process now begins, with the third term of 
the previous dialectic becoming the first term of the next dialectic. Now it 
is this term's turn to change its polarity and inseminate its second term 
with the ousia in order to create a further dialectic at a further level, and 
so on. 
In this way, the proportions of the process - which are the 
proportions of the original ousia- are repeated at every level. However, 
each 11 next" containing term is merely a potential container, an 
indeterminate space -a pure capacity which, at the instant of the injection 
of ousia is assembled into a virile and determinate body with respect to the 
following term. 
Additionally, the ousia which is passed down this semiotic chain 
remains intact. It is the carrier of virility and the condition of proportional 
formation. It is this original component which assembles the "masculinity" 
of terms from their previous "femininity". There is never any need to 
modify it, since its law is successfully stamped on every intermediate term. 
As it passes from one to the next, there is, in a sense, a perfect fit of unit 
and containing capacity. Nothing is damaged, lost or added in transit. And 
is ousia not one of the essences of logocentrism? The vast harmonic 
machine, with its light-filled essence has the listener's soul as the goal of 
its manifestation. As Derrida has written of another such metaphysical 
system, it all rests on 11 this logos which calls to itself and summons itself 
by itself as telos, and whose dynamis tends toward its energeia or 
entelechia" [Writing and Difference, p.166] Could this apply as much to a 
"harmony" as to a "melody"? 
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From this position, we can see that the image of harmony as given 
by Derrida (through Rousseau) in Of Grammatology is only one possible 
reuding. That reading was of a harmony which was inherently concerned 
with the multiplication of spacings, but a multiplication which was infinite 
and threatened the rupture of the very concept of structure. However, by 
engaging directly with harmonic theory (which Derrida avoids) we can 
easily provide a reading where everything turns on the image of a 
harmonic mechanism which, rather than engendering chaos, operates by 
dialectically mastering its energy in order to state structural imperatives 
over and over. Further, and it is also possible to consider the existence of 
/ 
a system of essences which operates within the structure of harmony, 
being the site of production for a pseudo-Rousseauist form of spatial 
attenuation. This spatial attenuation keeps the intervallic mechanisms of 
harmony in check, assuring the continual emphasis on concinnous, rather 
than ultimately dissonant spaces. Rather than the interval acting as a 
rupturing force, then, one can read it as always ever encapsulated within 
the ontological law, and the gravitational pull towards structural unison. 
If harmonics are true supplements, they can just as easily be determined 




This the feeling heart 
Would tenderly suggest: but 'tis enough, 
In this late age, adventurous to have touched 
Light on the numbers of the Samian Sage. 
High Heaven forbids the bold presumptuous strain, 
Whose wisest will has fixed us in a state 
That must not yet to pure perfection rise: 
Besides, who knows, how, raised to higher life, 
From stage to stage, the vital scale ascends? 
- Spring, James Thomson (1728). 
cHAPTER FOUR 
RHYTHMIC SPACE 
~~1 Ontological Rythmu.J11 
there is a Subject, viz. some Person or Thing the Discourse is 
referred to [ ... ] in like Manner, in every regular and truly 
melodious Song, there is one Note which regulates all the rest 
[Treatise, p.266] 
Mnlcolm's conception of tonal form relies here on images drawn from 
the theory of rhetoric. The renewed interest in such models have, of late, 
begun to provide a store of topoi for the ideological analysis of music - the 
return to rhetoric as a strategic means of connecting the sonic to the 
forms, if not the content of the phonic, thus opening the way for a 
hermeneutics of instrumental signification. Sus an McClary, for instance, 
derives a feminist critique of tonal practise from the recovery of the fact 
that during the Enlightenment, "music was typically discussed in terms of 
affect and rhetoric." [Feminine Endings, p.20] From this basis, she traces 
various su bversions of rhetorical codes to show a series of pseudo-
deconstructive "reversals in the representation of gender" [ibid., p.49, 
emphasis added] On the other hand, Elaine Sisman accuses McClary of 
perpetrating "overheated ideological reading[ s]" in this field [ Mozart: The 
"Jupiter" Symphony, p.98]. Nevertheless, Sisman broadly concurs wit.h 
[l] Throughout this chapter, Malcolm's spelling has been adopted unless 
there is a quotation from another source. 
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Mc:Clary's hermeneutic basis, writing that "the Classical composer may be 
seen as drawing on a common fund of musical types or 'commonplaces,' the 
source of ideas and arguments that constitutes invention (inventio), the 
first five parts of Classical rhetoric." [ibid., p.46] In much of McClary's 
work, the deconstruction of autonomous "absolutes" in instrumental music 
relies on putting certain phonically-derived indecida bles back into play 
in order to displace the sonic. However, the phonic "source" which Sisman 
and McClary flag up can be shown to rely on certain aspects of harmonic 
theory itself. Yet, as we will see, the reversal of this rhetorical return is 
not a simple matter of following Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau, of 
reactivating the sonic indecidables within a phonocentric theory. In the 
previous chapter, harmony itself was characterized as a dialectically 
logocentric (although not fully phonic) schema. Clearly, the search for the 
"source" is more labyrinthine. 
Let us pick Malcolm's thread up here, but this time, moving in the 
opposite direction - not the rhetorical sources of instrumental music, so 
much as the harmonic mechanisms of rhetoric; 
the ancient Greeks and Latins [ ... ] took infinite Pains to 
cultivate their Language, and make it as harmonious, 
especially in what related to the Rythmus, or Number, and 
Combination of long and short Syllables, as possible; to this 
End particularly were the pedes metrici invented, which are 
the Foundations of their Versification [Treatise, pp.601/2]. 
Quoting the Dutch theorist, Isaac Vossius, Malcolm opens a 
diametrically analogous agenda to Rousseau's phonocentric theory of 
music; namely, a harmonic theory of poetry. His approach to this agenda 
lies in a summary of an Ancient Greek division of the temporal aspects of 
the arts into two categories - rhythmica and metrica. While the first 
category is a subdivision within music proper (along with harmonica) the 
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second category, metrica, "belongs properly to the Poets, and respects the 
versifying Art" [p.455]. Thus, the possibility is raised of a complicity 
between music and poetry established not through a common vocal source, 
but through a common medium of rhythm, or spatial time. We have already 
considered the segmentation of time which is carried out to ensure the 
entelechation of music-harmonic space, and here we have the poetic 
possibility of a spatially measured temporality. 
Malcolm continues his delineation of this division by citing the claim 
of Aristides Quintilianus that rythmus is further subdivided into two 
categories: the static or the mobile. The static aspect of rythmus i.s 
expressed in purely visual-spatial terms, and is the concrete realization 
of harmonic number in the temporal world, as in "a well made Statue" 
[p.456]. Rythmus which is mobile itself divides into two further 
subcategories. First there is the motion of a human body, as in dancing; 
this is again visual-spatial, but now takes on the aspect of dividing time 
spatially, rather than simply existing spatially in time. Second, there is 
"the Motion of Sound or the Voice" [ibid.], in music or in oratory. This is 
also involved in the spatial organization of time, but is no longer visual-
spatial. Rather, it exists in an acoustic space. For these reasons, Malcolm 
writes that "RYTHHUS is perceived either by the Eye or the Ear, and is 
something general" to all arts [ibid.]. 
Rythmus "may be without Metrum", as is the case with the first two 
categories -sculpture and dance [ibid.]. Metrum, however, belongs to the 
third sub-category of rythmus, being "perceived only by the Ear" 
1.37 
[ibid.][
21. Despite this differentiation between metrum and the visual 
manifestations of rythmus, it is yet imaged in rigidly spatial terms, taking 
i.he anthropomorphic model of the pedes metrici, or metrical feet. The 
grafting of the spatial concept of the pedes metrici onto acoustic metrum 
represents once more the appropriation of time by a spatial mechanism in 
order to harmonize the distant term to the original space. In this way, the 
~ 
use of metrical techniques in performance become1 a kind of dance across 
the proportional capacities of the ear. This aural dance is also that which 
Malcolm referred to when writing of the "secret conformity" of the ear with 
the proportions of the "impulse" made upon it. These spaces are "danced 11 
across by these .. metrical feet", the feet which are in perfect proportion 
to the spaces of the ear. 
This image derived from dance and applied to music arrives there by 
way of literature. Yet regardless of which direction the "influence" of one 
art upon the other lies (or indeed, whether we can write of influence at all, 
if by that we invoke a theory of origination), there is a complicity between 
the theories of music and language which partake of the Hellenic moment, 
and this complicity arranges itself around the issues of harmony and 
rhythm. One of the first extensive studies of harmony and language to be 
written in English, and very much in the Pythagorean mould, was John 
Mason's An Essay on the Power and Harmony of Prosaic Numbers, published 
in London, 1749, 28 years after Malcolm's Treatise. Mason conceived of this 
text as a sequel to his earlier Essay on the Power of Numbers and the 
Principles of Harmony in Poetic Compositions, yet the harmonic power of 
l21 Malcolm's metrum here signifies metre, not the Gregorian Chant meaning 
of the same Latin word. Metrum is thus the structural organization of 
rythmus, just as metre is of rhythm. 
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Number, perhaps due to the greater aesthetic distance to be transversed, 
is all the greater in his study of prose. 
On the first page of the preface, Mason writes that his programme 
is to instill in the reader's use of language "a critical Regard to the 
Structure of their Periods; or of such a Care in the Choice and Disposition 
of their Words as will give them that agreeable Flow which the Anti en t.s 
called Rhythm us: The Harmony of which every good Ear perceives" 
[pp.iiijiv]. Once more, the emphasis on a spatial temporality and its 
proportional correlation with the ear of the initiate, but this time within a 
description of language. Further, there is the use of lexis more accustomed 
to a specific musical application. Quoting Geddes' Composition of the 
Antients, Mason asserts that "many Writers [ ... ] being destitute of a just 
Ear, run into dissonant and jarring Measures" [p.v]. Here, the ear is not 
only imaged as partaking of a just judgement, but also as operating within 
the musical sense of tuning - justice and consonance are compounded to 
dispel dissonance. However, this dissonance occurs in the parameter of 
"measures" -it is a metrical dissonance, evoking the image of a tuning of 
temporal, not harmonic, intervals. 
Equally, the image of the ear is of significance - if this is a theory 
of prose as an art of writing, then it is within a phonocentric mode. It is 
not the reading eye that counts to Mason, but in Derridean terms, the 
hearing and understanding ear. Just as Rousseau's unified theory of 
poetry and music must negate the instrumental or at least problematize its 
delineation in theory, so the same Hellenic will to unify the arts 
pro blematizes the written page for prose. The economy of both arts is 
hemmed in by the borrowed image, a mutual debt of reference. Mason 
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demonstrates how his awareness of the theoretical manoeuvres of the music 
treatises of the time frame his desire to do the same for poetry. In the 
preface, he echoes the Rameauist moment in asserting that reason and 
knowledge must supplement our experience - the ear cannot of itself 
provide a sound basis for judgement, and music theory is his model: "A 
good Ear is worth a thousand Rules- 'Tis true; so it is in Music. But an 
Acquaintance with the musical Notes and Chords, and the Rules and 
Principles of Harmony is notwithstanding necessary to make a good 
Musician." (p.8] Mason's project, then, is to write a harmonic theory of 
poetry on a par with the music treatises of the scientific Moderns. To this 
end, he develops the specifically Pythagorean aspects of the Aristotelian 
moment; his prime image is what he calls Numerous Composition - a 
manifestation of Pythagorean Number in prosody. 
Across this concept Mason inscribes an anthropomorphic image, 
when he writes of the Art of numerous composition as "far from being 
Effeminate" [p.4] Numerous composition is a specifically masculine entity, 
and as we will see, is so by virtue of the action of a harmonic mechanism 
within it. This harmony, however, is always phonocentrically imaged in 
Mason's text. Number itself is a virile voice to Mason, when he asserts that 
"all Demosthene 's Thunder would have failed him had it not been hurled in 
Numbers." [p.3] Here we can read of an anthropomorphism comparable to 
that which Malcolm assembles in his intervallic chain, with its alternating 
gender polarities which exchange a presence for an absence, and vice 
versa. In Mason, the possibility of harmony depends on the crucial moment 
of entelechy through a compositional act- in other words, the introduction 
of time. When space exceeds itself and spills over into time, or is "hurled" 
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into time by the composer (creating as it does so a spatial construction of 
time) it is then that the voice at the centre, the ousia which is transmitted, 
can access the force of time, rythmus, dividing time by this numeric 
principle, and successively voicing each proportioned unit. 
The question can be raised as to what constitutes the construction 
of the masculinity of numeric composition in structural terms; what are the 
techniques which assemble the form of the numbers which allow for the 
possibility of space being hurled into time? To understand this, we must 
return to the action of the pedes metrici, the image of metrical feet which 
belong to the ground of metrum common to music and language. One aspect 
of this anthropomorphic image is its bipedal connotation - two feet, one 
left, one right, both swinging from under the body, alternating in a 
symbiosis of backwards and forwards motion, but with the net effect of a 
general forward motion. In "putting one's best foot forward", as the 
phrase goes, one also realizes a certain priority of one foot over the other 
- just as we are left handed or right handed. The possibility of the 
dialectic is not far away in this simple model. With the introduction of two 
"lengths" to the feet, the prioritization of the one over the other is 
compounded - short and long. Mason gives two tables, the first of which 
sets out the composition of the familiar "simple feet": 
















Palim bacchic --v 
Molossus 
In Mason's system, just as in the small scale there are two forms of 
prime unit, the long and the short, so at the level of these simple combined 
units, there are two forms which operate not merely at the level of whether 
the unit is comprised of two or three prime units, but whether the unit is 
capable of occupying a central structural role. Again, it becomes a question 
of anthropomorphism; "These Numbers, considered in themselves or 
unconnected with any other, are either Generous and Strong, or Base and 
Weak" [p.9]. These units are to be considered in isolation from each other, 
and divided into two categories- they are, inherently, ontologically strong 
or weak. Their division according to this principle creates the following 
table: 













Palim bacchic --v 
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Thus, the two categories, strong and weak, are assembled according 
to whether the unit cadences on a long or short beat respectively. That 
which occupies more time, or more temporal space at the final moment, is 
that which endows the unit with a stable "masculinity". As Mason writes, 
"a Foot that ends with a long Syllable is more Strong and Sonorous, and 
consequently more Noble and Generous, than one that terminates in a shot~t 
one." [p.ll] For Mason, the masculinity of the strong feet is bound up with 
a heightened sonority: in other words, the sustainment of sound through 
time, the conquering of time by space is what is achieved by the sonority, 
the virility of the literary voice. 
However, as we have observed in other systems, so too in this- the 
stable requires an alteration with .the unstable in order to create a 
mechanism of passage from one stability to another. The short, weak beat 
here connects two long, strong beats, forming a periodic regulation of the 
exchange between two essential structural units. In this respect, Mason's 
system is a dialectical one which provides a model in the rhythmic 
dimension itself for a pseudo-entelechy of the structurally essential 
temporal space through the motive power of a structurally provisional 
temporal space. "Termination", closure, must occur on the strong element 
in order to guarantee a masculine nobility. 
Again, it is a question of legal balance: 
When we call these Feet base, low and feeble, we mean only 
when they are taken by themselves; for when they are 
judiciously blended with others, they are of equal Importance 
with the rest, and (like Mortar in a Building) contribute as 
much to the Strength and Beauty of the Composition. [p.lO, 
fn.l] 
In a manner identical to Malcolm's theory of the mutual dialectical 
reliance of the concinnous and inconcinnous interval, Mason sets up a 
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system whereby the One requires its Other in order to continually define 
itself as the One. The propagation of its law across all other spaces is 
c1chieved by virtue of a "judicious blend" of the two archetypally opposed 
elements. As Malcolm writes of the "inconcinnous degrees", or steps of the 
scule, "of themselves they have not Sweetness enough to satisfy the Ear, 
and are of Use only with regard to the Concords" [Treatise of Musick, 
}J.220]. The supplementary, transitional term, then, only signifies within 
the economy of the originary, structural term - by itself it cannot produce 
the return t.o stasis, and therefore the reification which produces pleasure 
as an expression of closure. 
The closure represented by the cadence, whether final or 
intermediary, is of great structuring importance to a serialized temporaL 
s Lructure. It is the point at which the full presence of the law is asserted, 
then to either be succeeded by another play of the return of the law of the 
origin, or to close on the origin for good. First, it requires the division of 
time into discrete units: "Every Sentence may be conceived as divisible 
into distinct and separate Clauses; every Clause where there is an 
apparent Cessation of the Voice, should always End with a generous Foot" 
[Essay on the Power of Numbers, p.19]. The structural significance of the 
return, then, requires the division of sentences into clauses, and then t.he 
hierarchization of these clauses into cadential or connective, according to 
their complicity in the presence or the absence of the voice. Next, it must 
be assured that there is a judicious balance between the two types of 
clauses, so that "the short ones be duly qualified by the succeeding long 
oues; reserving the best and most harmonious Numbers for the Cadence." 
[p.19] In other words, the weaker rhythmic units are legitimated through 
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their acceptance by and positioning within the law of the strong unit. 
With Rousseau's ghost inhabiting the Pythagorean margins, two 
terminological series are assembled and set up in opposition to each other: 
(1) The Strong, Generous, Noble, Sonorous, Sublime, Grave, Majestic, 
Bold, Eager, Solemn, Stately, Vehement, Eager, Martial; 
(2) the effeminate, weak, feeble, base, low, light. 
Even the number of terms in each series demonstrates which Mason 
considers to be of more significance. From this point, Mason then goes on 
tu make further hierarchical distinctions between the stronger pedes 
metrici, and, in taking a cue from Aristotle's Poetics, chooses the most 
archetypal unit as the model - the iambic foot: "Hence Aristotle sais that 
in his time it was more used than any other Number by those who spake in 
public. [ ... ] None of all the measures run more naturally into our common 
speech than the iambic". [Essay, p.12, fn. (n)] 
Here we have the whole situation in microcosm, with a single weak 
beat opening up the possibility of a closure on a strong beat. This is the 
prime generating structure of the whole system for Mason; "it follows that 
the Iambic ( v-) is the most noble and generous of all the Feet." [p.12] The 
elemental simplicity of this rhythmic unit can be taken as a model for the 
structural organization of time at all levels of a work - it is the basic 
compositional unit of all metrical arts, based on the originary difference of 
the short and the long (supplement to origin; absence to presence; female 
to male; Other to One, etc.). This is also expressed as a function of the 
Natural order as it relates to Mason's musical model: "as a long Time is best 
after a short one, [ ... ] the slow Airs in Music come in most agreeably after 
the quick ones. This is as pleasing to the Ear as Rest after Motion is to 
Nature." [pp.l2/3] Within this ontology, the iambic unit provides the 
complete and simplest image of the division of Nature itself, or rather, 
herself, as Mason would have it. Equally, the iambic foot marks the measure 
of all other feet: "the rest have their Degree of Excellence in Proportion as 
tlt£~Y approach or recede from it" [p.12]. Excellence is a matter of a spatial 
relation- more precisely, a proportional relation- with a direct correlation 
of proximity to the iambic foot. The series of feet is a matter of a spatial 
sequence, a truly linear series, with an iambic foot as its origin, stretching 
out its law of the return across all other terms in the series. 
The vitality of the iambic unit is something which Mason particularly 
stresses as, if not openly determined by an image of masculine gender, 
then at least virile and invasive: "the Iambic (which is of all the Numbers 
most generous) is very strong and sonorous, very proper (as Horace 
observes) to excite and express the Passion of Anger. Hence the AnapiP.st 
and Iambic are not improperly called by some, the pushing Numbers." 
[p.14] This most originary of rhythmic units, then, operates a virility at 
the heart of the rythmus, and this echoes Malcolm's statements that during 
the act of composition, "the Rhythmus [is] the Male, and the Harmonica the 
Female." [A Treatise of Musick, p.549]. 
Recalling the image of Demosthene' s Thunder which is generated by 
the "hurling" of space into time, Mason puts the following in a footnote to 
the idea of the "Martial Air": 
v- V V V VV 
The double double Beat I Of the thundering Drum 
In this image of the friction of harmony's entelechy through time is 
of a territorial limit, the alternation of two elements framed by one 
principle. It is the archetypal possibility of the gender determined 
dialectic of time. This is the mechanism by which rythmus is assembled as 
a serialized, spatialized time [3]. 
[
3
] The concept of the gendered cadence also emerges at a later point in the 
writings of the Belgian theorist Jerome-Joseph de Momigny (1762-1842), 
particularly his Cours complet d'harmonie et de composition (1803-6). Here, 
the cadence is regulated by a division into leve (upbeat) and frappe 
(down beat, lit. "struck"). These two terms are placed in a non-reversible 
temporal series: the leve always preceding the frappe, as the antecedent 
to the consequent. The unit created by the succession of these two terms 
in this order is thus de Momigny's cadence or proposition musicalc. 
Further, there are two levels of cadence; the cadence melodique and its 
containing term, the cadence harmonique. This is contained by the 
hemistiche (Gk.: half a line of verse), which is contained by the vers, which 
in turn is contained by the periode, and this contained by the reprise. 
Thus we have a series of structural terms which are capable of analyzing 
a score into hierarchical units, from the smallest to the largest. Here, as in 
Mason's gender determined rhythmic theory, we find the beginnings of a 
dialectics of musical rhythm, operating within a more general economy of 
a dialectic of absence and presence. According to de Momigny's system, 
rhythm is, first of all, structured and sequential. Next, within the 
structure of a rhythmic series, there are points of greater and lesser 
structural significance which can be articulated as masculine or os 
feminine cadences. The two cadences operate each other alternately, with 
the masculine term framing the overall structure, and the feminine term 
regulating the passage from one masculine unit to another. In this sense, 
the cadence feminine is an absence which calls forth the presence of the 
cadence masculine; it is merely the token of exchange between two 
structurally integral points which are the main focus of the general 
economy. It is this function of the cadence feminine, that of connective 
exchange, which de Momigny focuses on in his rhythmic dialectic, and 
which distinguishes this function of the upbeat, or leve from another form 
of the feminine principlei_ the leve or upbeat as anacrusis - that which 
comes before crusis ( krouo being Greek "to strike"). Indeed, another name 
for the connective leve is metacrusis, that which is beyond crusis and if 
it is beyond crusis, then surely we can read it as existing outside of the 
space of crusis. The cadence feminine, then, is the outside of the normative 
crusis; it exceeds crusis. However, such a reading of the term remains 
hardly radical - it is still defined according to an exterior economy, and 
thus falls into an ontological trap it would be better to escape. If it does 
hinder de Momigny' s dialectic, it does so only by arresting its motion, 
making the situation more rather than less stable. A more serious excess 
is suggested by Susan McClary. In Feminine Endings (which, despite its 
title only devotes two pages to the concept of the gendered cadence) she 
outlines the problematics operative within a passage from Edward T. Cone's 
(continued ... ) 
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Mason's programme in making the pedes metrici the centre of his 
theory goes further than a simple desire to lay down the laws of prosody. 
It is nothing more than a restoration of Hellenic theory against the 
barbarous dissonance of eighteenth century practice. At the head of 
Chapter One, he writes of "The high Esteem the Antients had for numerous 
Composition. The general Neglect of it among the Moderns. The Reasons of 
tlwt Neglect. And the Weakness of those Reasons." [p.l] Mason's 
programme, then, is to "show, that the Rules and Principles of this Art [ ... ] 
are as Applicable to our Language as theirs" [p.8]. In this, he implicitly 
forms an alliance with the anti-Enlightenment, pro-ancient movement 
represented by Rousseau, albeit complicated by his positioning of 
historical terms. His scientific essaying on the subject of language stands 
as an attack on his own time, setting up the example of an Ancient golden 
age of harmonious linguistic production which must be returned to in 
order to save language from demise. Significantly, however, his return is 
to a harmonic origin, invoking an Ancient Science as much as Rousseou 
invokes an Ancient Nature or Rameau a Modern Science. In this, we find 
[J] ( ••• continued) 
Musical Form and Musical Performance on performing the cadences in 
Chopin's Polonaise in A Major. As McClary writes in Feminine Endings, 
"Cone's nervousness over the 'feminine' cast of this ending suggests that 
more must be at stake than mere 'weakness.' Apel defines 'feminine 
endings' as those in which the final sonority is postponed beyond the 
down-beat. But we could also describe such events in terms of excess- a 
feminine ending then becomes one that refuses the hegemonic control of 
the bar line." [Feminine Endings, p.ll] This concept of the feminine which 
causes McClary to drop the inverted commas around the term as used by 
Cone and Apel, has a far more radical possibility, in its attack on the very 
limit of a piece of music; a true excess of rhythmic and structural anarchy 
which suggests a flow of the body of the music onto the body of ambient 
sound. This spillage would be better termed an anticrusis than a 
metacrusis. The anticrusis represents a deconstructive reading of de 
Momigny's gendered cadence; its excess is direct and affective. 
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another demonstration of the danger in assuming a univocal theoretical 
milieu around the issues of melody and harmony, ancient and modern, 
natural and synthetic. 
_4.2 The Ancient Voice and the Modern Critique 
At first glance, one may assume that Malcolm unproblematically 
asserts a harmonic modernity and disavows the centrality of time, thus 
allying himself with Rameau and against Rousseau. However, just i=tS 
Mason's position requires a certain reorganisation of the dualistic schema 
presented by Derrida's Rousseau, Malcolm's position proliferates the 
problematic further. Although he is a Modern in many senses, his stance 
will gradually be revealed as more pragmatic than appositional. Therefore, 
let us begin to engage Malcolm on the question of the Ancients and 
Moderns. 
One of Malcolm's Modern critiques of the Ancient Greeks lies in 
precisely their use of Mason's pedes metrici as "the only Rythmus of their 
~1usick, and so powerful, that the whole Effect of Musick was ascribed to 
it [ ... ] to make it the Whole, is perhaps attributing more than is dut~" 
[Treatise of Musick, p.602]. This critique of the centrality of the temporal 
(albeit a harmonic temporality) is perhaps to be expected from a Modern. 
However, Malcolm is here referring specifically to vocal music, and in a 
slight deviation from Modern dogma, continues this passage to assert the 
power of logos over rythmus: "the Words and Sense of what's sung [are] 
the principle Ingredient" [ibid.]. Ironically though, this logocentric 
assertion for the case of vocal music is used as a ground for the 
emancipation of the instrumental from the possibility of a literary origin. 
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While instrumental music is capable of making "a Connection betwixt 
certain Passions, which we call Motions of the Mind, and certain Motions in 
our Bodies; [ ... ] how any particular Passion can be excited without such a 
lively Representation of its proper Object, as only Words can afford, is not 
very intelligible" [ibid.]. While vocal music can obviously use the 
representational power of logos, it is absurd to attempt, in Malcolm's view, 
to contend that instrumental music partakes of the same structures of 
signification. In this way, the over-deterministic role of the pedes metrici 
is absent not only from the Modern instrumental music, but also from 
Ancient vocal music. 
It is all a question of a mechanics of signification to Malcolm: 
instrumental music makes "connections" between the "motions" of the 
world, and the "motions" of the mind and body. This is achieved by the 
impulsional mechanics we noted earlier - a serial chain of components, n 1l 
connected one after the other, pass down the line not so much a 
representation of a ·passion as the harmonic essence of a passion. This 
ousia., when impulsed upon the body of the listener, then generates by the 
proportions of its impulsion, a motion within that body identical to the 
original motion felt by the composer. All of this occurs through a harmonic 
metaphysics. 
Malcolm continues with a summary of Vossius' argument against 
Modern language and music. Vossius' claim is that there will be no more 
great poetry, music or song until "we new model our Languages, restore 
the ancient metrical Feet, and banish our barbarous Rhimes." [p.604] This 
Housseauist argument denies any independent status for music at all - a 
decay in language marked the fall of music, and a resurrection of Hellenic 
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But then, what an Improvement in the Knowledge of pure 
Harmony has been made, since the Introduction of the modern 
Symphonies? Here it is, that the Mind is ravished with the 
Agreement of Things seemingly contrary to one another. We 
have here a kind of Imitation of the Works of Nature where 
different Things are wonderfully joyned in one harr:.onious 
Unity: And as some things appear at first View the farthest 
removed from Symmetry and Order, which from the Course of 
Things we learn to be absolutely necessary for the Perfection 
and Beauty of the Whole; so Discards being artfully mixed 
with Concords, make a more perfect Composition, which 
surprises us with Delight. [pp.597 /8] 
llcre Malcolm demonstrates the Classicism of his Enlightenment 
aesthetic, completely in concord with the development of the symphonic 
genre as such [~1. Instrumental music is made possible by this play of 
pure sonic proportions, where symmetry, order and unity are the moin 
theoretical operators. The dialectical balance of oppositions "ravishes" the 
mind, producing delight. The introduction of the mind as the locus of 
aesthetic resonance here is significant, for as Malcolm continues with his 
attack against the supporters of the Ancients he writes that the mind is 
11 naturally pleased" with perceiving order and proportion, and that "this 
is an Application of Musick to a quite different Purpose to that of moving 
Passion" (p.598]. According to Malcolm, the action of an Ancient, phonic 
music, is ultimately an action upon the passions of the soul, whereas a 
Modern, purely sonic music, is also an action upon the capacity for 
proportional resonance of the mind; literally, the minding of music. 
The Modern music is a balance between the rational and the 
emotional. It is not so much that Malcolm wishes music to be purely 
[~] Malcolm's own use of the word "symphony", of course, must be read in 
the sense of the "sounding-together" of instruments - ie. instrumental 
music of any kind - and not referring to the formal concept of Symphony. 
However, his aesthetic system here is evidently in accord with the 
symphonic aesthetic of the emergent Classical period. 
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cer·ebral to the exclusion of all else, for he admits that "there is scarce any 
Piece of Melody that has not some general Influence upon the Heart" 
[p.599]. Equally, he claims that the Modern theatrical music is on a par with 
the ancient: "The Italian[S] and English Theatres afford sufficient Proof 
of this; so that [ ... ]there would be no Reason to say we had lost the Art of 
exciting Passion ... (p.591] 
However, he does posit the question 11 Why must the moving of 
particular Passions be the only Use of Musick?' [pp.598/9]. He ev0.n 
departs far enough from the notion of the passions to state that the new 
music does not move any specific or 11 particularpassions 11 at all. Again, he 
writes, 11 we also have a new Art, whose End is rather to entertain the 
Understanding, than to move particular Passions." [p.600, emp. add.] For 
Malcolm, then, the new sonic art induces motions in the mind which are 
proportional to the motions of its sounds, and the passions of the soul 
become an indeterminate, although present by-product of this movement. 
This slight movement from 11 particular Passions 11 to a more pragmatic, 
proto-indeterminate theory of musical signification is also to be found in 
James Beattie's Essay on Poetry and Music as they Affect the Mind, which 
involves a negation of the absolute representation of specific passions in 
music through, again, a distinction between the vocal and the instrumental; 
when I am asked what part of nature is imitated in any good 
picture or poem, I find I can give a definite answer: wherens 
when I am asked what part of nature is imitated in Handel's 
"Water Music .. , for instance, or in Corelli's eighth concerto, or 
in any particular English song or Scotch tune, I find I can 
give no definite answer, though no doubt I might say some 
[S] For a more developed perspective on the reception of the Italian style 
in Enlightenment Edinburgh, cf. David Johnson, Music & Society in Lowland 
Scotland, with Scottish Fiddle Music in the Eighteenth Century, and John 
Purser, Scotland's Music. 
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plausible things, or perhaps after much refinement be able to 
show that music may by one shift or other be made an 
imitative art, provided you allow me to give any meaning I 
please to the word imitative. [Essay on Poetry and Music, 
p.l28] 
For Beattie, it requires a conceptual and lexical "shift" in order to 
accept a Baroque concerto or a Popular tune as having a representationol 
power of the same order as literature. There is "no definite answer", 
although one can supply a "plausible" description, even if the inference 
here is that this is possible only through sophistry or "much refinement". 
Beattie continues by elaborating on this lack of representational definition 
in relation to the specific instance of Corelli; 
I have heard that the 'Pastorale' in the eighth of Corelli's 
concertos (which appears by the inscription to have been 
composed for the night of the Nativity) was intended for an 
imitation of the songs of angels hovering above the fields of 
Bethlehem, and gradually soaring up to heaven. The music 
however is not such as would of itself convey this idea: and 
even with the help of the commentary it requires a lively 
fancy to connect the various movements and melodies of the 
piece with the motions and evolutions of the heavenly host, as 
sometimes flying off, and sometimes returning, singing 
sometimes in one quarter of the sky, and sometimes in 
another, now in one or two parts, and now in full chorus. It 
is not clear that the author intended any imitation; and 
whether he did or not, is a matter of no consequence, for the 
music will continue to please when the tradition is no more 
remembered. [Essay on Poetry and Music, p.128/9] 
Here, we find some conclusions being drawn which would not be too 
out of place in a more contemporary context. While he states that music in 
and of itself is incapable of representation (a move towards the era of 
autonomy), he nevertheless alleges that the intentionality of the author 
can be doubted to the extent that it does not even (necessarily) signify in 
the utility of the piece. Significantly, however, Beattie's aesthetic 
scepticism does not negate the possibility of the listener "reading" thP-ir 
own signification into the piece, even if it is precisely the same 
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signification which Beattie has just expressed full scepticism about: "The 
harmonies of the 'pastorale' are indeed so uncommon and so ravishingly 
sweet that it is almost impossible not to think of heaven when one hears 
them." [ibid.] Although we can theoretically discount such imitation, then, 
il may be that the listener's choice to discount that theoretical basis can 
produce pleasure. The logical extension of this is that theory itself hc1s 
affective capabilities (and this instrumentalist approach to theory locates 
Beattie as a precursor to Adam Smith's concept of the Imaginary Machine 
denlt with in the next chapters). 
However, it also remains the case that Beattie's apparently radical 
negation of intentionality with respect to instrumental music can 
nevertheless be read as a component of a pro-Ancient, phonocentric 
agenda; 
But if you grant me this one point, that music is more or less 
perfect in proportion as it has more or less power over the 
hf!art, it will follow that all music merely instrumental, and 
which does not derive significancy from any of the 
associations, habits or outward circumstances above 
mentioned, is to a certain degree imperfect; and that while the 
rules hinted at in the following queries are overlooked by 
composers and performers, vocal music, though it may 
astonish mankind or afford them a slight gratification, will 
never be attended with those important effects that we know 
il produced of old in the days of simplicity and true taste. 
[Essay on Poetry and Music, p.162] 
Thus, vocal music is more affective, but Modern vocal music, through 
its unhealthy proximity to the instrumental, has lost the ultimate affective 
powers of the Ancient vocal origin. Nevertheless, Beattie's position is 
complex, accommodating a certain cheerfulness in his negation of 
iutentionality with his avowed preference for the medium more easily 
associated with musical intentionality - the voice. His schema is, foe 
instance, distinct from (Derrida's reading of) Rousseau's valorisation of the 
1S7 
i\ncient. Rousseau proposes an instrumental music which is degenerate in 
its pale imitation of vocal music. Beattie, however, proposes cHl 
instrumental music which is precisely not imitative of vocal music- rather, 
the Modern vocal music which in a sense derives from instrumental stylt!S 
is lhe prime target for accusation. Rousseau holds that representation in 
instrumental music is bad imitation, whereas Beattie holds that it is not 
imitative at all. His delineation of the divide between the instrumental and 
the vocal, as a divide of affective mode as much as power, is in this sense 
similar to Malcolm's. Hence, a specific strategic move can be used in common 
by "opponents", even if they each use this distinction for opposite 
pur-poses. To quote from Beattie once more, there is no contradiction in this 
historicist position which he shares with Malcolm: 
while I thus insinuate that music is not an imitative art, I 
mean no disrespect to Aristotle who seems in the beginning of 
his Poetics to declare the contrary. It is not the whole but the 
greater part of music which that. philosopher calls imitative; 
and I agree with him so far as to allow this property to some 
music, though not to all. But he speaks of the ancient music, 
<1nd I of the modern; and to one who considers how very little 
we know of the former, it will not appear a contradiction lo 
say that the one might have been imitative though the other 
is not. [Essay on Poetry and Music, p.127 /8] 
In such moves as these, Malcolm and Beattie are claiming, for their 
own distinct purposes, a radical distinction between two forms of musical 
signification; on the one hand, there is the Modern instrumental music 
which operates by pure harmonic mechanisms and affects the 
understanding of the mind, and on the other, there are the Ancient forms 
of vocal music which operate firstly through the spoken word, only 
secondarily utilizing harmonics as a vehicle, affecting the passions of the 
soul. 
The historical specificity of Malcolm's aesthetic here cannot be easily 
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overlooked. Instrumental music did not gain much intellectual credibility 
on mainland Europe or in the rest of Britain until later in the century. 
Further, while it is true that the rightful existence of the instrumental 
genres had been recognized by several writers around and before Malcolm, 
his position is far more radical in claiming a truly independent ground for 
instrumental music. His position differs from most writers by his disavownl 
of the operation on the passions by instrumental music in favour of a 
movement of the mind or understanding. Even Mattheson, the great 
champion of instrumental music in the mid-century provides more of an 
apologetics for its existence than a justification for its independence by 
focusing on the image of a "language of tones" whose aim it is to stir the 
passions in the same way as vocal music. Malcolm, on the other hand, 
attempts a far more radical distinction by asserting a qualitatively 
different affectiveness for the sonic which aims at the mind as much as the 
heart or soul. The specificity of Malcolm's position on this has far more in 
common with the early nineteenth century than his own early eighteenth. 
Malcolm was certainly well-versed in the various aspects of Parisian 
culture at that point, and there may indeed have been some influence on 
his thinking from the acoustic research at the French Academy of Sciences. 
Closer to home, however, it was probably the case that Malcolm had the 
space in early Enlightenment Edinburgh to consider the virtues of 
instrumental music with the recent revival of dance music in particular. 
Certainly, Malcolm's text also demonstrates a keen interest in the aesthetic 
space between music and dance. 
Yet Malcolm's project is not so much to reinstate or obliterate the 
Hellenic moment, but to investigate its mechanisms in comparison to the 
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theory of the Modern music, mapping the two in terms of affective power, 
and casting a rational doubt upon the grander claims forthe.po~ers of the 
Ancients: nthere are still wonders pretended to have been performed by 
the ancient musick, which we can produce nothing like; such as those 
amazing transports of mind, and hurrying of men from one passion to 
another, all on a sudden, like the moving of a machine" [p.592]. Despite 
Malcolm's expressed doubts as to these reports, his system, as is the case 
with many of his time and since, still shares the same basic "mechanics .. 
where the mind is literally 11 transported" through an immediate 
communication of essence across the representational space. He in fact 
rechannels certain Ancient theoretical currents towards an expansion of 
the new scientific theories of music. He aims to show that the mechanisms 
of the Ancient aesthetic operate within the body of the Modern music, and 
vice-versa. The difference between his theories and those of Vossius or 
Beattie is not so much over the processes by which music has affective 
power - in fact, they are in close agreement on matters ontological and 
mechanical. The dispute is about whether any of music's powers are the 
sole province of the Ancients or the Moderns, and while he wishes to draw 
a distinction between the two epochs along the lines of the vocal and the 
instrumental respectively, he also asserts that 11 We have vocal Musick os 
puthetick [affective] as ever the ancient was." [p.606] His claim is that the 
affective powers of the Modern voice are equal, if not superior to the 
powers of the Hellenic voice; 11 We have admirable Compositions, and the Art 
of Musick, taken in all that it is capable of, is more perfect than it was 
mnong the old Greeks and Romans." [p.608] The capability of the Modern 
style is extended from not only a vocal music which is the match of the 
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f r·om certain other theories of signification from the earlier Enlightenment. 
In this, it represents a methodological alternative to the abstract, 
ahistorical unity of such systems as John Locke's 11 Theory of Ideas ... In 
other respects, Malcolm makes use of and adds to the kind of mechanics of 
signification which Locke assembles in the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690). Locke's abstract reasoning negates the possibility 
of a historical perspective and thus represents an attempt at a univocal 
theory established from first principles, following on from Descartes, and 
presaging Rameau's Cartesianism in turn. Malcolm, however, creates a 
Modern theory from the first principles of harmonic science, and tbP.n 
introduces a proto-sociological comparison with the Ancient musical 
system, unearthing its theory of music, and finally creating a 11 bivocal" 
theory of musical signification. This historical method places Malcolm within 
the broader context of the Scottish Enlightenment in general. 
Locke's Essay begins with a dismissal of the existence of innate 
knowledge, suggesting instead that knowledge comes into the mind 
through experience. It is the mechanics of the entry of knowledge into the 
mind, rather than the generation of knowledge within the mind which is 
under consideration here; 11 Sensation 11 rather than "Reflection 11 • In Locke's 
theory of perception, it is a question once more of spatiality: 11 Though the 
qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united 
and blended that there is no separation, no distance between them, yet it 
is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and 
unmixed" [Essay, p.99, emphasis added]. A series is immediately set up: 
there is an inside and an outside to perception, a perceiving subject and 
a perceived object. Actual phenomena, external objects, are absolutely 
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111easured by the proximity of two vibrational values to each other in a 
system of proportionality· The closer two vibrations are to each other in 
terms of a harmonic scheme, the more frequent their harmonic 
11 coincidence 11 • 
From this position, the mechanics of the signification of sound can 
be understood with reference to the phenomenon of the consonant 
sympathetic vibration of two sounding bodies. "If a Sound is raised with 
any considerable Intenseness,[ ... ] and if there is any other sonorous Body 
near, whose Tune is unison or octave above that Sound, this Body will also 
sound its proper Note unison or octave to the given Note, tho' nothing 
visibly has touched it." [Treatise, p.85] Thus, it is possible to excite motion 
in other bodies without any necessary visible contact. All that is required 
is a certain proportionality of vibration, a harmony of motions. This is 
transmitted according to a chain of affectivities: "when one String is 
struck, and the Air put in Motion, every other String within the reach of 
that Motion receives some impression from it" [p.86]. Impulsion from the 
initial string upon the surrounding air excites a motion of that air which 
is in proportion to the motion of the string. This air motion then impulses 
upon any other string within a certain proximity and proportionality to the 
quantity of the air motion either the same motion as the initial string or a 
motion proportional to it. 
In this way, a series of surfaces already in contact with each other 
disseminate a vibration by means of stimulation, this vibration becoming 
weaker the further down the chain of surfaces it goes: "the Sound of the 
untouched Chord is weaker than that of the other, and its Vibrations 
consequently less" [p.88]. The affectivity of the vibration has a centre, 
Malcolm's system suggests a supplementary dispersion of energy, it 
becoming less virile across successive distances, and this very distance 
being the cause of the dispersal, the Pythagorean model suggests an 
integrity of virility across distances, a transmission of original essences. 
As Timreus writes: "The world soul's element of divinity (in other words, 
its originary harmony] radiates out from the centre entirely penetrating 
the whole world" [Pythagorean Source book, p.289]. It is the action of this 
"entire penetration" which grants the overcoming of the dispersal risk~d 
by movement across a distance. Thus, the Divine Music, the Celestial Music 
of the four-fold musica mundana, what Timreus calls the "world's soul 
element of divinity", enters every thing throughout the entire world, 
affectively presaging Locke's perceptual concept of "actual entrance". 
The Pythagorean theme of total semiotic control through the 
aesthetic penetration of the listening body can also be seen operating in 
the music aesthetics of Henry Home, Laird Kames. In his Elements of 
Criticism, he writes; 
Music has a commanding influence over the mind, especially 
in conjunction with words. Objects of sight may indeed 
contribute to the same end but more faintly; as where a love 
poem is rehearsed in a shady grove or on the bank of a 
purling stream. But sounds, which are vastly more ductile 
and various, readily accompany all the social affections 
expressed in a poem, especially emotions of love and pity. 
[Elements of Criticism, (1761), p.52] 
Firstly, we have the image of words directly controlling the mind, 
according to a semiotic where communication is a matter of phonic 
commands. The combination of the logocentric emphasis on the word along 
with the directness of the signification, allies Kames here with Mason's 
poetics (and the Cartesian mode of Malcolm's historical survey). Secondly, 
this is expressed in terms of influence, and it is noted that the fluidity of 
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sound is its ductility, or its transmission through the ear from the outside 
to the inside. In other words, there is a commanding penetration occurring 
here, and significantly, Kames associates this twice with his determination 
of "love". In this sense, we have a semiotic system which supports a 
specific sexual politics, operating through a frame of hierarchy and 
invasive essence. 
A particularly striking example of such a sexual politics connected 
specifically to music aesthetics is demonstrated in the Eighteenth Century 
writings of Alison Cock burn. In her Letters and Memoirs, she describes the 
penetrative power of composer John Reid's (1721-1807) flute pieces as he 
performs them himself; 
Of all the sounds I ever heard (and my soul has soared to 
heaven before now), of all the sounds I ever heard, Colonel 
Reid's flute well, it is amazing the powers of it. It thrills to 
your very heart. He plays it in any taste you please and 
composes what he plays. You know my taste is the penseroso, 
and so it is his. He played me five acts of a tragedy that went 
to my heart, and I spoke in to myself all the words of it. I 
would not let him speak the epilogue. [ ... ] and for his flute, it 
speaks all languages. But those sounds that come from the 
heart to the heart -I never could have conceived of it. It had 
a dying fall- I was afraid I could not bear it when I heard it 
perfectly. I can think of nothing but that flute [Letters and 
Memoirs, pp.81/2]. 
Here we have an example not merely of affectivity, but of extreme 
aesthetic penetration- Reid's music moves directly "from the heart to the 
heart", but also "speaks all languages". It is clear that Reid's flute has 
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phonic, and not just merely sonic, power[BJ. 
A similar system can be discerned in Francis Hutcheson's Inquiry 
into Beauty, where the affectivity of instrumental music is described in 
much the same way as Rousseau, Home and Cock burn would later. The voice 
is the prime locus of affectivity, and as such, instrumental music is a 
representation of vocal music: "The human voice is obviously varied by all 
the stronger passions: now when our ear discerns any resemblance 
between the air of a tune [ ... ] to the sound of the human voice in any 
passion, we shall be touched by it in a very sensible manner" [Inquiry into 
Beauty, l:VI:xii]. Although Hutcheson also uses the term "connection" 
within this context, it is a connectivity whose mode is that of the 
Pythagorean concept of "touching", leading us towards "resemblance" and 
thus a Rousseauist concept of vocal origins. 
A more explicit consideration of these parameters can be assembled 
around Malcolm's relation of how the concept of "harmonick Motion" has 
been used in medical practise. The Pythagorean component of this theory 
is evident, and is present in the narrative of the "touchings" recounted 
above: "the Gentlemen of the Academy of Sciences in France apply this 
Hypothesis of harmonick Motion, for explaining the strange Recovery of 
[B] In Ranger 1s Impartial List of the Ladies of Pleasure in Edinburgh, with 
a Preface by a Celebrated Wit (1775), a rather more direct imaging of the 
virility of the flute is given in a passage which appears to reverse the axis 
of anthropomorphism, with an image of the organ as a machine. Of "Miss 
Inglis, at Miss Walker's", the anonymous author writes that 
"Notwithstanding, she is no novice at the game of love, for she is 
remarkably fond of performing on the silent flute, and can manage the 
stops extraordinary well." [Ranger 1s Impartial List, entry on Miss Inglis] 
D£~spite the sexual politics made obvious by the book's title, and the 
financial relationship explicit in the passage quoted, there is here a move 
away from the phonocentrism of Alison Cockburn's letter, towards an 
instrumentalization of the human body itself. 
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one who has been bitten by the Tarantula, the Effect of which is a 
Lethargy and Stupifying of the Senses" [p.88]. This cessation of motion 
within the human body, it is held, can be overcome through its excitation 
by the motion of a sonorous body of a vibrational capacity proportional to 
that of the normal capacity of the human body; 
the Recovery is by means of Musick; 'tis not every Kind that 
will recover the same Person, nor the same Kind every 
Person; but having tried a great many various Measures and 
Combinations of Tune and Time, they hit at random on the 
Cure, which excites Motion in the Patient by Degrees, till he 
is recovered. To account for this, these Philosophers tell us, 
that there is a certain Aptness in these particular Motions, to 
gjve Motion to the Nerves of that Person (for they suppose 
the Disease lies all there) in their present Circumstances, ns 
one String communicates Motion to another, which neither a 
greater nor a lesser, nor any Combination can do; being 
exc.;ited to Motion the Senses return gradually. [Treatise of 
Musick, pp.88/9] 
Mulcolm terms this phenomenon "sympathetick Virtue in sonorous 
Motions". It consists of a mechanics of motion based on harmonic 
resonances which takes a non-penetrational form due to the very action of 
harmony within it. In other words, there is a harmonic specificity within 
each body and each ailment, and it is only the sound proportional to that 
specificity, the "apt" sound, which can excite a given body to motion, and 
expel a given venom from that body. 
The narrative of the tarantula, a prevalent narrative in 
Enlightenment texts, and one taken up more recently in deconstructive 
theory, gives a practical demonstration of the kind of mechanism under 
consideration here. In the writings of Catherine Clement, the tarantula 
mechanism is dealt with equally in terms of dance; specifically in a 
consideration of the musical genre of the Tarantella, all framed within the 
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Pylhagorean scenel
91. Clement narrates that it was the women of 
Mezzogiorno in southern Italy (and Pythagoras taught in nearby Croton ... ) 
who were cured by art of the tarantula bite. The process is the Ancient 
Greek katharsis[lOJ, the combination of vibration, enlightenment and 
cure, three components of the Pythagorean determination of 11 philosophy 11 • 
As Clement writes; 
to start with, there is the cathartic role of music and color. 
Before beginning the ritual, the woman bitten by the 
"ltl[·antula is subjected to a double exploration in music and 
color and, by showing that she is affected by one color and 
one chord and unaffected by the others, sh~ 11 chooses 11 the 
color and chord designating 11 her.. spiderl11] [The Newly 
JJorn Woman, p. 20] 
As Malcolm writes, the cure is "hit at random", the musicians explore 
various meters, tonalities, etc., until finally, the patient "chooses" the 
sound which has the direct harmonic resonance with the illness. Again, the 
image of "admittance .. , choice, is significant - in Malcolm's account and 
[9] Pythagoras' musical medicine was also paralleled by a medicinal theory 
of dance and of poetic meter, but always couched in musical lexis: 
Iamblichus writes of "Another kind of modulation [which] was invented 
against desires. He likewise used dancing, which was accompanied by the 
lyre, instead of the pipe, which he conceived to have an influence towards 
insolence [note from this that timbre was held to have medicinal properties 
also], being theatrical, and by no means liberal. For the purposes of 
correcting the soul, he also used select verses of Homer and Hesiod." [The 
Pythagorean Sourcebook, p.85] 
(lO] katharsis is a medical term which in Pythagorean writings takes on 
moral and spiritual overtones of purification, often through purgative 
means. In Aristotle's Poetics, katharsis becomes a component part of the 
affectivity of art: 11 Thus, Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is 
serious, complete, and possessing magnitude; in embellished language, each 
kind of which is used separately in the different parts; in the mode of 
action and not narrated; and effecting through pity and fear the catharsis 
of such emotions." [Poetics, p.50] 
(ll] Clement also cites the account of the tarantula ·given by the 
seventeenth century writer Athanasius Kircher, whose Musurgia. 
Universalis (1650) is a prevalent reference in Malcolm's Treatise. 
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Clement's, the Pythagorean act of penetration in order to cure is absent. 
There is no violation of an "inside" by an "outside". Indeed, the cure is 
specifically set up to expel from the inside an alien substance which 
invaded the body from the outside. It is by finding the correct harmonic 
resonance with the spider's venom that the body is excited into motions of 
the exact proportion capable of expelling the invasive substance back into 
the outside, thus restoring the natural harmony of body and environment. 
In this way, a mechanics of stimulation can overcome the effects of a 
mechanics of penetration. The effects of a "touching" can be undone by an 
impulsion transmitted through the medium of air. 
Thus it is that what Malcolm assembles in a near complete form is a 
pair of theoretical models for musical signification. It is only near complete 
because of the residual influence of his contemporary lexis, namely that of 
the Theory of Ideas as he takes it from John Locke, with all its latent 
Plato-Cartesianisms. It remains the case that Malcolm writes of an 
"admittance" of ideas in to the understanding in a passage following the 
narrative of sympathetic vibration in the Tarantella. While he is careful to 
distinguish within brackets the precise lexis of Locke, thus marking out 
his own diversion from it, the concept of "admittance", although more 
pragmatic than that of Locke's penetrative "actual entrance", nevertheless 
assumes the flow of the "external" into the "internal". The concept of 
"admittance" still relies on an opposition which negates the image of a play 
of surfaces which he clearly begins to articulate elsewhere. Malcolm only 
achieves a minor swerve from the Pythagorean version of katharsis, which 
Derrida describes as "cure by logos" [Dissemination, p.128], and certainly, 
if the ousia of Malcolm's harmonic signification is specifically associated 
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with the Platonic logocentric concept of enlightenment, then one must be 
cautious of his formulation of sympathetic vibration. 
Locke, on the other hand, assumes a penetrative semiotic 
throughout. His lexis therefore may be seen as retaining far more of a 
logocentric determination than Malcolm's. For Locke, it is all a question of 
an essence, which is transmitted through a mechanical process, but also in 
spite of it. In this sense, Locke's perceptual chain has more in common with 
what Malcolm designates as the Hellenic, vocal model than the more fully 
materialistic aura surrounding Malcolm's instrumental model. Locke writes 
that "Perception [is] the Inlet of the Knowledge" [Essay, p.122, emphasis 
added], and while he often writes in Newtonian terms of impulse and 
motion, even with respect to the spirit (Essay, p.193/4.), he nevertheless 
discounts surface in preference for the rationally inferred opposition of 
an 11 inside" and an "outside". 
Here, the whole action of perception is centred on an "inlet", a 
fissure on the body's surface which allows the penetration of essences into 
the mind, and the soul. In this sense, the empiricism which Locke is 
attributed with having established cannot be understood in terms of on 
account of appearances, surfaces, or phenomena by themselves. While he 
replaces Descartes' thinking subject with a perceiving subject, his main 
methodological strategy remains inference, and it is in the moment that the 
"inlet .. has been established upon the surface of a body that the action of 
inference can allow the rational mind to enter to the supposed true core of 
things. This constitutes one of Locke's penetrational Cartesianisms. 
Thus, in this schema, sound penetrates the body through the 
surface fissure represented by the ear. Locke asserts the "passivity" of 
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the hearing body in this relationship. It has no choice in this matter of its 
being entered; it is in no position from which it can bargain. There is no 
"choice" as in Clement's model, no "admittance", or permission, as in 
Malcolm's model. The hearing body must passively accept the invading 
essence, despite the fact that this essence only reaches the ear by the 
play of surfaces represented in the mechanical model of impulsion and 
motion. The essence reaches the ear and penetrates it precisely despite its 
transmission by the action of surface. 
Locke's theory as presented here bears a distinct relation to a model 
already derived from Mason and Rousseau. Malcolm departs from Locke's 
conception of an active essence penetrating a passive ear, or rather 
provides an opening onto a second theory of signification built on 
different principles. This alternative is not equivalent to a prioritization 
of one model of the metaphysics of sound over another, in that Malco]m 
proves two systems to be acceptable as theories, and expresses his 
preference for one to be put into practise [l1J. Malcolm's preferred theory 
equally supplements the kind of programme undertaken by Jean-Philippe 
[l2] Note however, that while Malcolm accepts the basic mechanics of the 
hellenistic model of vocal music, his Modern scepticism refuses to believe 
all that is written of the affective powers of the Ancient music: "I must 
observe, that the Historians, by saying too much, have given us Ground to 
believe very little. What do you think of curing a raging Pestilence by 
Musick? For curing the Bites of Serpents, we cannot so much doubt it, 
si11ce that of the Tarantula has been cured in Italy. But then they have no 
Advantage in this Instance: And we must mind too that this Cure is not 
performed by exquisite Art and Skill in Musick; it does not require a 
Correlli [sic] or Valentini, but is performed by Strains discovered by 
rundom Trials without any Rule: And this will serve for an Answer to all 
that's alleged of the Cure of Diseases by the Ancient Musick." [Treatise, 
p . .595] Again, Malcolm stresses his conviction of the indeterminacy of affect 
in music. The tarantula bite is no doubt cured by music, and in the manner 
of "sympathetick Virtue in sonorous motions", but it is a matter of chance. 
The hellenic claims of absolute contr.ol over signification, absolute phonic 
determination, are unfounded. 
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Hameau one year later, if not in terms of chord theory, which is Rameau's 
arena of innovation, then in terms of an aesthetic and a mechanics of 
signification. Malcolm's theory of instrumental music is pragmatic in its 
refusal to glibly state that the sonic is capable of the same level (not type) 
of affectivity as the phonic model, and therefore worthy of the same 
respect. His strategy is to accept that sonic affectivity has its own 
specificity which he marks out as distinct from that of the phonic. On these 
terms, instrumental music is not the equal of vocal music, nor is it better. 
According to Malcolm, it is different. 
Yet despite this difference between two semiotic modes, both 
nevertheless operate through a dialectical mechanism which continually 
threatens to re-close the action of supplementary difference. Within the 
structure of these modes, however, there lies the possibility of gradually 
disinvesting in the le xis of spatiality and proximity, and reinvesting our 
discourse at another parallel location; the opposition between a 
penetrational_ semiotic and a vibrational one allows us to consider this 
axiology in terms of an opposition between organism and machine. 
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PART Two 
r1ACHINES j\ND ()RGANISMS 
Tha crao bh nan rann 
am bannan stailinn, 
an sgoltadh chreag, 
an eag an amhghair; 
tha 'n duilleach gorm 
fo cholg a' mhabaidh, 
tha Crao bh nan Teud 
an eiginn sath-ghal 
- Craobh nan Teud, Somhairle Mac Gill-Eain, 1940. 
cHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTERVALLIC MACHINE 
Twa sage Philosophers to glimpse on! 
Smith, wi' his sympathetic feeling, 
An' Reid, to common sense appealing. 
Philosophers have fought an' wrangled, 
An' meikle Greek an' Latin mangled, 
Till with their Logic-jargon tir'd, 
An' in the depth of science mir'd, 
To common sense they now appeal, 
What wives an' wabsters see an' feel; 
- Letter to J--s T--t, Gl--nc--r, Robert Burns (1786) 
cHAPTER FIVE 
INTERVALLIC MACHINE 
5.1 Sympathetic Mechanism~ 
Adam Smith's aesthetics are often thought to be found primarily in 
his first publication, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Indeed, his 
contemporary reputation and employment as a philosopher was based on 
this text and the lectures on "Rhetoric and Belles Lettres" -it is only later 
that he becomes associated almost exclusively with the discipline of 
economics Ul. The reception history of his work is initiated not so much 
in the context of the moral/economic concept of the invisible hand, but the 
moral/aesthetic concept of sympathy. In order to approach this concept, 
we must first deal with a division which occurs in the philosophy of the 
affect. 
[l) Smith was appointed to the Chair of Logic in Glasgow University in 1752, 
and moved to the Chair of Moral Philosophy the following year. Previously, 
hE had delivered a series of public lectures on rhetoric in Edinburgh 
(1748-50), and this material was revived for his course in Glasgow on 
"Rhetoric and Belles Lettres". The ramifications of this are immense. One 
of the students of Smith's rhetoric lectures, Hugh Blair, began his own 
series of lectures on the same subject in Edinburgh University in 1759, 
which in 1762 yielded him the newly designed post of Professor of Rhetoric 
and Belles Lettres, effectively inaugurating the first Chair of English 
Literature in the world. As J.C Bryce points out, 11 his lectures constitute 
an anti-rhetoric" [Introduction to Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, 
p.36]. Indeed, Smith described traditional theory as "generally a very silly 
set of Books and not at all instructive .. [ibid., p.26]. In his radical 
departure from the traditional mould of rhetorical theory, the modern 
English Literature department becomes a possibility. 
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In the second book of the Treatise of Human Nature, titled Of the 
Passions (1739), Hume writes of two modes of passion under the headings 
of direct and indirect: "By direct passions I understand such as arise 
immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such ns 
proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other 
qualities. 11 [Treatise of Human Nature, p.276] From this, it is easy to read 
into the determination of the indirect passions a certain supplementarit.y-
they are generated not only from an immediate relation, but also from a 
secondary conjunction. The indirect passions in fact "arise from a double 
relation of impressions and ideas. 11 [ibid., p.439] The structure of the 
indirect passion is twofold, divided within itself; it contains an interval. 
Hume provides a tailored example; 
a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty; 
and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the 
impressions of volition and desire. Again, when these cloaths 
are consider'd as belonging to ourself, the double relation 
conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect 
passion; and the pleasure, which attends that passion, 
relurns back to the direct affections, and gives new force to 
our desire or volition, joy or hope. [ibid., p.439] 
In other words, the sight of a beautiful object immediately produces 
the direct passion of desire. This leads to our possession of the object. We 
then derive the indirect passion of pride which is generated by our 
knowledge of the object's beauty, combined with our possession of it. 
However, this indirect, twofold passion then folds back onto a further 
direct passion, such as joy. Thus, the indirect passions are marked not 
only by a further intervallic supplementarity than the direct passions, but 
they also operate a greater level of connectivity, lying at a junction 
between two other terms. 
In this aesthetic sequence, we can also discern a familiar structural 
178 
theme- the initiation of an originary term, which generates a secondary, 
less stable and more connective term, which serves to act as a transition 
between the originary term and a final, equally stable term (including the 
possibility of this final term then becoming the originary term of a furth1=!r 
ar·liculation of the structure). In this sense, there is a structural analogue 
between the logic of the direct passion and the logic of the origin, and 
be I. we en the logic of the indirect passion and the logic of the harmonic 
supplement. 
The indirect passions "arise from a double relation of impressions 
and ideas." [ibid., p.439] Hume states that the means of connection between 
a sensory impression and a mental idea - the articulation of the twofold 
nature of the indirect passion- is a form of supplementary representation. 
His initial concern in Book One of the Treatise of Human Nature is to show 
"that all ideas are borrow'd from impressions" [p.319]. Nevertheless, this 
has less connection with originary logic than at first might appear. Hume 
argues that "these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of 
force and vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul. The component 
parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike." [ibid.] Impressions and 
ideas, then, are two modes of the same mechanism which share identical 
components, the only difference between them being their position along 
a chain of representations between an external event and an internal 
experience of that event. 
In the aesthetic field, we can see a practical demonstration of the 
non-originary nature of Hume's logic here, when he asserts the reflexivity 
of these two terms. Although an idea often follows from an impression, the 
converse is also possible so that, in the affections, "a lively idea is 
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converted into an impression" [ibid.]. This conversion is also a function of 
a r·eduction in distance between the two terms of a representation; "The 
lively idea of any object always approaches its impression; and 'tis certain 
we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make 
a malady real by often thinking of it." [ibid.] In a lexical transposition 
which brings us closer to his intertext with Smith, Hume describes this 
imaginary mechanism as being "the nature and cause of sympathy; and 'tis 
after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of 
others" [ibid.]. Thus, a series of concerns are raised: not only is 
representation divided into a direct and an indirect form of affectivity, but 
the indirect form itself has a twofold structure. Within the indirect affect, 
the means of connection between its two faces is an imaginary mechanism 
dr-!fined as sympathy. Further, it is through this sympathetic mechanism 
that we can connect ourselves with the affective life of othersl21. 
Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments is specifically constructed as a 
reading of the concept of sympathy. His interest is not so much in what he 
calls the original passions, but rather in the sympathetic passions. In this 
sense, it can be considered as a reading of certain aspects of the logic of 
the supplement. However, it also extends the notion of sympathy beyond 
the normal associations of the word, and concentrates on the more 
slructural aspects of Hume's reading of the term; 
[2] The significance of Hume's aesthetic theory within his whole theoretical 
system is openly acknowledged by him: "What is principally remarkable in 
this whole affair is the strong confirmation these phcenomena give to the 
foregoing system [Book I] concerning the understanding, and 
consequently to the present one [Book II] concerning the passions; since 
these are analogous to each other." [Treatise of Human Nature, p.319] The 
fuct that Hume identifies the mechanism of analogy to be a point of 
connection between the terms of his system is significant in the context of 
ar-guments below on the idea of analogical systems in Smith. 
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Pily and compassion are words appropriated to signify our 
fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though 
its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, 
however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denot.c 
our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever. [Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, p.lO] 
In this extended sense, sympathy is defined not as a function of pity 
or concern, but as a mode of affective connectivity [31. Sympathy is the 
mechanism by which our passions can be made to resonate with those of 
others. However, in order that this resonance may occur, it is necessary 
that the relative capacities of two passions are proportional, and this is 
achieved through a middle term- "the propriety of every passion [ ... ] mHst 
lie, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity." [ibid., p.27] An individual 
requires this balance at a mid-point because "if the passion is too high, or 
if it is too low, he cannot enter into it." [ibid.] Smith threads around this 
concept a whole web of musical imagery; 
He longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the 
entire concord of the affections of the spectators with his 
own. [ ... ] he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his 
passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of 
going along with him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to 
say so, the sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce 
it lo harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are 
about him. What they feel, will, indeed, always be, in some 
respects, different from what he feels [ ... ] Though they will 
never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that 
is wanted or required. [Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 22] 
l31 1 t is often claimed that Smith makes a radical departure from Hume at 
this juncture; "Sympathy is central in Smith's account but is itself more 
complex than Hume's concept of sympathy. For Hume, sympathy is a 
sharing of the pleasure or pain produced in a person affected by on 
action. For Smith, sympathy can be a sharing of anyfeeling" [Introduction 
to Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.13]. However, the specifically structur;,.l 
role of sympathy is also a condition of Hume's reading of the term, as 
shown above, as an imaginary act which articulates the space between 
impression and idea. 
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Sympathy, then, is a matter of harmonization[~]. Unlike Rousseau's 
concept of phonocentric representation, where two terms are brought into 
absolute proximity and identity with each other, Smith proposes that there 
"will never be unisons" and that concordant differences are "all that is 
wanted or required". In this sense, it is a close structural relation of the 
musical principle which Alexander Malcolm calls "sympathetic virtue in 
sonorous motions". Indeed, for Smith too, sympathy is a matter of virtue 
as a function of harmonic balance; "Every affection is useful when it is 
confined to a certain degree of moderation; and every affection is 
disadvantageous when it exceeds the proper bounds. According to this 
system therefore, virtue consists not in any one affection, but in the 
proper degree of all the affections."[S] [ibid., p.306] In this notion of the 
"certain degree 11 , or the "proper degree 11 , Smith resonates most 
sympathetically with Malcolm's harmonic theories. All of the attendant 
concepts of harmony are traceable in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, from 
the virtuous balance of differences through to the idea of supplementary 
resonances. However, although we can discern the beginnings of an 
[~] In another characteristically musical image, Smith writes in a Burnsian 
mode that; "The great pleasure of conversation and society, besides, arises 
fcom a certain correspondance of sentiments and opinions, from a certain 
harmony of minds, which like so many musical instruments coincide and 
keep time with one another. But this most delightful harmony cannot be 
obtained unless there is a free communication of sentiments and opinions." 
[Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.337) 
[S] The "system" which places virtue in the "proper degree of all the 
affections" is actually Hume's, but Smith continues by pointing out tht.lt 
"the only difference between it and that which I have been endeavouring 
to establish, is, that it makes utility, and not sympathy, or the 
correspondant affection of the spectator, the natural and original measure 
of this proper degree" [Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.306] In other words, 
the distinction is that Smith, while agreeing with Hume's concept of virtue, 
concentrates specifically on the supplementary nature of sympathetic 
1-w ss ions . 
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approach to music aesthetics within the imagery and structures of the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, if we are to read Smith in more detail we must 
look to the essay Of the Imitative Artsl61, and the margins of many othP-r 
philosophical texts. As will be argued below at length, it is actually his 
position on music and sound in general which can be seen as the crucial 
fetctor in his general aesthetic scheme, particularly if we wish to read him 
sympathetically from a post-structural point of view. 
?· 2 Imaginary Machines and the Harmonic Chain of Theory: 
A well-composed concerto of instrumental Music, by the 
number and variety of the instruments, by the variety of the 
parts which are performed by them, and the perfect concord 
or correspondance of all these different parts; by the exact 
harmony or coincidence of all the different sounds which are 
heard at the same time, and by that happy variety of measure 
which regulates the succession of those which are heard at 
different times, presents an object so agreeable, so great, so 
v<:trious, and so interesting, that alone, and without 
suggesting any other object, by imitation or otherwise, it can 
occupy, and as it were fill up, completely the whole capacity 
of the mind, so as to leave no part of its attention vacant for 
thinking of anything else. In the contemplation of that 
immense variety of agreeable and melodious sounds, arranged 
and digested, both in their coincidence and succession, into 
so complete and regular a system, the mind in reality enjoys 
not only a very great sensual, but a very high intellectual, 
pleasure, not unlike that which it derives from the 
contemplation of a great system in any other science. [Of the 
Imitative Arts, in Essays, pp.204-5] 
In the two lengthy sentences quoted above, Smith provides a chain 
of concepts which represent the turning points of his whole theoretical 
(6] Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called the 
Imitative Arts, in the Essays on Philosophical Subjects. The Essays were 
collated and published in 1795 five years after his death, and consist of a 
systematic investigation into "the principles which lead and direct 
philosophical enquiries", illustrated by histories of astronomy, physics, 
logic and metaphysics, and essays on sensation, the imitative arts, and 
language. The thread which runs through all of Smith's enquiries is the 
significance of ancient Greek thought for the philosophy of Enlightenment. 
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system. Not only does he declare himself to be a proponent of the non-
imitative sonic affectivity of the Modern instrumental music, but he 
positions himself specifically within the series of concerns which mark the 
earlier writings of Alexander Malcolm, from the emphasis on the "variety" 
of harmonic textures to the definition of a dual affectivity based in the 
sensual and the intellectual l71. 
However, we can also discern an extension of Malcolm's programme 
into the conceptual field of the term system. As we will see in what follows, 
this term and its associations will gradually lead us beyond the limited 
notions of harmonic structure which have so far been interrogated, and 
towards other modes of engagement with music theory. For Smith, music is 
not an organic means of communication, but a system, and as such, is on a 
slructural par with all other sensual and intellectual pursuits. This 
structural analogy, however, can be described in other terms with equally 
far-reaching consequences: 
Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a 
little system, created to perform, as well as to connect 
together, in reality, those different movements and effects 
which the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginar-y 
rrtc1chine invented to connect together in the fancy those 
different movements and effects which are already in reality 
l71 Indeed, given Smith's evident interest in music (which, extensive 
though it is, appears to have been largely ignored until this current 
sludy) and his reputation as a wide reader, it would be surprising if he 
had not read Malcolm's text. A further connection is in their mutual 
interest in mathematics: Malcolm wrote several tracts on this subject, but 
Smith also studied mathematics and natural philosophy at Glasgow, under 
Professor Robert Simson, who later became his friend and colleague. 
According to J.C. Bryce, it was during this time that Smith developed his 
theoretical orientation when he "learned 'the idea of a system"' from 
Simson [Introduction to Smith's Rhetoric, p.36]. Given his study of 
mathematics, he may well have come across Malcolm's work in this area. 
However, is it possible that this Simson is related to the one who MalcoJm 
repeatedly refers to in his text on music? If so, then the interval between 
Malcolm and Smith is even more consonant than their theories suggest. 
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performed. [The Principles which 
Philosophical Enquiries; illustrated 
Astronomy, in Essays, p.66] 
Lead and Direct 
by the History of 
Here, we move from a description of music as a system to a 
description of system as machine, but one which is engineered by an artist. 
Equally, just as there is a structural correspondence between the music-
system and the science-system, so too we can read of "a picture, a poem, 
or a system of philosophy .. [Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.21] as an 
"imaginary machine". The imaginary machine, is the means whereby theory 
presents a picture of the world. The world which theory reflects consists 
of "movements and effects which are already in reality performed". The 
imaginary machine is created to make sense out of these movements and 
effects. In order to achieve this, it invents connections between them. The 
imaginary machine builds explanations by connecting components from the 
world into another system, another machine. In this sense, the imaginary 
machine is an assembly machine, forever selecting components from the 
scrapheaps of reality, plugging them into each other and setting them 
running. The imaginary machine is theory itself. 
Smith describes the necessity of theory through the following 
imaginary experience: finding himself in a brewery, he walks around and 
observes various machines which he does not understand. Firstly, he is 
confronted with the chaos of reality, and it is chaotic because he does not 
have an explanation of its workings. Unfamiliarity in things creates in him 
a desire for explanation. He observes 11 a number of appearances, which 
pn:!sent themselves in an order that seems to us very strange and 
wonderful." [History of Astronomy, p.44] These appearances, the brewing 
rrr<1chines of the factory, create in him a feeling of distance; he does not 
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understand their workings. He feels a desire to comprehend the space of 
that distance, to understand the system by which the brewer and his 
machines operate: "Our thought cannot easily follow it, we feel an interval 
betwixt every two of them, and require some chain of intermediate events, 
i.o fill it up, and link them together." [ibid.] The familiarity which the 
brewer has with his machines, his knowledge of their relations to each 
other in the whole process by which he produces his wares, means that he 
"feels no such interval"; he can hear the harmony of his machines. 
At this juncture, Smith has assembled his situation within a musical 
image: he perceives intervals between the phenomena before him, but these 
intervals are dissonant, he confronts a "chaos of jarring and discordant 
appearances" [History of Astronomy, pp.45/6]. His desire, then, is to 
reduce the discordant intervals, the alienating distances between the 
phenomena. This is achieved by the possibilities of assemblage afforded by 
tlte imaginary machine, which "fills up" the "gaps or intervals", providing 
a "chain of intermediate events" by which he can tie the chaotic, 
independent events together to form a whole chain, an ordered sequence 
organized by the imaginary machine according to a rule of sympathetic 
connection. 
The discordant intervals are imaged as disturbing gaps which tend 
to chaos; they are characterized by lack. The action of the imaginary 
rnachine of the philosopher is to adjust the width of these gaps, tune the 
appearances, until the whole vibrates with perfect ordered harmony, oll 
vibrations expressing a common connectivity. Smith writes of the 
philosopher that; "By long attention to all the connections which have ever 
been presented to his observation, by having often compared them with 
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one another, he has, like the musician, acquired, if one may say so, a nicer 
ear, and a more delicate feeling with regard to things of this nature." 
[History of Astronomy, p.45] Just as the brewer hears no unfamiliar 
dissonance when he operates his production line, as the musician's trained 
ear can "discover a want" [ibid.] - in other words, a lack - in the tuning 
of an instrument, so the philosopher listens to the harmony of the world 
through his imaginary machines, fine tuning its engines until they tick and 
purr in synchronization with the vibrations of the cosmos. 
Philosophy, the art of the imagination, the imaginary machine, 
confronts a chaotic scene, a series of discordant intervals. When faced with 
such spaces, however, "the imagination can fill up this interval" [p.42]. 
The imaginary machine oils the imagination, "smooth[ing] its passage from 
the one object to the other." [ibid.] It regulates the correct slippage of 
components across each other, by applying the laws of harmony - eveey 
thing is arranged by the imaginary machine according to proportions. The 
correct resonances are found between objects, they are arranged 
according to their proximity not in mere chaotic space, but in a harmonic 
space. In this sense, the philosophical project is one which sets the objects 
of reality into a harmonic relation; philosophy harmonizes phenomena, it 
makes music out of events, and finds the points of sympathetic resonance 
between terms: theory as the production of structural sympathy. 
Smith's Imaginary Machine is the materialist, intervallic move which 
Housseauism cannot tolerate. As Derrida writes of Rousseau's paranoia of 
imagination as witnessed in Emile, "If one moves along the course of the 
supplementary series, he sees that imagination belongs to the same chain 
of significations as the anticipation of death. [ ... ] Imagination is the powr~t~ 
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that allows life to affect itself with its own re-presentation. 11 (Of 
Grammatology, p.l84] This harmonization of events and objects, their 
representation, results in what Derrida calls a supplementary chain, but 
which can also be called an harmonic or intervallic chain. The choin 
comprises 11 intermediate 11 objects, and in this sense can the 11 gaps 11 and 
11 intervals 11 which create alienation be 11 filled up 11 • It is not so much a 
question of the penetration of these intervals, as the lexis Smith employs 
would initially lead one to suspect, and which a Rousseauist reaction would 
entail as a necessity, but more a matter of multiplying concepts in order 
to create chains between them. It is this multiplication of harmonic 
components which 11 fills" the spaces between objects and events; a 
substitution of one form of intervallic action for another- a tempering of 
the tendency to dissonance of the interval, in order to keep the interval 
stable, in other words, consonant. In this sense, Smith's move represents 
the re-affirmation of absence, its re-allocation into a parity with the 
structural value of positivity. The distinction between 11 gap 11 and 
"intermediate object .. becomes obfuscated by the instrumentality of the two 
terms, which become interchangeable. 
Much hinges on the question of these intermediary harmonic 
components which have been in some way multiplied out of the initial 
phenomena of the immediate reality. Smith writes that they are actually 
"invisible chains" [History of Astronomy, p.45] which the imagination 
"supposes .. and philosophy .. represents ... In this, he is claiming that the 
chains are not to be found so much in reality as in the imagination. They 
re!flain actual chains to the extent that the imaginary machine- philosophy 
- represents them. The imagination "bridges" the "gap" between two 
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objects in reality by the means of 11 supposition": the connections are 
synthetic. Smith's use of the term Supposition may be compared with that 
of Malcolm when he writes in the Treatise of Musick that, as a component 
of his dialectical conception of both harmony and time, 
The Harmony must always be full upon the accented Parts of 
the Measure, but upon the unaccented Parts that is not so 
requisite: Wherefore Discards may transiently pass there 
without any Offence to the Ear: This the French call 
Supposition, because the transient Discord supposes a 
Concord immediately to follow it, which is of infinite service 
in Musick, as contributing mightily to that infinite Variety of 
Air of ~ijich Musick is capable. [Treatise of Musick, 
pp.433/4) 
In this sense, Smith's concept of the discordant phenomena of 
reality which the imagination connects together into an harmonious whole 
by the means of a supposition of concordant intervallic chains between 
them could easily involve his system in a dialectics of explanation. Further, 
the concept of variety, which we have seen Malcolm associate with his 
dialectical systems at all levels, is also operative in Smith, articulating the 
s puce between difference and connection: 
Variety is more pleasing than a tedious undiversified 
uniformity. Connected variety, in which each new appearance 
seems to be introduced by what went before it, and in which 
all the adjoining parts seem to have some natural relation to 
each other, is more agreeable than a disjointed and 
disorderly assemblage of unconnected objects. [Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, pp.200-1] 
The same mechanics are in operation here as in Malcolm' s dialectical 
organization of harmonies across a spatialized time; the theory of musical 
he' r·mony seeks to understand sound on the basis of a repeated return to 
a consonant reference point, these rhythmic markers 11 bridging" the 
[B] It should be noted that Malcolm, given the chronology involved, is not 
referring to Rameau's theory of Supposition which is a rationalization of 
chords of the 9th and 11th from the chord of the 7th. 
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11
discordant gaps" between them. The possibility of a chaotic variety 
(inconcinnous intervals) is thus tempered into a "connected variety 11 
(concinnous intervals). This image is analogous to Smith's attempt to 
harmonize chaos by the imagination's supposition or inference of points or 
or·der. The action of this supposition means that Smith's formulation of the 
connective chains which explain the relation of events and objects in 
reitlity has a certain nominalism about it. It posits that the meaning of 
objects has more to do with their relation to the imagination than any true 
11 inner" essence. According to Smith's theory, it is philosophers with their 
imaginary machines who literally construct an order to a chaotic 
realityl91. The philosopher invents this order, and in doing so invents 
meanings for objects and events in a general system which is assembled, 
rather than given. Meaning is ascribed to objects, it does not derive from 
(9] Nominalism states that the signification of a term is not an essence 
inhering in that term, but is supplied by an act of mind. This is in 
contradistinction to Realism which posits signification as a process external 
to the mind. In The Circle of John Mair: Logic and Logicians in Pre-
Reformation Scotland, and The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy: A New 
Perspective on the Enlightenment, Alexander Broadie identifies il 
continuity of nominalist thought in Scotland from the Scholastics through 
to Smith's social and theoretical milieu: "Nominalism was strongly 
represented in the Scottish Enlightenment. In particular, Hume's 
philosophy is in many ways a continuation, along nominalist lines, of some 
of his Pre-Reformation predecessors. Indeed, from one point of view his 
version of the theory of ideas ensured that he had to be nominalist about 
almost everything." [The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy, p.129] Once 
more, this can be read as supporting the thesis that the difference 
between the Anglo-Cartesian tradition represented by John Locke, and the 
Scoto-Cartesians lies in the distinction between two different interests in 
signification. Equally, if we then connect Christopher Norris' account of 
Hume as a proto-deconstructionist [ Deconstruction: Theory & Practise, 
p.xii], then a new series of very wide-ranging connections could be made, 
linking medieval and post-structuralist theories of signification, anci 
hinging on the space between, say, Hume's scepticism, and Smith's 
aesthetic imaginary machine. As will be intimated later, such a scheme in 
relation to Duns Scotus is already possible, centring on the concepts of 
ultima differentia specifica and, of course, haecceitas. See also the 
arguments around Norris, Hume, and deconstruction in Chapter 1. 
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Ull!ffi, and this meaning is their place in the structure of the harmonic 
chain of theory; the meaning which objects are given by the imaginary 
rrwchine is a value in relation to each other, in other words, within a 
harmonic scheme analogous to that of Alexander Malcolm. 
Equally, one could make a case for Smith's theory of the imaginary 
machine per se as instrumentalist in the philosophical sense, in that it 
denies objective truth as some kind of determining force for meaning and 
concentrates on the utility of a theory. It is not so much his concern as to 
whether the specific imaginary machine is any more efficient than any 
other in terms of some universal veracity, but simply how it works as a 
system in itself, and how it relates to other imaginary machines: 
Let us examine, therefore, all the different systems of nature, 
which, in these western parts of the world, the only parts of 
whose history we know any thing[ ... ] without regarding their 
absurdity or probability, their agreement or inconsistency 
with truth or reality, let us consider [ ... ] how far each of 
them was fitted to sooth the imagination, and to render the 
theatre of nature a more coherent, and therefore a more 
rrwgnificent spectacle [History of Astronomy, p.46] 
For Smith, as for Malcolm, the historical perspective - to which he 
also adds a cultural context ("these western parts") - demands a calm 
pragmatism; the theory of theory can only be established without a prior 
determination of the outcome. The significance of a specific theory is taken 
to be its position in a network of theories, and its efficiency as a machinP., 
as an imaginary machine - does it aid the imagination, is it useful, does it 
work? These relational criteria represent a movement away from 
essentialist truth-criteria towards perspectivism. 
utility is one of the principle sources of beauty [ ... ] the 
fitness of any system or machine to produce the end for 
which it was intended, bestows a certain propriety and 
beauty upon the whole, and renders the very thought and 
contemplation of it agreeable [Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
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p.179] 
Utility and beauty become implicated in the idea of theory itself as 
an affective source of pleasure, effectively a notion of theory-as-art. 
As we have seen, the Imaginary Machine operates according to 
harmonic principles - the additive, supplementary calculus which, in 
I>errida's reading, Rousseau attempted to suppress. Derrida makes an 
association of importance in this connection when he writes tho t 
"calculation, the machine, and mute writing belong to the same system of 
equivalences, and their work poses the same problem" [Margins of 
Philosophy, p.107]. If harmony really is the possibility of a non-dialectical 
system, as Derrida marginally alleges, then how are we to follow this 
problematic through in Smith's work - where are the indecidables with 
which we can work, and what is their status? Will Smith, like Rousseau, 
11 say it without wishing to say it", and who are we to say anything of an 
author's wishes? Or might the indecidables, rather than rupturing on 
ai.tempt at a theoretical unity, be in fact in place in order to mark a swerve 
away from such unity? Derrida asks, "What might be a 'negative' that could 
nol be releve [resolved]?" [Margins, p.107] Where are the indecidables 
which are not recoverable to a dialectical closure and reconstruction? Mon~ 
importantly, is their negativity defined in relation to philosophy and their 
specific host texts, as Derrida alleges of Rousseau, or can we conceive of 
Srnith as "deliberately" aligning the indecidables of his text not against 
itself, but against the logocentric tradition. For instance, J.C. Brycc 
comments that Smith's Lectures on Belles Lettres and Rhetoric in fact 
assemble an "anti-rhetoric" - what would be the result of such a 
perspective if transposed into a consideration of Smith's music aesthetics? 
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[Introduction to Lectures, p.36] And does the musical equivalent of this 
anti-rhetoric constitute a dialectical antithesis or a radical alterity, a new 
departure? Derrida has written of "A machine defined in its pure 
functioning, and not its final utility, its meaning, its result, its work" 
[Margins, p.l07] Could this also be what Smith,s conception of the 
Imaginary Machine opens as a theoretical possibility? 
5.3 " ... the great hinge upon which every thing turned .. _.~~ 
Smith,s use of the terms "events" and "objects" is significant when 
he deals with the dissonant phenomena of reality. Indeed, the two terms 
ar·e interchangeable: "such disjointed objects" [History of Astronomy, 
p.42]; "as disjointed as any two events" [p.47]. Additionally, the 
components of the invisible chains themselves, those parts of the 
imaginary machines which link together real phenomena into a generaL 
system, are both "objects" and "events": "a chain of invisible objects" 
[p.45]; "a chain of intermediate, though invisible, events" [p.42]. In this 
wuy, spatial "objects" become temporalized - it is all a question of a 
succession along a chain, and this chain is both spatial and temporal in 
character. In the same way that he considers time in music to be in the 
position of the regulator of harmony, its dispenser, so time is the condition 
of all objects in space [lOJ. In other words, there is no a temporal space, 
space is temporal. Equally, "events" become spatially organized; the action 
of time as the privileged medium of space's entelechation means that 
(lO] cf. the quote at the head of this section: "that happy variety of measure 
which regulates the succession of those which are heard at different 
times", and also that the musical machine is "regulated according to time 
or measure, and thereby formed into a sort of whole or system" [Imitative 
Arts, p.187]. 
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temporal "events" are put into a succession. Each .. event" then occupies 
o space along a line of divided compartments. 
Smith's apparently lax application of "object" and "event" could be 
read as fitting in with a general attitude demonstrated throughout his 
work, when dealing with the relation of space and time. It could be 
understood from this that the fringe of distinction between "object" and 
"event" in Smith's usage is displaced in the same way that the fringe of 
contact between space and time is doubled by the possibility of the 
becoming-time of space, and the becoming-space of time, the former 
through its endowing space with the energy of motion, the latter through 
its sideways collapse into and divisional reorganization of time. In this 
"doubling" of the origin of the entelechy of space into time, we can also 
read the debate between Rameau and Rousseau, and Malcolm's pragmatic 
acceptance that both systems are possible. Derrida's term for the point of 
displacement at the origin of a deconstructed entelechy is "the hinge", la 
brisure, which posits the existence of an originary space before/at the 
origin of time. In this, Derrida radicalizes Rameau's theory of origination 
to a theory of supplementation, as much as he deconstructs Rousseau's 
theory. 
In Adam Smith's system, in the imaginary machine he assembles in 
his History of Astronomy, we also find the image of "the hinge", but under 
different conditions to those of Derrida's hinge of differance. It all turns 
upon a component of many imaginary machines which Smith describes in 
his three essays on "the principles which lead and direct philosophical 
enquiries". This component is analogy, analogia to the Ancient Greek 
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philosophers[([]. As Smith writes of the early "chemical philosophers", 
they 
naturally explained things to themselves by principles that 
were familiar to themselves. As Aristotle observes. that the 
early Pythagoreans, who first studied arithmetic, explained 
all things by the properties of numbers; and Cicero tells us, 
that Aristoxenus, the musician, found the nature of the soul 
to consist in harmony. [History of Astronomy, p .47] 
Here Smith has discerned a component which is used in almost all of 
the imaginary machines which the present text covers. Particularly in the 
Pythagorean moment, theories such as Rousseau 's, Malcolm 's or Mason's 
extend the analogical image in several directions at once. Rhythm is imaged 
according to gender categories or other anthropomorphic determinations 
such as that of the pedes metrici, harmony can equally be imaged as virile 
or passive according to the direction from which one considers its 
entelechy, the interval is imaged as an abyss or a space of potential 
presence, and so forth, most of the images falling in their dialectics or 
their polemics across some Table of Opposites. Often it is a case of mapping 
[ltJ Analogia invokes the concept of proportionality as a central aspect of 
likeness. As David R. Fideler writes in his introduction to The Pythagorean 
Sourcebook, "In Pythagorean thought the Tektrktys came to represent an 
inclusive paradigm of the four-fold pattern which underlies different 
classes of phenomena, as exemplified by Theon of Smyrna [ ... ]Not only does 
a four-fold pattern underlie each class, but each level is in a certain 
fashion analogous or proportionately similar with that same level in every 
other class of phenomena. In many respects Pythagorean philosophy is a 
philosophy of analogia." [The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p.29] The great 
strength of the analogical method is its ability to set up a multidirectional 
connective network of metaphysical planes, as Fideler points out with 
regard to Plato; "Plato, via analogia, identifies the three parts of the soul 
with three different parts of society" [ibid., p.37]. Smith was not the only 
Enlightenment philosopher to have a large analogical intertext with the 
ancient Greeks- as Derrida writes of Condillac's An Essay on the Origin of 
Human Knowledge (1746), "This lays claim to a new logic: the addition of the 
new arises from the sole association or complication- analogical connection 
-of a finite number of simple givens." [The Archeology of the Frivolous: 
Reading Condillac, p.62] 
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a term from one side of the table onto another from the opposite side, at 
other times, it is a case of a fusion of terms, or the subordination of one by 
another, and so forth- other examples abound. Each time, the phenomenon 
under consideration is referred to an opposition and connected in to the 
mechanics of that opposition. For instance, it is a theoretical assemblage 
which allows the opposition of the "masculine" "strong" beat to the 
"feminine" "weak" beat in the gendered cadence. The relation of all 
possible beats in reality is entirely relative and fluid- there is an infinite 
number of possible relations, and yet, by the action of an anthropomorphic 
analogy, cadential theory manages to universalize and concretize all beats 
into two categories which have a specific mechanics and occupy specific 
positions in a specific ontology. This certainly meets Smith's criteria for 
"soothing the imagination", even if the analogy upon which it hinges is 
radically red ucti ve. 
However, the significant aspect of Smith's theory here is a specific 
use of the analogic component in the imaginary machines of aesthetics. It 
is within the consideration of "the parallels of painting and poetry, of 
poetry and music, of music and architecture," that writers on aesthetics 
have made analogy "the great hinge upon which every thing turned." 
[History of Astronomy, p.47, emphasis added] This hinge upon which the 
imaginary machines image reality is a pervasive component of all systems, 
and Smith specifically connects it to the desire for harmony and 
representation: "that passion for discovering proportions and 
resemblances betwixt the different parts of nature, which [is ... ] common to 
all philosophers" [p.84]. Proportions and resemblances are the key 
operators of analogy here. We are on the verge of a theory of imitation 
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which, unlike Rousseau's, will be tempered and regulated according to 
certain rules of harmonic proportionality. In order for the great hinge to 
turn, there must be a resemblance between the two terms of the analogy, 
and this resemblance is measured according to their proportion to each 
other. In other words, it must be established that there is some common 
spatial unit regulating the possibility of the analogy. From this common 
unit of space the two terms can be ordered according to the same rule. 
In the sense of the imaginary machines of aesthetics, it is then 
possible within the terms of this analogic component of theory to explain 
one art by assembling an invisible intermediary chain of interva] lie 
components between it and another. The components of this intermediary 
chain will .. fill" the dissonant interval between the two arts with points of 
consonance, harmonizing various components of the two art machines, 
providing all the necessary tools for connection, and thereby explanation. 
Thus, the two art machines can be shown to have a common point of 
articulation at the analogic hinge, facilitating the use of one to measure 
and understand the other. 
_?.4 Explication 
Smith's aesthetic imaginary machine is to be found at its most 
affective in his essay Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in 
'"'hat are called the Imitative Arts. Here, he assembles an axis within the 
mechanism of imitation along which the movement of an analogy from an 
object to its representation produces the pleasurable affections. The 
distance which the analogy traverses across this axis is the site of 
pleasure's production, since if the objects at either end of the axis were 
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of lhe same order, our pleasure would be reduced: "though a production 
of art seldom derives any merit from its resemblance to another object of 
Ua! same kind, it frequently derives a great deal from its resemblance to 
an object of a different kind, whether that object be a production of art 
or of nature." [Of the Imitative Arts, p.l78) The distance along the axis is 
that which affirms difference and thereby induces a certain friction 
between objects, the possibility of a dissonance which is nevertheless 
surmounted by the action of the resemblance. 
Thus, a direct copy or clone of an object is not a work of art, since 
it has no intervallic difference, but only a proximity of type, and on 
indecipherable copy is not a work of art, since it has introduced too 
dissonant an interval between itself and the object of its representation. 
Again it is a question of the sympathetic consonance of the interval 
between two terms. A "unison" - if the image may be extended - produces 
little pleasure; likewise, a dissonance produces no pleasure; however, a 
consonance does produce pleasure because it connects two objects across 
the space of their difference, and is constantly working to do this against 
the background of the possibility of differential oblivion represented by 
both absolute proximity and absolute distance. As Smith wrote of the 
analogical action of sympathy between two passions, "though they will 
never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or 
required." [Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 22] 
In this way, the connection of the resemblance and the pleasure it 
produces is not an attempt to deceive the senses into believing the relation 
tu be one of absolute proximity. "The works of the great masters[ ... ] never 
produce their effect by deception. [ ... ] The proper pleasure which we 
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dr~r·ive from [art. .. ] far from being the effect of deception, is altogether 
incompatible with it." [Of the Imitative Arts, pp.l84.5] Only a fool is 
deceived by or even threatened, as were Plato and Rousseau, by a 
representation. An attempt to deceive is transparent and reduces the 
c1r-tistic worth of an art object. Rather, the production of pleasure is based 
precisely on the knowledge of the self-evident differential distance. It is 
the movement within this representational space which produces pleasure, 
and this movement is close to that of the great hinge of analogy: "Thi1t 
pleasure is founded [ ... ] upon our admiration of the art which surmounts 
so happily that disparity which Nature had established between them." 
[p.185, emphasis added]. The "surmounting" of the differential space is in 
fact the utilization of the energy of that difference to give force to the 
creation of a connection. 
This self-evident constitution and aim which is a quality of all 
artistic representations, is precisely what creates their difference from the 
wor-ks of Nature "her" self. The articulatory hinging action of artistic 
representation is given by Smith as explication, the mode of which gives 
a measure of the specificity of an art. Of sculpture and painting, the two 
arts with which Smith briefly introduces his essay, he writes that they are 
"a sort of wonderful phaenomena, differing in this respect from the 
wonderful phaenomena of Nature, that they carry, as it were, their own 
explication with them, and demonstrate, even to the eye, the way and 
manner in which they are produced ... [ibid., emphasis added]. Explication, 
then, is what constitutes the sympathetic hinging mechanism of 
representation for Smith; this is what occupies and 11 surmounts" the 
differential space between the art object and the natural object. It is the 
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means by which the representation announces itself to the senses 
precisely as a representation, and not as an originally present object. 
A component of explication is the affirmation of the absence of the 
imitated object; the art work proclaims the "disparity" between itself and 
the object as the presence of an image and the absence of a source. This 
distinguishes it from the mode of representation of a mirror, for instance, 
which "can represent only present objects" [p.186] (the semiotic attraction 
of the mirror for the Rousseauist should be obvious on reflection). 
Secondly, the "disparity" is announced by the fact that the natural 
object does not divulge its mode of production in so obvious a manner os 
the art work. Not that natural objects deceive the senses, but they do form 
part of a chaotic natural order for which the imagination must invent 
explanatory connective chains. An art work is just such a connection, an 
explanation of a natural object, but also of itself, in its announcement of 
ils own means of representation, whether they are means of paint, marble, 
ink, sound, speech, or anything else. The art work is created by an artist 
as a machine which reveals its own mechanisms, which 11 carries, in some 
measure, its own explication 11 • Each art has its own affective powers, and 
it is the art's productive mode of explication which defines its distinction 
from other arts, its specificity. Pictures are produced two-dimensionally 
with paint, canvas, brush-strokes, etc., music is produced with vibrations, 
motions, etc., and so on. Each art work equally has its own affective 
powers within the set of possible powers endowed to it by the art practise 
to which it belongs, and it is the work's operative manner of explication 
which contributes to its value as an art object. It is a good art work when 
it uses the representational and explicative mechanisms available to it 
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cf(iciently, and a bad one when it attempts to bypass its specificity as an 
imitation and become a deceitful copy in a failed Rousseauist attempt dt 
authenticity. 
Smith also claims that those arts which have a larger disparity to the 
natural object are capable of greater affective power, so that sculpture 
hus less affective power than painting, for instance, because it is in closer 
constitutional proximity to the objects which it represents, as a three-
dimensional art. Painting, on the other hand, exists at a further distance 
from natural objects, and therefore there is a greater power of explication 
required to surmount the gap. There are more intervallic components in 
the chain of representation between object and image, and therefore more 
imagination required to achieve a similar effect to a sculpture. 
The greater the representational space, the more active the 
surmounting of that space, and the more pleasure produced. One could 
easily infer from this that Smith would grant music, and especially 
instrumental music, a privileged position within his aesthetic imaginary 
machine. Turning to the main body of his essay Of the Imitative Arts, one 
does indeed discover an emphasis on instrumental music, which assembles 
an alternative to the concept of imitation within the very text which namr!s 
itself by that issue. 
?·5 Originary Unmeaning 
Smith opens the section on music aesthetics with a consideration of 
the voice, "the first and earliest of all musical instruments" [p.187]. The 
determination of the voice as instrument is significant here, for it not only 
crosses the division between Rameau and Rousseau, but can be read as 
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bypassing the axis altogether. For Ram eau, the instrument occupies a 
theoretical primacy which informs the secondary ontological category of 
voice, although the voice has a different position in practise. For 
Rousseau ~ the voice is the prime generator of all, and instrumental music 
is an inadequate imitation of it. Neither suggest that the opposition itself 
is inadequate. Smith, however, makes a theoretical move very close to 
Derrida. Derrida 's deconstruction of the Rameau-Rousseau axis can be read 
as an attempt to de-vitalize Rousseau 's voice by introducing an interval at 
its origin, spacing it from itself and leading back towards an originary 
supplement, in other words, making Rousseau 's system harmonic. Smith 
determines the voice as an instrument, and thus introduces the possibility 
of a mechanized voice as the spatial, intervallic "origin" of the self-
proximate Hellenic voice. Smith does not immediately write of the ancient 
Greek voice, as even Malcolm does. Rather, he writes a voice before the 
Hellenic moment, a voice which does not operate on the penetrative semiotic 
suggested by such as Rousseau and hardly disputed by Rameau. 
Smith's voice is both the "first and earliest", the latter term 
implying a historical, the former an ontological determination. The 
historical point supports an ontological claim: the sounds produced by this 
first and earliest voice "would not, for a long time have any meaning, but 
' might resemble the syllables which we make use of in sol-faing, or the 
derry-down-down of our common ballads" (pp.187/8]. Therefore, the 
"first" voice, the voice which supplements the origin of Rousseau 's Hellenic 
voice, makes use of" unmeaningor musical words" (p.188, emphasis added]; 
the voice at the originary interval is a voice of unmeaning, the true voice 
of music. Yet, as we will see, this originary inarticulate voice is of a wholly 
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different order to that of Rousseau (and Saussure), which Derrida 
formulates as 11 a natural language, a language of unarticulated song, 
modeled after the neuma. 11 [Margins, p.151] The specifically post-structural 
association of Smith's voice of unmeaning is evident in Deleuze and 
Guattari's assertion that "Machining the voice was the first musical 
operation... [A Thousand Plateaus, p.303] Certain other connections 
between Smith and DeleuzejGuattari are considered in Chapters 9 and 10, 
hut the distinction between Smith and Rousseau does not only have its 
"origin 11 in the concept of the machine. 
Employing le xis similar to that of other Scottish Enlightenment 
historiographic work, Smith writes that this 11 rude form of vocal 
Music" [l2l [p.188, emphasis added] nevertheless assembles an essential 
component of music; 11 sounds proper to be modulated into melody 11 [ibid., 
emphasis added]. The "rudeness" of this instrumental voice, then, 
(l 2] Adam Ferguson's An Essay on the History of Civil Society(1767) is often 
credited with being the earliest sociological text of any significance. It 
describes the "progress" of society from "rudeness" to 11 Civilization ". 
However, these terms are not as moralistic as they would be in a 
Housseauist text. Ferguson, a University professor whose childhood had 
been in Gaidhlig society (which the post-Union intelligentsia imaged os 
barbarous) knew all too well that such racism stemmed from a crass 
sociology. His project in the Essay can be read as a denial of such 
complacent metropolitan values; destabilizing the nature-culture 
opposition, he argues that "all situations are equally natural" [p.8], and 
more extensively, he argues for a relativistic approach to culture; "We are 
generally at a loss to conceive how mankind can subsist under customs and 
manners extremely different from our own; and we are apt to exaggerate 
the misery of barbarous times, by an imagination of what we ourselv,~s 
should suffer in a situation to which we are not accustomed. But every age 
hath its consolations, as well as its sufferings. [ ... ] In rude ages, the 
persons and properties of individuals are secure; because each has a 
friend, as well as an enemy [ ... ] And among the Celtic nations, when age 
rendered the warrior unfit for his former toils, it was the custom, in order 
to abridge the languors of a listless and inactive life, to sue for death ot 
the hands of his friends." [pp.105/6] Ferguson's relativism is a constant 
trait of the text, regardless of which culture he deals with, and is in il 
sense the sociological equivalent of Smith's aesthetics. 
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Jn-uduces sounds which are nevertheless endowed with a certain 
"properness'', even "propriety .. l131. The proper sounds in question are 
those uttered by the originary voice in a state of unmeaning. There is, 
Uterefore, a sonic component at the origin of the phonic; the ontological 
proper of music is vibrational stimulation, sympathetic resonance, not 
essential penetration. 
Smith continues with a historical perspective, and describes the 
genesis of this originary inarticulate voice. As time passes, 11 in the room 
of those unmeaning or musical words, if I may call them so, might be 
substituted words which expressed some sense or meaning.. [p.188, 
e111phasis added]. These proper sounds occupy a space, a "room 11 , and over 
the course of time, there occurs a "substitution 11 of them by words. The 
scheme is that of the incremental addition to the sonic by the phonic; 
sound gives rise to and then is intervallically supplemented by logos. 
This is the precise opposite of what Rousseau attempts to assemble, 
and yet is nevertheless exactly what Derrida claims he cannot fail to 
assemble. Rousseau fears the originary substitution of the voice by the 
[l3] Smith makes extensive use of the term "proper", and his long visits to 
Paris may have some bearing on this {much of The Wealth of Nations WiiS 
written there}. In French, le propre signifies a variety of concepts from 
property to propriety, properness, cleanliness, and so forth. Also, Smith 
regularly uses alliteration: "proper pleasure" [Of the Imitative Arts, p.185]; 
.. proper pronunciation" [ibid., p.188]; "proper proportion" [p.189]; "proper 
purpose" [p.210, also twice on p.212]; "please by a proper" [p.213]. His use 
of the term often seems quite Gallic. Equally, one can discern the etymology 
of lhe French form in many of the following examples: "acted with proper 
freedom" [p.194]; "a proper arrangement" [p.197]; "proper tone and 
ruodulation" [p.203]; "properly succeed" [p.205]. The connection between 
propriety and imitation is also prevalent: "proper and natural objects of 
musical imitation" [p.l93]; "be said properly to imitate" [p.196, and p.199]; 
"by imitation properly" [p.198]; "properly imitative" [p.203]. Smith's lexical 
usdge would appear, for instance, to fit well into the deconstructions of the 
term by the contemporary Parisian theorist Helene Cixous, in particular. 
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instrument- imitation is a fatal abyss, therefore the voice must penetrate 
all in order to operate its law. For Smith, however, the voice itself has no 
olher privilege than that it is the first in a structural series. It is a 
starting-point, but not a force of absolute determination. It even effacf!s 
i Ls own original, proper capacity. Smith's originary voice is not an eternal 
principle which is absolutely present in all that follows - it even becomf!s 
absent from itself when it gradually, incrementally substitutes meaning for 
its original nature of unmeaning. Equally, there is no sudden catastrophe 
such as Rousseau fears for his originary phonic voice; Smith's voice, in the 
transformation which it undergoes, becomes many voices at many stages 
in a long process. The logos begins to work within a small portion of it, a 
small "room" is occupied at first, and a whole series of minor 
i.r·ansformations take place before the voice has finally become its full 
shadow, its vocal "opposite". There are, however, components of its sonic 
construction which it retains as traces of its previous state. Originally, the 
proper sounds which the voice emanates are produced according to the 
slr-ictures of a spatialized temporality; they are "modulated into melody". 
This is the site of their entelechy from the vertical, harmonic axis of pure 
sonority into the axis of time and motion. The hinging action of their 
sideways collapse into time arranges them across temporal spaces, 
carefully making sure that they are "lengthened or shortened according 
to the time and measure of the tune." [p.188] As the voice progresses and 
these temporal spaces become the site of the substitution of the phonic for 
the sonic, the law of organization remains the same. This much of the 
or-iginal nature of the voice is retained: the pronunciation of the "meaning" 
words "might coincide as exactly with the time and measure of the tune, as 
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that of the musical words had done before." [ibid.] What we have, then, is 
not so much of a radical change as a Rousseau would fear. The substitution 
of the original material is incremental- truly intervallic- not instantly or 
finally catastrophic, and the means of the organization of units is not 
substituted, but remains intact. What does change is the affective power 
of the voice, which can now access new energies to supplement its original 
sonic force. As Smith writes of the result of this genesis: "Hence the origin 
of Verse" [ibid.]. 
Again, the contrast with Rousseau 's imaginary machine is useful; 
Rousseau states the origin of both music and poetry as a phono-Hellenic 
voice wherein the two media are absolutely proximate. The history of the 
voice from this point on becomes a genealogy of decay, a catalogue of 
disasters. The only alternative is to turn back to a lost era. Rousseau 's 
theory is marked by nostalgia. 
Smith, on the other hand, states the origin of both music and poetry 
as a sonic voice. This origin is framed as historical and ontological (much 
as Rousseau 's is). However, there is no nostalgia here- the turn of events 
produces new formations which are equally valid. While he writes of sonic 
unmeaning as "proper" to the originary voice, he can also determine this 
initial propriety negatively with respect to the later development of the 
poetic voice. At the poetic stage, a return to the purely sonic voice 
produces verse which "would for a long time be rude and imperfect" 
[Smith, p.188] until it had found its own specificity, independent of the 
original voice. The change from Rousseau 's origin to the proto-Derridean 
supplement is no cause for the paranoia which Rousseau 's reaction to 
instrumental harmony suggests. 
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Jnueed, the originary propriety of unmeaning would soon turn into 
an intrusion into the space of the becoming-poetic voice: "When the public 
ear came to be so refined as to reject, in all serious Poetry, the unmeaning 
words altogether, there would still be a liberty assumed of altering and 
corrupting, upon many occasions, the pronunciation of the meaning ones, 
for the sake of accommodating them to the measure." [p.188] This "liberty" 
runs the risk of attempting what Rousseau attempts- turning back to the 
originary state. In Rousseau, this is an imperative, but in Smith it is a 
"corruption" of the uni-directional progression of linear time. For 
Rousseau, a spatialized time assembles the possibility of a sinful distance 
fr·om the origin. For Smith, the attempt to stop or reverse the effects of 
spatialized time is a corrupting force, a failure to face reality. 
5.6 Divergence and Synthesi~ 
The point at which Smith's imaginary machine has assembled an 
intervallic voice of meaning, is also the point where two entities can emerge 
distinct from each other. The first of these which he deals with is poetry 
per se, which operates by a "proper pronunciation of the words alone, and 
without any other artifice" [p.188]. This is where the poetic voice has fully 
emerged from its past as the sonic voice. However, it is still produced by 
an adherence to "the observation of time and measure, of the same kind as 
the time and measure of Music." [ibid.] Indeed, music has now become an 
independent category, as much as the poetry which need no longer use its 
organizational power, for it has its own. 
Previously, before the two arts have established themselves as 
independent categories from each other, any attempt by music to restore 
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ils precedence over poetry was a corruption. The two should not invade 
each other's territory. In fact, the emergence of poetry from music now 
comes to be seen as not a full effacement of music, but an effacement of the 
singularity of the original category; poetry had to assemble its~lf 
piecemeal from within the body of music only in order to break away from 
it and allow the independence of both media. The reaffirmation of music nt 
this point of rupture, then, is not so much a Rousseauist return to the 
origin as a natural continuation, expressed as the reassertion of a 
temporarily dormant factor. The new division of the voice into the sonic 
and the poetic now establishes the possibility of a third, properly 
synthetic art of song. 
Again, the concept of the great analogical hinge of explication comes 
to the surface in the delineation of a mechanics of imitation. When the two 
components of poetry and music re-combine to form vocal music, the poetry 
gives "sense and meaning to what otherwise might not appear to have any, 
or at least any which could be clearly and directly understood, without the 
accompaniment of such an explication." [p.188] The inarticulate unmeaning 
of the instrument is endowed with an explicative component when poetry 
is fused with it. Here meaning, explication, and imitation form the hinge 
between the two axes of music and poetry. 
The relation of Smith's theory of the vocal explication of the 
instrumental, or the analogical connection of two modes of signification to 
their mutual benefit, can also be read (but used to a different end) in 
Heattie' s Essay on Poetry and Music as they Affect the Mind; 
Nor do I mean any disrespect to music when I would strike it 
off the list of imitative arts. I allow it to be a fine art and to 
have great influence on the human soul: I grant that by its 
power of raising a variety of agreeable emotions in the hearer 
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i l proves its relation to poetry, and that it never appears to 
the best advantage but with poetry for its interpreter: and 
I am satisfied that though musical genius may subsist without 
poetical taste and poetical genius without musical taste, yet 
U u~se two talents united might accomplish nobler effects than 
either could do singly. [Beattie, Essay, p.128] 
However, apart from the obviously more pro-vocal position taken by 
Beattie, a further distinction between this and Smith hinges on the lexical 
turn which substitutes Smith's "explication" by Beattie's more Platonic 
concept of an "interpreter". Here, we see the possibility of a phonocentric 
re-coding of the Smithian materialist programme. Where Smith's connective 
mechanics are based on a pragmatic accumulation of affective powers, 
Beattie maintains that poetry acts as a hermeneutic tool to reinstate the 
logo-phonetic moment within music. This reintroduction of pneuma into a 
materialist mechanics does not occur in Smith's writings, which concentrate 
on affective differences between the arts, albeit centred on the issue nf 
imitation, but this is imitation in a post-Rousseau mode. The explicative 
capacity of vocal music which is lacked by purely instrumental music has 
1.hr·ee main imitative components, according to Smith: 
The "first species of imitation" is "Music imitating discourse" 
[p.190]; the music per se will imitate the form of the poetry. This is the 
primary imitation at work in vocal music, since it provides a direct 
structural analogical bridge between music and poetry. Since the poetry 
will be involved in the production of an imitation of a series of narrative 
events, this hinging action accesses the operation of the poetic imitation 
for the music. The "musical imitation of discourse", demonstrates a certn in 
negativity to musical imitation in comparison to the other species. In this 
respect, the imitative powers of the sonic component are determined as 
"much inferior" to those of the phonic component; "its melodious but 
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u nmeaning and inarticulated sounds cannot [ ... ] relate distinctly the 
circumstances of any particular story, or describe the different situations 
which those circumstances produced" [p.195]. Instrumental music does not 
have a narrative power in this sense. However, by the operation of 
harmonic proportion between the structure of the poetry and the 
structure of the music, the latter can access a kind of proportional 
narrative power- it becomes a formal image of the narrative, which cannot 
convey the content of the narrative by itself, but, with the explication 
provided by the words, can partake of the motion of that narrative. This 
species of imitation nevertheless operates through the proportional media 
of harmony and rhythm, and is therefore a "musical" imitative power in its 
very structure, through this assemblage of the becoming-imitative 
component of sonority. 
The second species of imitation in vocal music is the imitation of the 
passions. This is an imitation which the poetic component assembles within 
vocal music. The words "express the situation of some particular person, 
and all the sentiments and passions which he feels from that situation." 
[ p.190] This imitative power, then, is a power possessed by all poetry 
regardless of its complicity in any vocal music, and forms a further basis 
for all poetic imitation. The sonic aspect of song can only access this 
imitation through the first species, its formal imitation of the poetry. The 
harmonizing of the two arts across the interval between them allows the 
sonic to call upon the imitative powers of the phonic, with the same hinging 
mechanism that Alexander Malcolm assembled to give harmony access to the 
powers of rhythm. 
The third species of imitation in song is the "imitation of the actor" 
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[ p.194 ]. Here, the "double imitation", as Smith puts it, of the first two 
species, one musico-formal, the other poetico-narrative, is supplemented 
by an accessing of the physico-expressive powers of drama. Every song 
should be "not only sung, but acted with proper freedom, animation, and 
boldness." [ p.194] The mechanism by which this gestural imitative power 
is accessed by song is identical to that explicative hinging which endowed 
the sonic with the power of the phonic. 
Firstly, there was the proportional power of music. This accesscd 
the narrative power of poetry by the assemblage of a formal proportion 
between music and language. The hinge on which this union turned was no 
doubt the becoming-poetic of music, the disposal of musical powers at the 
service of poetry. Secondly, this proportional power of music accessed the 
gestura! power of drama by the assemblage of a formal proportion between 
music and drama; 11 In a good opera actor, not only the modulations and 
puuses of his voice, but every motion and gesture [ ... ] correspond to the 
time and measure of music ... [p.194] This represents both the becoming-
musical of drama, or the rhythmization of drama, but also the becoming-
dramatic of music. 
Through the sympathetic analogy which music sets up between itself 
and on the one hand poetry, and on the other hand, gesture, it would he 
easy to extend Smith's imaginary machine towards a description of music 
acting as an intermediary link in the chain between poetry and gesture. 
Music would be the hinge which articulates the space between the other 
two components in forming the whole system. Thus, a reflexive network is 
assembled between three components - music, language, gesture - where 
each component articulates the others, but all under the basic operative 
211 
laws of proportional rhythm, in other words, harmonic time. In this sense, 
the structure of the means of analogical linkage between all the arts relies 
on a musical mechanism. 
The image of the singer as a whole system is what captivates Adam 
Smith. For him, the opera singer in particular must operate a triple 
ilflitation, but the mechanism at the centre of this, the great hinge upon 
which it all turns, is harmonic proportion, the intervallic link between oil 
phenomena which is posited by his imaginary machine. This musical image 
is the analogy by which Smith makes sense out of the dissonant phenomena 
before his senses, and nowhere is this more important for him than in 
assembling his theory of the whole singer[HJ. Within the body of the 
sirtger, music operates as the hinging mechanism which articulates all the 
other components. 11 Music is as it were the soul which animates him'' 
[p.194], where the soul can be read as a lexical hangover from a 
phonocentric mode, but which nevertheless remains an image, rather thon 
a theoretical component per sel151. The image of the soul as that which 
[H] Nietzsche makes a similar attack on Rousseauist aesthetics which also 
uses the concept of the total involvement of the experience with the site 
of production; .. For art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or 
perception to exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: 
intoxication. Intoxication must first have heightened the excitability of the 
entire machine: no art results before that happens ... [Twilight of the Idols, 
p.71] Here Nietzsche elaborates the distinction between the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian moment. However, the "wholeness" of the situation for both 
Nietzsche and Smith is distinct from that of Rousseau in that here we are 
dealing with a moment of multiplicity and of indeterminacy, rather than 
fcwced penetration and the reduction of an interval. This is the distinction 
between the full organism of Rousseau and the "entire machine" of 
Nietzsche. 
[lS] Yet Derrida himself may be slightly disingenuous to blithely accept 
Rousseau's position on Rameau, for instance, whose texts contain many 
phonocentric statements. If Derrida was being entirely thorough, a 
deconstruction of Rameau would have to precede that of Rousseau, if one 
were to base a pragmatics of signification on his harmonic theory. 
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animates the singer's body remains problematic, and can easily be read in 
a phonocentric mode. The soul of the singing machine is an image of the 
music of the spheres. This essence within the singer's body which has 
been placed there by means of an entelechy of spirit, of pneuma, divine 
breath, is the seed which propagates the site of the voice, and for this 
reason, those who are themselves without seed cannot take the place of the 
whole singer; "the castrati, who perform the principle parts, being always 
the most insipid and miserable actors" [ p.194]; they are "scarce ever 
tolerable actors" [p.195]. Such statements appear to endanger what Smith 
writes elsewhere. They represent the possibility that his imaginary 
machine will collapse into a vital organism which will call for the 
reinstatement of the origin above all else (as if this origin were more thnn 
a supplement, for the body of the seed requires also another body for its 
propagation, and is there no body prior to that?) 
The problem, then, is what the place of this statement of the soul's 
vitalism and these two solitary statements against the castrati are within 
Smith's text. It has already been established that a certain pragmatism is 
at work which is assembled in order to allow specificities their own space. 
This is Smith's historical approach in the History of Astronomy, and also 
his ontological approach as far as the genesis of the voice is concerned. 
Does this aversion to the castrate relate to his aversion to "cowards", 
whose sense of hearing is exaggerated? "The hare, and all those other 
timid animals to whom flight is the only defence, are supposed to possess 
the sense of Hearing in the highest degree of activeness. It seems to be the 
sense in which cowards are very likely to excel." [Of the External Senses, 
p.168] In short, is this statement a theory or a prejudice, or is indeed a 
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prejudice inherently theoretical as such? 
The aversion to the castrate is also Rousseau 's prejudice, and this 
alone would alert a reading of Smith's statements to the problematic. In the 
article in the Dictionnaire de musique, Rousseau wrib~s of "These men, who 
sing so well, but without fire or passion, become on the stage the most 
miserable actors in the world". It would seem that it is the acting ability 
above all else which gives the artistic ground for the aversion, and yet 
Rousseau links it directly with a lack of "fire", and Smith appears to link 
it with a lack of "the soul which animates him, which informs every feature 
of his countenance, and even directs every movement of his eyes." [p .194] 
Smith's reversion to a phonic-pneumatic determination in this negative 
mode is problematized further in his direct confrontation with Rousseau 's 
theory of essential representation. 
Smith takes issue with Rousseau 's article on Imitation in the 
Dictionnaire de musique: "Music [ ... ] imitates, however, every thing, even 
those objects which are perceivable by sight only. By a delusion that 
seems almost inconceivable, it can, as it were, put the eye into the ear" 
[quoted on p.199]. Smith retorts that music alone cannot achieve this 
absolute representation which Rousseau both admires and fears, but it can 
approach it when it has other media such as language, gesture, scenery, 
etc. to explicate the formal analogy which the music assembles between 
itself and these other arts (this particular argument is dealt with more 
fully in the following chapter). 
Thus, the penetrative semiotic of soul which the castrato lacks in his 
lack of vital essence has no real place in Smith's general theory of 
signification. Whether it appears merely as a theoretical wart, a tiny 
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rupture on the surface, or as a virus which threatens the whole system, 
it is nevertheless alien to not only the letter, but also the "spirit", if the 
pun may be forgiven, of Smith's aesthetic imaginary machine. If one were 
to take Smith as a phonocentric theorist "at heart", however, and attempt 
a deconstruction along the lines of Derrida on Rousseau, it would take very 
few pages indeed, given the statistically greater number of machinic 
statements in Smith than in Rousseau. 
The theory of harmonic proportion, derived from music as a musical 
irrrage or analogy, nevertheless operates within Smith's theory of the 
singing machine as a kind of meta-mechanism which is assembled within oll 
the other machines and also provides all the necessary invisible chains 
which are needed to link each component of the whole singing system 
together. Within this system, Smith establishes a series of analogical chains 
between the phonic and the sonic, even if the phonic is defined as always 
already in some respects sonic. This all hinges on the idea of resonances 
between terms - on sympathetic connection. However, Smith also makes a 
move away from the concept of sympathy which has significant 
ramifications for the allegedly harmonic metaphysical status of 
instrumental music. Let us therefore begin to retrace the structure of the 
second species of imitation - of the passions - but this time specifically 




Ill those days I thought light existed to show things, that 
space was simply a gap between me and the bodies I feared or 
desired; now it seems that bodies are the stations from which 
we travel into space and light itself. Perhaps an illusionist's 
main job is to exhaust his restless audience by a show of 
marvellously convincing squabbles until they see the simple 
things we really depend upon. 
- Lanark, Alasdair Gray, 1981. 
CHAPTER Srx 
THE MACHINIC 
6.1. Harmonic Passions 
Smith's theory of the second species of imitation - the imitation of 
the passions - demonstrates a further layer of harmonic metaphysics with 
wide-ranging ramifications for the concept of sympathy so crucial to so 
many of the traditional readings of his aesthetics. We will begin by tracing 
through the musicality of the affect. Smith assembles this musicality with 
an emphasis on a temporal succession of affects. As with his implication of 
the temporal nature of objects, so too with affective stimulation. For Smith, 
it is a question of the tempo of "That train of thoughts and ideas which is 
continually passing through the mind 11 [Of the Imitative Arts, p.197]. Each 
passion produces its own characteristic tempo, rhythm and textur'e. 
Firstly, a 11 gay and cheerful 11 passion produces a fast succession of 
thoughts and ideas which have 11 1ittle connection" with each other, or i.H'e 
11 connected rather by their opposition than by their mutual resemblance" 
[ibid.]. In this case, speed and difference are produced. Attentiveness is 
high, and a breadth of stimulus is sought. No matter how various the 
thoughts are, however, there is no dangerous dissonance or fragmentation 
of passions, since all the thoughts are nevertheless connected by their 
variety. In other words, they fulfil all of Malcolm's criteria of "variety", in 
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that they are diverse, but always ultimately harmonious. The apparent lack 
of connection adds to the motive power which a sameness of character 
would not admit. Secondly, a "melancholy and desponding" passion 
produces a slow succession of thoughts and ideas which are "resembling 
or· closely connected" (p.197]. In this case, sameness produces a slowness, 
or rather, a lack. of succession, a textural stasis. Likewise, the third 
passionate disposition is a "state of sedateness, tranquillity, and 
composure" [ibid.], and occupies the position between the other two. Here, 
as one would expect, the tempo of succession is neither fast nor slow, and 
the relation of one thought to the next is more continuous than in the first 
case, and more varied than in the second. 
Smith ascribes the same properties to musical pitch - high 
frequencies, or acute sounds, are "naturally gay", low frequencies, or 
grave sounds, are "melancholy". This is related also to tempo; there is a 
"natural connection" between high frequency and fast tempo, and between 
low frequency and slow tempo. There is thus a direct correspondence for 
Smith between musical tempo, rhythm and texture, and the passions. It is 
as if the passions themselves are organized by musical laws, operating 
according to musical structural relationships of consonance and 
dissonance, both "vertical" (sameness-difference) and "horizontal" (slow-
ftlst). The passions, then, are vibrations of the mind, and the mind in this 
sense can be considered to be a monochord capable of being set into 
affective motions. This is the way in which music per se affects the mind, 
but in order that the string of the mind can be affected in proportion to 
Ute properties of the music, it must be at a state of rest, its motive 
capacity must be emptied; "if the mind is so far vacant as not to be 
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di~;turbed by any disorderly passion, it [music] can, at least for the 
moment, and to a certain degree, produce every possible modification of 
en eh of those moods or dispositions." [p.197, emphasis added]. Smith's le xis 
here is significant in its distinction from the Pythagorean lexis of 
penetration and "touchings". Notice also that, unlike Descartes, Smith 
writes of the passions of the mind. The Cartesian version of affectivity 
concentrates on the soull11. It is always a question of temporal orientation 
for Smith; the great productive powers of music which can induce "every 
possible" change of passion, are nevertheless bound by the temporal 
strictures of "the moment". If the mind is presently in a state of 
dissonance, then the temporal coincidence of music and present passion 
can only produce further dissonance, or at best, affectivity will he 
possible only 11 to a certain degree ... If, however, the mind is "vacant .. , if 
it is in possession of a capacity for production, then, such production can 
take place at this moment, and according to the proportions of the full 
affectivity of which the music is capable. Once more, the theme of the 
proportional relation of two spatial capacities, and the issue of their 
distance or proximity along a harmonic chain. Mind and sound are two 
surfaces which are brought into a system of resonance: 
The mind being thus successively occupied by a train of 
[l] Descartes' famous dualism in the .. ghost in the machine .. hypothesis can 
be readily discerned in the following passage from the opening pages of 
The Passions of the Soul: 11 To understand the passions of the soul, we must 
distinguish its functions from those of the bodJ'· Next I note that we are 
nol aware of any subject which acts more directly upon our soul than the 
body to which it is joined. Consequently we should recognize that what. is 
a passion in the soul is usually an action in the body. Hence there is no 
better way of coming to know about our passions than by examining the 
difference between the soul and the body, in order to learn to which of the 
two we should attribute each of the functions present in us. 11 [Selected 
Philosophical Writings, p.218] 
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o l>jects, of which the nature, succession and connection 
correspond, sometimes to the gay, sometimes to the tranquil, 
and sometimes to the melancholy mood or disposition, it is 
itself successively led into each of those moods 01~ 
dispositions; and is thus brought into a sort of harmony or 
concord with the Music which so agreeably engages its 
al.lention. [Of the Imitative Arts, pp.197 j8, emphases added.] 
Music is a machine which has as its analogue the machine which is 
the mind. Both machines operate by analogous laws of motion. Thus, when 
the music machine begins a motion in a certain direction, it has a certain 
speed, capacity, and so forth, which can produce a corresponding motion 
of similar speed and capacity in the mind machine. This minding is made 
possible by the establishment of an invisible chain of intermediate 
components between the two machines which_ provides them with a site of 
a rnut.ual connection. Once this connection has been made, and once each 
machine has been thought of as a component in itself, they can then 
engage in an action of analogical hinging which will connect the two 
components into a greater machine, with one component regulating the 
ollter according to the rules of regulation which apply to each. 
§.2 Unsympathetic Instruments 
Within this system of harmonic passions, Smith initially locates the 
sonic affectivity of instrumental music at a certain negative juncture: 
instrumental music cannot "express clearly, and so as to be understood by 
every hearer, the various sentiments and passions" [p.195] which iH'e 
imilated by language. However, as was the case with Alexander Malcolm's 
initially negative statement of the incapacity of instrumental music to till 
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directly representational spacel21, Smith later turns this provisionally 
nr!gative difference into an affirmation of specificity. Already, there is the 
potential for an affirmative difference between phonic and sonic affectivily 
in Smith's conditional description - instrumental music does not signify 
"clearly'', and so signifies on a level other than the logocentric action 
which would be required for the same semiotic message to be directly 
"understood by every hearer". The affirmative nature of this difference 
is achieved by the fact that, although instrumental music cannot be 
thought "properly to imitate, [it] may, however, produce all the effects of 
the finest and most perfect imitation." [p.196] The specificity of 
instrumental music does not reside in an imitative power, but in a 
productive power - the production of all the effects of imitation, but 
without the necessity of calling in to operation a semiotic, phonic 
determinism. 
However, this move away from logocentric imitation which purely 
instrumental music achieves is also claimed by Smith to be a move beyond 
even the supplementarity of the concept of sympathy; 
It is not, as in vocal Music, in Painting, or in Dancing, by 
sympathy with the gaiety, the sedateness, or the melancholy 
and distress of some other person, that instrumental Music 
soothes us into each of these dispositions; it becomes itself a 
gay, a sedate, or a melancholy object; and the mind naturally 
assumes the mood or disposition which at the time 
corresponds to the object which engages its attention. 
Whatever we feel from instrumental Music is an original, and 
not a sympathetic feeling: it is our own gaiety, sedateness or 
melancholy; not the reflected disposition of another person. 
[Essay, p.198] 
1-lfTe, Smith departs radically from the concept of sympathetic 
[2] cf. Chapter 3: "how any particular Passion can be excited without such 
a lively Representation of its proper Object, as only Words can afford, is 
nol very intelligible" [Treatise of Musick, p.602]. 
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chaining at several levels. Most significantly, if we accept the mapping of 
the origin-supplement opposition onto the passionate axis of original-
sympathetic, we soon realise that Smith's positioning of the affectivity of 
instrumental music is within what may appear at first to be a form of 
originary logic: "whatever we feel from instrumental Music is an original, 
and not a sympathetic feeling". It may be, then, that the instrumental does 
nol necessarily fall within a supplementary logic at all levels. As we have 
seen above, it was through a sympathetic analogy that instrumental music 
was able to access imitative powers, which are associated with phonic 
signification, and therefore potentially origination. How, then, do we come 
to a point where the sonic power of the instrumental meets up with a notion 
of originarity? 
Equally, while we have previously associated the concept of 
intervallic sympathy with aspects of supplementarity, and authentic 
imitation with the concept of originarity, this question must be traced 
carefully, since we have already noticed that Smith's alignment of the 
concept of imitation is radically distinct from that of Derrida's reading of 
Rousseau's. For Rousseau, imitation is an attempt to generate an 
authenticity which closes off the abyss which the supplementary action of 
intervallic representation threatens. For Smith, however, imitation is 
precisely not a question of maintaining authenticity, but of celebrating 
supplementary difference. The contemplation of the disparity between 
object and representation is the site of pleasure's production: difference 
produces pleasure. In this, we can see that sympathy, as a harmonization 
of two terms, is aligned with the concept of imitation. If, then, 
"instrumental Music does not imitate", does not affect us "by sympathy" 
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[il>id.], then what precisely is the means of non-imitative production which 
instrumental music utilizes in order to bring the mind "into a sort of 
harmony" with itself? If sympathy is a harmonic mechanism in Smith, and 
if instrumental music is a harmonic medium, then what is suggested by the 
qualifier around this non-sympathetic affectivity as a sort of harmony? If 
imitation is sympathetic, harmonic, then why is its "opposite" - production 
- located within the operation of the harmonic art? The adequacy of the 
appositional lexis which Derrida presupposes in order to effect his 
deconstruction begins to crumble here, and, accordingly, we should 
proceed with care. 
Smith first asserts that in song and other art forms, the mode of 
connectivity which we operate is a sympathy in the sense of a resonance 
wilh the feelings of another person - ie. the singer. In this way, we are 
affected by the singer's original passion, and this sets up a resonance in 
us which produces our sympathetic passion. Instrumental music equally 
"soothes us into" a passionate disposition, but not through sympathy as 
such. Smith claims that instrumental music, rather than representing a 
passion which lies behind it in the body of a singer (actual or 
trnnscendental - as in Rousseau), "becomes itself a gay, a sedate, or a 
melancholy object". Thus, the sonic is not a link in a dialectical-semiotic 
chain between a signifying subject and a receiving subject, but is itself 
the site of a passionate disposition. It then becomes a question of how the 
mind is .. led into each of those moods or dispositions" by music which has 
itself become passionate, and here we notice a certain lexical somersault 
which works at a deconstructive level against (Derrida's) Rousseau's 
origin-supplement opposition. If, whilst listening to an instrumental piece, 
223 
the passion which we feel is original to us, then how can it have been 
produced by the music when such a mode of production would classify it 
as a supplement of the music's originary passionate disposition? Could it 
be that Smith has taken the notion of supplementarity to such an extent 
that the play of instrumental music sets up a form of resonance which even 
goes beyond certain definitions of sympathy? In other words, the intervnl 
belween source (sound) and destination (mind) is so great that no form of 
causal logic can encapsulate the relation? 
If passion is defined without recourse to spirit, or soul, then it is a 
short step to define it as material, and describe its mechanics. From then~, 
it is to be understood as a quality of any machine which is capable of 
incorporating such components. The mind is one, but so is music itself; the 
passions are determined by Smith as being assembled from a musical 
mechanics, they operate according to proportional laws of analogy. For this 
re.:lson it is possible to conceive of this music-mind relationship from the 
opposite end of the chain. The mind is "brought into a sort of harmony or 
concord with the Music" for the reason that the music "becomes itself a 
gay, a sedate, or a melancholy object" [Smith, Essays, p.198, emphasis 
added]. In this, the non-imitation and non-penetration of instrumental 
music is radically affirmed. If the passions are musical, then music is 
passionate. If the passions are mechanisms, and if this mechanism is 
harmonic, then music can become itself an "object" (or event) in which the 
passions reside. In other words, passion becomes a component of not only 
the mind which is moved in proportion to music, but becomes a component 
of music itself. This is not to impart any quality of "consciousness" onto 
sound, but rather represents a step towards a materiality of 
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consciousness, a further formulation of the idea that music has an affective 
capacity, a potential connectivity, which is independent of the affectivily 
of the listener's mind - the sonic is not representational, because it 
embodies the actual passion, which inheres as an affect of its motion. At 
this point, Smith's system is assembling in a manner which makes it quite 
distinct from such harmonicist theories as Alexander Malcolm's. Malco]m 
describes a mechanical operation which produces the passions in the mind, 
but the mechanism which he considers is specifically that which can be 
thought within sympathetic vibration. With that concept, there is a certain 
sense of the attenuation of centralized semiotic power as sound becomr"!s 
disseminated throughout space. Yet sympathetic vibration can be 
considered to have a residue of the penetrational semiotic in the sense of 
a depositing of an essence of motion (impulsion), even if this is subject to 
decay across an intervallic chain - in order for dis-semination to occur, 
tl1ere must be an extant seminality to begin with. In Smith's notion of 
instrumental music, however, this residue is not present, and he is at pains 
to rule out the possibility that his imaginary machine be understood in the 
limited Malcolmist sense: instrumental music specifically operates through 
.. an original, and not a sympathetic feeling .. [ibid.] The passion which is 
experienced during an act of audition does not take place because ofthe 
pCission which inheres in the music. It is not the same passion, it is the 
passion which inheres in the mind. Smith here radicalizes the space 
bel we en music and mind beyond the notion of sympathy, and beyond any 
notion of sound as cause and a-ffect as e-ffect. The problem of lexis here 
is that the term .. sympathetic .. potentially evokes a latent penetrational or 
causal residue, in that in a sympathetic vibrational system, there is an 
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original vibration which sets up, ea uses, vibrations in other bodies. Thus, 
in that system, although there are factors which interfere with and 
disperse the essential identity of the original vibrational essence (the loss 
of affective power over a distance which Malcolm recognized), there is yet 
a point of causal origin. 
Smith has already called into operation the conditional mechanisms 
of "the moment", and thus the "certain degree" of indeterminacy which can 
throw surfaces in the way of an ousia or pseudo-ousia, and deflect it in 
unexpected directions- dissemination. As Derrida writes, "There is no first 
insemination. The semen is already swarming. The 'primal' insemination is 
dissemination." [Dissemination, p.304] The temporal nature of the 
coincidence of mind and sound assembles a further layer of uncertainty 
with respect to the integrity of a passion across the mind-sound space, in 
that it is the temporal-harmonic nature of the mind mechanism which 
regulates its potential connectivity to the musical machine. Again, it is a 
mal ter of the proportionality of two entities which affects their 
connectivity, but this proportionality is neither fixed nor inherently 
controllable. Thus Smith emphasizes the independence of the passion 
inhering in the music "itself" from the passion which is "original" in the 
mind. An aspect of the integrity of the identity of cause and effect which 
still bears a trace in Malcolm has been replaced by an almost complete 
ea usal collapse in Smith, if causality is taken as a mode of penetrational 
propagation, even to the mild point of direct sympathetic vibration. In 
other words, cause and effect have been finally invested with full material 
power, devoid of any metaphysical traces such as that which involves 
Malcolm in the concept of the "admittance" of vibrations into the mind, and 
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Locke in the forced entry of sounds. Despite Malcolm's pragmatism 
inherent in his use of this lexis, disassociating himself from Locke's 
violence, it remains a residue of a penetrative semiotic, in that it supports 
the locational axiology of such as Locke. Smith, in affirming the complete 
independence of sound and mind, by affirming that no essence is 
transmitted through a space, but that both sound and mind have their own 
passions as 11 original .. modes of their own surfaces, has refined the notion 
of production to a point where all is surface, all contact is frictional, and 
not invasive. 
6.3 Original Passion - The Proximate Supplemen~ 
A further comparison with Hume elaborates another transgression 
at work in this reading of Smith's Original Passions. In book two of the 
Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes specifically Of the Passions. Here, 
the passions are linked in closely with the concept of the origin; "A 
passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, 
and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of 
any other existence or modification ... [Treatise, p.413] Significantly, Hume 
defines passions as operating not within a representational form of logic, 
but one in which terms are modified, or, as Kristeva would have it, 
intertextually transposed. This assertion also has a large intertext with 
Smith's attack on Rousseau's theory of imitation and deception, in claiming 
that passion is original to the mind to the extent that it is not a direct 
tr-ansmissional copy of an external entity which has penetrated the surface 
of an internality. Hume's statement that the passion is not a copy of 
another .. existence or passion .. , in other words, another person's passion, 
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accords with Smith's contention that it is "not the reflected disposition of 
another person". For Hume also, it turns upon the question of 
representation; whether it is either authentic or inauthentic, as Rousseau 
holds, or affective and connective, as Smith holds. 
Here, the issues of truth and reason come into play for Hume. 
Passion is original to the mind in that it is produced as a mode of the mind, 
a modification of an extant component, and not as a deposited essence 
which has penetrated the mind's surface. Passion, therefore, cannot 
contradict truth or reason, "since this contradiction consists in the 
disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, which they 
represent." [Treatise, p.415] Thus, the contradiction of passion with truth 
and reason is a by-product of a Rousseauist establishment of an axis of 
origin and supplement, where the supplement is defined as the deceptive 
copy of the origin. In other words, the opposition of passion to truth and 
reason can only be produced if there is also an opposition of origin and 
fake. Since the passion is no copy, there is no opposition, because the 
passion is neither an origin in itself, and nor is it a deceptive supplement. 
This constitutes its transgression of the axis, and requires a new 
investment in the meaning of the terms origin and supplement, if not their 
outright disposal (rather than Derridean displacement). 
Smith's Original Passion is "original" precisely because it is so 
supplementary in Rousseauist lexis. Or rather, while it is indeed connected 
to other entities such as the ear and the mind, it cannot be encapsulated 
in either end of the Rousseauist opposition of origin and supplement. For 
it to be encapsulated within that framework would immediately require the 
presupposition of the internality and the externality of an entity which has 
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been penetrated. In this sense, to state that the Original Passion is original 
because it is so supplementary is also to call for a new differential lexis 
which will not admit of confusion with the penetrational semiotic. 
Derrida, too, intimates the necessity of such a move when he states 
that "The supplement is neither a presence nor an absence. No ontology 
can think its operation." [Of Grammatology, p.314] However, the fact that 
the term 11 supplement 11 has been drawn from a specifically ontological 
system (Rousseau's) presents at least a lexical problem for Derrida's play 
beyond presence-absence. To inscribe any non-ontological value into the 
term "supplement 11 is immediately to take a provisional position wit.h 
respect to the deconstruction of ontology, and always risk its automatic 
reconstruction. The strategy of erasure nevertheless relies on the 
slructure of the concept beneath the strikeout or questioned by the 
scarequotes. 
Hence, the concept of the 11 original passion .. can perhaps be read as 
a pun as much on Rousseau's lexis as Derrida's "supplement at the. origin .. , 
for this original passion of the mind is no simple origin of itself; it is not 
an organic origin, one which would, in an ideal phonocentric "system", 
directly produce from within its own body, and from nowhere else, a 
"child" as its external representation. Rather, it exists as an affect of a 
supplement - an affect of a supplementary mind, a mode upon a surface -
and it has been produced not in a manner of direct proximity to an 
"external" source, but at a great, quite independent distance along a chain 
of provisional and transitional proximities. It is "original", in that it 
belongs to itself, and is independent, precisely because of this, but also 
because it is so supplemental with respect to other origins. In Smith, 
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organic causality has collapsed, machinic causality has been affirmed; 
connective affectivity has replaced penetrational intentionality. The affect 
is not the effect of imitation. 
f>.4 Taking the Imitation out of the Ear 
The radical distinction between a phonic music which is an 
irnitational art, and a sonic music which is an affective art is also, by 
analogy, that between the model of the organism and that of the machine, 
and between penetration and vibrational stimulation. The distinction is 
drawn very neatly by consideration of Smith's answers to Rousseau's 
article in the Dictionnaire de musique on Imitation, where the organicism 
of the one is contrasted with the materialism of the other. Smith introduces 
Housseau by describing him as "an Author, more capable of feeling 
strongly than of analising [sic] accurately" [p.198], and continues with a 
quotation from Rousseau [J]; 
Music, one might imagine, should be equally confined to [the 
objects] of hearing. It imitates, however, every thing, even 
those objects which are perceivable by sight only. By a 
delusion that seems almost inconceivable, it can, as it were, 
put the eye into the ear [Rousseau, Dictionnaire article 
"Imitation", quoted in Smith's Of the Imitative Arts, p.199, 
emphasis added]. 
Srnith has already objected to the notion that imitational art deceives 
[3] On a more personal level, Smith had harsher words to describe 
Rousseau. Following Rousseau's famous paranoid insults in the face of 
Hume's generosity, Smith sent his condolences to Hume, advising him to 
ignore the provocations; 11 By endeavouring to unmask before the Public 
this hypocritical Pedant, you run the risk, of disturbing the tranquillity 
of your whole life. [ ... ]He is in danger of falling into obscurity in England 
and he hopes to make himself considerable by provoking such an 
illustrious adversary. He will have a great party. The church, the Whigs, 
the Jacobites, the whole wise English nation, who will love to mortify a 
Scotchman, and to applaud a man that has refused a Pension from the 
King. 11 [Correspondence of A dam Smith, p.113] 
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the senses. In fact, the whole first stage of his assembly rested on 
refuting this, when he wrote that works of art "never produce their effect 
l>y deception" [Essays, p.184], and that the "proper pleasure" which we 
derive from it, apart from being "incompatible" with deception, is founded 
"upon our admiration of the art which surmounts so happily that 
disparity" [p.l85] between object and representation. His objection to the 
concept of deception forms the basis of his desire for the mechanism of 
analogy, and the great hinge upon which everything turns. Much is at 
slr1ke, therefore, when he confronts Rousseau's theory, and it is his 
concept of explication which he initially invokes; "without the 
accompaniment of the scenery and action of the opera, without the 
assistance of either the scene-painter or of the poet, or of both, the 
inst.rumental music of the orchestre [sic] could produce none of the effects 
which are here ascribed to it" [p.199]. Again, instrumental music is not an 
irnitative art; it can only "imitate" objects if there are other media with 
which it connects and by which its "imitation" is explicated - other media 
which are actually imitative in capacity, and are capable of endowing music 
with certain semblances of their imitative powers, through a proportional 
mechanism of analogy (thus, the whole of Smith's aesthetic imaginary 
machine, as much as Derrida's, can be read as a specific refutation of 
Rousseau). 
Rousseau, however, was also commenting on the Theory of Ideas in 
much of his work, and it is evident from the contention that musical 
imitation can "put the eye into the ear", that there may be many music-
aesthetic resonances within this tradition, particularly in the attempt to 
append a visual penetration to an aural "organics". This is not least due 
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tu the fact that its most prominent theorists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, etc.) 
tend to concentrate their theories of perception upon the eye, to the near 
exclusion, or at least subordination of the ear. Rousseau's statement is a 
particularly blunt attempt to negate the specificity of the ear, and equally 
bluntly proposes that the visual model of signification can mysteriously 
penetrate the operation of the aural organ [~1. 
Such assertions can be read as developing the theories of Descartes, 
who, in the Principles of Philosophy {1644 ), proposes a common structure 
for vision and audition which operates through a locational axiology, an 
opposition between internality and externality; "the properties in external 
objects to which we apply the terms light, colour, smell, taste, sound, heat 
and cold [ ... ]are, so far as we can see, simply various dispositions in those 
objects" [Principles, in Writings, p.206]. According to this view, sound 
(along with other phenomena) is a property, a disposition of an externnl 
object. Its connectivity with respect to the ear then (given its externality) 
could be held to depend on the depositing of a semiotic essence into the 
interiority of the ear. Again, "we perceive by our senses as being located 
outside us [ ... ] light, colour, smell, taste, sound, and tactile qualities." 
[ibid.] The common ground between sound and light, then, is their 
externality, and from this, all the connective mechanisms of perception arc 
potentially involved in the rupture of a surface, its forced division in 
l4l However, in Derridean mode, we should notice that the penetration of the 
visual logos into the aural sonos is described by Rousseau as a "delusion" 
- ie. this organicist form of the "explication" of two modes of perception 
provides Rousseau with yet another disturbing interval within the 
organism. 
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order- to unite an internal and an external terml51. 
However, it is at the point of entry, and the question of what it is 
that enters, that the nature of the connection between sounding body and 
hearing ear requires more detailed consideration. Descartes only hints at 
the problem by suggesting a difference between sound and affective 
sensation; "When the air strikes the tympanic membrane it produces a 
disturbance in the little chain of three small bones attached to it; and the 
sensations of different sounds arise from the various different movements 
in these bones." [ibid., p.203] Harmonic connectivity is invoked by the 
evidence of the "little chain" of vibrating bones, and the possibility of 
sympathetic vibrational mechanisms along a supplementary chain is not far 
away. What the issue hinges on here is the striking of the air on the ear, 
a forceful vibration which leaves its mark upon the limited intervallic 
chain. The difference between sound and sensation, then, could be the 
difference between sound and affect, but only where we determine sound 
as origin, and affect as causally-determined. Although Descartes begins to 
provide an intervallic explanation here, a causal residue remains as a 
f51 Equally, Kant makes a similar move which associates sound with colour 
in the Critique of Judgement, and extends himself into the body of 
universality: "The art of the beautiful play of sensations (externally 
produced), which admits at the same time of universal communication, can 
be concerned with nothing else than the proportion of the different 
degrees of the disposition (tension) of the sense to which the sensation 
belongs, ie. with its tone. In this far-reaching signification of the word it 
may be divided into the artistic play of the sensations of hearing and 
sight, ie. into music and the art of color." [Critique of Judgement, p.168] 
Kant,s position, though, is considerably more complex with regard to 
consideration of the internality-externality axis. 
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potential trace of a semiotic penetration [6]. In Tympan, Derrida providC!s 
a neat description of this Cartesian mechanics of auralized spirit -
indefatigably at issue is the ear, the distinct, differentiated, 
· ar·Liculated organ that reproduces the effect of proximity, of 
absolute properness, the idealizing erasure of organic 
difference. It is an organ whose structure (and the suture 
that holds it to the throat) produces the pacifying lure ot 
organic indifference. [Margins of Philosophy, p.xvii] 
Despite the potential rupture suggested by a mechanics of spirit, 
the service of such mechanisms to the law of the ousia. dialectically returns 
[6] Smith specifically engages with Cartesian methodology in the following 
extract from one of his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres; "in 
Na lurall Philosophy or any other Science of that Sort we may either like 
Aristotle go over the Different branches in the order they happen to ca:jt 
up to us, giving a principle commonly a new one for every phaenomenon; 
or in the manner of Sir Isaac Newton we may lay down certain principles 
known or proved in the beginning, from whence we account for the 
severall Phenomena, connecting all together by the same Chain. - This 
Latter which we may call the Newtonian method is undoubtedly the most 
Philosophical [ ... ] It gives us a pleasure to see the phaenomena which we 
reckoned the most unaccountable all deduced from some principle [ ... ]and 
all united in one chain, far superior to what we feel from the unconnected 
rnel.hod where everything is accounted for by itself without any reference 
to the others. We need not be surprised then that the Cartesian Philosophy 
(for Des-Cartes was in reality the first who attempted this method) tho it 
does not perhaps contain a word of truth [ ... ] should nevertheless have 
been so universally received by all the Learned in Europe at that time. [ ... ] 
we justly deem [it] one of the most entertaining Romances that has evt~t~ 
bet!n wrote." [Rhetoric, pp.145-6] This is a complex passage, perhaps due 
to its dissemination through the hands of a student, and yet we can readily 
find Smith's cheerful passion for instrumentalist theories which utilise a 
"connected variety". What is significant, however, is his identification of: 
this method as a Cartesian one. In this connection, it may be inferred that 
Smith would approve of Descartes' attempt to link all modes of perception 
by a common mechanism. However, we should also note Smith's reserve in 
relation to Descartes himself, and also his warning elsewhere that the "mnn 
of system" who is "wise in his own conceit" can, through misapplication of 
systematic thought, risk the "highest degree of disorder" [Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, pp.234-5) It should be remembered that each Imaginary 
Machine is to be judged on its aesthetic merit - Des cartes is "one of the 
most entertaining Romances that has ever been wrote", but this does not 
mean that his system (or any other) should be applied dogmatically and 
uncritically. Philosophy is an art- not a social panacea, and most attempts 
at the latter have indeed ended in the "highest degree of disorder" in the 
political field, whether we consider Maoism's dialectical dogmatism or the 
Nazi obsession with the philosophy of Spirit. 
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the mechanisms to the organic body. This hearing,· then, is a phonic 
hearing, which organically connects the ear with the throat not through 
an interval but a biologically internal passage. It is the organics by which 
the singer performs an authentic and self-proximate signification without 
an interval, the "hearing-oneself-speak" of Rousseauism. The organic 
difference between the vocal and auditory organs- their division into two 
separate mechanisms - has as its telos the dialectical return of voice and 
ear to within one and the same body, an undifferentiated unity, or organic 
iiJdifference. 
RP.tween Descartes, Locke, and Rousseau in aesthetic terms, however, 
it is merely a matter of degree. To "put the eye into the ear", as Roussenu 
suggests, or to associate visual and aural mechanisms as Descartes does, 
is also to append to the experience of audition another aspect of the logos; 
the penetration of Light into the darkest recesses to shine pure, undivided 
Reason upon them. This logocentric activity is, of course, Plato's 
recommendation for the enlightenment of his ignorant Cave-dwellers. 
Equally, Locke's penetrational theory of audition is mentioned in the 
previous chapters, in contrast with the sympathetic vibrational theory of 
Alexander Malcolm. However, Malcolm's theory retains a trace of a Lockean 
semiotic in its insistence on an axis of internality and externality. From 
that position, it is hard to maintain a play of mutually stimulating surfaces, 
although this can be read as the direction to which the concept of 
sympathy gravitates. 
A similar movement can be found in Berkeley's writings. In An Essay 
Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), he writes that "a man is easily 
convinced that bodies and external things are not properly the objects of 
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hearing; but only sounds, by the mediation whereof the idea of this or that 
body or distance is suggested to his thoughts." [Essay, in Works, p.21] In 
olher words, it is the mediation of sound which produces the idea of a 
source, and thus the sensation of hearing across a distance. Sound 
becomes the medium through which a spatial relation to a source is 
inferred. Berkeley has moved from a determination of audition as t1. 
reception of a penetration towards a conception of a surface which 
interrupts the absolute continuity of an acoustic ousia, to the point where 
its meaning has to be rationally inferred. This aspect of Berkeley's theory 
must also be connected with another of the rare instances of a discussion 
of sound, in the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713), 
where Hylas states that "sounds too have no real being without the mind" 
[Dialogues, in Works, p.144 ]. Here, the issue of inference is stated fully as 
the endowment of a state of Being upon sound by the mind. This is no mere 
couception of a lack of existence of sound in the absence of a perceiving 
mind, but an angulation of the issue across a specific determination of 
existence as the presence of Being. In the light of Berkeley's more 
thorough treatment of the mechanics of vision, and the statement that "by 
the ear I perceive distance, just after the same manner as I do by the eye" 
[Essay, p.21 ], it is possible to associate with the concept of sound's Being 
a further vast series of visual and penetrational mechanisms. However, in 
the absence of a significant body of writing from Berkeley on the issue of 
sound, other texts must be consulted to trace the development towards an 
imaginary machine for musical signification. 
Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) provides many paths for 
a reading of the concept of penetrational mechanics, and for reasons nf 
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space, only a certain route will be traced here. In the Appendix, we find an 
unambiguous position on this matter. On the issue of the intervals between 
two bodies, Hume makes two statements. Firstly, he states that, empirically, 
the interval is "a property of the objects, which affect the senses" [p.638]. 
The interval is a mode of the connection of the two objects as far as 
appearance is concerned. Hume then considers the proposition that such 
intervals are "full of body" to be inconclusive, in that it is a question 
based not on appearances only, but on the possible inference of a body 
which is imperceptible to the senses. However, he does provisionally hold 
the opposite; "If the Newtonian philosophy be rightly understood, it will 
be found to mean no more. A vacuum is asserted: That is, bodies are said 
to be plac'd after such a manner, as to receive bodies betwixt them, 
without impulsion or penetration." l7l [p.639] Here, we have an explicit 
rejection of penetrational mechanics, where the vacuum is determined as 
a kind of potentially full interval, if only on account of the inability of the 
sense organs to correctly perceive a body there. This still requires the 
action of inference in cases where such an intermediate body is "invisible 
or intangible", and as Hume admits, he accepts this argument because it is 
"more suitable to vulgar and popular notions.l81u [ibid.] However, it is the 
case where there is a visible and tangible intermediate body, and the 
vacuum in question can be read as the potential connectivity of two bodies, 
(?) cf. the previous footnote on the Smithian version of Newton "rightly 
understood", as the methodological precursor of the intervallic Imaginary 
Mc1chine, but with its ultimate roots in the "entertaining Romance" of 
Descartes. 
[B) In this connection, cf. the quotation from Robert Burns at the head of 
the previous chapter, which accuses the philosophers of "sympathetic 
fP-eling" such as Smith and Reid of appealing merely to "What wives an' 
wabsters see an' feel" [Letter to J-s T-t? Gl-nc-r]. 
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their potential differenc~. 
Further, and Hume provides a mechanics of translation between 
these two forms of distance; "an invisible and intangible distance may be 
converted into a visible and tangible one, without any change on the 
distant objects." [p.59] This is achieved through a spatial and temporal 
movement of a sense organ such as the hand, which can provide an 
experience of the interval's distance. From this position, it is possible to 
afCirm the non-penetrational mechanics which result from the rejection of 
inference, to the point where the connection between two objects or events 
is undecidable. In other words, causality is the subject of scepticism, if it 
is taken as the mechanics of a forced action of one body onto (impulsion) 
or into (penetration) another; "we can never penetrate so far into the 
essence and construction of bodies, as to perceive the principle, on which 
i.heir mutual influence depends. 'Tis their constant union alone, with which 
we are acquainted" [p.400]. It is clear from the use of lexis in these 
quotations, that Hume draws a kind of link between the idea of a 
mechanical penetration and a theoretical penetration. Not only is causality 
considered as the action of one body depositing an essence of motion into 
another, but also in the sense of the action of the theoretical imagination 
perceiving an essence as a true substance of a body. The moment of 
Humean scepticism is close to that of Smith's determination of philosophy 
not as an inference, a mental forced entry of a substance but as a means 
of creatively making mental links, connections between objects, events, 
elc.: the active writing of an intertext. Here, Smith avoids even the 
question of causality which Hume has raised, in that, while Hume defines 
causality as inferred, and therefore in a sense created, Smith's theory of 
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the imaginary machine has as its regulatory component the very concept 
of creation. 
The complicity of creation in Smith's theory of the ear, which neither 
raises the question of causality nor vision (whether impulsional or 
penetrat.ional), points towards a different framework from any of the other 
writers considered here. In the theory of audition as laid out in Smith's 
essay Of the External Senses, even the methodological preoccupation with 
axiological thought is rejected. This is not to infer that his theories o E 
touch or vision, for instance, are not worked through imaginary axes, but 
rather to assert that two models of perception are assembled non-
oppositionally; one based on an axiological distinction of an 11 inside 11 and 
an "outside 11 , and thus capable of operating according to a logocentric 
dialectic, and another based on an affirmation of immanent surface as 
distinct from internality and externality. In this he continues the line 
which Malcolm opened in the Treatise of Musick where two models are 
elaborated but not oppositionally negotiated. Once more, we find Smith 
using sonos to transgress sympathy and move towards a more radical 
theory of the affect. 
In the sense of touch, Smith writes of the fact that pressure or 
resistance immediately sets up a concept of externality. Pressure is 
therefore "not merely an affection of my hand, but altogether external 11 [Of 
the External Senses, p.135]. Equally, the theory of vision given here is 
derived very directly from Berkeley's An Essay towards a New Theory of 
Vision (1709), and thus cannot significantly dispense with the concept of 
externality and internality, or the attendant possibilities of causality and 
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penetration [91. 
What is remarkable is the space which Smith devotes to the sense of 
hearing. For a start, it occupies a whole section to itself (unlike most other 
treatises within the Cartesian tradition of perception), proceeding to 
describe a model of audition devoid of visual-penetrative lexis. Every 
sound, according to Smith, is naturally felt "as an affection of our Ear" 
[p.143]. Sound does not exist along an axis which has its ends inside and 
oulside the ear, it is not an essence which has been deposited in the ear 
there from outside, inseminated by a more virile term in an act of 
entelechat.ion. Rather, it exists more as a component of the ear, as a mode 
of it, an integral constituent of its surface, just as the affectivity of 
instrumental music operates non-causally within the context of our 
"original passions". This immediately distinguishes Smith's theory from the 
appositional conceptions of spatiality which operate from Descartes 
through Rousseau. While Smith concedes, like Descartes, that sounds arc 
produced by bodies at a distance from the mind, unlike Descartes, he 
asserts that the "real" sound, the actual affective sound, "can nev~r 
change its place, it is incapable of motion" [p.143] in the sense of motion 
throughout a concrete space. Sound is an a-ffect of the ear, not an e-ffect 
of a body external to the ear; the ear is the sole locus of sound. To 
conceive otherwise, in an absolute opposition of sound and sensation, is f:o 
posit internality-externality. From there, as with Descartes' appositional 
axiology, there must first be a theoretical penetration of the ear's surfar.c 
[9] Smith writes of Berkeley's theory of v1s1on that "I have scarcely 
anything to add to what he has already done [ ... ] Whatever I shal [sic] say 
upon it, if not directly borrowed from him, has at least been suggested by 
what he has already said." [Essays, p.148] 
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in order to establish the locational axis, to infer the "inside" and the 
"outside" of the situation, thus allowing the passage of a penetrating 
cs~:ence through the inferred duct. 
As with Smith's adoption of the imaginary machine of the original 
passions, which transgressed this issue in relation to the theory of 
causality, so too the adoption of a wholly mechanized ear transgresses the 
two penetrational mechanisms of the Cartesian or Rousseauist ear. Smith's 
proto(pseudo)-deconstruction of the appositional axis which establishes 
1.he possibility of the penetrational duct is stated in the formula: "The real 
sound, however, the sensation in our ear, can never be heard or felt any 
where but in our ear, it can never change its place" [p.143]. Thus, the 
transgression of the penetrational axis is achieved by the transgression 
of the axis which Descartes established between "sound" and "sensation": 
the "real sound" is "the sensation in our ear", and nowhere else. Foe 
Smith, it is only a question of an immanent surface, not of a mobile essence 
which penetrates a body's surface as an insemination of the external into 
the internal. 
The spatiality of the ear is assembled according to its own specific 
locus; "The ear can feel or hear nowhere but where it is, and cannot 
stretch out its powers of perception, either to a great or to a small 
distance, either to the right or to the left" [ibid., emphasis added]. The e~r 
is not the locus of Reason, it cannot infer causes behind immanent 
phenomena. Inference, the analytical, rational power of penetrating a 
surface conceptually in order to "get inside" it, to the "heart of the 
matter", and so forth, is a tool which the ear does not possess, and has no 
intention of possessing, indeed, in this sense, has no intentionality per se. 
The ear is a surface which is in contact with other surfaces, and its 
experience of other surfaces comes only through a mediation of 
provisionally proximate surfaces. The ear is not penetrated, does not 
receive sound as an action of a passive receptacle, but produces the affect 
known as sound upon its own surface, indeed, as a mode of that surface. 
This constitutes the difference between Smith's theory and that of 
Housseau's - the perceptual organ does not penetrate and cannot be 
penetrated, it is not an all-seeing eye with access to a transcendental 
realm, behind the material world, or an all-penetrating voice, or a 
penetrated receptacle, but simply an organ of limited perceptive powers 
which is constituted by its surfacial quality and the vibrational 
connections which its surface makes with other surfaces in the immanent 
locality. 
Ironically, Rousseau himself provides us with an excellent example 
of the inability of even the most structurally invasive voice to actually 
ar.hieve a penetration. In the Letter to d'Alembert, he describes the failure 
of a theatrical voice which is backed up by all of the political weight of the 
law and the state; 
The laws can determine the subjects of the plays, and their 
form, and the way to play them; but the laws cannot force the 
public to enjoy them. The emperor Nero sang at the theatre 
and had all those who fell asleep put to death; still he could 
not keep everybody awake. And the pleasure of a short nap 
came close to costing Vespasian his life. Noble Actors of the 
Pnris Opera, if you had enjoyed the imperial power, I should 
not now complain about having lived too long. [Letter to M. 
d'Alembert on the Theatre, p.22] 
Here, the issue of melodic law is introduced into the consideration 
of the theatrico-political voice. The ultimate legislator attempts to 
penetrate the souls of an audience and yet his projected melodic essenr,e 
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meets with and is halted by the inhibiting action of surface. His ontological 
vanity requires all those bodies to feign reception, and the penalty for not 
participating in this model of direct origination is severe; for refusing 
colonization by this imperial semiotic model, for proclaiming supplementary 
independence from it (aesthetic U.D.I.), one is put to death. Refusing 
capture invites annihilation, for the claim to originarity must be either 
worshipped or challenged, and the refusal to participate is considered the 
severest challenge to authority. To disinvest in the economy of power is 
anurchism (that which is without arkhe), and to disinvest in the semiotic 
aesthetic which Nero proclaims is in itself a political act punishable 
according to the most rigorous of imperial legislation. 
The audience undoubtedly finds Nero's compulsory song boring, and 
yet to externalize that affective position, to demonstrate the failure of 
brute power to capture in essence, to do no more than fall asleep, is to 
demonstrate the failure of the laws to fully penetrate the audience and 
successfully command them to experience the directly intended phonic 
message. This demonstration of the actual powerlessness of the laws to 
fully achieve what they proclaim is what constitutes the necessity of the 
annihilation of the anarchic body and its suggestion of sonic affectivity. 
The establishment by the anarchic body of its own independent 
constitution of affectivity, the rejection of the phonic command, is a 
rupture to the universal power of Nero's melodic command. Liberty creat~s 
a harmonic abyss, a difference between source and goal, the interruption 
of the teleological certainty which allows the voice to directly influence the 
passions of the soul. The introduction of the semiotic interval breaks the 
dictatorial bond between voice and passion, and embarrasses the laws 
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which proclaimed the melodic unification to be possible. Thus, the 
seemingly mere crime of falling asleep during the emperor's song must be 
Jllet with death. Sleep is the threat of an organ's absence from the 
organism, its autonomy, a high form of anarchy which is no less politir.al 
for being aesthetic. Indeed, with the word autonomy, we are led to the 
connection of the concepts of law and melody in the Greek term nomos. 
Autonomy is the establishment of a series of independent nomoi against the 
imperialism of the originary logos- one sings one's own laws, becomes a 
melodic nomad, transgressing the laws of a centralized melodic originarity. 
This anti-trope of concepts is of further significance in the work of 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: "there is an opposition between the logos 
and the nomos" [A Thousand Plateaus, p.369]. DeleuzejGuattari point to 
further political resonances within the concept of nomoi: "It is a vital 
concern of every State not only to vanquish nomadism but to control 
migrations and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire 
'exterior'" [ibid., p.385]. In this context, the body of Vespasian is the 
"exterior" territory which Nero's logos must penetrate and thus 
semiotically invade its internal hinterland in order to reproduce itself 
there in a representation. Against this, DeleuzejGuattari argue for "a 
nomadism of true nomads, or of those who no longer even move or imitn te 
anything [ ... ] an assemblage that makes thought itself nomadic" [ibid., 
p.24]. This nomadic form of Imaginary Machine is considered in greater 
detail in Chapters 9 & 10. 
In the same way that Vespasian's falling asleep is the greatest threat 
to the penetrational power of the emperor's voice, so too Smith's coe 
operates without the ontological division of an inside and an outside. There 
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is nothing to uncover, nothing to invade or capture, unlike the 
penetrational semiotic which always presupposes this locational axis. 
Hather than placing itself within the economy of this axis, Smith's ear 
represents a total disinvestment in it, and a reinvestment according to a 
non-axiological economy of pure immanent surface. 
The significance of this radical affirmation of the ear's specificily 
ruises a blockage between a conception of the mind as internal, and of 
sound as external. Vespasian's unconsciousness provided a shield against 
the emperor's logos, across which its attempt to inseminate the mind was 
disseminated across further surfaces, according to a mechanics of 
hurmonic proportions. Such an action on the part of Smith's ear ruptures 
the self-proximate continuity of phenomena and consciousness, and 
requires a repositioning of the determination of the mind as receptacle. 
Even Locke recognized this important question, which reaffirms the 
difference between the ear and the eye, and despite his lack of interest in 
following this question through to any significant discoveries, there is a 
short passage from the Essay Concerning Human Understanding which 
demonstrates the dynamics involved; 
How often may a man observe in himself that whilst his mind 
is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and 
curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no 
notice of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ 
of hearing, with the same alteration that uses [sic] to be for 
the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there 
TrriJY be on the organ, but, it not reaching the observation of 
the mind, there follows no perception; and though the motion 
thut uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet 
no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not 
through any defect of the organ, or that the man's ears are 
less affected than at other times when he does hear; but that 
which uses to produce this idea, though conveyed in by the 
usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, 
and so imprinting no idea on the mind, there follows no 







there some idea is actually produced, and present in the 
understanding. [Essay, p.l20] 
Hr~ce, Locke continues to trace through the lexis of the penetrative 
semiotic, while admitting that it is incapable of a full, direct, and absolute 
control over the mind or passions. He finds that such situations as 
Rousseau suggests in the form of Vespasian are able to effectively block 
phonocentric essences. However, he maintains the existence of the duct 
through which sound passes, through the body of the ear, and even in I o 
Ute body of the mind. The process by which this ea usal essence registers 
no effect is necessarily mysterious; sound enters by the usual passage, 
and yet no sensation is forced into existence. 
As we can see in Smith's approach to the Theory of Ideas, however, 
a demystification of this distribution of phonocentric power may be 
achieved if the lexical framework of penetration is transgressed, opening 
towards the possibility of sonic considerations assembling a pragmatics of 
consciousness. At this point, not only does sound become mechanized, and 
not only does the ear redefine its role as an organ independently of the 
organism, but so too the concept of mind becomes instrumentalized. 
6.5 Surfacial Accumulation 
The problems of phonocentrically residuallexis begin to break down 
with Smith's approach to the constitution of components of an Imaginary 
l\1achine. Of affective sounds, he writes that, because they "have no 
extension, so they have no divisibility", calling upon the concept of self-
JJroximity in an entirely different fashion to its function for Rousseau. [Of 
the External Senses, p.l44] Precisely because they have no inside and no 
outside, because they, as the ear itself, are pure surface upon surface, 
they cannot be penetrated, they are not divisible in the traditional sense 
at least; one cannot cut into them. They are self-proximate in a non-
dr.lermining and non-determined way. Smith's determination of sounds, 
then, are by these strategic ruptures distinguished from melodic 
ontologies. 
What constitutes the distinction between these semiotic ruptures and 
the phonocentric penetrations of supplements is the hinge upon which the 
whole radical indeterminacy of Smith's system operates. With the concept 
of the undeconstructed supplementary series, the mechanism of linkage 
between terms is the penetration of one term by the previous term, with 
each term taking a "male" determination in one direction, and a "female .. 
in the other, each passing an essence to the next down a communicatory 
chain. Even Peirce describes the semiotic chain, despite its infinitude, os 
eusuring that "the torch of truth is handed along" the series. [Principles 
of Philosophy, p.171] The theme of fire as logocentric ousia remains within 
this most proto-post-structural of theories, and fails to move completely 
beyond the framework of essential penetration. The concept of the 
rupture, however, such as Vespasian's unconsciousness, is not the 
rupturing of the entity, but the dislocation of the very mechanism by 
which entities penetrate each other. The introduction of the extreme, 
deconstructed supplementarity of the surface with its modes creates 
slippages of surfaces across each other. This rupture is that which truly 
has always already occurred, and is the mechanism which allows the 
constitution even of the supplement, but in so doing, creates its 
impenetrability as much as its inability to form stable chains. At this point, 
i.l1e Derridean supplement has become the surface mode. The instability of 
the intermediate chain is a significant factor in the connectivity of modal 
surfaces, and is a component also of Hume's critique of causality. The 
instability of the connections of intermediate chains is demonstrated by 
Hume with regard to his causal scepticism; "In a word, then, every effect 
is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in 
the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be 
entirely arbitrary." [An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.30] 
As with Smith's Imaginary Machine, connections between objects or events 
ar·e created as components of philosophy. The Peircean torch of truth 
which smoulders yet in Derrida's grammatology is blown out by its own 
enlightened breath. 
With Hume in particular, we return to the question of the connective 
mechanics of modes upon the immanent surface. In this, it may be usefu 1 
to make a distinction between the concept of division which has been 
applied with regard to supplementary action, and the concept of 
accumulation. The manner of "divisibility" in Smith's surfaces can be 
understood as "a certain composition and decomposition" of the modes of 
a surface: "In a concert of vocal and instrumental music, an acute and 
experienced Ear readily distinguishes all the different sounds which strike 
upon it at the same time, and which may, therefore, be considered as 
making up one sound." [Essays, p.145, emphasis added] This "compound" 
sr:rtsation expresses the coincidental temporal connectivity of "the moment" 
"' hich has already been described [IOJ. Now, however, the "vertical" 
(JO] H~:ckeley has a similar conception of vertical hearing when he writes; 
"Sounds, for example, perceived at the same instant, are apt to coalesce, 
if I may say so, into one sound: but we can perceive at the same time great 
variety of visible objects, very separate and distinct from each other." [An 
Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, p.51] 
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aspect of the affective surface is fully positioned. Affects are arranged 
vertically, accumulated, and this constitutes their composition. Their 
"divisibility" is to be taken as meaning their vertical connectivity 
according to the accumulation of modes across a surface, where the 
difference between "mode 11 and "surface" is only a matter of where the 
invisible connecting chains of the imaginary machine are traced; a mattt~c 
of pragmatics, a nomadic, nominalistic definition of a body's limit - an 
intertextual field. 
Beginning with Smith's concept of the "certain composition and 
decomposition" of sounds on the surface of the ear, we can go further than 
this; it is a question of harmonic chains which can not only be established, 
but also broken, and re-established in a different form, without ever 
destroying any components. In this sense, machines can be "destroyed", 
but only by a pragmatic action of dis-assembly. The possibility of re-
assembly is always there. Smith's machine cannot be "killed" in the same 
way that Rousseau's organism can, and for that reason alone, Rousseau is 
right to fear the annihilation present in the existence of the abyss of 
absence. Equally, Rousseau's theory is not an attempt to harmonize nature 
and theory, but to authentically represent a true reality (the contradictio 
in adjecto which Derrida picks up on); it is an attempt to reduce the space 
bPlween theory and reality, to bring them into absolute proximity. Smith, 
on the other hand, is harmonizing the two, bringing them into a machinic 
relationship which is as nominalist as it is instrumentalist in both the 
musical and the philosophical senses. 
Smith's connection of Nature and Theory can also be read as 
occurring entirely within the immanent surface of Nature. In this way, the 
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"divisibility" of Smith's machines by actions of composition and 
decomposition should be understood as the orientation and reorientation 
of c.;oncepts, and not as an authentic description of objective matter; we 
have already noted the transgression of the concept of Truth which occurs 
al the point of disinvestment in penetrational semiotics and 
representational deception. Smith's Imaginary Machine itself is located 
upon a surface of immanence, and is therefore reflexively connected with 
what it images: Theory is a part of Nature. In a machinic system, there is 
no subjectivity or objectivity, only specific affectivities and 
connectivities, and so the decomposition of a machine is simply the 
redefinition of a concept- its reconnection into another machinic system. 
The philosopher and lawyer John Millar[ll] hinted at this approach to 
theory when he wrote of Smith's work that "the most useful part or 
metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of 
communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the 
principles of those literary compositions which contribute to persuasion 
or entertainment." [quoted in Dugald Stewart's Account of the Life and 
Writings of Adam Smith, LL.D., in Smith's Essays, p.274] Phonocentric 
determinations of language aside, which are almost requisite for the period 
of this passage's composition, Millar nevertheless points to Smith's 
grounding of philosophy, through his nominalist instrumentalism, in a 
cortsideration of language as a means of tackling metaphysics. Yet, as we 
have seen, philosophy is not offered up by Smith as an enlightened meta-
discourse of a Platonic order. J.C. Bryce comments on the notion of the 
[ll] One of Smith's students who became Professor of Law in Glasgow 
University. 
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connective chain of theory that "Smith is concerned with this on the 
strategic level just as contemporary writers on Milton and Thomson were 
on the imaginative." [Introduction to Smith's Rhetoric, p.13] This elision of 
not only the literary and the philosophical but more crucially, the musicdl 
as well, will be recognized as a Derridean, as much as a Smithian trait, and 
in many senses, we can read Smith as locating himself upon a similc1r 
theoretical surface as that outlined by Derrida - "It may even be that 
these questions are not philosophical, are not philosophy's questions. 
Nevertheless, these should be the only questions today capable of 
founding the community, within the world, of those who are still called 
philosophers." [Writing and Difference, p. 79] As Derrida paraphrases the 
Saussurean position, "Semiology, then, is a part of the theory of the 
imagination." [Margins of Philosophy, p. 76] For Smith, however, semiology 
would be in no position to act as the analytical meta-discourse of the 
imagination, since it is itself a by-product of that of which it attempts to 
speak. 
The composition, decomposition, and recomposition of concepts, of 
modes and surfaces, is what constitutes the impenetrability of Smith's 
sounds, ears, passions and minds. An ear is undoubtedly an organ, but the 
"mechanization" of this organ which Smith achieves ruptures the 
]Jf~uetrational continuities of the organicist semiotic, dissociating it from 
the concept of the organism. With regard to "division", all that can happen 
tu such machinic organs - components - is that they are reconstituted in 
other forms. The division of which they do not admit is the division which 
forms an organ of the act of penetration. In other words, their divisibility 
comes from their own affective specificity, it comes from "within", or 
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rather, according to the provisional cornpositional tensions which 
constitute their surface at that moment. 
Within this conception of composition, we begin to notice the 
refractive capacity of all these concepts within the Imaginary Machine. The 
boundaries between each term become a matter of intertextual pragmatics 
which are only ever provisionally assembled within the Imaginary Machine, 
and as we have noted already, the Imaginary Machine itself is only a 
compositional component of the general system of Nature which it imagines 
- whether this natural system is taken as, in one assemblage, "the whole 
machine of the world" [Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.289], or in anotht~r 
distribution, "the immense machine of the universe" [ibid., p.236]. In this 
way, the composition of a body in itself is a network of connective chains 
as much as its position in the overall machine with respect to the other 
bodies. At all levels in this Imaginary Machine, it is always a matter of 
connectivity, and of the differences in connective capacity which assemble 
affective networks. It should not be overlooked, however, that Smith is 
dealing with a specific set of phenomena - sound, temperature, taste - and 
these phenomena are distinguished from others; "It is sufficiently evident 
that this composition and decomposition is altogether different from that 
union and separation of parts, which constitutes the divisibility of soJici 
ex tension." [Essays, p.145] Smith is providing us with two Imaginary 
Machine alignments here; the sonic model which operates according to the 
composition and decomposition of affective capacities, and a solid model 
which operates according to the union and separation of penetrative 
cct pacities. 
Not only the disinvestment of the internality-externality axis (which 
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the concept of the impenetrable surface points to) indicates the 
deconstruction of appositional space, then, but more significantly, the very 
multiplicity of connections available to any given mode or surface. In this 
sense, it is not a question of the deconstruction of space as differenti~l, 
the rejection of the difference between two spaces, but precisely the 
multiplication of differences to a point where the ontological move of 
lir11iting the field to two territories loses its grip on the movement of a vast 
complexity. The generative capacity of the Imaginary Machine multiplies 
spatialities as a subsidiary action of its more crucial interest in the 
diversification of connective capacities. 
The acoustic connectivity which is considered here can be conceived 
as a kind of timbral organization where there is a change of spech'al 
texture at work constantly. The morphology of this texture should not be 
considered continuous in itself, however, but capable of any kind of 
motion. Equally, this timbre might have no fundamental, or at least the 
possibility of several likely candidates. The change of relationships within 
this timbre are also to be understood along the lines of Smith's composition 
and decomposition of the modes of a surface, the connection and. 
disconnection of any number of components. In this sense, ontological time 
becomes organized not by the same means, but as the same thing as Hs 
opposite, space; harmony "is" rhythm, and so forth. It is a question not of 
an object's location on a spatia-temporal grid such as the musical score is 
or·dinarily conceived as, but a question of the affective connectivity of 
surfaces which operate independently of each other in a non-causal sense, 
and also can be linked together in an imaginary machine by invisible 
intermediary chains which articulate themselves in any given geometricn L 
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direction, not just horizontal or vertical. With the immanent concept of 
timbre, the analytical concepts of space and time are not synthesized, but 
become irrelevant to the consideration of the connection of modes upon a 
changing surface of instability. 
As Smith writes, the ear is the sole "locus" of sound, or rather, 
sound is a mode of the ear-surface. From this statement, it follows that the 
connective relationships between sounds are relationships of the 
assemblage of modes upon the ear's surface. It is upon this surface that 
the connections between sounds are assembled, and arranged into various 
configurations. This mechanism can be called otosynthesis; the means of 
connection upon the ear, where synthesis is not understood as the 
synthesis of a duality into a unity, but rather, the assemblage of modes 
into any number of intermediate chains of connection such as Smith 
elsewhere suggests. This is not the synthesis of dialectics- the synthesis 
of two ends of an axis into a mid-point or the compression of the axis into 
only one of its poles. Otosynthesis is a means of describing Smith's 
multivalent articulation of any number of modes and types of modes as they 
occur as components of the ear machine. The ear which operates by 
otosynthesis, however, cannot be a surface of which a mode is the 
imaginary machine, for the ear has no imagination; its connective 
mechanisms operate on different lines. The ear 'is literally, a hearing 
machine, and nothing more elaborate than that. 
The synthesis which the ear produces is never stable or finalized; 
it has no telos in that it is characterized by an occurrence rather than a 
function or goal. Each connection is always operating under the possibility 
of disconnection or reconnection, and any connective network, any timbral 
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surface which can be assembled from the available modes is as likely as 
any other to an ear which operates according to its own affective 
pcoduction. ,Just as otosynthesis occurs without penetration or capture, 
it also operates without being guided or driven. Otosynthesis is a 
mechanism which operates as a connective mode of the ear-surface, under 
a certain morphology of connections, and no where or when else. The car 
is only the ear, and its connection to acoustic vibration is only precisely 
that; at no point is there an entry of an essence through either of these 
two affective surfaces, from one direction or another. A process of 
stimulation occurs which involves not the creation of a set of objects in or 
behind either surface, but involves the production of a certain 
configuration of extant modes into a connective network. Nothing is passed 
c1long a line in otosynthetic production, nothing is created or destroyed, 
but simply reconnected according to a different configuration. 
Configurations are assembled and disassembled, but can always be 
reassembled or modified into other configurations. This all represents the 
connective mechanism of otosynthesis, and establishes it according to a 
different logic to semiotics. The ear does not receive; the ear connects 
itself. 
O"lusynthesis is a mode of Smith's analogical, explicatory or 
articulatory hinge which relates specifically to the diverse connectivity of 
Ute aural experience. With its corollaries upon other surfaces of the 
Imaginary Machine, it assembles a mechanism whereby the metaphysical 
determination of music which aesthetics puts forward can be 
"deconstructed" and replaced by a truly differential configuration of 
Hlodes on the musical machine's surface. We can potentially read it as a 
theory which dispenses with the metaphysical tools of spatia-temporal 
axiology which Derrida remains tied to, and bypasses the risks of 
collapsing back into a position where all the attendant concepts of 
dialectical entelechation, penetrational ductility, and so forth, reconstruct 
Utemselves or at least threaten to do so at every juncture. In one sense, 
it multiplies the articulatory hinge beyond the strictures of axiology, and 
in another, positions connectivity in a surfacial mode which potentially 
renders penetrational semiotics powerless. Yet it does not represent any 
kind of finalized provisionality: it should not be forgotten that although 
Vespasian can certainly fall asleep during Nero 1s song, the emperor is 
nevertheless empowered by the laws to put him to death; it may be the case 
that even if one withdraws the affective organ from the effective organism, 
the organicist programme can still be restored by a drastically final 
cadence. At this juncture, it becomes very much a question of the political 
alignment of the "structural politics of harmony", a question of the 
distinction between logocentrism and a certain dislocational form of 





THE VoiCE OF UNI{S)ON 
Truan yw gennyf, gwedi lludded, 
Goddef gloes angau trwy anghyffred, 
Ac eil trwm truan gennyf fi gweled 
Dygwyddo ein gwJr ni ben o draed 
Ac uchenaid hir ac eilywed 
Yn 61 gwyr pybyr tymyr tydwed, 
Rhufon a Gwion, Gwlon a Gwlged, 
Gw,9'r gorsaf wriaf, gwrddyng ngaled. 
Ys deupo i'w henaid hwy wedi trined 
Cynnws yng ngwlad nef, addef afneued. 
- Y Gododdin, Aneirin ( c.600) 
CHAPTER 
TnE VorcE OF UNr(s)oN 
There is a sensuality in Rousseau. Combined with such an 
intellectual gift as his, it makes pictures of a certain 
gorgeous attractiveness: but they are not genuinely poetical. 
Not white sunlight: something operatic; a kind of rosepink, 
artificial bedizenment. [Lectures on Heroes, p.325] 
Strangely through all that defacement, degradation and 
alrnost madness, there is in the inmost heart of poor Rousseau 
a spark of real heavenly fire. [Lectures on Heroes, p.324] 
Thomas Carlyle's Lectures on Heroes and Hero-worship (1841) on the 
one hand condemns Rousseau as degenerate, and on the other claims that 
he was nevertheless capable of being otherwise. Carlyle mistrusts the 
.. artificiality .. of Rousseau, as much as Rousseau distrusted the artificiality 
of Rameau's harmonic theory. For Carlyle, Rousseau attempted the correct 
metaphysical programme, and yet failed to deliver its final result. In this 
sense, there is a close intertext between Derrida's assertions that 
Rousseau failed to provide a truly phonocentric theory, by virtue of the 
systematic rupture represented by the supplement, and Carlyle's 
assertions that. Rousseau was corrupted by the materiality and artificiality 
of the age in which he lived. Rousseau, Carlyle contends, is 11 not white", 
but .. something operatic". The choice of le xis here is significant, if read in 
conjunction with Carlyle's short essay The Opera (1852). Here, the question 
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of u phonocentric determination of music returns, once more in an analysis 
of the operatic; music is not pure sonic affectivity as was the case foe 
Smith, but an expression of something beyond the surface of the world; 
"Music is well said to be the speech of angels; in fact, nothing among the 
u l Lerances allowed to man is felt to be so divine." [Opera, Essays Vol.III 
p . .509 [1]] Music is not material, but spiritual. Neither is it sonic, but 
phonic. Indeed, it is an "utterance" privileged above all others. With "the 
speech of angels" we have the clause from which all the rest can be 
derived, in a bivocal definition of music as phonic and as non-material. The 
conception of music as material and actual which harmonic theory was 
moving towards in the writings of Malcolm, Rameau, and Smith has been 
replaced by Carlyle's transcendental return to specifically phonic logos. 
Music "brings us near to the Infinite" [ibid.], it is a means of transporting 
the mind out of the realm of the material and towards a transcendental 
goal. In this, Carlyle not only rejects the materialism of the Enlightenment, 
but does so with a re-vitalized logocentrism which goes beyond the 
dichotomous failures of (Derrida's) Rousseau. 
The transcendental Infinite which is established here also holds a 
mapping-over of biological images for Carlyle; the act of audition is likened 
1.o that of vision. Once more, a familiar (Cartesian) theme returns, and 
again, Carlyle extends its remit. The Infinite is reached according to a 
glimpse afforded us by sound; "we look for moments, across the cloudy 
[1] The Opera, in Essays Vol.III. Note that, with the exception of The French 
Hevolution, Past and Present, Sartor Resartus, and the Lectures on Heroes 
and Hero-worship all subsequent references to Carlyle's works are drawn 
from the Critical and Miscellaneous Essays. A single collection is here used 
c1s the source for sake of convenience, since Carlyle's works were 
extensively reprinted throughout the Nineteenth Century, in several 
countries, and in several languages. 
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eiP.rnents, into the eternal Sea of Light, when song leads and inspires us." 
[ibid., emphasis added] In hearing, we look, we see, by the action of 
inspiration which is conducted through the channels of our ears. Song 
"inspires" us, the breath of the gods is transmitted through the singing 
of Lhe angels, it is breathed into us through our ears and endows us with 
the ability to see their realm of the Infinite for a brief moment. Our glimpse 
of the eternal is temporary, afforded us by the temporal art of music, 
which, among all the arts, all the "utterances" which Man is "allowed", is 
thus the most "divine". 
For Carlyle, it is also a question of Nature, and the destiny of the 
Nation. A proper use of music is the mark of a nation's serious attitude 
towards the eternal realm; "Serious nations, all nations that can still listen 
to the mandate of Nature, have prized song and music as the highest; as a 
vehicle for worship, for prophecy, and for whatsoever in them was divine." 
[ibid., emphasis added] As the gods are of Nature, so their judgement is 
passed down to "Man" through "her" voice, the voice of angels, and the 
nation which hears Nature's voice is the nation which expresses thnt 
mandate through their song. Yet the mortal ear must have an interpreter 
to bring the law of the gods from the songs of the angels, and this 
interpreter is the singer, who is "a vates, admitted to the council of the 
universe, friend of the gods, and choicest benefactor to man." [ibid.] This 
her·meneutic, vatic singer is the prophet to the serious nation, and gives 
it access to the natural law of the gods, is the privileged medium of the 
mandate which inspires the nation, in a knowledge of the universal 
council's rulings. The vatic singer is the carrier of the divine pneuma, the 
brt~ath of the gods, and brings it to benefit "Man" by passing it on to its 
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final goal. This goal is the realization of the will of the gods; "Tyrtreus, who 
had a little music, did not sing Barbers of Seville, but the need of beating 
back one's country's enemies; a most true song, to which the hearts of men 
did burst responsive into fiery melody, followed by fiery strokes befor~e 
long" [ibid., p.510, emphasis added). This is the final goal of the divine 
mandate; the serious nation which properly uses music is commanded lo 
realize its destiny in conflict with other nations. It must establish 
ontological difference between itself and its neighbours, and it must use 
this power to annihilate Others, to establish its own logos within their 
independent nomoi. This is the dialectics of violence. 
The vatic singer delivers this message, the warriors of the nation 
are inspired by the melodic transmission of celestial pneuma into a but~st 
of "fiery melody", melody which realizes the full force of the divine breath, 
and then this whirlwind of fire is transformed into warlike action. It is n t 
this point that the mandate of melodic natural law is complete. The warriors 
follow their melodic fire with a rhythmic fire across the bodies and land of 
their opponents. "Fiery strokes" are beaten into other nations, and these 
beats are direct transpositions of the rhythm of the divine melodies. This 
is the rhythm of capture and annihilation. 
The whole entelechy is completed, from the original celestial song 
which prophecies the nation's destiny and inspires it to act towards that 
goal, to the transformation of spiritual melody into the material rhythm of 
war, but all the while, the war rhythm being guided by the divine song, 
and striving towards the telos, the final goal, which has been prophesied 
for· this serious nation. 
Hence, nation struggles with nation over rival claims of access to the 
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s pirituallight of prophetic melody. Philosophy is at its most Platonic here, 
in aiding the nation in its ascent towards melodic enlightenment, but not 
all philosophies can lead to true Vision - Rousseau, for instance, is 11 not 
white sunlight", and as Derrida writes, 11 lf light is the element of violence, 
one must combat light with a certain other light, in order to avoid the 
worst violence, the violence of the night which precedes or represses 
discourse.[ ... ) The philosopher (man) must speak and write within this war 
of light .. [Writing and Difference, p.117] Following this conceptual tropc 
through in Carlyle, it is crucial to acknowledge that much rests on the 
political dimension in his aesthetics. As Edward Said points out, this side 
of Carlyle is all too often ignored: "There is, I believe, a quite serious split 
in our critical consciousness today, which allows us to spend a great de a 1 
of time elaborating Carlyle's and Ruskin's aesthetic theories, for example, 
without giving attention to the authority that their ideas simultaneously 
bestowed on the subjugation of inferior peoples and colonial territories." 
[Culture & Imperialism, p.12] Yet Said is sceptical regarding the 
teleological causality which Carlyle claims for his prophesies, and cautions 
against an over-deterministic interpretation; 
Carlyle did not drive Rhodes directly, and he certainly cannot 
be 'blamed' for the problems in today's southern Africa- but 
it is genuinely troubling to see how little Britain's great 
humanistic ideas, institutions, and monuments, which we still 
celebrate as having the power ahistorically to command our 
approval, how little they stand in the way of the accelerating 
imperial process. [Culture & Imperialism, p.97) 
When one engages with Carlyle's aesthetics of song, it is hard to 
avoid the existence of this imperial authority, and any reader of his 
writings in general will find it difficult not to come across specifically 
iHtperialist politics. Yet not only in relation to the non-British cultures 
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which Said indicates -a parallel thesis which will appear in the margins of 
our current reading is that Carlyle is also engaged in a series of 
circumlocutory positions with regard to his own culture, if we read against 
the grain of both his and subsequent determinations of him as "English" 
and not Scottish. Indeed, his attempted adoption of an English identity is 
in itself an indicator of his belief in its superior imperiality. As R.D. Laing 
writes, "The colonists not only mystify the natives [ ... ] they have to 
mystify themselves." [The Politics of Experience, p.49) It is the idea of an 
anglicized Scotland-within-Britain which Carlyle wishes to save through 
his melocentric prophesiesl21. Significantly then, the image of the vates 
derives from a Celtic, rather than a Germanic Golden Agel31, but as will 
become gradually clear, Carlyle is engaged in a tumultuous relationship 
with concepts of race and politics, at once denying and affirming the Celtic 
specificity of Scottish culture. Sometimes his textual strategies amount to 
a re-rooting of the Celtic in the Germanic, absorbing them within a grc.:\t 
Saxon organicism. At other points, his assault is more direct. True to his 
Presbyterian heritage, one does not have to look far for an example of more 
specifically Germanic dimensions; according to Carlyle, his theory of divine 
melodic prophesy finds its model par excellence in Lutheran psalm. 
He it was, emphatically, who stood based on the Spiritual 
World of man, and only by the footing and miraculous power 
[21 For an excellent (if necessarily dated) sociologically-oriented account 
of these dynamics, see Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British 
National Development, 1536-1966 (1975) by the American scholar, Michael 
Hechter. 
(J] A~: Strabo writes, commenting on the artistic-religious castes of Ancient 
Celtic Gaul, "The bards [ bardo11 are singers and poets, the vates [ ouateis] 
interpreters of sacrifice and natural philosophers, while the druids 
[ druTda11 in addition to the science of nature study moral philosophy." 
[Geographia, iv, chap.4, $4] 
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he had obtained there, could work such changes in the 
Material World. As a participant and dispenser of divine 
in nuences, he shows himself among human affairs; a true 
connecting medium and visible Messenger between Heaven 
and Earth [Luther's Psalm, in Essays, Vol.II, pp.3/4] 
Luther, then, achieves through the medium of divine song whiil 
Housseau, in his "operatic" nature, failed in. Yet, it is nevertheless also 
significant that Rousseau harks back to his Protestant origins in various 
idyllic images of pastoral virtue linked with the binding masculinity of 
Genevan psalm-singing: "One of their most frequent amusements is to sing 
psalms in four parts with their wives and children; and one is amazed to 
hear issuing from rustic cabins the strong and masculine harmony of 
Goudimel so long forgotten by our learned artists." [Letter to d'Alembert, 
p.62] Perhaps Rousseau here refers to Claude Goudimel's settings of the 
Genevan Huguenot Psalter of the 1560's, but what is evident is that, 
despite the action of harmonic structures within them, their divine subject 
matter, presided over by the familial patriarch binds the mother and 
children within the law of a "strong and masculine harmony", a harmony 
which is thus opposed to the ontological weaknesses of supplementary 
action. No doubt, this is the side of Rousseau which Carlyle wishes hod 
been more thoroughly evident. 
For Carlyle, Luther provides a more thoroughly originary model of 
lhe connection between the Divine and Material worlds - he is the medium 
who stands at the point of their union and uses the body of his song to 
allow divinity to flow in an in-fluence of vital energy into the dead matter 
of lhe fallen world. He is the point at which spirit and life enter, penetrate 
into, mute matter. 
Carlyle is at pains to point to the real locus of Luther's inspired 
genius; "With words he had not learned to make pure music [ ... ] in tones, 
only through his Flute, amid tears, could the sigh of that strong soul find 
ullerance. [ ... ] Nevertheless, though in imperfect articulation, the same 
voice, if we will listen well, is to be heard also in his writings, in his 
Poems." [ Luther's Psalm, p.4] The phonocentricity of Luther's psalms, then, 
comes not so much through his literal or even his literary voice, but 
tltrough the articulation of sound itself as an "utterance" - L uther' s music 
per se has a "voice", distinguishable from the actual voice, and this divine 
"voice" pervades also his poems and other writings. Hence, Carlyle 
operates a double phonocentrism when writing of song- there is a celest.ia l 
voice, not necessarily connected to the material voice, and it lies at the 
centre, the heart of all productions of genius, articulating great art 
through its connective proximity to the celestial world. At the centre of all 
music is song. 
Such it was, Carlyle writes, "in Greek, Roman, in Moslem, Christian, 
most of all in Old-He brew times" [The Opera, p.509], in the times of 
Tyrtreus, Sophocles, £schylus, and David. Yet the time of David's psalm 
(the historical origin of Luther's psalm, and thus the golden age of its 
genesis) has gone, its melody is lost, and now, in our fallen age of 
materialisms, we can only read it: "To sing it attempt not, for it is 
itnpossible in this late time; only know that it once was sung. Then go to 
the Opera, and hear, with unspeakable reflections, what things men now 
sing!" [ibid., p.510] 
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7.2 " ... fiction and delirium ... " 
The opera of 1852 is a fallen art for Carlyle. His visit to the 
Haymarket Opera fills him with "unspeakable reflections" on the state of 
the world, and with a nostalgia for more divine days. This opera house 
becomes a paradigm of all that is degraded in British culture, all that is 
false~ dishonest and material. Money has come to represent the 
superficiality of opera, there is no longer any soul in music, it is all 
expenditure and philistinism. Instead of celestial music, he finds "Lustres~ 
candelabras, painting, gilding [ ... ] a hall as of the Caliph of Alraschid, or 
him that commanded the slaves of the Lamp" [Opera, p.510]. The one" true 
song" is now replaced by a foreign god, an exotic heathen image whose 
only power comes through material luxury, "regardless of expense" [ibid.]. 
In what should be the centre of London's power, its artistic vatican, there 






the Italian baritone, Filippo Coletti, degrading his geniusl41; "stamped by 
Nuture as capable of far other work than squalling here, like a blind 
Samson, to make the Philistines' sport! 11 (ibid., p.511] The moment of 
Ccll.astrophe, blindness, loss of Vision, and therefore loss of access to the 
divine, is near. 
The opera even operates through a visual degradation, and de bases 
the very concept of Vision. The ballet corrupts the nature of the human 
body: 11 Motion peculiar to the Opera; perhaps the ugliest, and surely one 
of the most difficult, ever taught a female creature in this world. Nature 
ahhors it" [ibid.] This dance is not natural, not originary, but a mere 
supplement to the original nature of the body: it is not in unison with the 
origin, but stands at a distance, an interval, from it. It has moved from the 
unison to the harmonic. Vision is a matter of the internal world, and Ci"'l n 
[~]The presbyterian narrative of papal corruption and supplementation of 
the original religion of the 11 0ld-Hebrew" is operative within this religious 
metaphor; religion has become debased by the supplementation of direct 
communion with God by the material representation of the Pope. The 
presbyterian argument is often one for an authentic relationship with God, 
although this is normally expressed through a de-centralization and 
democratization of religious power, leaving the subject in control of their 
own worship. Carlyle's interest in presbyterianism is precipitously 
bcllanced between the argument for authentic communion and the argument 
for supplementary institutional devolution, and gravitates towards the 
former. In this text, Carlyle images Coletti (1811-94) as a fallen Pope, guilty 
of the same material corruptions. According to the New Grove, Coletti hod 
pr·oved an unpopular replacement in 1841 for his colleague Tamburini, the 
public favourite at Her Majesty's Theatre, London, and his appointment 
hud resulted in riots. However, Coletti's position was more comfortable 
there when Tamburini defected to Covent Garden in 1846. Coletti's forte 
was Verdi, and he retired in 1869. 1852, however, was the year in which the 
director of Her Majesty's Theatre, Benjamin Lumley (1842-58) finally 
dr-~cided to close the theatre due to lack of support ensuing from various 
scandals and the fact that most of his best singers had now followed 
T<nnburini to Covent Garden (However, Lumley reopened the theatre in 
1856). The context of Carlyle's visit, then, was the demise of the theatre in 
the midst of general hostility towards singers such as Coletti, and 




only be induced through the hermeneutic administrations of the vatic 
singer. Mere sight cannot accomplish Vision, since the object of this Vision 
is not material, but celestial. Only the inspiration of divine melody can 
achieve true vision, and so all these material sights, whether the lavish 
decoration of the hall or the unnatural motions of the dancer can only 
interrupt the mandate of nature's voice. "Wonderful to see; and sad, if ynn 
hud eyes!" [ibid., p.512] If you had eyes to truly see, eyes to see beyond 
the mere appearances which disfigured the original divinity of music, eyes 
which could burn away matter and touch the essence, eyes which could 
contract the intervals of harmonic proliferation back to the unity of the 
originary unison. Such are the eyes which Carlyle assembles here; musical 
eyes. 
Further, and Carlyle begins to realize that music had been displaced 
from its mandatory centrality to opera, that the "Rhythmic Arts were a 
mere accompaniment" [ibid.] (and note the emphasis on the temporal 
dimension, rather than the harmonic). Music had become peripheral to the 
pleasure of the situation, rather than its cause; the origin itself had been 
intervallically inverted into a harmonic of the social graces of the occasion. 
The natural order of operatic ontology is transgressed. Here, Carlyle sees 
the ultimate debasement of the origin take place; "Young beauties of both 
sexes used their opera-glasses, you could notice, not entirely for looking 
at the stage." [ibid.] The audience are not here to hear the celestial voice, 
Cllld thus to musically see the eternal realm, but to materially see each 
other - it is a social, not a properly spiritual scene. Not even the harmonic 
rn<s l.eriality of the dancer is seen, and this removes the seer even further 
from the musical origin, turns the phonic origin into a harmonic of the 
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oplic, unhooks the fundamental and inverts the true interval between 
source and accompaniment. Music is no longer the voice at the centre (the 
vhonocent.ric logos of Greek theatre and vatic prophesy), but a peripheral 
amusement; the ontological order has been transgressed. 
This inversion of the natural order achieves a dissonance, only to 
compound yet further the deceptive traits which are beginning to emerge, 
the dishonesties which Carlyle is here to see through. Even the beauty of 
the onlookers in each other's eyes is false, and complicitous in the 
disunified heterophony of the situation as a whole: "certain old Improper-
Females (of Quality), in their rouge and jewels, even these looked some 
reminiscence of enchantment [ ... ] and, in fact, I perceived that Coletti and 
Cerito and the Rhythmic Arts were a mere accompaniment here." [ibid.] The 
impropriety of these "Improper-Females" derives from the material nature 
of their frivolous decoration, which echoes the decor of the hall in the 
e:xot.ic jewellery of some foreign bordello, where money attempts to buy a 
slice of the celestial, and yet only procures a base matter. Coletti, the 
fallen singer, no longer vatic hermeneut, is the slave of the "macassar 
Chatabangues and his improper-females past the prime of life!" [ibid., 
p . .513] Coletti, who has been bought, captured, by the owner of this 
improper property, is now made to perform as a mere accompaniment to 
material profanity, he has been "chained [ ... ] to the wheel of Prince 
Mahogany's chariot" [ibid.]. Here Carlyle reaches a point of no longer 
l:wlieving that such a singer could have ever had any ability with "the 
Melodies Eternal" [ibid.]. Coletti has now fully lost eternity, he exists now 
only in the temporary, fallen world, and is a slave to the extravagances of 











Coletti has been transformed, disfigured, by the transience of 
decoration, he too has become exotic, harmonically foreign to the vitnt 
melodic unity of the origin which should incite the serious nation to its 
destiny. Carlyle' s lex is is extreme: "Wretched spiritual Nigger, 0, if yo n 
had some genius, and were not born a Nigger with mere appetite for 
pumpkin, should you have endured such a lot? I lament for you beyond oil 
olher expenses." [ibid., emphasis added] Coletti, who is no longer 
connected to the divine Infinite, who has become so harmonically distanced 
as to lose all proximity to the origin, the root, is now nothing but property 
- both spiritually and materially. The cause of his fall is precisely his loss 
of the visionary glimpse of Spirit. Without this he is not only spiritual 
slave, but bodily slave. Pumpkin is no substitute for, no authentic 
representation of the pure white ambrosian milks of the speech of angels. 
Carlyle here suggests an ontology where there are two forms of nigger; the 
one material, such as the Black Prince Mahogany, and the other who is 
even further debased by being owned by this material nigger- ie. the 
spiritual nigger. Coletti is capable of Spirit, but in selling his capability 
to the material world, thus becomes even more objectionable to Carlyle than 
the material itself. As Coletti's owners are lavishly exotic, so he is basely 
exotic, with the most base of material desires - the pumpkin of the 
270 
"N' •• [S] Th 1 't · · · t h' Igger . e rea pervers1 y of the s1tuahon for Carlyle 1s tha 1s 
noble white vatic singer has fallen to the point of the "Nigger" of the black 
prince. The white enclave of the speech of pure white angels has been 
scandalized. Coletti is the white nigger, and represents the ultimate threat 
to Carlyle 's image of music as inspiring the serious nation directly from the 
[S] Just as elsewhere, Carlyle 's culinary images determine the "Irish poor-
slave" as having only an appetite for potato. Carlyle 1S obsession with 
Ireland no doubt stems from his upbringing in the Covenanting 
Presbyterian enclave of Dumfriesshire, and often takes almost 
hallucinatory turns: "The wild Milesian features, looking false ingenuity, 
restlessness, unreason, misery and mockery, salute you on all highways 
and byways. The English coachman, as he whirls past, lashes the Milesian 
with his whip, curses him with his tongue; the Milesian is holding out his 
hat to beg." [Chartism, p .271] The image of the Irish as supplementary 
other is clear here, in the lexis of falsity, deception, and so forth. Carlyie 
suspects the representations which the Irishman makes to the coachman 
as dishonest. They are false representations. The whole network of the 
"spiritual Nigger" image is brought out in the argument against Jamaican 
independence: "To have 'emancipated 1 the West Indies into a Black Ireland: 
'free 1 indeed, but an Ireland, and Black! The world may yet see prodigies; 
and reality be stranger than a nightmare dream. Our own white or sallow 
Ireland, sluttishly starving from age to age on its act-of-parliament 
'freedom, 1 was hitherto the flower of mismanagement among the nations: 
but what will this be to a Negro Ireland, with pumpkins themselves fallen 
scarce like potatoes! Imagination cannot fathom such an object; the belly 
of Chaos never held the like." [The Nigger Question, p.467] Carlyle here 
establishes onto-culinary differences between his "Saxon" race and the 
Celtic or Black African (and thereby also ignoring the diversity of all 
three, and imposing a genetic univocity upon them). This ontological 
distinction then paves the way for a dismissal of the supplementary 
independence of these cultures, and a statement that, since they are 
inherently base, they must be captured or eradicated. Such is the action 
of ontological difference when brought to bear in politics. As Ed ward Said 
writes, Carlyle 1S writing on such subjects "is not obscure, or occult, or 
esoteric. What he means about Blacks he says, and is also very frank about 
the threats and punishments he intends to mete out. Carlyle speaks a 
language of total generality, anchored in unshakeable certainties about the 
essence of races, peoples, cultures, all of which need little elucidation 
because they are familiar to his audience. He speaks a lingua franca for 
metropolitan Britain: global, comprehensive, and with so vast a social 
authority as to be accessible to anyone speaking to and about the nation. 
This lingua franca locates England at the focal point of a world also 
presided over by its power, illuminated by its ideas and culture~ kept 
productive by the attitudes of its moral teachers, artists, legislators." 
[Culture & Imperialism, p.123] 
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melodic breath of the gods; the .. eternal Sea of Light .. has been darkened-
we are imprisoned in Plato's Cave. 
Further, and Carlyle finds that even this divine melodic breath has 
been disgraced, and that music itself in this fallen age without heroes has 
become truly a medium of deception and madness, a medium of 11 fiction and 
delirium .. [ibid., p.510]. The gods which are worshipped in this deceitful 
ar-tistic vatican are but shadows of the likes of pure-white and He braically 
Proper David and his divine psalms; .. And Rossini, too, and Mozart and 
Ht!llini -- 0 Heavens! when I think that Music too is condemned to be mad, 
and to burn herself, to this end, on such a funeral pile,- your celestial 
Opera-house grows dark and infernal to me! .. [ibid., p.513, emphasis added] 
According to Carlyle, opera has been infiltrated by a band of "spiritual 
niggers .. , from Rossini and Bellini to Mozart[61. The madness of music is 
a r·esult of its loss of Vision, it has fallen from the height which gained it 
access to that glimpse of the Infinite with which it endowed warriors with 
the breath and rhythm of fire, the power of flamy pneuma, in all its 
blinding whiteness. Music has become dark, negroid, 11 lmproper 11 along with 
those "Females" who are owned by the Dandy, Marquis, Black Prince, or 
Foreign Dignitary. Indeed, music has now been chained to their chariot, lo 
the wheel of their debased temporality, and no longer signals the gateway 
to the eternal temporality of the Infinite. This is music's madness - .. the 
[6] The imaging here of Mozart as a "spiritual nigger .. is significant when 
one connects this to the imaging of Burns discussed later. Both Mozart and 
Hurns are known for their promiscuity, drinking, Freemasonry, and vast 
outputs. Both tend towards the ideals of the French Revolution which 
Ctn·lyle so hated, and towards the idea of egalitarianism. For Carlyle, 
however, while he describes Burns as a potential genius of Spirit brought 
down by the debasing influence of a materialist age (the connection with 
Rousseau and Coletti is also significant here), Mozart appears not to have 
been so worthy of reappropriation for this aesthetics of Spirit. 
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shadow of Eternal Death" [ibid.], the negation of the eternal life of the 
celestial realm. For Carlyle, it is a matter of black-and-white. 
The Haymarket Opera is the centre of the swirling vortex of absolute 
ontological absence. Here is not a site of Vision, for Death's "bottomless 
eye-socket" [ibid.] pulls all down into the depths of the abyss of pure 
negation, "down towards Falsity, Vacuity, and the dwelling-place of 
Everlasting Despair" [ibid.]. This vacuity, the absence of this artistic 
vacuum which endows the theatre with the aspect of an all-devouring, 
vaeant eye-socket, signals the departure of the warrior; "if you ask me, 
Why heroes are not born now, why hero isms are not done now? I will 
answer you: It is a world calculated for strangling of hero isms." [ibid.] The 
image of calculation, of Number and therefore division, harmonicity and 
supplementarity, is significant here, for this introduces Carlyle's critique 
of the Enlightenment philosophy which has resulted in the spiritual 
barbarity of the opera-house. 
Carlyle would replace all of this with the speech of angels and the 
acts of the warrior hero of the serious nation, the nation which hears and 
understands the mandates of the gods' natural law. His desire is to see 
"Populations of stern faces, stern as any Hebrew, but capable withal of 
bursting into inextinguishable laughter on occasion:- do you understand 
that new and better form of character?" [ibid., p.514, emphasis added] Here 
Carlyle betrays a certain pseudo-presbyterianism- the stern Hebrew face, 
the face of the serious nation. In this form, however, it is divine laughter 
which bursts from the warrior's lungs; a war-like laughter, stern and 
spiritual, full of pneuma, and inextinguishable as the fire of celestial 




spiritual voice against materialist strangulation, against the deceitful 
materialism of harmony, for Carlyle would have us "abhorring phantasms;-
abhorring unvera.city in all things; and in your 'amusements,' which are 
voluntary and not compulsory things, abhorring it most impatiently of all. 11 
[il>id.] 
In this way, Carlyle's article on The Opera describes and 
distinguishes two opposing systems; one which establishes the divine right 
of the vatic singer, the vocal prophet and spiritual medium who will guide 
the serious nation to its pre-ordained destiny through the power of 
melody, and another which captures the vatic singer in order to enslave 
and debase him, thus cutting off the access which he formerly had to the 
judgments of the council of the universe, and casting him into the vortex 
of harmonic intervals which leads downwards to the black abyss. The first 
system operates by the revelation of the unity and unison of divine truths, 
and the second by the obfuscation of such truths, and the establishment 
of a fractured realm of "unveracity". 
7_.3 n ... only a flat, continuous thrashing-floor for Logic ... " 
in the French System of Thought (called also the Scotch, and 
slill familiar enough every where, which for want of a better 
title we have named the Mechanical), there is no room for a 
Divinity [ Diderot, Essays Vol. I!, pp.459/60] 
For Carlyle, the era of Enlightenment was an irreligious catastrophe, 
in both Scotland and France. Indeed, his charge against the Scots 
Enlightenment is that 11 our culture was almost exclusively French" [Burns, 
E.c.·says Vol. I p.258]. Our "stern Motherland" was at the mercy of the 
"Mechanical Age", an age when the machine had become a theoretical 
weapon against the vital soul and soil of the nation. Scotland was under 
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the insidious influence of French sceptics. The positing of this influence 
has a distinctly paranoic overtone, and its strange patriotism becomc~s 
stranger still when this argument against becoming "a French Colony" 
[Burns, p.259] lies side-by-side with the celebration of "our whole English 
Existence" [Heroes, p.261], by "we English" [ibid., p.353] with "our English 
blood" [ p.198]. He solves the Franco-Celtic infection of Scottish soul and 
soil by an appeal t.o the Anglo-Nordic axis, replacing what he sees as Celtic 
materialism with the organic image of "the living tree Igdrasil", the mythic 
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world-tree of the Nordic religionsl71 [Heroes, p.312]. 
Carlyle's fear is expressed in terms of a repugnance towards the 
machine, for with organized industry comes the call for the laissez-fairc 
which marks "the time of Adam Smith" [Chartism, Essays Vol.III p.287]. The 
Smithian call for the circulating economy, for industrial equity and 
l7l It is important t.o note, however, that the investment in the organic 
spirituality of the tree is not limited to Germanic cultures, and is just as 
prevalent in Celtic metaphysics, as in the determination of the ash tree as 
the container of souls. Tracing the etymology of the Gaidhlig word for tree, 
craobh, one soon discovers other metaphysical investments, such as that 
in craobh-dhruididh signifying "nobleman", connecting with the verb 
druidh, "ooze", "penetrate", from which comes the noun meaning 
"philosopher", giving the English "druid". Equally, in contradistinction to 
Carlyle' s implied imaging of Celtic culture as materialist, many examples of 
Celtic phonocentrism do indeed exist, as his own image of the vates 
suggests. In Adamnain's Vita Columbae ( c.690), St. Calumba's voice is 
described as having a penetrative power over great distances, thus 
reducing the disseminatory effect of spacing over phonic production: "The 
venerable man, when singing in the church with the brethren, raised his 
voice so wonderfully that it was sometimes heard four furlongs off, that is 
five hundred paces, and sometimes eight furlongs, that is one thousand 
paces. But what is stranger still: to those who were with him in the church, 
his voice did not seem louder than that of others; and yet at the same time 
persons more than a mile away heard it so distinctly that they could mark 
each syllable of the verses he was singing, for his voice sounded the same 
whether far or near." [Life of St. Calumba, p.61] Purser suggests a 
materialist explanation that this was possible through the agency of 
Eastern overtone techniques, and also connects Ethiopian Coptic chant 
with the Gaidhlig Salm [Scotland's Music, pp.33-6 ]. Certainly the Islamic 
influence on Celtic Christianity can be observed in that other product of 
Iona Abbey, the Book of Kells, and more generally, van der Merwe remarks 
that "so much that is Oriental in character lingered on in the folk music of 
Scotland and Ireland." [Origins of the Popular Style, p.13] A further 
phonocentric motif, tracing the dual signification of logos as "light" and 
"word", can be read in the late C8th Miracula Nynie Episcopi, where St. 
Ninian, "gave the blind bright light in the place of darkness, he cleansed 
the swelling leprosy from the scaly body and cured lameness in many men 
and broke through deaf ears with the prick of his voice" [The Miracles of 
Bishop Nynia, in MacQueen, St. Nynia, p.95] Yet, the same hagiographer 
parodies the idea of the divine inspiration of songs into the devoutly 
receptive body; "And then the holy man was deemed worthy to eat of the 
sacred sacrament, and after he had eaten, he belched forth sacred hymns 
of praise from his throat." [ibid.,p.lOO] Significantly, the humour of this 
passage is located in the inverted transubstantiation of a spiritual process 
into a material one. 
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democracy which characterizes the Whig movement for Carlyle is nothing 
more than the threat of a Gallic perversion; "why do we ask of Chartism, 
Glasgow Trades-unions, and such like? Has not broad Europe heard the 
question put, and answered, on the great scale; has not a FRENCH REVOLUTION 
been?" [Chartism, p.281]. Rousseau, as symbol of the Revolution, is 
inherently bound up in the machinations of laissez-faire in Carlyle's mind, 
although his objection to the Enlightenment is expressed in similarly 
organic, anti-machinic terms. This is the paradox for Carlyle; Rousseau, the 
prophet of the self-proximate and the logocentric, was nevertheless 
complicitous in the French Revolution, and thus the whole democratic 
narrative of the machine age. As Derrida demonstrates in Of Grammatology, 
Rousseau's spirituality corrupts itself, places distances at its own origin, 
and (to transpose Derrida's reading into our current terms) ultimately 
assembles a machine within the organism it attempts to create and 
naturalize. The machine then lacerates the organic body from within. Just 
as the interval was the indecidable for Rousseau, in Carlyle, it is the image 
of the machine. 
Cc1rlyle also fears the ongoing assault on Spirit by an age he 
characterizes as one of "inorganic chaos" [Heroes, p.312]. The age of Adorn 
Smith and the Whig machine which brings liberty, which Carlyle calls the 
democratic "Representative Machine" [ Sartor Resartus, p.153], is in fact 
the age of oppression by the very machines of liberation. Rousseau equally 
fears machinic representation on the grounds of the yawning interval, the 
abyss between origin and representation, but Carlyle's political objection 
is not so much to the means of representation as to the more precipitous 





which the French Revolution left for Europe, and now threatens Britain 
through the "millocratic" proletariats of Paisley, New Lanark, and 
Lancashire: "Shall we tremble before clothwebs and cobwebs, whether 
woven in Arkwright looms or by the silent Arachnes that weave 
unrestingly in our Imagination?" [ Sartor, p.40] The fear, then, is not only 
of the actual machine, but also of Arachne's weaving-machine of the 
imagination. This is the industrialization of thought itself, and therefore 
of all culture in general. 
Carlyle's image of the web also weaves itself into the narrative of the 
Tarantella. As Alexander Malcolm's use of this narrative demonstrated, the 
poison of the tarantula is enticed out of the body by the machinic, non-
penetrative influences of instrumental music. Malcolm establishes a 
distinction between this stimulational model of music and a penetrative 
model, associated with John Locke's formulation of the Theory of Ideas and 
Pythagoras' phonic medicine. The stimulational model can be discerned to 
be operative within Malcolm's theory, which can be characterized as a 
machinic approach, and here Carlyle associates such machinism with the 
technological productions of Arkwright, and the imaginary weaving loom 
of Arachne, who challenged Athene, goddess of wisdom, to a weaving 
contest. This challenge is the challenge of the machine against divine 
knowledge, and it is in this context that Carlyle operates the narrative. 
We have, then, harmonic theory's technological Arachne challenging 
the eternal wisdoms of Carlyle's divine Athene. It is a confrontation of 
mechanical materialism and onto-theological transcendentalism, and just. os 
Athene destroyed Arachne's clothweb in order to hang her upon it for her 
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insolence, there by creating the first spiderl81, so too Carlyle would hope 
tu hang the harmonic machine and the associated call for representational 
parliament on the products of their own mechanisms, their historicnl 
failures as evidenced in the Terror following the French Revolution. In this 
way, Carlyle will turn the machinic system of non-penetration into a 
penetrative organism, a spider, which will inject its venom into further 
organisms. As Derrida attempts to show the machine within the organism, 
so Carlyle's critique of the machinic "time of Adam Smith" is an attempt to 
show that the machine cannot exist unless it has actually been an organism 
fr·om the origin. This is the meaning of Arachne for Carlyle- he decides the 
fate of his indecidables himself. 
Carlyle' s message is also that the mere material temporality of the 
technological "Loom of Time" [Sartor Resartus, p.125] will be replaced by 
an aristocracy of Spirit which will have access, through the vatic singer, 
to the celestial temporality, or eternity. In his le xis this base temporality 
threatens to destroy pure, undivided spirit. Material time is a temporality 
which is rhythmic, machinic, divided and dividing. Technological thought 
destroys religion; "That progress of Science, which is to destroy Wonder, 
and in its stead substitute Mensuration and Numeration [ ... ] and man's 
mind become an Arithmetical Mill" [Sartor, p.40, emphasis added]. The mind 
becomes the site of machinic accumulation by an intervallic process of 
addition. Equally, the image of time given here is one of harmonicity, a 
conception based on numeric mensuration which inevitably yields a spatial 
temporality. This proportional entelechy which marked the writings of 
[S] Thus giving the name arachnida to the biological order of spiders, 
scorpions, etc. 
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Hameau, Malcolm, and Mason, where space collapses sideways into 
horizontal time, segmenting it and reorganizing it according to a spatial 
low in the process, is the "substitution" of religious wonder, adoration, by 
the action of Number, and its entelechy through harmonic Mensuration. 
Spatial time is the encroachment of the abyss, the possibility of 
annihilation and absence, and must therefore be defeated. Carlyle thus 
calls for a form of meditation which derives from "not mathematics, but that 
Mathesis, of which it has been said many a Great Calculist has not even a 
notion." [Navalis, p.465] In this, Carlyle asserts a form of knowledge which 
is pure, direct, umbilical, to its object. 
In Sartor Resartus, Carlyle writes that life is an "internecine 
warfare with the Time-spirit", and that "other warfare seems questionable" 
[p.119]. It is not that Carlyle's ontology proposes that space must defeat 
time, as one would expect if such a statement were made with reference to 
a Rameauist scheme, for this temporality which must be defeated is itself 
spatial. Equally, space as such is a base appearance here; "deepest of a.ll 
illusory Appearances, for hiding Wonder, as for many other ends, are your 
two grand fundamental world-enveloping Appearances, SPACE and TIHE." 
[ Sartor, p.159]. As science and machinism destroy religious wonder, so too 
do the veils of space and spatialized time. 
Here, the two ontological axes themselves are defined as harmonics 
of the true original root of reality, they are determined as illusory 
clothing, obfuscating the internal self of all things. Space and time are 
"spun and woven .. [ibid.] by a base, material process, just as the machines 
of harmonic theory and Arachne are assembled to obfuscate wonder and 
wisdom, to representationally deceive the senses and the imagination. 
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Material, harmonic space and time "clothe our celestial ME" [ibid.], arc 
illusory veils drawn over the body of our true divinity which is neither 
spatial or temporal. Carlyle' s move here constitutes his transcendentalism, 
a post-Kantian appeal to Spirit, a backlash against the "flat, continuous 
thrashing-floor for Logic" [Burns, p.259] which Kames, Hume, Ro bertson, 
Srnith et al, had assembled in the philosophy of "our own stern Motherland" 
a generation before [ibid., p.258] [91. No longer would stern logic be 
allowed to thrash reality, to privilege the harmonic over the fundamental, 
ancl proclaim with Adam Ferguson that "all situations are equally natural" 
[Essay on the History of Civil Society, p.8]. The danger of the Scottish 
Enlightenment was a move towards relativism, towards metaphysical doubt 
concerning causality and religion themselves, towards a mechanics of the 
mind, and a denial of all that is extra-material. This was expressed in music 
aesthetics such as those of Malcolm as a preference for the instrument 
rather than the voice, harmony than melody, sonic acoustics than phonic 
hermeneutics. 
Carlyle will reassert the "speech of angels" as the true origin in his 
ontology. He will attempt to reduce the intervallic spaces of instrumental 
difference and bind all together in a spiritual vocal unison. This unified 
song will become the source of the universe in a grand revitalization of 
metaphysics to purge philosophy of scepticism: "In the Pyrrhonism of 
Hume and the Materialism of Diderot, Logic had, as it were, overshot itse)f, 
[91 And is not the irony here that Kant himself was post-Humean? As he 
writes himself in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will br~ 
Ahle to Present itself as a Science (1783), "Since LOCKE'S and LEIBNIZ'S 
Essays, or rather since the beginning of metaphysics as far as the history 
of it reaches, no event has occurred which could have been more decisive 
in respect of the fate of this science than the attack which DAVID HUME 
hus made upon it." [Prolegomena, p.5] 
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overset itself." [lO] [Characteristics, in Essays Vol.II p.225] The 
materialist logicians had gone beyond the capacity, the boundary of 
thought, they had severed it from its true locus, introduced an interval 
between their work and its true origin. Logic had fractured itself, and 
thr·eatened to fracture the world with it. However, "in that wide-spreading, 
deep-whirling vortex of Kantism [ ... ] is not this issue visible enough, That 
Py r-rhonism and Materialism, themselves necessary phenomena in European 
culture, have disappeared[ ... ] and the word Free-thinker no longer means 
the Denier or Caviller, but the Believer" [ibid.]. In the post-Kantian world, 
freedom is no longer a function of harmonic connectivity, of distant 
representation, but of binding oneself to the melodic origin at the root of 
the world. Freedom is only achieved through listening to the mandate of 
Spirit through the maternal voice of nature. Freedom is no longer a matter 
of separation, but of binding, of proximity to the root. 
Even the attempts at a presbyterian philosophy of the sensus 
communis such as Thomas Reid assembled could not reinstate Spirit in the 
[lO] Carlyle, no doubt, calls Hume a Pyrrhonist precisely because of Hume's 
care in describing the limitations of scepticism in the Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding. As Hume writes, "The great subverter of 
Pyrr11onism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and 
employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may 
flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not 
impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the 
presence of real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are 
put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they 
vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same 
condition as other mortals. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within 
his proper sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise 
fr·om more profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of 
triumph" [Enquiry, pp.158/9] It is not a matter, for Hume, of having a 
single principle or goal in life, as it is for Carlyle, who would reduce 
evP.rything to a single essence. Rather, Hume's scepticism functions within 
certain limits, and has no absolute jurisdiction over all aspects of life - it 
is no ultimate meta-discourse. In this, Hume's pragmatism is contrasted 
with Carlyle's dogmatism (as well as the latter's will to slander). 
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form which Carlyle calls for. Reid's philosophy was necessarily trapped in 
Humean le xis by its very attempt to answer Hume's religious and generally 
metaphysical scepticism; "The school of Reid had also from the first taken 
a mechanical course, not seeing any other. The singular conclusions at 
which Hurne, setting out from their admitted premises, was arriving, 
brought this school into being" [Signs of the Times, in Essays, Vol. I, 
p.478]. The mistake of the Reidian formulation of sensus communis was its 
continuation of a Humean concern with the intervallic chains of the 
imaginary machine; "they let loose Instinct, as an undiscriminating ban-
dog, to guard them against these conclusions;- they tugged lustily at the 
logical chain by which Hume was so coldly towing them and the world into 
bottomless abysses of Atheism and Fatalism." [ibid., emphases added] The 
Heidian move towards instinct could not help but become enslaved by the 
chain of harmonic connectivity which Hume and Smith had established; 
theory's harmonic chain had its end in the dark abyss which turns divine 
song into a material intervallic component within the transient machine. 
What was needed was a disinvestment in the whole economy of the 
Enlightenment. Carlyle dismisses it out of hand when he states that Reid's 
answer to Hume makes the harmonic chain redundant, and that "the chain 
somehow snapped between them" [ibid.]. The new approach required, in 
Carlyle's mind, an appeal to Germanisms as a counter-weight to what he 
considered ''Gallic lownesses" [Richter and de Stael, in Essays, Vol.I, 
p.634 ]. The language of Scottish philosophy, "some broken Lingua-tranca, 
or English-French" [ Sartor, p.169] should shun the Gallic inflection for the 
piercing edge of analytical Saxon dialect. Carlyle writes "To the eye of 









To the eye of Pure Reason what is he? A Soul, a Spirit, and divine 
Apparition." [ Sartor, p.39] This is Carlyle's answer to the Enlightenment -
it is no longer a question of space's entelechy into time, but a question of 
Spirit's entelechy into a spatia-temporal web of illusion and false 
prophecy. In this return to Plato's Cave, however, Carlyle substitutes the 
effete philosopher-ruler with the virility of the warrior-priest. 
7 .'t The Spatia-temporal We~ 
Carlyle's theory of actual time is that it is a debased .. Mensuration .. , 
debased, that is, by a spatiality which is itself debased and debasing, in 
its action of .. Numeration... This is associated with the theories of the 
Enlightenment "Logic-choppers .. [Sartor, p.41], where logic is defined in 
terms of an intervallic divisibility, and a distortion of reality by the 
violence of this division. Mensuration divides the phonic origin from it.s 
offsprings, separates original Song from the matter of the universe and 
opens the door to the discordant abyss of the black prince. 
The implicit rejection of Number here, as the mechanism of division, 
is significant for a reading of Carlyle's transcendental origin, the 
"celestial essence .. [Sartor, p.127]. In Sartor Resartus, Carlyle suggests 
that this debased temporality can be overcome by the logos: .. in this so-
solid-seeming World, which nevertheless is in continual restless flux, it is 
appointed that Sound, to appearance the most fleeting, should be the most 
continuing of all things. The WoRD is well said to be omnipotent in this 
world .. [ Sartor, p.121]. Here, the sound which achieves the victory of the 
internecine warfare against mensurated time is the sound of logos which 
fnlls from the celestial essence and appears in the world by a temporal 
paradox as a gateway to the eternal. 
In this, Carlyle demonstrates an extreme Rousseauism, and the Gallic 
reference is further compounded when Carlyle writes, like Rousseau, of the 
parental voice; 
ab! like the mother's voice to her little child that strays 
bewildered, weeping, in unknown tumults; like soft 
slr·eamings of celestial music to my too-exasperated heart, 
came that Evangel. The Universe is not dead and demoniacnl, 
a charnel-house with spectres; but godlike, and my Father's! 
[ Sartor, p.115] 
Nature's voice, then, is also the Maternal voice which fills the fallen, 
divided, transient and mensurated space of the universe, and this space 
is ultimately that of the Father, not the machine. It is fallen, because it is 
a space of division, and therefore presupposes and ensures a divided 
temporality. The celestial Maternal voice, however, can kill time by 
occupying its base spatiality and extending itself throughout all eternity, 
thereby reducing space and time to one eternal moment of absolute self-
proximity[lll. The temporality which is material, debased, and 
arithmetically divided "devours all his Children" [Sartor, p.79], threatens 
us with the violence of a mensural abyss, we are "swallowed-up of Time" 
[Sartor, p.111]. This is the chaos, the catastrophe of the material universe, 
and the threat of the machinic illusion; time is the negative masculine, the 
feminized masculine, the abyss which practises violence and annihilation. 
[ll} Just as John Leyden had written of the musical "peasant .. in the 1801 
Preliminary Dissertation on the historic Complaynt of Scotland (1548): 11 He 
has not learned his favourite airs from a music-master, or in a scientific 
manner; but he has acquired them in his infancy, in the bosom of his 
fnmily; and, in their tones, he hears the voice of his mother, of his sister, 
of his youthful love. There is no fibre of his heart which does not vibrate 
to some of his well-known strains:- you cannot improve them to him". 
[p.275] The complicity in the image of the maternal voice of "peasant" 
culture, with its ontological negative as "barbaric" anti-culture is 
prevalent throughout much ethnographic writing. 
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Equally, de based spatiality is imaged as the 11 cruel Step dame 11 
[ Sartor, p.115], the negative feminine, the masculinized feminine, whjch 
ac:ls as the locus of the temporal stepfather's swallowing of all material 
presence. 
The celestial Mother, however, the Mother who is the true origin, and 
not some debased, supplementary, step mother, can find the lost child and 
pr·ovide him with the ambrosian milks of presence. Equally, the tempest of 
temporal catastrophe which flows "like a mad witch's hair" [Sartor, p.115], 
the mensural hair of the evil stepmother, is cast down into its own abyss 
by the purity of the originary Mother's voice. She makes way for "the 
clear sunbeam" [ibid.] of the paternal space. The original Mother can in 
this sense devour the act of devouring, efface effacement, and restore 
original familial hierarchies. 
Carlyle associates the heterophonic, the plural, with the catastrophe: 
the mother's voice restores univocity to the 11 din of many-voiced Life" 
[ Sartor, p.115]. The image of dissonance and catastrophe is extended 
further in Carlyle's description of the plunge "into the jaws of the Devil!" 
[ Sartor, p.90]. The agency of the evil stepfather can be transmitted not 
only through that of the stepmother, but also through the evil 
enchantress, the "Duenna Cousin 11 [p.89] who grounds the "hapless air-
navigator" [p.90], he who explores the region of pneuma, the seeker of the 
Maternal melody. This deceitful machinic woman draws the original Man into 
the a by ss, the final jarring dissonance which consumes and divides, 
lacerates, the body. Here, "thick curtains of Night rushed over his soul, 
as rose the immeasurable Crash of Doom; and through the ruins as of a 
shivered Universe was he falling, falling, towards the abyss." [ Sartor, 
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p.90] In this absence which is announced by a dissonant Crash, in the 
triumph of rnachinic space and time, the event of a French Revolution 
perhaps, one hears a "noise as of the Crack of Doom" (French Revolution, 
p.150]. Doom, ontological absence, is presaged by the sound of division, 
dissonance; the self-proximate melodic origin is "cracked 11 1 just as the 
world is ruptured by the gateway to the abyss. 
Following this crash and crack of doom, there is "the laughter of 
demons" [p.92], until, at the heart of this "dark bottomless Abyss 11 [p.65], 
we stand before the "inexorable word, NEVER!" [p.65]. This is the ontological 
negative of logos- the eternal absence which devours all, the dissonant 
word which breaks all melody and divides all unity; the final "crack". 
In this mythic ontology, only the celestial voice of the melodic 
Mother can avert the collapse into catastrophe and absence by a vocalized 
assertion of the pure presence of Spirit, a ritual action of singing which 
re-enacts the structure of the original song: a sacred invocation of the 
binding power of the origin. This is the means of movement from one 
ontological layer to another for the questing individual. When this ritual 
song is performed, then the little lost Carlyle becomes aware that the 
universe is in fact ultimately the Father's space; the melodic organism 
defeats, by internecine warfare, the harmonic machine. 
Original Paternal space is restored by the Maternal voice, a Maternal 
temporality which acts as a 11 Hell-gate Bridge over Chaos" [Sartor, p.124]. 
The presence of melody fills the absence of the abyss, bridges its rupture 
and ensures material integrity; "there has a Hole fallen-out in the 
immeasurable, universal World-tissue, which must be darned-up again!" 
[ Sartor, p.150] However, this darning is not the work of an Arachnidian 
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Malcolm. Here, the fissure in the tissue of the world organism is healed up, 
not fabricated. This action of darning is exactly the opposite of that which 
sets up the illusion of the world machine. The machinations which result 
in the abyss are overcome by the reduction of the interval, the healing-up 
of the gap which fissures the integrity of tissue and threatens to rip it 
apart with the action of a spatialized temporality. This medical image is that 
which reasserts the proximity of the origin and seals up the space of the 
machine and the interval of the harmonic chain. 
7.5 The Centre of Indifference 
Paternalized material space represents the overcoming of distance, 
the overcoming of the proportional difference which allows the chain of 
harmonics to act. It is the first step in the winning of the internecine 
warfare against intervallic time; "the CENTRE oF INDIFFERENCE I had now 
reached; through which whoso travels from the Negative Pole to the 
Positive must necessarily pass." [ Sartor, p.112] In-difference, non-
difference, is the precondition of proximity, of sameness, likeness, 
authenticity and originality. This is the possibility of Paternal law, 
achieved through the administrations of the Maternal voice. The 
mediumship of melody has achieved this middle state of indifference 
between the two poles of the material world. On the one hand, below, there 
is the tendency towards machinic ruin. On the other, above, there is the 
tendency towards organic integrity. Here, in the middle, lies the centre of 
indifference, a materiality which has been purged of the negativity of the 
machine and can now look up, towards the organism. It is in this realm that 




en l.elechy of Spirit into the matter of a stabilized space-time. 
Carlyle provides an anthropomorphic image; if "the Universe is 
rrrc1jestically unveiling, and everywhere Heaven revealing itself on Earth, 
nowhere to the Young Man does this Heaven on Earth so immediately revcnl 
itself as in the Young Maiden." [ Sartor, p.82, emphasis added] The image 
is of the Spiritual and the Temporal, with the "female" acting as the 
medium of entelechy for the "male", just as the Maternal voice can act as 
a barrier to the machinic step-mother's voice and thereby protect the low 
of lhe Father from the machinic law of the step-father. 
The precise means of this mediumship is "a certain orthodox 
Anthropomorphism [which] connects my Me with all Thees in bonds of 
Love" [Sartor, p.82). Here Carlyle describes the mapping of the universal 
law of one term onto the body of another. However, the opposition is one 
of internality and externality; the anthropomorphism involved is the 
projection by the "male" onto the "female" of the "male .. attribute which 
she lacks, namely, humanity. "She" is the animalistic object of an 
anthropomorphic projection. 
The "orthodoxy" of the anthropomorphism which unites these two 
terms is the article of faith which allows this union of self and Other. 
Equally, there is within this movement from one ontological layer to 
another a certain connective insemination of Spirit into 
animalisticjmachinic matter- one term captures the body of the other and 
bends it to its law, and for its use. This is all expressed in terms of a 
Py l hagorean opposition of the "like" and the "unlike", the same and the 
different; "it is in this approximation of the Like and Unlike, that such 
hei.lvenly attraction, as between Negative and Positive, first burns-out into 
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cl flame[ ... ] thus, in the conducting-medium of Fantasy, flames-forth that 
fire-development [sic] of the universal Spiritual Electricity" [ Sartor, p.82, 
ernphasis added]. The orthodox anthropomorphism, then, by which the 
entelechal insemination takes place, is also the conducting medium or 
funtasy. 
Imagination is not far away from Carlyle's Spirit, since it is the 
action of fantasy which endows the logos, or pneuma, with its ability to 
"flame-forth" across the space between Spirit and matter, thus reducing 
that space to a proximate connection. However, unlike the imagination 
operated within Smith's theory, this is no attempt to harmonize an 
imaginary machine with the motions of a natural machine. Carlyle's 
conception of fantasy functions in a similar intermediary capacity to the 
Maternal melody which acts as a "hell-gate bridge over chaos''. This 
similarity of melody and fantasy is compounded by Carlyle's statement that 
"Fantasy I might call the true Heaven-gate and Hell-gate of man" [Sartor, 
p.88]. Fantasy is, then, the bridging act which can open or close the gates 
of the temporal abyss or the eternal space; just as the threat of machinic 
absence and annihilation can be averted by the filling of the gap in the 
world-tissue by the Maternal voice, so the insemination of matter can be 
realized by the opening of the cloth-webs of space and time by the 
attractive force of fantasy. This, however, can only be achieved if fantasy 
is understood as incorporating a certain upward penetration of the 
illusory cloth-webs of the Smithian machinic world, which allows the 
downward fall of universal, fiery logos, and the reduction of independent 
nomoi to its centralising laws. 
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cHAPTER EIGHT 
THE PENETRATING ORGANISM 
Eius flatu facula sopita pro inuidia 
Succenditur in Scocia sine ignis materia. 
- Office of St. Kentigern, 
Sprouston Breviary, c.1280. 
", ··. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE PENETRATING ORGANISM 
8.1 " ... penetrate into the eternal Substance ... ·~ 
Towards this heaven the thought of the writer soars 
continually with fervour, sometimes even with a kind of 
despair. It is a reflection of this heaven, the image of the sun 
in the dew-drops, which he seeks in terrestrial objects. He 
penetrates the symbol to arrive at the idea ... [On the Genius 
and Tendency of the Writings of Thomas Carlyle, in Mazzini, 
Essays, pp.115/6] 
In 1843, the same year as Joseph Mazzini published these symbols in 
the British and Foreign Review, we find that penetration is indeed a 
particular concern of Carlyle's in Past and Present. In chapter two, "The 
Sphinx", there is once more the opposition of Spirit and matter, and the 
nar-rative of the necessary penetration of the one into the other; "he who 
dwells in the temporary Semblances, and does not penetrate into the 
eternal Substance, will not answer the Sphinx-riddle of Today, or of any 
Day." [Past and Present, p.80] The temporary is plural, divided, and 
therefore distanced, the eternal is single, univocal, and therefore self-
proximate. Penetration thus entails the giving-up of the plural, and the 
adoption of a certain directionality of mind. If one object is the true, then 
much in the illusory spatia-temporal world must be discarded. Additionally, 
the illusory nature of the world is inherently bound up with the 
temporary, temporal aspect of semblance, or representation. It is the 
unfixed character of phenomena which give reason to distrust them, and 
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this distrust leads to the fantasy of stasis which paradoxically brings one 
closer to the truth. The symbolic is penetrated to arrive at the idea and 
the Ideal. 
The image of illusion gains a further image of penetration here, 
where the illusory image is extended in specifically visual-penetrative 
terms; the "clear-beaming eyesight" of the virtuous man is "steadfast, 
severe, all-penetrating, - it is like the Fiat lux in that inorganic waste 
whirlpool; penetrates gradually to all nooks, and of the chaos makes a 
kosmos or ordered world!" [Past and Present, p.141] Here, the fire of the 
eye can burn mere surface away, it penetrates to the essence of things, 
brings light to the darkness of disorder, and shows the true nature of the 
world as cosmos. 
This action of penetration is followed by a filtration process. The eye 
discards, burns away, what is inessential, leaving only the essential core. 
Carlyle names this action of filtration as a sifting; "Would to Heaven that 
we had a sieve" [Past and Present, p.93]. The sieve is required to 
distinguish the core terms from the inorganic waste. In political terms, it 
will distinguish his "aristocracy of talent" from common talent "like wheat 
out of chaff" [ibid.]. It is the "infallible sifting-process; to which, however, 
no soul can help his neighbour, but each must, with devout prayer to 
Heaven, endeavour to help himself" [p.94]. That which will be retained as 
a core term by the sifting process is that which is internally essential, and 
this is a quality that cannot be endowed, but must be reached from within. 
The criteria for the sifting are transcendental, and in this context, 
Carlyle's statement that "Kant is a sort of Political Reformer' [Historic 
Survey of German Poetry, in Essays, Vol.II p.176, emphasis added] is a 
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notable preface to the neo-organicist backlash of 1933. It is a high order 
of ontology which categorizes according to such rules, and its law is 
"infallible". 
Alongside this visual and moral model of penetration, Carlyle 
develops an aural model. Here, we find the same processes in operation os 
within the visual model, unmodified with the exception that now, with the 
full action of logos and pneuma in operation, the penetration lodges ousill 
within the body of the self. The visual model is an analytical model, one 
which we can use in order to penetrate the surface of illusion and gain 
knowledge about the true melodic order of things. With the aural model, 
however, an entelechy takes place in the form of a descent or fall of ousia 
fr-om the universal origin. "A God's-message never came to thicker-skinned 
people; never had a God's-message to pierce through thicker integuments, 
into heavier ears. It is Fact, speaking once more, in miraculous thunder-
voice, from out of the centre of the world" [Past and Present, p.93, 
emphasis added]. Here again, we have Demosthenes' Thunder, "hurled" 
from one ontological realm into another, hurling pure Spirit into the 
material world, the potential void. 
This is the 11 orthodox Anthropomorphism" by which the animalistic 
"female" machine "unveils" itself for the "male" seer and his analytical, 
penetrating gaze. With the complicity of the visuality of analysis, the whole 
process becomes an ontological strip-tease, a removal of the illusory webs 
of Arachne's clothing of space and time in order to uncover, or visually 
penetrate through, see, to the maternal melodic essence at the core of all 
things. 
The materialism of the Enlightenment philosophers, the machinists, 
is characterized here by a thick surface skin, a near-impenetrability which 
only the logos, the message of God, can forcefully rupture in order to 
reach the heart of the subject and destroy its harmonicity by bringing it 
into direct contact, unified "touching" in Pythagorean lexis, with the 
origin at the true, transcendental centre of the world, which is melody. 
Here, harmonicity and the principle of the vibratory chain are swept aside, 
concertinaed into a single entity, collapsed in on themselves and captured 
by the compression of the unitary source, pure, undivided Spirit. 
8.2 Melodic Essence 
Carlyle' s theory of Spirit is distinguished from the "ghost in the 
machine" theories which ran parallel to the more radical materialisms of the 
Enlightenment, and were announced in the Cartesian moment. He writes: 
"Alas, poor Cogitator, this takes us but a little way" [ Sartor, p.30]. Unlike 
Descartes' "rational soul", Carlyle's Spirit cannot be thought of as having 
a pseudo-mechanical relationship to the body; while it can penetrate th8 
body, it does so only in order to capture it. For itself, it is not captured 
within the body as a mere component of that body - it does not have the 
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possibility of a precise locus in the illusory web of space and time[l). It 
exists only in a transcendental space, and can either be fantasized by the 
self or can melodically invade the self in order to bring the self closer to 
it. Spirit thus has its origin, and to an extent its present nature in a 
transcendental realm in line with the celestial concepts per se of the 
Hellenic system. 
Religion, then, is not defined paganistically as knowledge of the 
mechanical relationship of space to time, but transcendentally as 
knowledge of the spiritual relationship of self to the "Unseen World or No-
World 11 [Heroes, p .186 L the world of the melodic voice. Carlyle 1S invisible 
realm, however, is to be understood as a true reality - extant, and yet 
beyond the fringes of the immediate, illusory world. Rather than 
theoretically harmonizing perceptual chaos (as in Smith) Carlyle attempts 
[t) Descartes writes, in the Discourse on the Method, that "I described the 
rational soul, and showed that, unlike the other things of which I had 
spoken, it cannot be derived in any way from the potentiality of matter, 
but must be specially created. And I showed how it is not sufficient for it 
to be lodged in the human body like a helmsman in his ship, except perhaps 
to move its limbs, but that it must be more closely joined and united with 
the body" [Discourse, p.46]. In this sense, the soul is a separate entity 
from the general transcendental Spirit, and can lodge itself within the 
body, connecting in to all the components of the body in a radically 
mechanical way. Such a chain of components can be discerned in the 
following passage; "movement is then transmitted to the other ends of the 
nerves which are all grouped together in the brain around the seat of the 
soul [ ... ] The result of these movements being set up in the brain by the 
nerves is that the soul or mind that is closely joined to the brain is 
affected in various ways, corresponding to the various different sorts of 
movements" [Principles of Philosophy, p.201] Here, the soul has a specific 
locus in the body, it has a seat in the brain, in a specific place within 
matter, and is connected to the bodily machine by the brain component. 
This is what Descartes refers to when he writes above of the insufficiency 
of simply describing the soul as a ship 1S helmsman. Equally, the body is 
capable of acting without the soul; "all the limbs can be moved by the 
objects of the senses and by the spirits without the help of the soul .. [The 
Passions of the Soul, p .224]. In the same way that Descartes' soul does not 
penetrate every pore of the body, it is equally not omnipotent with respect 
to it. 
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to defeat it. In order to achieve knowledge of the transcendental realm of 
the ontological unison, the harmonic clothing of the seen world must be 
penetrated; "Pierce through the Time-element, glance into the Eternal." 
[ Sartor, p.160] In this expression of the methodological primacy of the lex is 
of visibility, Carlyle asserts vision as capable of breaking the surface of 
the temporal world, rupturing the cloth-webs of materialism, and 
announcing an action of analysis. 
This penetration constitutes the success of the "internecine 
wurfare" to be conducted against the temporal in order to attain the 
spiritual. This is what the previous "haggard epoch, with its ghastly 
Doctrines, and death's-head Philosophies" [Past and Present, p.258] could 
not achieve. Carlyle' s project is to re-vitalize ontology, with all the 
attendant concepts which the Vital entails, and yet all circulating around 
a musical image; 
Musical: how much lies in that! A musical thought is one 
spoken by a mind that has penetrated into the inmost heart 
of the thing; detected the inmost mystery of it, namely the 
melody that lies hidden in it; the inward harmony of 
coherence which is its soul, where by it exists, and has a right 
to be, here in this world. [Heroes, p.247] 
To penetrate into the inmost heart of a thing, then, by an action of 
the mind, is to penetrate to a central musical essence within the body of 
that thing. This mental penetration, or analysis, gains its musicality in 
relation to the object of its penetration. It must have a certain proportional 
correspondence with its object in order that it can reach and fully 
comprehend its goal when it reaches it. In this sense, thought is endowr~d 
with musicality as its telos, its metaphysical goal, which it knows before 
the commencement of its project, but has not yet attained in reality. 
The proportion which musical thought requires in order to attain its 
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le/os is not a logical proportion; there is no room here for a "thrashing-
floor of Logic" which could never dig beneath the immediate surface; "The 
meaning of Song goes deep. Who is there that, in logical words, can express 
the effect music has on us?" [Heroes, p. 247] The "logical chain" of 
Enlightenment thought cannot penetrate to the core which is music - this 
core operates by a musical language, and in this, the full meaning or 
Carlyle's determination of theory and music becomes apparent. 
This theoretical realm of the logos and of the telos is the realm of 
Song; the musical thought which can seal the abyss of the machine, and 
also penetrate the cobwebs of material surface, is the thought which is an 
"inarticulate unfathomable speech, which leads us to the edge of the 
Infinite, and lets us for moments gaze into that!" [Heroes, p.247] As this 
speech is Song itself, so Song is also the teleological essence; 11 All deep 
things are Song. It seems somehow the very central essence of us, Song" 
[ibid.]. Song is both telos and ousia. 
Carlyle's "inarticulate" Song is distinguished, however, from the 
inarticulacy of Malcolm's original instrumental music, which was an 
expression of a radically sonic specificity signalling the shift from 
imitative aesthetics to affective capacities. 
Carlyle's inarticulate music, on the other hand, is a component of a 
radically phonocentric move - this music is Song, it is a form of speech, 
and we even find the Rousseauist theme of "accent" as an organ of the 
Song organism; 11 all speech, even the commonest speech, has something of 
song in it: not a parish in the world but has its parish-accent;- the rhythm 
or tune to which the people there sing what they have to say! Accent is a 
kind of chanting" [Heroes, p.247]. Song permeates all the productions of 
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the voice, and that which distinguishes one people from another is that 
which produces the specificity of their chanting of the sacred logos, the 
incantation of their relationship to all else which is endowed by virtue of 
the universal voice, the ontological source. A local accent is constituted by 
its tonality in relation to the root tonality which, like the maternal voice of 
nature~ generates all tonalities as parts of its own body. 
Aristotle wrote of "the tonality of normal speech" [Poetics, p .49], but 
this was a tonality reliant on rhythmus, and the correct application of the 
pedes metrici. Carlyle here forms a concept of tonality, and therefore of 
the specific voice, which is not easily shown to be based on a specifically 
spatialized, harmonic temporality. 
As Rousseau wrote in the Dictionary of Music on "Accent .. there is 
an accent of language which "produces the melody particular to a nation 11 , 
and yet there is also for Rousseau a "universal accent of Nature" which 
permeates and produces this local accent. In this way, logos becomes the 
prime generator of all things, but specifically music. The appeal to poetry 
in this move is easily found. As Carlyle writes, 11 Poetry, therefore, we will 
call musical Thought" [Heroes, p.247]. Like Rousseau, he states that logos 
is the essence which is at the centre of all things. Poetry and Song 
therefore become primary components of the system~ and one expects 
instrumental music, the realm of the specifically harmonic, non-
representational and absolutely supplementary, to be derived from the 
logocentric component. This is what Rousseau attempts when he elaborates 
his Hellenized theory of pure, undivided Song, the originary synthesis of 
logos with the sonic, and states this to be the origin of the debased 
supplement which is instrumental music, as well as the origin of all debased 
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northern forms of language (which is always defined in the lexis of the 
phonic, since the graphic is yet a further debased supplement). This is 
also, according to the Derridean deconstruction, precisely what Rousseau 
fails to achieve, by actually placing a harmonic space at the origin. 
Carlyle, it will be noticed, also suggests that there is a harmonicity 
at play within his theory of the origin, when he writes of the "musical 
thought" which is the production of the analytical mind which has 
penetrated to the "inmost" melodic essence of a thing. While this essence 
is melodic, it is nevertheless 11 the inward harmony of coherence which is 
its soul" [Heroes, p.247, emphasis added]. Yet there is a significant 
distinction between Rousseau's harmonic origin which is harmonic only by 
default, and Carlyle's "inward harmony". Carlyle writes of this "inward 
harmony" in the same tone as he does with the concept of melody. This can 
be discerned in his admiration for "The Greeks fabled Sphere-Harmonics: 
it was the feeling they had of the inner structure of Nature; that the soul 
of all her voices and utterances was perfect music. Poetry, therefore, we 
will call musical Thought." [Heroes, p.247] Carlyle previously states that 
the soul is Song. Here, Song, the voice of Nature, also has a soul, but this 
soul is harmony. 
Rousseau, on the other hand, endows harmony with an aspect of 
externality; harmony is the "dangerous supplement" to original melody. 
What Carlyle suggests is the opposite, that harmony is an "inmost", 
"inward" part of melody; that it is the "feeling [ ... ] of the inner structur·c 
of Nature". This harmony is overtly endowed with an aspect of internality. 
Where Rousseau's harmony is the chain of supplements which the 
Enlightenment philosophers establish through scepticism and "logic-
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chopping", and must therefore be overcome, Carlyle's harmony is an 
internal part ~f a self-proximate object. It is therefore not based so much 
on an expanding arrangement which places its law around things, than a 
compressing vortex which draws things towards its own locus. In this, it 
is a harmony distinct from that of Malcolm or of Rameau. Indeed, it is set 
up in opposition t.o precisely these theories. 
Carlyle's harmony rejects the concept of the interval by aiming at 
self-proximity. It is under-pinned not so much by a fundamental, as a root; 
in this term, and its accompanying image of the tree, we find Carlyle's 
theory of harmony as an organ of a fully melodic organism. 
8.3 Organic Filament~ 
It is all a Tree: circulation of sap and influences, mutual 
communication of every minutest leaf with the lowest talon of 
a root, with every other greatest and minutest portion of the 
whole. The Tree Igdrasil. .. [Heroes, p.261] 
Here, the full meaning of Carlyle's determination of harmony as 
inward, melodic, can be read as that not of the generation of the 
fundamental to the harmonic across a spatial interval, but of the 
penetration of all things from the root. A penetrating organism, with the 
tree as its image. The origin which is a root is not a pragmatic harmonic 
machine which can change its locus depending on the relative harmonic 
perspective from which enquiry begins. The root is the single origin of all 
things, in direct univocal communication with all of its offshoots. This 
communication takes the form not of mutual stimulation, but of a pulsating 
insemination of essence: "circulation of sap". The sap of the life-tree, the 
transmissional medium of this ontological ousia is the maternal Song which 
binds the most distant organs of the tree together, overcoming distance, 
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indeed, penetrating space in order to occupy it and ensure an 
uninterrupted continuity between parts. 
The proximate communication of the organs of the harmonic tree is 
achieved not by mere analysis, but by motion, a circulation of essence, but 
also the pulse of the organs themselves according to the rhythm of the 
sap's penetrative entelechy into their bodies: "The living TREE Igdrasil, 
with the melodious prophetic waving of its world-wide boughs, deep-rooted 
as Hela" [Heroes, pp.312/3]. The tree lives, it is not a machine, but iill 
organism which is endowed with Spirit, with melodic essence. This melody 
is transmitted throughout the organism as a means of proximate control 
and coordination of its organs, and results in a rhythmic transposition into 
the motion of the organism as a whole. This motion is a "melodious 
prophetic waving" of the organs, it foretells the fortune, the final tuning 
of the organism's destiny. It presages cadential destiny, or the organism's 
telos. All this is achieved by the uninterrupted, self-proximate flow of 
melodic essence, binding all organs together in an inward harmony, or 
melodic structure. 
Thus, the harmony which Carlyle writes of is of a different order to 
the harmony of Enlightenment writers. His harmony is inward, compressive, 
organic, while theirs is outward, expansive, machinic. In this lexis, the 
Enlightenment represented the threat of the living tree's annihilation, it 
had "died-out into the clanking of a WoRLD-MACHINE." [ibid., p.313] The 
separation of the root and the bough, the origin and the organ, the 
introduction of the interval and therefore harmonic connectivity, is whi:lt 
turns this tree into dead, machinic matter - "Whatsoever is noble, divine, 
inspired, drops thereby out of life. There remains everywhere in lift: a 
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dr·spica ble caput-mortuum; the mechanical hull, all soul fled out of it. 11 
[ibid., p.314] The distinction between these harmonic orders is absolute, 
and only one can prevail in this internecine warfare of rival ontologies; 
11 'Tree' and 'Machine:' contrast these two things. I, for my share, declarP-
the world to be no machine! 11 [ibid., p.313, emphasis added] Harmony is a 
matter of the binding of 11 organic filaments" ( Sartor, p.153], not of the 
dividing of machines into components. This binding, however, is not some 
analytical after-thought created to explain diverse phenomena. Rather, it 
is the very process of generation itself; the melodic sap which inseminates 
all organs is also the principle of the generation and growth of those 
organs. This is the full distinction between Scoto-gallic materialism and 
Germanic transcendentalism which Carlyle draws out. For Carlyle, the 
historical origin barely matters. As we know from Derrida's reading of 
Rousseau, it splits and divides as time progresses, thus sowing the seeds 
of its own deconst.ruction and dissemination. Such a mensural debasement 
of the historical origin results in the higher harmonics of a materialist nge 
evidenced in writers such as Rameau or Smith, who provide rationalizations 
of harmonic generation, of supplementarity. For Carlyle, then, the 
historical, generative origin is no ontological guarantee. It is not enough 
to derive all things from a common root - they must be ontologica lly 
penetrated and bound into a single unified organism. This is not so much 
a nostalgic return to a historical origin, as a political guarantee of n. 
slructural origin. 
In his essay Navalis, (1826) Carlyle gives an account of Navalis' 
theory of three developmental stages in philosophy on the path to its full 
realization. In this schema, the first two historical stages are the 
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"scholastic" stage and the "eclectic" stage. As Carlyle writes; 
It may be observed here that British [sic] Philosophy, tracing 
it from Duns Scotus to Dugald Stewart, has now gone through 
the first and second of these ,stages', the Scholastic and th~ 
Er.lectic, and in considerable honour. With our amiable 
Professor Stewart, than whom no man, not Cicero himself, was 
ever more entirely Eclectic, that second or Eclectic class may 
be considered as having terminated; and now Philosophy is n t 
a stand among us, or rather there is now no Philosophy 
''-, 
visible in these Islandsl2l. [Navalis, in Essays, Vol.I, p.4.~3] 
'J'Ite first stage is characterized by a separation of philosophy into 
scolastici.sm and alchemism, logic and metaphysics, mere mechanics and 
ntt:r-e dynamics. Here, the two branches are independent inquiries both 
[
21 This passage is remarkable in Carlyle's writings not only for its 
determination of the history of British philosophy as entirely a Scottish 
affuir, but also for its evident respect for his fellow Scots and their 
productions, particularly Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), Professor of Mor.:il 
Philosophy at Edinburgh University, and student, friend, and biographer 
of Carlyle's hated Adam Smith. Carlyle himself had graduated from the 
city's University in 1814, although he had largely studied philosophy 
under the metaphysician Professor Thomas Brown, but it may be that his 
interest in the Scottish tradition here comes from the fact that he had not 
at the time of publication (1826) yet moved to London. Two positions of 
Stewart's, however, are likely reasons for Carlyle's uncharacteristically 
benevolent attitude; firstly, Stew art's admiration of and assistance t.o 
Burns when the latter moved to cold, mechanical Edinburgh, and second, 
his statement on transcendentalism that "whoever at some time of his life 
has not entertained this theory, may reckon that he has yet shown no 
talent for metaphysical research." [Navalis, p.449] Carlyle, howev0.r.~, 
admires Stewart's work greatly, and it is worth quoting at length the warm 
account of this sensus communis theorist which he gives in his essay on 
German literature, if only because of its singularity in Carlyle's writings; 
"The name of Dugald Stewart is a name venerable to all Europe, and to none 
moce dear and venerable than to ourselves. Nevertheless, his writings are 
not a Philosophy, but a making ready for one. He does not enter on the 
field to till it; he encompasses it with fences, invites cultivators, and 
drives away intruders: often (fallen on evil days) he is reduced to long 
arguments with passers-by, to prove that it is a field, that this so highly 
prized domain of his, in truth, soil and substance, not clouds and shadow. 
We regard his discussions on the nature of Philosophic Language, and his 
unwearied efforts to set forth and guard against its fallacies, as worthy 
of ull acknowledgement; as indeed forming the greatest, perhaps the only 
true improvement, which Philosophy has received among us in our age. rt 
is only to a superficial observer that the import of these discussions can 
seem trivial; rightly understood, they give sufficient and final answer to 
H11r·tley's and Darwin's, and all other possible forms of Materialism, the 
grand Idolatry, as we may rightly call it, by which, in all times, the true 
Worship, that of the Invisible, has been polluted and withstood. Mr. 
Stewart has written warmly against Kant; but it would surprise him to find 
out how much of a Kantist he himself essentially is. Has not the whole scope 
of his labours been to reconcile what a Kantist would call his 
Understanding with his Reason; a noble, but still too fruitless effort. to 
overarch the chasm which, for all minds but his own, separates his Scienr.e 
fr·om his Religion? We regard the assiduous study of his Works as the best 
preparation for studying those of Kant." [The State of German Litera tun~, 
in Essays, Vol. I, p.67] 
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operating according to the same method of first. principles, but there is a 
gap between them, a fissure within the body of philosophy. The second 
sl.age is characterized by partial fusions of the two sciences, but only 
results in Logical metnphysics or metaphysical logic. As Navalis writes, "the 
time of misunderstanding begins" [31 [Navalis, quoted in Navalis, p.452]. 
This is the time of false prophets, of Humes, Smiths, Rousseaus, Diderots, 
French Revolutions, Chartism, weaving looms, and so on. Navalis writes of 
Ute first and second types - "those are heads without hands, these are 
hands without heads" [ibid.]. This stage is an unsuccessful attempt to 
unite logic and metaphysics, and the full philosophy is only realized in 
"the genuine Transcendentalist, or 'Philosopher of the third stage,' 
pr·operly speaking, the Philosopher" [Navalis, pp.452/3 ]. Here, the 
"artistic" stage of philosophy, as Navalis calls it, is the moment of the 
dic1lectical union of the two philosophies into one organic unit, and is the 
proof that the division of philosophy, its "Separation indicates, by its 
existence as such, the possibility of being adjusted, of being joined" 
[Navalis, quoted, in Navalis, p.452]. This "artistic" philosophy is the post-
Kantian phase which Carlyle calls for. 
Dialectically, then, Carlyle aims to unite the two into one 
philosophical organism, and this inevitably requires the prioritization of 
the organic, dynamic model over the mechanistic. "For the spiritual will 
[3] The following theory of a certain Dr. Cabanis, in his Rapports du 
Physique et du Morale de l'Homme, is pilloried by Carlyle as an example of 
the confused "ultimatum of mechanical metaphysics"; "He fairly lays open 
our moral structure with his dissecting-knives and real metal probes; and 
exhibits it to the inspection of mankind, by Leuwenhoek microscopes, and 
inflation with the anatomical blow-pipe. Thought, he is inclined to hold, is 
secreted by the brain; but then Poetry and Religion (and it is really worth 
knowing) are 'a product of the smaller intestines'!" [Signs of the Times, 
p.478] 
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always body itself forth in the temporal history of men; the spiritual is the 
beginning of the temporal." [Heroes, p.277] Thus, the "loom of time" is 
penetrated by the entelechy of Spirit into matter, and all things become 
dynamically organic, with the single melody as origin. Carlyle admits of the 
existence of the mechanical realm, but claims that the ultimate origin of the 
machine is the dynamic organism. In this move, there is the prioritization 
of melody (inward harmony) over harmony (outward harmony), and the 
associated prioritization of the voice over the mechanical instrument. 
In listing a series of historical instances where the melo-dynamic 
organism was the prime mover, he writes of science, art, poetry, painting, 
sculpture and the Christian religion, that "They originated in the 
Dynamical nature of man, not in his Mechanical nature" [Signs of the Tim0s, 
p.482], that the Maternal melodic voice had "sent a gifted spirit upon the 
earth" [ibid.]. The Crusades were for Carlyle, further instances of this 
organic, vital principle in operation to the full. They too were initiated not 
by the machine, but by "the passionate voice of one man" [ibid., p.483]. 
They are an example of Carlyle 's "serious nation" fulfilling its destiny 
through the realization of the "Gods-message", transmitted through the 
"speech of angels", and interpreted for it by the 11 vates 11 or vatic singer, 
the national prophet and seer. The Crusades are a triumph for the melo-
dynamic vocal organism of the serious nation, the nation whose message of 
destiny is beaten into the bodies of its opponents by the fiery warriors 
and "unextinguishable" heroes. The triumph of the voice for Carlyle, is the 
triumph of the "internecine warfare" which the hero wages in his direct 
access to the origin against a harmonic materialism of separation and 
division. 
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!3.4 The Original Man 
Such a man is what we call an original man; he comes to us at 
first-hand. A messenger he, sent from the Infinite Unknown 
with tidings to us. We may call him Poet, Prophet, God [Heroes, 
p.219]. 
Carlyle's "original man" is not a genius in the sense of an innovator 
of originality, but in the sense of having a privileged access to the melodic 
origin. This constitutes his "originality", and distinguishes him from all 
other men. He has direct contact, through his ability to hear-and-
understand the "voice of Nature" [Heroes, p.265], with the ontological root 
which is Song, but equally, he is capable of performing a certain "orthodox 
Anthropomorphism" in his relations with those less Spiritually endowed -
he is available to us "at first hand". He is the messenger, the carrier of 
divine melocentric logos, and in hearing the voice of the Gods, is 
penetrated by their Song, receiving it and allowing it to lodge in his heart, 
so that when he sings to us, he can likewise penetrate our hearts with that 
Song, transposed into our mortal register. The Original Man is the warrior, 
the hero, he is Navalis' full philosopher, the artist-philosopher who 
overcomes the division of the divine and the material, the dynamic and the 
mechanical, metaphysics and materialism. He is testimony to the organic 
continuity of ontology, the indivisibility of the universe. He is living proof 
of the process whereby "man's spiritual nature, the vital Force which 
dwells in him, is essentially one and indivisible" [ibid., p.264, emphasis 
added]. This vitalism is the binding force which forms man as a branch of 
the harmonic tree which has melody at its root - it is the dynamic procP.ss 
of 1ife. 
Aguin, with melody as the root of all the inward harmony of the 
universe, so the Song of a man, his accent, the tonality of his voice, marks 
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out which branch of the tree he is produced upon; "You may see how a man 
would fight, by the way in which he sings; his courage, or want of courage, 
is visible in the word he utters, in the opinion he has formed, no less than 
in the stroke he strikes. He is one; and preaches the same Self abroad in 
all these ways." [ibid.] Fighting and singing- the two aspects of the self-
proximity of the hero, or rather, the self-proximity which his organic 
origin keeps through his body, forever binding him to the Maternal and 
Paternal roots of his tree. In singing, the rhythm of this divine melody is 
tr·nnslated, interpreted, by this hermeneutic warrior into the strokes, the 
beating rhythm of war. Music is no frivolity here, it is an essential weapon 
against matter and its allies. Music is a matter of radical seriousness in 
this politics of empire. 
Do away wit.h "inorganic chaos", with "spiritual paralysis", with the 
"Sceptical Century", with "moral Doubt", with the "effete world", with the 
"godless world", and reinstate an "age of miracles" [Heroes, p.312]. This 
is what Carlyle prescribes and its result can be seen in the works of the 
Hero, whose "Art is not Artifice" [p.265]. The result is a dissolution of the 
boundary of Art and Nature, just as mechanics and metaphysics are united, 
their separation ended. Art becomes naturalized, it becomes organic, 
dynamically fused with the root of the harmonic tree: "It grows-up from 
the deeps of Nature, through this noble sincere soul, who is a voice of 
Nature." [ibid.] All art, then, has its origin in the melodic root, and the 
a r·tist is himself [sic.] a branch of that tree, is himself a voice within the 
Maternal body of nature, absolutely continuous with the Song and the law 
of the Gods. 
This is the context which Carlyle establishes for his writings on the 
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songs of Robert Burns, both in the Essay on Burns, and the fifth part of 
the Lectures on Heroes and Hero-worship, titled "The Hero as Man of 
L~lt.ers. Johnson, Rousseau, Burns." In the latter, he gives the example of 
the hero organism which could not fully develop, which was held back by 
the era of the machine, and yet in this, is perhaps a greater hero for 
standing alone amongst the materialists of the age; "they were Sons of 
Nature once more in an age of Artifice." [Heroes, p.318] The works of these 
Sons of Nature could have been greater in an age which heard-and-
understood their divine Song; "It is rather the Tombs of three Literary 
Heroes that I have to show you. There are the monumental heaps, under 
which three spiritual giants lie buried. [ ... ] We will linger by them for a 
while." [Heroes, p.303] Just as their works were lacerated, divided, by the 
rnachinism which they heroically attempted to defeat, so their bodies lie, 
not in some noumenal realm of celestial melody, but incarcerated in material 
tombs, under heaps of the dead matter which, resisting, ultimately 
consumed them. Carlyle's narrative of Burns' songs and life is a warning. 
8.5 The Tomb of the Vocal Organisif! 
Among those second hand acting-figures, mimes for most part, 
of the Eighteenth Century, once more a giant Original Man; 
one of those men who reach down to the perennial Deeps, who 
take rank with the Heroic among men: and he was born in a 
poor Ayrshire hut. [ ... ] Yes, I will say, here too was a piece of 
the right Saxon stuff: strong as the Harz-rock, rooted in the 
depths of the world[ ... ] like the old Norse Thor, the Peasant-
god! - [Lectures on Heroes, pp.326/7] 
For Carlyle, Burns is an Original Man, a son of Nature, a "piece of 
the right Saxon stuff" who stands alongside, but against the "windy 
sentimentalism" [Heroes, p.317] of Enlightenment Edinburgh, in a heroic 
struggle of the pastoral and the metropolitan. Burns' rustic" Sincerity, his 
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indisputable air of Truth" [Burns, p.240] is contrasted with the 
"second hand acting-figures, mimes" of the metropolis, and again it is <'l n 
opposition of the self-proximate organism and the dividing machine, with 
Truth as a function of Spirit, and artifice of base matter[4]. 
It is also a question of the infection of the whole of Scotland by the 
machinic virus of Gaul - Burns' tomb, his Fall, is prepared by the 
dissonant relation between his soul and the soil of his pastoral 
environment. Kyle is an "inorganic waste", infected by the French-inspired 
revolutionary politics abroad in nearby Dumfries; "no 'pre-established 
harmony existed between the clay soil of Mossgiel and the empyrean soul 
of Robert Burns; it was not wonderful that the adjustment between them 
should have been long postponed, and his long arm cumbered, and his 
sight confused, in so vast and discordant an economy as he had been 
['l] Here it is intriguing to note Nietzsche's later statement that Carlyle is 
a "semi-actor and rhetorician" [Beyond Good and Evil, p.164]; this connects 
fully into the framework of Rousseau's fear of representational deceit, and 
the point Rameau makes about the composer as actor. Nietzsche makes the 
same point of Rousseau as he does of Carlyle; "everything deriving from 
Rousseau [is] false, artificial, fustian, exaggerated. 11 [Twilight of the Idols, 
p. 70] However, Nietzsche's statement cannot be taken merely as an attempt 
to capitalize on the Rousseauist obsession with honesty. Rousseou 
associates the presentation of originary simplicity with the state of Nature. 
Not so for Nietzsche, as this direct critique of Rousseau demonstrat0.s; 
11 Nature, artistically considered, is no model. It exaggerates, it distorts, it 
leaves gaps. Nature is chance. To study 'from nature' seems to me a biHi 
sign: it betrays subjection, weakness, fatalism - this lying in the dust 
before petit faits [petty facts] is unworthy of a complete artist. Seeing 
1vhat is- that pertains to a different species of spirit, the anti-artistic, the 
prosaic. One has to know who one is ... " [Twilight, p.71] In this sense, 
Nietzsche's "complete artist" not merely knows Nature, but also knows 
their self. This opens up an interval in the artistic process which rupturr!S 
the seamless continuity of Rousseauism or Carlylism. Thus, Nietzsche's 
"honesty", if it can be called such, comes not from a simple univocity, hut 
f r·om a multiplicity which tends to the complex. Just as Nature is chance for 
Nietzsche, so the Judceo-christian tradition which Carlyle venerates is a 
n~gation of this multiplicitous energy; "What is Jewish, what is Christian 
morality? Chance robbed of its innocence" [The Anti-Christ, p.136]. 
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appointed steward over. 11 [Burns, p.261] The natural proximity which Burns 
should feel in relation to the soil from which he was generated has be(~n 
fr-actured by the age in which that soil produced him. There is no inward 
harmony, but an interval. Burns is cut off, divided from the originary 
nourishment of Kyle's soil by the interrupting interval, the discordant 
relation which not only fractures space, but also postpones the ontologir.11l 
union, fractures time by making it spatial and divided. The celestial empire 
for which Burns' empyrean soul should breath out the fires of Original 
Song is denied him by the abyss of the material illusion; indeed, denied by 
the Original Sin of spatial rupture which Carlyle attacks and which Derrida 
shows to underlie Rousseau's paranoias. Carlyle defines the inward 
harmonic adjustment of soul and soil which is the natural state for the 
Original Man as a "moral manhood" [ibid.]. Here we see the full bond 
between the concepts of inward harmony, the organism, the vatic singer.~, 
and the warrior- they all point to the same heroic entity. This is Burns' 
potential, and his tragedy is that it is postponed by the interruptive force 
of the machine era. 
According to Carlyle, the same was true of English writers of the 
Enlightenment: "literature was, as it were, without any local environment; 
was not nourished by the affections which spring from a native soil. Our 
Grays and Glovers seemed to write almost as if in vacuo; the thing written 
bears no mark of place" [Burns, p.257]. The organic bond of English 
literature and soil had been interrupted; a space had been introducr~d 
between them, or rather, a machinic space which lead to a vacuum. This 
was a no-space in its inability to receive the circulating sap of the melodic 
body. What was received instead was the Gallic supplement to the Saxon 
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or-igin, for if this interruption was the case with England, it was, "in the 
highest degree, the case with Scotland. In fact our Scottish literature had, 
ell that period, a very singular aspect; unexampled, so far as we know, 
except perhaps at Geneva" [ibid., p.257]. The example of Rousseau)s native 
republic which had spawned the French Revolution threatened the same 
cultural vacuum for Burns in Kyle, with "no mark of place", no 
significatory and inseminatory stroke from the celestial realm into the 
material, sanctioning the soil for the growth of a 11 serious nation" l5l. 
Burns' attempt to bond with the spiritual soil of the nation which 
had lost its seriousness and become frivolous came through a specificaJly 
national locus: "One small province stood open for him,- that of Scottish 
Song; and how eagerly he entered on it, how devotedly he laboured there!" 
[ibid., p.259] This is what constitutes Burns' heroism; with no actual soil 
worth the tilling, Burns penetrates into the province of Song, labouring on 
its originary ground, planting his seed into its soil, and cultivating an 
organic art therein. Burns rejects the actual, material potatoes of the 
actual Ayrshire soil, and fertilizes an ideal, vocal organism in an ideal, 
spiritual soil. Burns is a member of Carlyle's Aristocracy of Talent; "for him 
[5] Carlyle continues this passage by denying any Scottish specificity for 
Hume; "neither had he aught to do with Scotland; Edinburgh, equally with 
La Fleche, was but the lodging and laboratory, in which he not so much 
morally lived as investigated." [Burns, p.258] Carlyle's "Scottish" 
s pecificity, however, is based in the assumption of the total cultural and 
racial assimilation of Scotland into England. His "own stern Motherland" is 
a Saxon land, not a Gaidhealach or Celto-Anglian land, as his use of the 
Nordic model of Igdrasil in preference to such Celtic ash-tree myths 
df:monstrates. Hume is attacked by many as anglocentric, and yet for 
Carlyle his gallicisms far outweigh his Tory Unionism (even though it was 
a Jacobite, federalist position he held, in stark contrast to the anti-
federalism of the late-twentieth century Tory Unionists). Whatevee 
direction Carlyle's arguments against Hume are taken in, they all point to 
an obsession with viewing anything of consequence in Scottish culture as 
necessarily injected from outside. 
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Ute Ideal world is not remote from the Actual, but under it and within it 
[ ... ] He is a vates, a seer." [ibid., p.244] Thus, Burns bonds himself in n 
celestial union with an originary soil, under and within, behind, the soil of 
Kyle. He is a vatic singer whose Vision penetrates mere surface to find the 
eternal beneath the commonplace, and finds this eternity to consist of 
Song. 
This knowledge and skill which Burns possesses thus establishes 
what he himself described as the phonic affectivity of "old Scotia's melting 
airs", the airs which form a direct, univocal continuity between sound and 
soul; "No guess could tell what instrument appear'd, 1 But all the soul of 
Music's self was heard; I Harmonious concert rung in every part, 1 While 
simple melody pour'd moving on the heart." [The Brigs of Ayr, in Burns: 
Poems and Songs, p.232] Here, the sonic instrument is over-run by the 
penetrative power of the phonic soul of music. The instrument no longer 
has distinguishable timbre or materiality, it has been captured by the 
maternal melodic voice, is made part of that body, and now no longer plays, 
but "sings". This continuous, self-proximate and undivided melodic liquid 
then penetrates the listening body and "pours moving on the heart". The 
listening body is thus itself captured and integrated into the maternal 
body, allowing the paternal ousia to communicate directly with the 
listening soul, to move it in an absolute fashion. The instrument thus 
becomes a "soul-ennobling Bard" [ibid.] who sings directly into the 
listener's soul and flawlessly narrates a message, a story where "The 
Genius of the Stream in front appears", followed by "Sweet Female Beauty", 
"Spring", "Rural Joy", "Courage with his martial stride", and other 
characters in an archetypal drama, all directly represented by the 
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inspiration into the body of the divine pneuma of the melody. This is the 
infiltration of the voice into the instrument, the organism into the 
machinel61. 
Carlyle writes that such a Song, in all its organic spirituality, is 
Burns' folk-cantata, Love and Liberty (1785), which alternates 
"recitatives" with Scots Airs. Again, it is a matter of compression, of the 
inward, centrifugal harmony of the dynamic; "this piece seems thoroughly 
compacted; melted together, refined; and poured forth in one flood of true 
liquid harmony." [Burns, p.255] Here, Carlyle extends Burns' image of the 
liquidity of melodic motion. Burns' piece is a unified, organic whole, a 
single entity, complete in itself, "a real self-supporting Whole'' [ibid.], by 
vir·tue of its organic bond with the ontological root which endows it with 
all the requisite spiritual fluids, all circulating in one motion throughout 
its body. This Carlyle defines as "the strong pulse of Life" [ibid.] which 
penetrates the listening body and continues its pulsating, inseminating 
motion even "when the curtain closes" [ibid.], such is its binding grip. 
This process of the organic cantata is a compression of base material space 
and time into the image of one single, eternal location and instant, 
absolutely self-proximate and drawing the listening body back to its origin 
l61 Just such a colonization of the sonic by the phonic can be witnessed in 
the engraving from Simon Fraser's Airs and Melodies (1816) in plate 2. 
Here, the Maternal Muse inspires the liquid melodies of the fiddler Niel Gow, 
and a Gaidhlig clarsair, or harpist. Note also the pastorality of the 
instrumentalist's context, and its elision with Carlyle's orthodox view of 
Burns' organic locus. As John Purser writes, "It is clear from the 
fr·ontispiece and Fraser's introduction that the ideals of the Temple of 
Apollo were still very much alive. Niel Gow on the left and a member of the 
extinct bardic class on the right are crowned with laurels by a muse. In 
the background, the rural idyll continues untouched by Culloden, or laws 
against poaching, famine or emigration; and the obedient natives are 
pictured on the right rowing the tourists of Europe to Fingal's Cave." 
[ S'cotland 's Music, p.197] 
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The pastoral organism captures the sonorous body: 
Fiddler, clarsai.r, and the melodic Muse from 
Simon Fraser's Airs and Melodies {1816). 
within this great organically harmonic tree. Burns' cantata literally 
captivates its audience in an ontological drama underneath its actun L 
narrative. This Ideal process constitutes the very heart of Carlyle's 
aesthetic. 
In the song Caledonia (1789, written to the tune of The Caledonian 
Hunt's Deligh·t), Burns himself moves ontological matters into the narrative 
of national destiny. Here, perhaps, we can read the motif of the warrior-
poet which Carlyle establishes as the context for all his heroic figures. The 
rtu;lal determination of the Scots in Caledonia is more Nordic-Germanic than 
Gaidhealach, with references to Odin as Caledonia's "grandsire", just os 
Cnrlyle takes Odin to be the first of his heroes in the Lectures on Heroes, 
and claims him as the Scottish pagan god. However, Burns gives an image 
in the last stanza which relates to the whole issue of national entelechy 
from the baseness of the ontological axes of space and time which 
characterize the writings of the Enlightenment philosophers. Burns writes 
of Caledonia's true telos as autonomy not so much from external political 
control, but from what Carlyle terms the Actual, the illusory webs of 
materiality. Scotland's true independence will not be achieved through the 
temporal, but through the spiritual estate; 
Thus bold, independent, unconquer'd and free, 
Her bright course of glory for ever shall run; 
For brave Caledonia immortal must be, 
I'll prove it from Euclid as clear as the sun; 
Rectangle-triangle the figure we'll chuse, 
The Upright is Chance, and old Time the base; 
But brave Caledonia's the Hypothenuse, 
Then, Ergo, she'll match them, and match them always. 
[from Caledonia, in Burns: Poems and Songs, pp.364/5] 
The lexis of the celestial realm's triumph over the material in the 
internecine warfare of ontology is evident here. Caledonia must become 
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"ir11mortal", foregoing the base temporal existence, but also defeating 
Chance. Burns proves this with Euclidian logos, "clear as the sun", 
pointing to the Vision of Caledonia's "bright course of glory", of a spiritual 
balancing in order to realize the national telos. Caledonia is initially caught 
between the two ontological axes of chance and time, two abysses which 
threaten to swallow her body and soul, but which she breaks out from, 
becoming the golden triangle which ascends beyond the grey matter of the 
axial rectangle towards eternity and immortalityl7l. In this spiritunl 
realm, Caledonia cannot be defeated in her retreat from the temporal. 
Burns is perhaps less confrontational and more nostalgic than Carlyle in 
the methods they propose, but nevertheless, the ontological war is the 
same fight for both. Burns has a nostalgia for the time of the warrior-poet, 
when "soul-ennobling Bards heroic ditties sung" [The Brigs of Ayr], 
whereas Carlyle calls for the new warrior. 
f71 However, in the context of Burns' actual political views (rather than 
reading him within the over-determined context of Carlyle), one could 
easily assemble a quite other reading of the Caledonian hypotenuse. The 
idea of breaking free from the structure of the Cartesian graph becomes 
purticularly significant in the next chapter. There, the theories of Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari suggest the possibility of breaking not only the 
graph, but the whole of ontology through the musical line of flight. 
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0.6 "quartered on the scaffold". 
Storys to rede ar delitabill, 
Suppos that thai be nocht bot fahi1l 
- The Bruce, John Barbour, 1375. 
Fy on Fortoun, fy on thy frivoll quhele, 
Fy on thy trust, for heir it hes na lest. 
Thow transfigurit Wallace fra his weil 
Quhen he trustit for til haif lestit best. 
- The Wallace, Blin Harry, c.147ol81. 
The interval between Carlyle and Burns is at its most political over 
the historiographical positioning of what is perhaps (along with Auld Lang 
Syne) the most famous of Burns' contributions to James Johnson's The 
Scots Musical Museum (1787-1803). In Bruce's Address to his Army (1793), 
mor-e commonly known as Scots Wha Hae wi' Wallace Bled (Scots Who Have 
With Wallace Bled), Burns overtly adopts the voice of the national prophet 
himself. Yet the question to be put to Carlyle's reading of the song is 
J·Vhich nation? 
Here is the full passage on Bruce 's Address in the Essay on Burns, 
replete with the requisite apocrypha of all Romanticist determinations o E 
post-Ossianic Scotland: 
Why should we speak of Scots, l-'lha hae wi' Wallace bled, since 
all know of it, from the king to the meanest of his subjects? 
This dithyrambic was composed on horseback, in riding in the 
middle of tempests, over the wildest Galloway moor, in 
cornpany with a Mr. Syme, who, observing the poet's looks, 
forbore to speak, -judiciously enough, for a man composing 
Bruce 's Address might be unsafe to trifle with. Doubtless this 
stern hymn was singing itself, as he formed it, through the 
soul of Burns; but to the external ear it should be sung with 
(S] These two passages could be transposed into English as follows: "Stories 
to read are delightful, 1 Even if they be nought but fable"; and "Fie on 
Fortune, fy on thy frivolous wheel, I Fie on thy tryst, for here it has no 
endurance. I Thou transfigured Wallace from his weal I When he trysted 
tu have endured most." 
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tlte throat of the whirlwind. So long as there is warm blood in 
the heart of Scotchman or man, it will move in fierce thrills 
under this war ode; the best, we believe, that was ever 
written by any pen. [Burns, pp.252-3] 
Here, Carlyle speaks of a reverential abstinence of speech - Syme 
forbears his own vocal ejaculations in deference to the more seminally 
virile whirlwinds of Burns which have not their acoustic sign, but a visual 
sign of melodic stirrings in the poet's blood and soul. In the middle of the 
external tempests, and in the absence of signs presented to the external 
ear, Burns forges the musical organism within himself, his prima materia 
being that which sings itself, is communicated, to him. 
Let us now turn specifically to the political question of the nation, 
which (as Edward Said points out) is never far from Carlyle's aesthetics. 
Of the post-Burnsian scene, he writes that, 
Among the great changes which British, particularly Scottish 
literature, has undergone since that period, one of the 
gr·eatest will be found to consist in its remarkable increase of 
nationality. Even the English writers, most popular in Burns's 
ti111e, were little distinguished for their literary patriotism, in 
this its best sense. [Burns, p.257] 
In the context of many other passages, we are clearly to construe 
that Carlyle considers Burns song in general to be recoverable within the 
context of a British, rather than Scottish nationalism. Certainly, he writes 
against the contextualization of Burns within the Jacobite or Jacobean 
traditions, and argues that his true genealogy stems from an English, 
Tudor root; "We might write a long essay on the Songs of Burns; which we 
reckon by far the best that Britain has yet produced: for indeed, since the 
era of Queen Elizabeth, we know not that, by any other hand, aught truly 
\·vorth attention has been accomplished in this department. 11 [Burns, 
pp.255/6] In Carlyle's reading, one discounts Burns declaration that "the 
319 
Scotish Muses were all Jaco bites" [Notes on Scottish Song, pp.4/5] Indeed, 
with reference to two specifically Jacobite precedents, Carlyle claims thnt 
df~spite having only "the rhymes of a Ferguson or Ramsay for his standard 
of beauty, he sinks not under these impediments: through the fogs and 
dr1 r·kness of that obscure region, his lynx eye discerns the true relations 
of the world" [Burns, p.237]. For Carlyle, the negroid darkness of a 
Jacobite Scotland does not hinder the penetrating eye of the poet who can 
burn away such surfacial illusions to discover the ''right Saxon stuft" 
which constitutes the truly transcendental origin. 
Yet to locate Bruce's Address within a British nationalism would be 
to logically imply that the song constitutes a hymn to civil war, and 
therefore internal division and the threat of an intervallic rupture within 
an organic political unity. In Carlyle's reading of the Address, then, the 
T20 
slakes are high indeed 191. For this reason, a further contextualization of 
the song from other sources will be necessary in order to determine 
exactly what Carlyle's historiographic strategy achieves. 
The melody which Burns chose for this song operates a specific 
positioning of the Scoto-gallic relationship throughout history, and one 
which Carlyle does his best to ignore and even efface. The medieval melody 
JIF!Y Tuttie Tattie is traditionally associated with the victory of Wallace at 
Bannockburn in 1314, the decisive moment at which the expansionist 
interference of the English Edward II began its decline. Subsequently, the 
Declaration of Arbroath was signed, in 1320, declaring that Scottish 
(q) And is it not extremely ironic that Carlyle, in his attempt to locate an 
aesthetics of originarity and unity chooses a songwriter from the balli1d 
tr-adition? As is well known, the ballad is one of the most intertextual 
genres there is. Not only does each tune have as many variants as there 
ar-e performers to perform it, but often, as in the case of much of Burns' 
practise, fragments of lyrics will be collated from diverse sources, and a) so 
the same lyric will appear arranged to different tunes. Further, the 
concepts of interlanguage and the creole continuum from post-colonic1l 
theory can be applied to the tradition in Scotland (cf. Ashcroft et al's The 
Empire Writes Back, pages 66 & 44 respectively). Here, as Hamish 
Henderson has noted in his term Ballad-Scots, the practise of folk singers 
is to use a "flexible formulaic language which grazes ballad-English along 
the whole of its length, and yet[ ... ] may be said to include English and go 
beyond it." [Alias MacAJias, p.53] A post-structural theory of Ballad-Seats 
can easily be assembled around the idea of differance understood as the 
self-difference of a text from itself under certain conditions of difference 
within repetition. Hence, the use of the 11 same 11 melody for each verse 
nevertheless yields a difference-from-itself as each new line of lyric 
forces the melody into variation from its previous form. Linguistically, this 
difference within repetition can be seen to operate through the concept ot 
the creole continuum between various Scots forms of a word, but also their 
counterparts and substitutions in English. Hence, the following examplc~s 
tr·anscribed from Alison McMorland's rendition of The Cruel Mother: "She's 
buriet them where nane cuid see" transforms on repetition into "She's 
buriet them whaurnane cuid see" (ie. passage from English where to Scots 
whaur); "Ye didnae gie us cou milk an reid wine" transforms to "Ye didna. 
gie us cou milk an reid wine" (Scots didnae to Scots didna); further on 
McMorland shifts from fer to tor, and must to maun. Thus, at all levels, the 
form of the Scots ballad transgresses itself - musically and linguistically. 
Nevertheless, Carlyle would probably answer this case against structu,-al 
unity by invoking the theme of essential unity. 
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sovereignty would never again be compromised. According to John Purser, 
the melody's operation as a political icon then makes the Gallic connection 
with its adoption in France through the Scots regiments who aided Joan 
d'Ar·c's victory over English interference in French political autonomy in 
l 1t29 - when her army took Orleans, the melody accompanied the 
reoccupation of the city by French and Scots forces (Scotland's Mu sir:, 
p.63]. All of this (and more) lies before Burns' use of the melody to 
celebrate the wish for self-determination as it manifest itself in 17'J3. 
According to Ellis and Mac a' Ghobhainn, the melody then becomes the 
symbolic fulcrum of the transformation of Scottish radical politics from 
Jaco bitism to Jaco binism, from the royalism of the 1745 to the French-
inspired republicanism of the 1790's Friends of the People, the United 
Scotsmen, and later the Radical Riots of 1820 [lO] [The Scottish 
Insurrection of 1820, passim]. Further, Christina Bewley and Marilyn Butler 
both claim that Burns wrote the song as a protest following the infamoll s 
trial of the republican leader Thomas Muir [ Muir of Hunters hill, p.85, and 
Romantics, Rebels & Reactionaries, p.37, respectively]. What is even worse 
for Carlyle's reading, however, is the widespread tradition that Bruce's 
Address has specific political intertexts with the French Revolution 
[lO] Indeed, according to Ellis and Mac a' Ghobhainn, during the various 
Radical meetings of 1819, Hey Tuttie Tattie was used (as it is today) as the 
anthem of the proposed independent Republic. The riots in Paisley on 11-
09-1819 followed a meeting of Radicals which was inaugurated by the 
rm!lody's rendition by a band from Nielston. At a similar demonstration in 
Airdrie soon afterwards, an entire republican-nationalist band was 
ar-rested by the Unionist authorities for playing this melody. 
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i lself [ll]. 
Carlyle's re-alignment of these specific political traces can be seen 
to stem from passages such as the following, where he invokes the 
powerful spectre of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun: 
It is on his Songs, ns we believe, that Burns's chief influence 
as an author will ultimately be found to depend: nor, if our 
Fletcher' s aphorism is true, shall we account this a small 
ir~fluence. "Let me make the songs of a people," said he, "and 
you shall make its laws." Surely, if any Poet might have 
cq ualled himself with Legislators on this ground, it was 
Burns. [Burns, p.257] 
Carlyle's misquotation here at once invokes and reinscribes the 
rddicality of Fletcher's statement [l21. Fletcher, as an M.P. in the last 
sessions of the Scottish parliament was directly opposed to the ratification 
of the 1707 Treaty of Union. In this context, Carlyle's appropriation of him 
[ll] cf. Thomas Crawford in Boswell, Burns, and the French Revolution, p.59, 
although William Donaldson expresses scepticism regarding the connection 
between the royalism of the song and any possible republicanism [The 
Jacobite Song: Political Myth and National Identity, p.87] 
[l2] The precise nature of the misquotation suggests that Fletcher views the 
roles of the songwriter and the legislator as somehow complementary. 
However, the passage in question, from Fletcher's An Account of a 
Conversation Concerning a Right Regulation of Governments for flu~ 
Common Good of Mankind (1704), actually reads: "I said, I knew a very wise 
man so much of Sir Chr-'s sentiment, that he believed if a man were 
permitted to make all the ballads, he need not care who should make the 
laws of a nation." [Regulation of Governments, p.109] Fletcher's 
determination of song here suggests more that it makes legislation 
redundant. Song is here a political act in itself, one which has a powerful 
hold over the minds of a nation. Burns himself echoes this sentiment when, 
in a letter delineating his own opposition to the Act of Union, he writes 
"When Political combustion ceases to be the object of Princes & Patriots, 
it then [ ... ] becomes the lawful prey of Historians and Poets" [Letters, 
quoted in Jacobite Song, p.84 ]. In both Fletcher's and Burns' statements, 
we find not that song and law are complementary, as Carlyle's misquotation 
suggests, but that song is more powerful than law; in short, that cultural 
power outweighs legislative power, and is capable of usurping its plnce 
when legislation reneges on its responsibilities. Culture becomes the locus 
of "Political combustion", as Burns put it, when a society is deserted by its 
political institutions. 
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as .. our Fletcher" is an example of the penetration of the deviant political 
supplement, and its disempowering resolution back into the structure of. 
i.he centralizing organism. Yet the absorption of Fletcher is a mere prelude 
to the following; 
A heroic Wallace, quartered on the scaffold, cannot hinder 
that his Scotland become, one day, a part of England: but he 
does hinder that it become, on tyrannous unfair terms, a part 
of it; commands still, as with a god's voice, from his old 
V C!lhalla and Temple of the Brave, that there be a just real 
union as of brother and brother, not a false and merely 
sernblant one as of slave and master. If the union with 
England be in fact one of Scotland's chief blessings, we thank 
Wallace withal that it was not the chief curse. Scotland is not 
Ireland: no, because brave men rose there [Past and Presen {, 
p.80] 
The subsequent historical ironies with respect to the statement 
concerning Ireland aside, we find Carlyle here asserting a patriotism with 
rt::s pect to the Scotland of the British Union - a "part of England ... For 
Carlyle, the Union is "one of Scotland's chief blessings" precisely because 
of Wallace's previous, Nordically-defined resistance to it. Now, not only will 
it be hard to fit Carlyle's theories of Irish submission into recent history, 
but, particularly in the context of the new historiography which is gaining 
increasing ground in Scottish scholarship, the contention that Wallace and 
Bruce were somehow preparing the ground for the Union will appear 
remarkable. Carlyle would appear to be arguing from a position which 
defines the 1707 Treaty of Union as the logical conclusion of the 1320 
Declaration of Arbroath. For Carlyle, this political unison is the divine 
message of national telos which Wallace .. commands still, as with a god's 
voice" from Valhalla, and which is inspired "through the soul of Burns ... 
Freedom is not supplementary here, but originary - through a binding to 
the centre, and only through this, can one escape, in Burns' words, 
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"Chains and slavery". In all of this, Carlyle achieves an ideological 
assimilation of precisely that which opposes his politics. "Free-man stand, 
or- free-man fa'", indeed. Carlyle penetrates and absorbs the supplement. 
!3· 7 The Full Organism 
In Carlyle's schema, Burns' songs are generated by inward harmony, 
they are branches of the world-tree Igdrasil. In truly organic Song, there 
is "no separate faculty, no organ which can be superadded to the rest, or 
disjoined from them" [ibid., p.249]. Here we have the full artistic organism 
which penetrates and annihilates, makes war on aesthetic materialism. The 
spread of its fibres throughout nineteenth and early twentieth century 
European culture can hardly be exaggerated, from Beethovenian 
symphonies and Wagnerian opera, to Schenker's graphic analyses. All 
organs of these tree-like structures relate univocally to each other 
according to a single organic principle; the penetrational entelechy ot 
Spirit into matter, and the prophetic narration of this process through the 
medium of celestial song. This song announces the ultimate goal of the 
organism, its telos or final cadence, upon which the organism will be 
completed, and yet our teleological knowledge of its full form, its destiny, 
ensures that the organism is always fully present, always whole in the 
mind of those with melodic Vision, those who can hear-and-understand the 
divine mandate. In carrying the full form of the organism in our minds, 
prior to its temporal completion, we defeat base temporality and are carried 
into the realm of an eternal temporality. In this noumenal realm, the 
organism exists fully-formed prior to, during, and after its entelechy into 
i.lte real space which we inhabit. Our experience of that organism in real 
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time is our opportunity to catch a fleeting glimpse of its true, Ideal, 
transcendental existence. 
Carlyle holds that we who are privileged listeners to this Song must 
realize the mandate which it sets out for the ultimate telos of our nation, 
which must become serious enough to fulfil the teleological prophesy. Our 
nation's final cadence is only reached when all the opposing rhythms of 
our· distant neighbours have been made proximate to our own, for we are 
the chosen few who have been given the rhythm of the gods. It is our 
destiny to strike this rhythm into the machinic bodies of our enemies. This 
is the politics of the phonocentric moment. 
Thus, we read and do not hear Carlyle's message to the serious 
nation. It proves difficult to deconstruct according to the same strategies 
as those which Derrida assembles in Of Grammatology for dealing with the 
phonocentric theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for Carlyle deals directly 
aud violently with the concept of the harmonic interval. His aim is not to 
sing a nostalgic lament for some glorious phonocentric past, such as 
Rousseau sings, but to announce a new warlike organism, an organism of 
empire, which can easily be used to affirm the imperial right of the British 
Union. This is Carlyle the Unionist patriot and patriarch, who will 
annihilate the attempt to establish the politics of the interval which has 
resurfaced so many times in the twentieth century, and which much of 
eighteenth, in its own, politically repressed and culturally traumatized 
way, also called for. 
Clearly, this is more developed a position than Rousseau's mere 
paranoia when faced with the abyss. Carlyle confronts the abyss directly, 
and provides weapons for its annihilation. While he calls for a revitalized 
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'·· .... 
phonocentric ontology which can be compared with Rousseau's, he 
nevertheless takes Rousseau to task on the grounds of representationol 
politics. Where Rousseau prescribed a parliament in which all 
communication was phonic and not graphic, where direct speech ensured 
aulhentic communication, he had not attacked the representational chasm 
at a deep enough level. Carlyle goes beyond Rousseau's self-contradicting 
attempt and prescribes the full demise of democracy. This is to be replaced 
by an aristocracy of warrior prophets who will guide the nation not 
through political oratory, but through the mandate of nature expressed in 
Heroic Song. 
Carlyle deals directly and successfully with the concept of 
"Separation", of the harmonic interval and the supplement. Indeed, he 
reorients the very concept of harmony from the expansiveness of the 
Enlightenment definition to an inwardness which aims to capture nr 
annihilate everything within its reach. 
His aesthetics of the vocal unison are also the politics of the Union, 
of Lhe Empire, and the rhythm of his transcendental song is the rhythm of 
that empire's wars. How can this semiotic be disrupted, and a call made for 
a universal de-universalization, affirming not only the aesthetic, but also 
the political interval? It is not a question of war, as Carlyle's theoretical 
ia vestment implies, but precisely a total disinvestment in the economy of 
copture and annihilation; it is a question of the affirmation of liberties, of 
new connectivities. Joseph Mazzini wrote in 1843 that "Mr. Carlyle 
comprehends only the individual," the true sense of the unity of the humn n 
ruce escapes him." [Essays, p.124] Yet Carlyle perceived a unity beneath 
the illusory appearance of the human race, as Emerson knew when he wrote 
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to him thc1t "You shall wear your crown at the Pan-Saxon Games with no 
equal or approaching competitor in sight, well earned by genius and 
exl1austive labour, and with nations for your pupils and praisers." [quoted 
in ed. George, Essay on Burns, p.xvii] For Carlyle, it was a question of 
determining the poets of the nation, along with Burns, as "a piece of the 
right Saxon stuff: strong as the Harz-rock, rooted in the depths of the 
world [ ... ] like the old Norse Thor, the Peasant-god!" (Lectures on Heroes, 
p.327] This, Carlyle would have said, is a higher unity than the collective. 
As Carlyle bases his image of the serious nation on the teleology of 
the final cadence of prophetic song, could this be deconstructed with nn 
irrtage of the humorous nation which has no cadential closure and, indeed, 
no territorial enclosure? How far can we disinvest in ontological difference, 
and reinvest in differance; a harmonic politics? By what means could we 
sing together, but the while, singing our own songsl131? 
Reflect for a moment on the image of authentic representation which 
occurs in the Rousseauist moment of logocentrism. Derrida (like Smith) 
describes it clearly as a form of mirroring - the re-presentation of a 
present object which nevertheless subverts the idea of an origin: 
There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is 
split in itself and not only as an addition to itself of its image. 
The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. 
The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. [ Ot 
[l 3] In the words of a Bob Marley song, "We refused to be I What you 
wanted us to be 1 We are what we are I That's the way it's gain to be" 
[ Da bylon System, on Survival, 1979]. However the quotation from M arcus 
Garvey on the album cover invokes a Carlylean image: "A people without 
the knowledge of their past history, origin and culture is like a tree 
without roots ... [ibid.] Is it possible that the image of the tree can become 
ruore mo bi.le, less centralized than it is in the hands of Carlyle, whose 
tirades against the 11 Black Ireland .. which would result from Jamaicnn 




lt is this theme of endless folding back onto differing selves which 
Carlyle attacks in Rousseau as "not white sunlight: something operatic; a 
kind of rosepin k, artificial bedizenment." [Lectures on Heroes, p.325] 
Carlyle's programme is indubitably to seal up these fissures and make the 
organism whole once more. As John Lyons comments; 
Carlyle, however, has the mirror turn into a window, and a 
window that looks out not on the world or nature, but into the 
artist himself. He says that Shakespeare's works "are so many 
windows through which we see a glimpse of the world that 
was in him." [The Invention of the Self, p.220] 
In other words, Carlyle strips away the artificial reflective material 
which works behind the glass of the mirror - this material which works os 
the origin of the supplementary cancellation of the origin. In Carlyle, the 
sign becomes wholly opaque to those with vision, the sign is clr:ar 
mediation between the prophet and the "thing itself"; we do not experience 
the mechanics of representation, but the organics of direct connection. 
Yet other representational problems come to light within the image 
of the mirror - Rousseau is not as dangerous a supplement as can be 
imagined. If the mirror is not made opaque, but has its intervallic nature 
fragmented further - if we shatter the mirror - how can the essence of the 
origin be maintained? Just such an insight which will have ramifications in 
the following chapter, and which presages Carlyle, was made by John 
Ireland in Book 6 of his Meroure of Wyssdome (1490); 
tak a merour I richt litle and ane als mekle as a hous I and 
pul a man befor tham baith I thar sal appeir I bot the figur 
of a man in ilkane 1 and the man is bot ane I thocht the figHc 
and similitude be diuers I bot and thou brek the merour in 
mony partis 1 the figur will appeir in ilkane of the partis I 
Hicht sua and thar war ane haste 1 als gret as a hous and ane 
vthir als litle I as it that we wse the body of ihesu contenit in 
bnit.h war all ane 1 and thocht ilkane of thame war diuidit in 
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a hundreth thous~af partis 1 the body of ihesu war vnder 
fhame I bot a ne [ Johannes de Irlandia 's Meroure of 
Wyssdome, Vol.III, p.33] 
Here, we have a most translucent example of what Richard Rorty has 
termed Glassy Essencel15l. It would seem that within an intervallic 
fragmentation of a greater order than even Rousseauist reflection - even 
if one shatters the mirror completely, one may still claim to achieve a unity 
through the penetration of a univocal spirit into all things: the body o[ 
Christ maintains its unity within a diversity. 
At this point, it becomes a severe question of method. If Carlyle's 
organism of Spirit is to be dissected effectively, affectively, we must arm 
[l~] "Take a mirror right little and one as large as a house and put a man 
before them both. There shall appear but the figure of a man in each even 
if the man is but one, though the figure and similitude will be diverse. But 
if you break the mirror into many parts the figure will appear in each of 
i.he parts. Right so even if there were a host as great as a house and 
another as little as it that we use to contain the body of Christ in, both 
were all one and though each of them were divided in a hundred thousand 
parts the body of Christ was under them but one" [trans. Sweeney-
Turner]. As Craig McDonald writes, "The image of the shattered mirror, 
which he attributes to St. Augustine, raises interesting questions, not only 
as to the host's ability to carry the body of Christ in its entirety, which 
is Ireland's immediate point, but, given the title of Ireland's work, the 
ability of a text to reflect its source or the idea it is meant to convey and 
explain. We might be tempted to ask how successfully the Meroure itseH 
reflects the tenets of wisdom to the reader, or, if we take the approach of 
some modern critics, whether there is anything to reflect at all. 11 [ Mirroc, 
Filter, or Magnifying Glass? John Ireland's "Meroure of Wyssdome ", p.448] 
However, the debate around the referent in post-structuralist theory is 
identified by Christopher Norris as part of an ongoing argument between 
realism and nominalism [The Truth About Postmodernism, passim]. In this 
context, see Alexander Broadie's positioning of Ireland's work within the 
broadly nominalist tradition of "The Circle of John Mair 11 and its influence 
on Enlightenment thinkers like Hume [The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy: 
A New Perspective on the Enlightenment, passim]. 
[l~] In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980), Rorty writes of "the 
image of man as possessor of a Glassy Essence, suitable for mirroring 
nature with one hand, while holding on to it with the other. 11 [ PhilosophJ' 
and the Mirror of Nature, p.123] Incidentally, Rorty tangentially derivPs 
the term from the title of an essay by C.S. Peirce: Man's Glassy Essence 
(1892). 
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our·selves with defensive strategies beyond what Derrida has to offer in Of 
Gra.mmatology. Rousseau has already done most of the work for Derrida by 
leaving a network of fissures within his organisms. Carlyle is somewhat 
more determined than that in his weeding out of the interval; he has given 
birth to the organs of metaphysical war and created the organism of the 
vocal warrior. But which direction should we proceed in? 
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cHAPTER N INf~ 
]pROLIFERATING ~OOTS 
Arbor Saeculorum: A great tree and its branches, spreading 
right and left, suggest the twofold aspects of each historic 
en1, temporal on one side, spiritual on the other. The tree has 
its roots amid the fires of life, and is perpetually renewc<i 
f r·um them; but the spirals of smoke which curl among its 
branches blind the thinkers and workers of each successive 
age to the thought and work of their precursors. 
- A First Visit to The Outlook Tower, 
Patrick Geddes, et al, 1906. 
CHAPTER NINE 
]pROLIFERATING JlooTS 
9.1 Reversing Towards the Root 
'Tree' and 'Machine:' contrast these two things. [Heroes, 
p.313] 
We have already noted Carlyle's relation of the processes by which 
the "original man" is organically produced from the spiritual body of a 
specific national soil. This organism operates according to an umbilical 
binding of all organs through the circulation of a celestial melodic essence. 
Car·lyle has given birth to this organism precisely in order to penetrate the 
illusory surfaces which Adam Smith's machinic era attempted to establish 
as a means of de-vitalising signification. Like Vespasian's unconsciousness, 
Smith's aesthetics lead to an interruption of semiotic essential flow. Like 
Arachne, the Scottish Enlightenment wove a web of materialism around its 
underlying reality. 
In a Derridean mode, we could embark upon a deconstructive 
programme which would tackle Carlyle over the same (or at least very 
similar) issues to those of Rousseau. We could in this manner attempt to 
deconstruct the original melodic essence by showing its own illusory, 
surfacial movements. However, Carlyle's ruse complicates such a neat 
programme, by attacking the very ruptures within Rousseau which Derrida 
hooks into. Carlyle is very aware of the particular fissures which entail the 
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self-deconstruction of Rousseau's quest for the origin. Where Rousseau 
proposed that all stems from a single root, Carlyle dictates that deviation 
ff'om the imperatives of that root must be counteracted not only in the 
aesthetic sphere, but also in the political. As Edward Said has noted, we cio 
nol have to resort to complex textual excavations in order to find Carlyle's 
ideological agenda. Carlyle overtly offers a programme of re-binding the 
tis~ures which intervallic metaphysics attempt, and this is expressed 
violently, whether in racial, metaphysical, or semiotic terms. 
Even so, we could still show the deconstructed supplement at work 
in Carlyle. Yet as should by now be clear from our lengthy and often 
circuitous sojourn with the concept of intervallic connection so crucial to 
Derridean supplementarity, the interval itself is a highly plural structure 
- and not necessarily always within the sense of pluralism. Derrida's 
version of harmonic theory is not taken so much from harmonic theory 
itself, but via Rousseau's paranoid reading of it. We can therefore ask the 
question of whether or not Derrida engages with Rameau, or Rousseau's 
Rcuueau (and it should always be borne in mind that the Rameau in Of 
Grammatology is in fact Derrida's Rousseau's Rameau). Derrida makes a 
great deal of significance from the points in Rousseau's texts where 
harmony is temporarily admitted (fissure), but what shape would Of 
Gru.mma.tology take if Rameau was engaged directly, and deconstructed 
specifically at the points where melody is introduced (sealant)? 
The question is this - if deconstruction is the engagement with an 
opposition, the destabilising of that opposition, and "finally" its 
displacement, then why should we necessarily "end" by effectively 
valorising one of the original terms, albeit in a new "deconstructed" form, 
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under erasure and all? In other words, could we not de stabilise the origin-
supplement relation by working on the structure of the origin in order to 
deconstruct the ontological residues which are risked in the supplement? 
Is this a reversal of the Derridean project or not, and if so, is the reversnl 
symmetrican If the supplement is not as debased as Rousseau suggests, 
then perhaps the origin is not so originary as Carlyle suggests - the 
significant corollary of this, however, is that if Derrida shows the 
supplementary nature of the origin, perhaps there is an originary aspP.ct 
of the supplement, as a certain reading of Smith can establish. Ultimately, 
though, we are still bound by the shadowy threat of dialectics if we accept 
any dealings with the connection of just two terms. The possibility of re-
closure is always presentU1. 
[l] This problem can be illustrated by a political example. If we were to 
consider the deconstruction of Carlyle's melodic version of imperialism, it 
may be tempting to cite the strategy of decentralisation. Such a proposal 
was made by Andrew Fletcher during the debates around the emergence 
of the British state in the Scottish parliaments of 1703 onwards. His 
argument against an "incorporating union" between Scotland and England 
involved the concept of radical decentralization not only at the British 
level, but also at the national level, with several regional state structures 
within each country. This proposal for "leagued governments" was to be 
extended throughout Europe (effectively, a "Europe of the Regions 11 , pre-
empted by almost three centuries). In terms of its introduction of intervals 
within the body of a unified state, Fletcher's proposal could be seen as the 
inlroduction of a supplementary movement of politics. The problem lies in 
a comparison of the directions in which the citizens of the state can face. 
H is evident that the British Unionist state is "deconstructed" by such 
intervallic federalism. However, the "deconstruction" of one sto te 
apparatus is simply followed by the reconstruction of another state 
apparatus at another level. In this way, a deconstruction is followed by a 
reconstruction, and the citizens are still left within the binding action of 
a state. This is indubitably one of the great problems for the intersection 
of post-colonial theory and deconstruction: disinvest in one layer of 
hegemony not by disinvesting in hegemony itself, but by reinvesting in 
another currency in the same market. The supplement becomes another 
origin; dialectics threaten to close movement once more, to stabilize what 
wos only a provisional movement. One modulates, only to discover another 
fundamental attempting to find its cadence. 
335 
Let us therefore engage Carlyle 's aesthetic organism not by 
approaching the supplement, but from the opposite direction~ taking a 
more risky route, still in a direction away from the root, but by attempting 
to throw ourselves directly towards it. 
9,2 Musical Roots 
The tree and root inspire a sad image of thought that is 
forever imitating the multiple on the basis of a segmented or 
higher unity. [A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, p.16] 
In their two collaborative texts, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1972), and A Thousand Pia tea us: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia II ( 1980), the Parisian philosopher Gilles Deleuze and 
psychoanalyst Felix Guattari deliver a post-structuralist critique of the 
traditions of European thought. In A Thousand Plateaus, this critique 
opens with a contrast between the structural model of the tree and the 
multiplicitous processes of post-structuralism, a contrast which can easily 
be positioned to give a critique of Carlylean organics. 
Deleuze/Guattari 's interest in multiplicity is bound up with the 
plural nature of their authorial conjunction, but also the psychoanalytic 
concept of schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus opens: "The two of us wrote 
Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was s~veral, there was already 
quite a crowd." [Plateaus, p.3] For them, multiplicity requires a certain 
mode of engagement different from that which can be applied to the tree 
model. In a tree, all of the pathways of signification are strictly 
determined. In explaining the structure of a tree, then, one can only 
engage at the beginning, or at least at one of a set of predetermined 
beginnings. For instance, in an organic account of harmonic theory, one 
336 
would first delineate the fundamental root; to begin with an explanation of 
dissonance makes no sense unless one can compare it to the root which 
dt!(ines its significance in the whole structure. DeleuzejGuattari term this 
mode of engagement a tracing - one follows a specific path through a 
slr·ucture in a linear fashion, because the structure itself is ordered 
through the principle of linearity. 
On the other hand, there is the mode of engagement which can be 
characterized as a mapping. On a map, there are no necessary points of 
engagement - one can begin at any point, and stroll through a terrain to 
reach any other point. Rather than moving in a specific direction, one con 
walk in circles, spirals, retrace steps, go left, right, backwards, forwards, 
etc. With this form of engagement one is free to wander, to be a nomad in 
Utis terrain, declaring autonomy from the idea of roots and centres, 
establishing one's own nomosl21. As Carlyle writes in The Nigger Question, 
"In all human relations permanency is what I advocate; nomadism, continual 
change, is what I perceive to be prohibitory of any good whatsoever." 
[Essays Ill, pp.778-9] The first step away from Carlylean organicism and 
rootedness in general, then, is to map the "continual change" which 
constitutes the condition of "nomadism". Yet, in terms of writing, a map is 
difficult to make. Writing is (in the form currently being used at least) a 
linear activity. Any attempt to explain the theories of DeleuzejGuattari will 
necessarily have to trace a particular line through their texts (which 
themselves remain linear). Although a certain point will mark our 
[21 Derrida aligns nomos with the supplement, while also recalling the more 
structural resonances of the term: "Let us now persist in using this 
opposition of nature and institution, of physis and nomos (which also 
means, of course, a distribution and division regulated in fact by law) 
which a meditation on writing should disturb" [Of Grammatology, p.44] 
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b£~ginning, and another our end, the arbitrary nature of these points must 
be acknowledged- with Deleuze/Guattari, engagements of the current type 
ar·e necessarily poised precipitously between the trace and the map. 
This problem of critical engagement yields one of the first of many 
differences with Derridean deconstruction which we will encounter in the 
work of Deleuze/Guattari. Just as Derrida is always at pains to show thi1t 
the action of the supplement is always already fissuring the structures of 
language, with Deleuze/Guattari, the inverse also becomes a problem. Just 
as the attempt to write a map leads to an arbitrary form of tracing, the 
linearity of writing leads us into a position where the serial delineation nf 
concepts threatens to over-structure thought, to turn a multiplicity into 
a tree-like organization. Care is therefore necessary: "It is a question of 
method: the tracing should always be put back on the map." [J] [Plateaus, 
p.13] There are, then, two forms of book- one which operates through a 
tracing, and one which maps a field; 
A first type of book is the root-book. The tree is always the 
image of the world, or the root the image of the world-tree. 
This is the classical book, as noble, signifying, and subjective 
organic interiority (the strata of the book). The book imitates 
i.he world, as art imitates nature: by procedures specific to it 
that accomplish what nature cannot or can no longer do. 
[Plateaus, p.5] 
:Here we read of a similar form of book to that which Derrida outlines 
[)] DPrrida' s conception of the trace is markedly different, and has many 
r.esonances of a tracing on a map: "We must begin wherever we are and the 
thought of the trace [ ... ] has already taught us that it was impossible to 
justify a point of departure absolutely. Wherever we are: in a text wh~:r'e 
we already believe ourselves to be." [Of Grammatology, p.162] In this 
conception of the trace on the map, is also the idea of writing as a furrow 
on a textual field. Elsewhere, Derrida writes of a linearity which is fixed, 
re.ther than mobile: "The end of linear writing is indeed the end of the 
book, even if, even today, it is within the form of a book that new writings 
- literary or theoretical - allow themselves to be, for better or for worse, 







in Of Grammatology as "the book of Nature and God's writing" [p.15]. The 
"root-book" is indubitably what Carlyle intends to write through the 
highly red uctive "harmony" of his melocentric politics- in his attempt to 
hermeneutically interpret the Book of Nature, he will "accomplish what 
nature cannot or can no longer do" and heal up the intervallic fissures 
which Rousseau 's "artificial" interpretation left open. This requires the 
"strata of the book", the structure of imitation which operates through 
significance as an interior binding of segments, an in ward harmon.v, as 
Carlyle puts it. 
Deleuze/Guatt.ari take issue with the vatic bibliomancy of imitation: 
"contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. 
[ ... ] Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to 
describe phenomena of an entirely different nature." [Plateaus, p.ll] 
Further, if the binary nature of imitation is acknowledged, then it can 
quickly lead us into the kind of originary processes which we have already 
identified as complicitous in the Pythagorean concept of cosmogenesis: 
The law of the [root-] book is the law of reflection, the One 
that becomes two. [ ... ] whenever we encounter this formula, 
even stated strategically by Mao or understood in the most 
"dialectical" way possible, what we have before us is the most 
classical and well reflected, oldest and weariest kind of 
thought. [ ... ] Binary logic is the spiritual reality of the root-
tree. [Plateaus, p.S] 
In this context, it is significant that Nietzsche (whose precedence 
for post-structuralism is well-known) writes that "the need for belief, for 
some unconditional Yes and No, Carlylism if I may be excused the 
expression, is a requirement of weakness." [The Anti-Christ, p. 172] For 
Nietzsche, Carlyle becomes the veritable paradigm for the intellectual 
"weakness" which demands binarism, and such Nietzschean themes indeed 
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prepare the field for much of the Deleuze/Guattari argument [41. They 
[
4
] More specifically, Nietzsche accuses Carlyle of assembling a philosophy 
of '!pessimism as indigestion" [ibid., p.67]. Further, he writes in a 
damningly Carlylean tone: "I have read the life of Thomas Ca.rlyle, that 
unwitting and involuntary farce, that heroical-moralistic interpretation of 
dyspepsia.- Carlyle, a man of strong words and attitudes, a rhetorician 
from necessity, continually agitated by the desire for strong faith and the 
feeling of incapacity for it- (in this a typical Romantic!) The desire for a 
strong faith is not the proof of a strong faith, rather the opposite. If one 
has it one may permit oneself the beautiful luxury of scepticism: one is 
secure enough, firm enough, fixed enough for it." [Twilight, p.74] Here, 
Nietzsche appears to make a tangential reference to Carlyle 's attack on 
Hume and concludes that perhaps Hume (whom Nietzsche also criticizes-
cf. Beyond Good and Evil, p .164) had more philosophical fibre than Carlyle 
by the very fact the he was a sceptic. Nietzsche continues in this passage 
by either mistakenly assuming Carlyle not to be Scottish, or by attempting 
to insult him by a stigmatized association. "Carlyle deafens something 
within by the fortissimo of his reverence for men of strong faith and by 
his rage against the less single-minded: he requires noise. A continual 
passionate dishonesty towards himself- that is his proprium, because of 
that he is and will remain interesting. - To be sure, in England he is 
admired precisely on account of his honesty ... Well, that is English; and, 
considering the English are the nation of consummate cant, even 
appropriate and not merely understandable. Fundamentally, Carlyle is an 
English atheist who wants to be honoured for not being one!" [ibid., 
pp .74/5] It is intriguing here to note the use of the term dishonest for 
describing Carlyle, particularly when Nietzsche 's music aesthetics as 
extant in Nietzsche Contra. Wagner, and in The Case of Wa.gner, assemble a 
line of thought whereby Wagner's work is considered to be bad music 
because it is dishonest towards the listener, Brahms' because it is 
dishonest towards itself, and Bizet 's is to be considered excellent because 
it is too ignorant to be deceitful. Equally in this passage, the musical 
metaphor of Carlyle's dialectical requirement of noise is significant, 
particularly given Carlyle 's positioning of a musical metaphor of pure 
unison consonance at the centre of his ontological framework. Again, the 
point is being made that the One requires the existence of the other in 
order to continually reassert its law upon the other. Such means of 
operating philosophy are what Nietzsche calls "the religious way in the 
manner of Carlyle." [Twilight, p.98] In Beyond Good and Evil, after 
assaulting Hume and various English theorists, Nietzsche writes that "What 
is lacking in England and always has been lacking was realized well enough 
by that semi-actor and rhetorician, the tasteless muddlehead Carlyle, who 
tried to conceal behind passionate grimaces what he knew about himself: 
namely what was lacking in Carlyle- real power of spirituality, real depth 
of spiritual insight - in short philosophy." [Beyond Good and Evil, p .164] 
However, at this point, we can discern more of a Carlylean mode to 
Nietzsche than just rhetoric and punctuation - Nietzsche is here claiming 
for himself that very spiritual grounding of philosophy which Carlyle 
attempts to assemble. In the continuation of the above passage, Nietzsche 
(continued ... ) 
340 
assert that the root-book, and any other structural model which relies on 
the connection between only two terms, always lies at the border of 
dialectical territory, and risks tripping over the line. The examples which 
DeleuzejGuattari cite range from the grammatical tree in linguistics, to the 
"tree of delusion" in psychoanalysis[S], and so forth. One could easily 
exlend this list into musical trees, Schenker's graphic analysis being the 
most obvious, but also the tonal system in general, and even seriali::;m 
demonstrate tree-like structuring. The central point is the apparent 
universality of this ethnocentric form of structuring; "It is odd how the 
[~]( ... continued) 
al~;o makes for the moral high ground of a musical ontology, in which he not 
only runs the risk of becoming Carlylean, but also Wagnerian, in the use 
of explicitly musical metaphors for philosophy itself. Not only do the 
English have no actual music, but this is connected to theic 
unphilosophical nature; "But what offends in even the most humane 
Englishman is, to speak metaphorically (and not metaphorically), his lack 
of music: he has in the movements of his soul and body no rhythm and 
dance, indeed not even the desire for rhythm and dance, for 'music'" 
[ lJeyond Good and Evil, p.165] 
[51 The famous example which DeleuzejGuattari expound in Anti-Oedipus 
(the title in itself declares open-season on dialectical structures) is thilt 
of Freud's interpretation of the schizophrenic German judge, Daniel Paul 
Schreber. DeleuzejGuattari here extend the kind of radical anti-
psychoanalysis of R.D. Laing, who claimed that it is not schizophrenics who 
are ill because of their inability to function in society, but society its(~IE 
which is ill because of its inability to accommodate schizophrenics. 
DeleuzejGuattari propose what they call schizoanalysis, which attempts not 
i.o annihilate schizophrenia, but to accelerate it as a significatory process 
in general, and one which ruptures unitary structures, and occasionally, 
even signification itself. Thus, rather than interpreting Judge Schreber's 
visions as illusory, Deleuze/Guattari point to their significatory and 
affective power: "Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. A solar anus. 
And rest assured that it works: Judge Schreber feels something, produces 
something, and is capable of explaining the process theoretically. 
Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not mere metaphors. A 
schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the 
analyst's couch. A breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside 
world ... [Anti-Oedipus, p.2] Here, we find the replacement of the Freudian 
model of the neurotic by the post-structuralist model of the schizophrenic: 
a replacement of t.he dualistic by the multiple. 
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tr·ee has dominated Western reality and all of Western thought, from botany 
to biology and anatomy, but also gnosiology, theology, ontology, all of 
philosophy ... : the root-foundation, Grund, ra.cine, tondement." [Plateaus, 
p.18] From the rooting of harmonics in the fundamental to the grounding 
of developments in thematic reasoning, it is the tree image which provides 
the central term from which all else stems. From the Latin root arbor \VC 
ct:tn characterise this structure as an arborescent model, and this leads us 
again to the root of ancient Greek thought in the appositional table: "The 
Tree is the knot of arborescence or principle of dichotomy; it is the axis of 
rotation" [Plateaus, p.212]. The tree is a point where separate threads are 
bound together into one organism (as in Carlyle) and structured according 
to a centre and its Others (as in Rameau): it controls terms by arranging 
them across an axis and subjecting them to the law of one point on that 
axis (as in Rousseau). 
If such arborescence constitutes the structure of the "classical 
book", operating according to a One-Other, or Subject-Object axis, with a 11 
Others given as debased representations or secondary imitations of the 
One, then the same is also true of the Classical period per se in music; 
the artist, s only cry is Creation! Creation! The Tree of 
Creation! An ancient wooden flute organizes chaos, but chaos 
reigns like the Queen of the Night. The classical artist 
proceeds with a One-Two: the one-two of the differentiation 
of form divided (man-woman, masculine and feminine rhythms, 
voices, families of instruments, all the binarities of the ars 
nova); and the one-two of the distinction between parts as 
they answer each other (the enchanted flute and the magic 
bell). [Plateaus, p.338] 
Ji is easy to continue with other examples which stem from 
Deleuze/Guattari's arborescent image of magic flutes, to continue with any 
nurnber of operatic scenes which are played out in the space around the 
tr·ee, whether structural, metaphorical, or actual. The woodland hunting 
scene is a true archetype. In the instance of Wagner, we have a massivP-ly 
T"f~sonant arborescence, and all specifically within the image of Carlyle's 
Igdrasil: der Weltesche, or World-ash. Indeed, the twilight of the gods, 
G'otterdammerung, opens with the Norns' narration of how the world is 
entering the Fall since Igdrasil was broken, made intervallic, to form 
Wotan's spear, in turn broken by Siegfried's sword, which was drawn from 
Igdrasil's body itself, and so on. A supplementary series developing from 
cHI originary fissure, presaging the Fall from the original order. Yet 
DeleuzejGuattari also point to the shift from Classicism to Romanticism ns 
that from the root to the ground: Romanticism is the cry of "the Earth, the 
territory and the Earth!" [ibid.] Yet territories require peoples, races; 
Carlyle reinscribed his nation as Saxon as opposed to Celtic, and so too 
Wagner sucks in the Cymric myths of Arthur and Tristan, absorbing thP-rn 
too into the Germanic body. What is at stake in Wagner is no longer the 
racial root (racine in both senses) of a single nation, but the national root 
of a whole ground - Europe is German within this nationalism, but never 
without more originary universal roots. As DeleuzejGuattari write, "The 
territory is German, the Earth Greek." [ibid., p.339] Contrasting two forms 
of nationalism within this moment, they state that; 
nationalism is everywhere in the figures of romanticism, 
sometimes as the driving force, sometimes as a black hole 
(fuscism used Verdi much less than nazism did Wagner). The 
problem is a truly musical one, technically musical, and all the 
more political for that. The romantic hero, the voice of the 
romantic hero, acts as a subject, a subjectified individual 
w ilh "feelings"; but this subjectified vocal element is 
reflected in an orchestral and instrumental whole [Plateaus, 
p . .341] 
With the original noble savage Ossian at the helm, Romanticism 
discovered its fundamental territory - the vocal subject, full of Geist, 
whose spiritual melodies are represented, followed, by the masses of the 
orchestra. Der Volk and their hero, and the representation of the folk, the 
capture of the music of the folk: "everything is put in terms of a people 
aTid the forces of a people" [p.340]. Thus Carlyle ends his Rectorial 
Address with a quotation from Goethe, whose poetry he calls the 
"marching-music of the great brave Teutonic Kindred" (quoted in Froude's 
Life of Carlyle, p.591]. 
As soon as the Pastoral had modulated into the region of the People 
and of purity, as soon as Rameau was read by Genevan Rousseau as French 
aguinst Italian, as soon as English Addison claimed a superior Latin origin 
than the modern Italians, as soon as Ramsay read in Scots against the 
English and the Italian - as soon as music and literature were defended 
from foreign incursions, the ground of the Romantic was writtenl6l. Yet 
whether we consider the harmonic branches and melodic roots of Classicism 
or the subject-object territories of Romanticism, the basic structures of 
ar·borescence are intact. To be sure, they are organically developing, but 
always through the dialectics of progress. A progression always rooted in 
the same essential tonality. For Deleuze/Guattari, arborescence and 
tonality are to be read within the same structure; 
In the tonal or diatonic system of music, laws of resonance 
and attraction determine centers valid for all modes and 
endowed with stability and attractive power (pouvoir). These 
centers therefore organize distinct, distinctive, forms that 
[6] For Addison, see his comments that modern English writers resemble the 
Classical writers "much more than the modern Italians pretend to do" 
[Slrunk Source Readings, p.513] For Ramsay, see his farewell poem to the 
composer James Oswald on his departure for London, in The Sco l s 
f\1agazine, October 1741- after listing a number of popular tunes, he writes 
of the lure of the "false Sicilian air", etc. 
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ar·e clearly established for a certain amount of time: a linear, 
codified, centered system of the arborescent type. [Plateaus, 
p.9.5] 
Harmonic theory, then, presents us with an arborescent model: well-
structured plants all circulating fundamental essences in structural 
pr·uportion with each other. Tonality provides us with an image of music as 
a well-ordered garden -nature tempered by art, nature reaching its true 
ielus in ordered form. The gardener digs down to the roots, yet in doing 
this, inevitably penetrates the ground, grundj racinej urlar, and 
ruanipulates an even more fundamental reality. DeleuzejGuattari call this 
the plan(e) of organization, and also the plan(e) of development: a. 
combination of the notions of plan and plane; in other words, a plane 
subjected to the organization of a plan - a surface manipulated into a 
slr·ucture. This structure, however, is one which lies behind, beneath, 
above, within the actual surface of the musical garden -its precise location 
in relation to reality is not important, except that the real exists in a 
dimension supplementary to it, so that the originary plan( e) is always prior· 
to it and generating it, giving birth to it as a compositional principle; 
The tree is given in the seed, but as a function of a plan(e) 
that is not given. The same applies to music. [ ... ] There is a 
transcendent compositional principle that is not of the nature 
of sound [ ... ] Is not Stockhausen also obliged to describe the 
structure of his sound forms as existing "alongside" them, 
since he is unable to make it audible? [Plateaus, p.266] 
Stockhausen has many knots of arborescence in his work, 
particularly in relation to matters onto-theological. For him, music itself is 
a form of arborescent plan(e) abstracted from organic reality; he writes 
i.lirLt it is the "abstract form of processes which bring about the life of 
organisms." [Towards a Cosmic Music, p.89] Within this conception of music 
as a distillation of the essences of the world, we can also see that his 
organizational plan(e) does not necessarily include organisms such as 
weeds: "I think that a planet like ours is a kind of garden. There is still <1 
lot of work to be done over the course of millions of years in order to 
transform the planet into a pleasant, aesthetically beautiful, and well-
or·ganized place." [ibid., p.93] Indeed, he sees his work as a component of 
this gradual movement towards a world- telos, and has distilled the 
slructure of this evolution into the plan(e) of ideas behind the meta-
Wagnerian opera cycle, Licht. This idea of light as pure Geist and 
developmental goal is expressed in the necessity of nurturing a "timeless 
validity in order to counter destructive relativity" [ibid., p.lOl], yet this 
"li111elessness should not lose sight of the idea of "history with its demands 
that spirit be manifested in music" [p.108], and also of "the integrating 
Svirit" [p.109]. Stockhausen also attempts a return to the ultimate musical 
root: "I'm not a specialist in Pythagoras but what I've come across here 
and there seems to be the outcome of a unified world concept" with 
everything "obeying just a few universal laws out of which diversity 
develops. [ ... ] I'm just a mouthpiece, a trail-blazer in whom this emerging 
current manifests itself in music." [ibid., p.109] How Carlylean is this 
branch of Modernism. 
There are, then, not only musical gardens which operate according 
to the principles of tonality. Atonal music, too, can operate according to a 
plan(e) of organization. In this sense, dissonance in itself is no guarantee 
of a deconstruct.ing situation, just as the harmonic supplement en n 
reconstruct itself into a point of arborescence. From this position, we can 
ask what is at stake in the image of the tonal tree? DeleuzejGuattnri 
suggest that "we do not need to suppress tonality, we need to turn it 
loose." [Pia tea us, p.350] How, then, shall we approach this loosening, and 
where will it lead, if not to dissonance? If it is a question of a musiccll 
ar·boriculture, then it is also possible to consider how our organizing 
planner nurtures consonance, and weeds out dissonance. Certainly, one of 
the points of departure which Deleuze/Guattari make as they plough their 
way through the map of sound is a statement by Boulez relating to "a seed 
wl1ich you plant in compost, and suddenly it begins to proliferate like a 
weed" [quoted in Plateaus, p.519, n.8]. In this context, the weedy 
proliferation referred to comes from a composer of atonal musics, but such 
images are widespread. For instance, the anonymous author of the 
Sixteenth Century treatise The Art of Music writes of "the gardin of music" 
which consists not only of the "plesand plantis of concordance", but also 
of "all kind of wyld weydis, that is to say, all barbur and onformall 
puyntis" [barbarous and unformed points]. The former should be "plantit" 
in the garden, whereas the latter are to be "utterly exterminat", weeded 
out by the composer [quoted in Ross, Musick Fyne, p.173]. Francis 
Hnlcheson and Alexander Malcolm refer to concordances as culinary 
delights, arid certainly one would not wish to eat a weed - that is, unless 
one were one of Carlyle's discordant barbarians, such as the Irish peasant. 
Carlyle states absolutely that "All Poor-Slaves are Rhizophagous (or Root-
eaters)" [Heroes, p.172], and here we find another point of intense 
resonance in this web of images - Carlyle specifically associates the 
"barbur and onformall puyntis" of the social garden with what 
Deleuze/Guattari determine as the enemy of the tree-root - the rhizome. 
However, if we are about to partake of a weedy, rhizomatic meal of "Potato 
[ ... ] and Potheen" [ibid.], then we would do well also to recall a furthf~r 
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desecration of spiritual soil which was carried out by the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Wordsworth, in truly Carlylean mode, gives us n n 
appropriately rhizomatic image, writing disparagingly of its lack of a 
literary plan( e) of organization, and the temptation "to think that there at~e 
no fixed principles in human nature for this art to rest upon." -
This opinion seems actually to have been entertained by Adam 
Smith, the worst critic, David Hume not excepted, that 
Scotland, a soil tof7yhich this sort of weed seems natural, hns 
produced. [Essay , in Poetical Works, p. 7 46] 
If being a weed can not necessarily be achieved through even the 
most supplementary of dissonant intervals, if this attempt to dislocate from 
the root can just as easily result in being arborified at another level into 
one of Stockhausen's plan(e)s of organization, then perhaps we must graft 
ourselves onto other forms of horticulture than that of the root. If 
Wordsworth and Carlyle are correct, then it may once more be a question 
of certain affects from the Enlightenment. Let us begin to trace our way 
towards this movement by attempting to map the affects of the rhizome. 
9.3 Music is a Weed 
The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified 
surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulhs 
and tubers. [Plateaus, p.7] 
This statement serves as a salutary warning against the attempt to 
summarize all the possible forms or characteristics of the rhizome. Above 
all, it is a process, and not a structure (or, with Stockhausen, an "abstract 
form of process") - if a rhizome is identified it will be different to all other 
rhizomes. In this sense, there are multiplicities at work within the rhizome 
[?] This arborescent propaganda is ironically given a most Derridean title: 
Essay, Supplementary to the Preface (1815). 
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wl1ich, indeed, constitute it and are produced by it. The rhizome thus has 
no underlying plan which can be traced. Rather, it has characteristics 
wl1ich can be mapped. There is no specific point at which we must enter the 
structure of the rhizome, there is no beginning as such, no point or 
origination. Not one root from which all else stems, but a whole system of 
roots (which can also be described as stems), indeed, nothing stems from 
anything else, or is rooted in them. Rather, the particles of the system 
graft themselves onto each other, continually making new connections: 
"unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other 
point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same 
nature.,. [Plateaus, p.21] In this sense, the rhizome does not even provide 
stability within its own instability; there is no "structure" of instability in 
a rhizome. For instance, although the root requires structuring, an 
organizational plan(e), it can nevertheless find itself being connected to 
a rhizome, and even overwhelmed within a rhizomatic system; ,.there are 
knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots." 
[Plateaus, p.20] Rhizomatic movement can begin to occur at any point, but 
can also become arborified at any moment. For present purposes, it will be 
eJJough to consider only one of these possibilities: 11 if it is true that it is 
of the essence of the map or rhizome to have multiple entryways, then it 
is plausible that one could even enter them through tracings or the root-
tree" [Pia tea us, p.14] In other words, if the Western tonal system in music 
represents an example of arborescence, then how can we begin to place 
ourselves within the rhizome from the position of the harmonic root? At 
whut point does the root lose its centrality and become a rhizome in a 
decentred system? 
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T>r!leuzejGuattari hint that the move from the tonal to the modal can 
be a stf~p towards the rhizome: "It is true that the minor 'mode' gives tonnl 
music a decentered, runaway, fugitive character due to the nature of its 
intervals and the lesser stability of its chords. 11 (Plateaus, p.95] In this 
emergence of decentralisation, we begin to move away not only from the 
central organising plan of tonic-dominant relationships, but also begin to 
hear echoes of true modalities, taking us away from European territories, 
and beginning to manifest certain "phantoms of the Orient". Perhaps we 
can hear these phantoms which DeleuzejGuattari allude to in the Aeolian 
modality of the natural minor scale, or even more resonantly in the 
augmented second (minor third) between the flattened sixth and the raised 
seventh of the harmonic minor. Perhaps we can also hear these echoes in 
U1e increased instability of structure in the melodic minor, but certainly, 
in all of this, musical minority begins to take on a multiplicitous aspect in 
comparison to the rigidity of the major scale. Not only a multiplicity of 
forms for that minority (naturaljharmonicjmelodic), but also a dual and 
conditional arrangement within one of those forms (melodic ascending -
descending) [BJ. 
Yet, we are only beginning to scratch the rhizomatic surface with 
the minor modes. One can indeed trace away from the root towards 
"dissonances" other than Stockhausen's planned structures, and even 
characterize this movement in spatial terms- "tempered chromaticism hns 
cllt even greater ambiguity: stretching the action of the center to the most 
distant tones" [ibid.]. However, as we have seen, even if we manage to snop 
[61 DeleuzejGuattari do not provide this elaboration themselves, but tracing 
through the maps of their theories, one cannot help but find such 
resonances. 
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the centralising action as we stretch it, an arborifying Carlyle or 
Stockhausen can still come along and plant us firmly back in the grounrl. 
Dr:leuzejGuattari suggest an active resistance in answer to such forced 
arborification. One form of resistance lies in the movement from "tempered 
chr-omaticism" towards the concept of" generalized chromaticism". Here, we 
"turn back against temperament, affecting not only pitches but all sound 
components - durations, intensities, timbre, attacks [ ... ] By placing all its 
components in continuous variation, music itself becomes a superlinear 
system, a rhizome instead of a tree". [Plateaus, p.95] In this field, it is no 
longer a question of oppositions between melody and harmony, of the 
origin of one in the other, or even the possibility of one always already 
fissuring the other or being closed by it. There is no longer any bi-polnr 
axis to be concerned with overthrowing. 
According to DeleuzejGuattari, "what constitutes arborescence is the 
submission of the line to the point." [Plateaus, p.293] This principle of 
rooting has particular significance for the way in which we conceptualize 
musical structures, and here we can begin to discern further resonances 
with the whole problematics of Derridean supplementarity; 
Musical representation, on the one hand, draws a horizontal, 
melodic line, the bass line, upon which other melodic lines 11 re 
superposed; points are assigned that enter into relations of 
counterpoint between lines. On the other hand, it draws a 
vertical, harmonic line or plane, which moves along the 
horizontals but is no longer dependent upon them; it runs 
f r·om high to low and defines a chord capable of linking up 
with the following chords. [Plateaus, p.295] 
The structure of the score, then, arborifies the possible 
relationships of musical parameters. While linearity is achieved, it is always 
wahin the grid of the Cartesian graph, an x-axis and a _y-axis, melody and 
harmony lines: root-lines and tree-lines. These lines are not "free", but 
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an.~ tracings connecting points (and thus are lines segmented into points), 
joined together at the ultimate root-point of origin o. The linearity of the 
score is "the submission of the line to the point". In Derrida's approach to 
the time-space axis in Enlightenment music theory, it was suggested that 
the originary supplement would loosen the geometric rigidity of the origin-
root structure. The hinge of differance became effectively a mobile origin 
(supplement at the origin), displacing the staticity of the .x-y articulation 
at the origin o, allowing the connection of the two lines at any other point. 
ln DeleuzejGuattari, however, the question is not so much one of the 
axiological articulation of two root-lines, but the picking up of the 
rnultilinear "lines of flight" which inhabit the areas between the 
arborescent lines. One way in which it is suggested that tonality can be 
"fr·eed", then, is to break with this arborescent principle, to free the 
linearity of the theme, turning it from a rooted connector of points into a 
freely-moving, rhizomatic line; "Opposed to the punctual system are linear, 
or rather multilinear, systems. Free the line, free the diagonal: every 
musician or painter has this intention. One elaborates a punctual system 
or a didactic representation, but with the aim of making it snap, of sending 
a lr·emor through it." [Plateaus, p. 295] It is not a matter of disposing with 
the structure of the score, then, so much as subverting its rigidity, not 
allowing oneself to become rooted to the arborescence which it will attempt 
to impose upon sound. In the "snapping" of the score-tree, its roots arc 
severed, and as soon as this occurs, new shoots will rhizomatically 
proliferate in all directions. These offshoots produce a disorganized system 
of rnultilinearity (and here, we have the possibility of a non-ontological 
reading of the hypotenuse of Burns' Caledonia more in accord with Burns', 
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than Carlyle's politics). 
It is easy to imagine this as a compositional possibility, since the 
arborescence of the tonal system and of Stockhausen have already ber~n 
mentioned, but when DeleuzejGuattari write of the freeing of the diagonal 
by "every musician 11 they do not mean merely the compositional field. 
Performance, too, can be a rhizomatic activity. For instance, "even a rubato 
by Chopin cannot be reproduced because it will have different time 
characteristics at each playing." [Pia tea us, p. 271] Differences in 
performance speeds, then, can begin to throw weeds into the musicnl 
gc:wden, begin to break up the planned ground, snap roots and encourage 
rhizome growth; "There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such c1s 
those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines. When Glenn 
Gould speeds up the performance of a piece [ ... ] he is transforming the 
musical points into lines, he is making the whole piece proliferate.•• 
[Plateaus, p.B] The rubato-rhizome is undoubtedly one way in which a 
performer can snap a root-line, but this temporal, horizontal root-line is 
only one of the axes of the Cartesian graph. In this sense, rubato is only 
one possible beginning of the weedy proliferation of arborescent 
structure. If a fully rhizomatic situation is to be reached, it is clear thn. t 
disruptions will have to occur not only on the temporal axis, but also on 
the harmonic. String players utilize such techniques under the heading of 
intonation, and even a cursory experience of such a performer as the 
'cellist, Paul Tortelier will be enough to understand the rhizomatic 
principles involved in using rubato with intonation in order to snap 
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arborescent axes [9]. 
Further, and even the articulated relationship between the vertical 
and horizontal axes will have to be snapped in order that a multiplicity nf 
fr-eely-moving lines can sweep them up in a general movement. 
Deleuze/Guattari write of the point where this is achieved as a chaotic 
moment, where everything is at stake [tO]. This is the moment at whir.h 
music is produced, and we move from the representational codes of the 
score to the affectivity of sound: "In a multilinear system, everything 
happens at once: the line breaks free of the point of origin; the diagonal 
breaks free of the vertical and the horizontal as coordinates; and the 
trunsversal breaks free of the diagonal as a localizable connection between 
two points." [Plateaus, p.297] In this manner, the snapping of the roots nf 
musical geometry give rise to a nebula of moving lines, and 
Deleuze/Guattari characterise this nebula as the sound block. The sound 
b1ock evidently has no locality as such, since it has been freed from the 
coordinates of the graph which function to place, or to plant the block in 
a g·round, whether harmonic or melodic, and to re-graft the lines to a root. 
The sound block, being without coordinates, origin, or telos, is effectively 
composed of a middle or milieu- a line which is not subjected to the point, 
whether this point be at a beginning or an endingl111. From here, we con 
tnjce through DeleuzejGuattari's mapping of the sound block to discover 
l91 In particular, hear Tortelier's recording Bach: The Six Cello Suites 
(1983), where his use of rubato and intonation are more than Chopinesque. 
(lO} For another rare example of a theoretical discussion of the moments of 
performance, see David Sudnow,s phenomenological analysis of his own 
learning of jazz piano, in Ways of the Hand (1978). 
[ll] Deleuze/Guattari use all the resonances of the term milieu: middle, 
amidst, middle course, environment, (social) underground. 
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another identity, since "a rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in 
the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo." [Plateaus, p.25] Very 
clearly, then, we can read the sound block as a rhizome, a collection of 
lines of flight away from their previous identity as an organic system of 
roots. Here, we are also within the theoretical milieu of Kristeva 's 
intertextuality. 
However, the performance milieu of the sound block is not the only 
point where music can become weedy. Deleuze/Guattari also point to the 
ruptures and points of proliferation in musical form itself (indeed, the 
enthusiasm that they show for musical examples and models leads one to 
wonder whether they view music as perhaps the rhizome par excellence); 
"Music has always sent out lines of flight, like so many 'transformational 
multiplicities, 1 even overturning the very codes that structur~ or arborify 
it; that is why musical form! right down to its ruptures and proliferations, 
is comparable to a weed, a rhizome." [Plateaus, p.12] Music is a weed, then, 
but in many different ways; there is a multiplicity of weeds which can be 
grown in the field of sound. Just as rubato or intonation in a performance 
can begin to snap temporal arborescence, so too musical form per se can 
become composed of lines of flight from arborescent coordinates, and one 
can consider "continuous variation 11 from the viewpoint of a tonal style, 
too: "Rediscover Mozart, and that the 'theme 1 was a variation from the 
start. 11 [Plateaus, p.309] In other words, just as a root can begin to 
proliferate into a rhizome, so too the theme can be heard not so much as 
the ground on which the development is situated, or as its motivic origin, 
but as a part of the variation process already begun. 
From the point of view of its position within an arborescent 
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st r·ucture, the theme can be described as a line which is fixed between two 
points, say, anacrusis and cadence, but also as between two axes - the 
vertical and the harmonic. If we approach such a fixed line, we can only 
hope to trace it, to delineate its teleological movement from beginning to 
end (always reciting the prime directive of arborescence: in principio 
erat). 
The idea of thematic variation as potentially taking either an 
arborescent or a rhizomatic mode is clear in the performance pracU~es 
which affect the form of a piobaireachd. One begins, of course, with the 
urlar, or ground, and then proceeds through a series of variations which 
are often more rhizornatically than organically related to the urJarU21. 
However, the crucial point is how to end the piece: (1) often, one ends on 
the highest point of proliferation, the crunluath[131; (2) just ilS 
"traditionally", one can then return to the urlar, thus closing off the 
intervening variations as simply the means of connection between n n 
originary point and its self-identical telos; (3) a further rhizomatic 
complication, however, is that one can also repeat the final urlar while 
walking out of the hearing of the audience, thus giving the impression of 
a disintegration of the urlar into the rhizomatic field of ambient sound. It 
is this articulation of formal arborescence by performance-rhizomes which 
aligns plobaireachd with DeleuzejGuattari's assertion that "it is a question 
[l2] The Gaidhlig ur in this context should not be· confused with the 
Germanic ur which one finds in terms such as ursatz or urtext, although 
the associations are arbitrarily very close: urlar comes from air (upon) as 
an intensive prefix to Jar (ground). 
[IJ] This term can also signify a seal, but is comprised of the two elements 
crun, meaning "crown", and luath, meaning either "swift"/"nimble", or as 
a noun, "ashes". 
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of method": by either refusing the return to the origin, or by returning 
only in order to further displace it, piobaireachd performance practise 
always takes the tracings of organic structure within it and puts them 
" back on the map". This is what constitutes the differance of piobaireachd 
- the difference with a repetition, an identity made across time to differ 
from itself. 
Deleuze/Guattari themselves list instances from Boulez, Beethoven, 
Schumann, Wagner, and so on, as points where the form-rhizome begins t.o 
proliferate. In order that this occurs, however, there must be an 
arborescence in place to rupture, as in the examples from the performance 
of Chopin and plobaireachd. Once more, their example is in the field of the 
temporal: "Ravel and Debussy retain just enough form to shatter it, affect 
i l, modify it through speeds and slownesses. Bolero is the classic example, 
nearly a caricature, [ ... ]that preserves a minimum of form in order to take 
it lo the bursting point." [Plateaus, p.271] It is clear, then, that to a high 
degree, the affectivity of the rhizome depends on the rigidity of the root. 
Nothing can be broken, no lines of flight can be sent out, no sound-
rhizomes can overgrow the garden's "plesand plantis", unless we begin 
with arborescent organisms which can be made to collapse under their own 
weight, become "deconstructed", through our weedy proliferations. 
Yet the difference between this approach to the planned axiology of 
the score, where all lines are thrown into rhizomatic blocks, and Derrida 's 
exacerbation of a single axial line should not be underestimated, 
particularly at those points of connection where the two methodologies 
appear to be at their most commonly articulated. Surely we can read the 
following as an oblique (perhaps diagonal) reference to the action of the 
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harmonic supplement; DeleuzefGuattari write of "a sound block that no 
longer has a point of origin, since it is always and already in the middle of 
the line; and no longer has horizontal and vertical coordinates, since it 
creates its own coordinates" [Plateaus, p.296]. For the sound-rhizome, the 
sound block, there is no origin, it is always-already in the position of an 
intermezzo. Into this, it is we could almost read the action of t.he 
supplement. Certainly, the supplement has a rhizomatic relationship to the 
origin in Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau; it displaces singularity 
through multiplicitous movement, it puts things into circulation, cuts away 
fundamental structures as far as it can, even if, as we have seen, it always 
runs the risk of merely repeating the origin at higher levels, of falling into 
an endless regression of serial dialectics. Even the most intervallic, most 
supplementary, and least penetrational aspect of harmonic theory which 
has been considered above, that of sympathetic vibration, or, in more 
general terms, the affectivity of sympathy in Smith's moral aesthetics -
even the merest concept of a common resonance of one term with another 
runs arborescent risks according to Deleuze/Guattari: "Resonance, or the 
communication occurring between the two independent orders, is what 
iustitutes the stratified system." [Plateaus, p.57] This, indeed, is the limit 
of the concept of the supplement. How can we ensure that harmonics, 
however intervallic, do not merely become re-rooted, if their meaning as 
harmonics is in terms of their relationship to a root, indeed their very 
signification is in terms of the idea of the sign, however displaced, and 
when even sympathy implies a certain gravitational tendency towards re-
roo ling, even with its radically mildest hint of unison, identity of 
understanding? 
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Wilh DeleuzejGuattari, we have seen that proliferation is not merely 
a matter for the consonance-dissonance axis, or even the melody-harmony 
cn;is. All parameters can be swept up in rhizomatic movement, but the fact 
that the rhizome must be actively nurtured, and that although its reality 
i.s one of being always-already in the intermezzo (nevertheless relying on 
an arborescent point from which to fly), leads one to wonder where we con 
go after the rhizome-supplement has been established. From certain points 
of view, the rhizome itself can be read as a semi-arborescent form, not 
fully broken and flying; 11 There are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and 
rhizomatic offshoots in roots. Moreover, there are despotic formations [ ... ] 
specific to rhizomes, just as there are anarchic deformations in the 
transcendent system of trees .. [Plateaus, p.20]. In this, DeleuzejGuattor~i 
diagonally confirm the critique of supplementarity that our lengthy 
sojourn with harmonic theory provided. Once we have established the 
supplement, it can all too easily become re-originated, re-rooted, 
particularly in the field of dialectics which sterns from the Pythagoreii n 
appositional root. What is even more significant, however (as the example 
of Carlyle shows) is that there are many who will attempt actively to 
provide political attempts to re-root us. In this light, our attempt to locate 
ourselves upon a post-structural field becomes one not so much of proving 
what i-s out there as a supplementary movement, or a substitute for a 
pr·eviously acknowledged universality, a universal non-universality. The 
certainty of uncertainty is no longer so certain. Other approaches will 
have to be explored - how do we actively keep the supplement in 
continuous opening, if this is what we desire? 11 0nce a rhizome has bP.(~n 
obstructed, arborified, it's all over, no desire stirs; for it is always by 
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rhizome that desire moves and produces. Whenever desire climbs a tree~ 
internal repercussions trip it up and it falls to its death [Plateaus, p. 14]. 
If the rhizome-supplement is truly an intermezzo, and if it follows the 
proliferation of the root-origin, then what happens on its other side- what 
are its proliferations once it has de-arborified a structure? 
.9.4 Synthetic Milieu 
The method of composing with twelve tones substitutes for 
the order produced by permanent reference to tonal centres 
an order according to which, every unit of a piece being a 
derivative of the tonal relations in a basic set of twelve tones, 
the 'Grundgestalt' is coherent because of this permanent 
reference to the basic set. Reference to this set offers also 
the justification of dissonant sounds. [ ... ] They are natural 
and logical outgrowths of an organism. And this organism 
lives as vitally in its phrases, rhythms, motifs and melodies 
as ever before. [My Evolution, in Style and Idea, p.91] 
We may say long live Chabrier, as opposed to Schoenberg, 
just as Nietzsche said long live Bizet, and for the same 
reasons, with the same technical and musical intent. We go 
from modality to an untempered, widened chromaticism. We do 
not need to suppress tonality, we need to turn it loose. 
[Plateaus, p.350] 
Leaving the ground of Schonbergian developing variation, we arrive 
in the conceptual milieu of Deleuze/Guattari 's continuous variation~ 
achieved through a widened chromaticism. This constitutes the shift from 
organism to rhizome. It is not a matter of an increasingly supplementary 
shift from the root towards a dissonant harmonic; Schonberg will reappear 
and make us develop according to a plan(e) of organization, such as the 
series (and does the Derridean supplementary series not resonate here on 
a necessarily metaphysical plane?). As Deleuze/Guattari point out, we are 
just as likely to be able to plant weeds in a modest rubato as in a 
disintegration of the tonal system. The problem remains, that weeds are 
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nevertheless planted. All that has happened is that we have discovered 
some of the more remote regions of the same old system. In a developing 
var-iation we still proceed according to a schema on a supplementary 
plan(e), indeed, a Platonic plan(e) which will serve to manipulate or 
arliculate surface Style from the perspective of a transcendental Idea. The 
movement of this articulation will inevitably be dialectical. Plato and 
Schonberg: two Ideas of the transcendent, two variations developing from 
the same Ideal root, two manifestations of what Nietzsche termed 
CarlyJisrJHl. 
In a continuous variation, however, chromaticism need not be limited 
to pitch. Gradual shifts can occur between categories, blurring boundaries, 
and beginning to demonstrate not so much the intervals which 
differentially separate, but the proximities which are passed through in a 
differential glissando - a movement between, through the milieu, the 
intermezzo, no longer charting the interval as a gap (as in Rousseau and 
even passages of Smith), but mapping bodies within its space. Here, we 
[H] Jn her book, Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western 
Music, Rose Rosengard Subotnik, while remaining essentially Schonbergian, 
transfers herself from the concept of Idea to that of a critique of Ideology, 
inspired by the dialectical articulations of Critical Theorists such os 
Adorno. While in her preface and endless endnotes, she seems at pains to 
suggest that her methodology has changed through a more recent 
"exposure to a French way of thinking" [p.xxii] (and continually hints that 
the sequel will be titled Deconstructive Variations: Music and Reason in 
Western Society), she nevertheless provides an excellent insider's view of 
the concept of developing variation: "a process whereby a musical element 
s u l>jects itself to logical dynamic change while simultaneously retaining its 
original identity, thus overcoming the contradiction between identity and 
nonidentity. [ ... ] Development is the process through which the musical 
subject demonstrates its self-generated powers as it 'goes out,' in 
dialectical terms, from itself into the generalizing world of Other or object 
-through which it demonstrates, in other words, its freedom in objective 
reality." [Developing Variations, p.20] It is in this sense, that the "musical 
subject" arborifies itself as a point of structure in a root-line, rather than 
a milieu or a line of flight. 
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rr:ilch a new form of connectivity. According to DeleuzejGuattari, a machine 
is required to achieve this movement through bodily states: "A synthesizer 
plitces all of the parameters in continuous variation, gradually making 
'fundamentally heterogenous elements end up turning into each other in 
some way.' The moment this conjunction occurs there is a common matter. 
It is only tlt this point that one reaches the abstract machine" [Plateaus, 
p.1 09] The synthesizer is the abstract machine which is capable of picking 
up a rhizome and taking it yet further from the strucb~re of the rooteci 
organism. Unlike the idea of the supplement, which introduces spacings 
between other supplements as a form of serial connectivity, the 
synthesizer sets the structured parameters of sound into a potentially 
continuous variation, where elements transform themselves from one state 
i.u another. Whereas transitions in a series occur with movement from one 
term to another, the synthesizer can hook into any term and transform it 
smoothly to become any other. In the relatively simple parameter of pitch, 
this occurs quite simply as a glissando - (1) on the one hand, serially, we 
eau supplement Eb with A by substitution, putting A in the place ofEb, but 
(2) on then other, in a continuous variation, Eb can slide into becoming A 
itself; the transformation occurs in the same body, shifting from one 
"place" to another, where "place" now signifies more of a difference in 
constitution than in physical space. However, if the idea of the synthesizer 
is transferred to the connections between parameters (as even the 
ar-borescent Stockhausen found in J(ontakte), a pitch can be slowed down 
until it transforms into a pulse - both operating according to a "common 
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matter" of frequency liS]. 
Let us consider an extension of this transition from the vertical 
through to the horizontal, harmonic to melodic, in an example drawn from 
Deleuze/Guattari. As we have seen from Derrida's critique of Rousseau, the 
opposition between melody and harmony can also be transposed into on 
opposition between the voice and the instrument, and even as far as the 
organism and the machine. Derrida obviously aligns himself theoretically 
with the harmonic supplement, and thus implicitly with the instrumental 
machine, whether we view this from the position of the Moderns' anti-
Ancientism, or Adam Smith's conceptual chains which harmonize reality. 
Deleuze/Guattari, although with a certain Smithian intertext perhaps more 
substantial than Derrida, nevertheless approach the problem from a quite 
different, and less provisionally appositional angle: 11 The Voice-Music 
relation proposed by Rousseau, on the other hand, could have taken not 
only phonetics and prosody but all of linguistics in a different direction." 
[Plateaus, p.96] They argue that, to be sure, as long as the voice is defined 
as the carrier of song, it operates according to the values of self-proximity 
[151 Although Stockhausen found this process of synthetic transformation 
in many compositions, it is almost always tempered by arborescence; his 
concept of serialism as a means of achieving mediated gradations between 
categories is directed towards discovering not an immanent surface but on 
underlying reality such as Carlyle saw. This transcendental reality is 
achieved through dialectical balances between differences arranged and 
ordered along a bi-polar axis; "Serialism is only a way of balancing 
different. forces. In general it means simply that you have any number of 
cleg·rees between two extremes that are defined before starting to compose 
a work, and you establish a scale to mediate between these extremes. [ ... ] 
Ser·ialism tries to go beyond collage, beyond the incoherent multiplicity of 
things. It tries to find unity without destroying the individual elements, 
and that means to interconnect, to -yes, to try to balance out the different 
aspects of sound. [ ... ] I'm trying to go beyond collage, heterogeneity and 
pi uralism, and to find unity: to produce music that brings us to the 
essential One." [Towards a Cosmic Music, pp.? /12] 
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that Derrida identifies in Rousseau, and that it acts as a signifying subject 
to be accompanied by its instrumental objects. However, when the voice 
becomes "tied to timbre", then this self-proximity (which will inevitably 
tend towards knotty arborescence) will rupture and proliferate into a 
voice-rhizome, revealing "a tessitura that renders it heterogenous to itself 
and gives it a power of continuous variation: it is then no longer 
accompanied, but truly 'machined'" [Plateaus, p.96] This reading of 
Rousseau does not place his arguments along an appositional axis between 
two points to then demonstrate the inability of his writing to conform 
consistently to that over-coded structure. Rather, it is a reading of 
Rousseau which assumes a theoretical heterogeneity from the start. The 
result is that the definition of music within the terms of a close connection 
between voice and sound allows the slippage from organism to rhizome, 
always remembering that there are indeed points of arborification within 
the rhizome, as much as lines of flight within two axes. Just as the 
synthesizer is an abstract machine which can transform sound particles 
into each other, this conception of the voice begins to lead into a field 
where not only musical parameters elide, but "where the synthesizer and 
the instrument speak no less than the voice, and the voice plays no less 
than the instrument ... [p.96] If there is a 11 Common matter .. which allows 
these elisions to occur, it is like a matter-stream which the machinic 
assemblage (whether defined as a synthesizer or as a cellist's hand 
creating rubato or vibrato) can hook into, manipulating sound-rhizomes, 
and allowing them to proliferate further in an .. immanent continuollS 
ve:H·iation .. [p.97]. While Smith's conception of theory as an Imaginary 
Machine is based on the harmonization of chaotic elements into some form 
364 
of order, the Deleuze/Guattari abstract machine (as represented by the 
synthesizer) is precisely not an intervallic machine, but one which 
attempts to pick up rhizomes and begin to relocate them on a common 
surface where difference is defined not spatially, but in terms of 
specificity. The abstract machine finds a term and pulls it away from its 
roots, snaps its arborified line of developmental variation, allows it to 
establish its own coordinates beyond the axiological graph, and sets it into 
continuous variation as a line of flight. However, one significant parallel 
remains between Smith and DeleuzejGuattari - just as Smith describes 
theory as an Imaginary Machine, so too Deleuze/Guattari describe 
p1rilosophy itself within the terms of their abstract machine, a machine 
which, although abstract, is not a product of the imagination, but an acbJcll 
machine; 
The synthesizer, with its operation of consistency, has taken 
the place of the ground in a priori synthetic judgement: its 
synthesis is of the molecular and the cosmic, material and 
force, not form and matter, Grund and territory. Philosophy 
is no longer synthetic judgement; it is like a thought 
synthesizer functioning to make thought travel, make it 
mobile, make it a force of the Cosmos (in the same way as one 
makes sound travel). [Plateaus, p.343] 
Wilh DeleuzejGuattari, then, we have moved from a plan(e) of 
organization, through the collapse of its organisms, through the milieu of 
vJeedy proliferation, and into another field, that of synthesis. This field is 
not a ground or an a. priori plan(e) - it does not organize, plan, or 
str-ucture before the event. Equally, it does not exist as a supplementary 
dimension produced by, or even transcending actuality. It has no 
{wborescent interest in coordinates, or, for that matter, in dialectical 
Eyntheses. With it, we move from synthesis as planned development 
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towards synthesis as free variation(16]. The abstract machine of the 
synthesizer composes philosophy or music on a field consisting of a 
common matter, which it sets into continuous variation. In this, we have 
ah;o moved from the concept of variation as organic development towards 
variation as heterogeneity; from the unity-within-contrasts of the 
or·ganicist Romanticist aesthetic, towards the contrasts-within-alleged-
unities of a certain (non)aesthetic of Otherness. 
[l6) This distinction is also made (to a different end) by Stockhausen, who 
defines process as "a development towards something"; in other words, 
development is teleological. This he contrasts with the idea of variation, by 
emphasising the possibility that development is a m~vsterious teleology, in 
that we should not be able to tell where we are going, but once we are 
there, it makes linear, logical sense; this "is not the case with variation. Of 
course you can say: 'If I constantly proceed by leaps and bounds in a 
Suite, I don't know where I'm heading either.' That may be so, but I don~t 
huve the feeling either of any sense of necessity, of the later deriving 
from the earlier and vice versa. The idea of growth is not present. Diverse 
U1ings are simply assembled alongside one another, and this does not 
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Hindaen deendo been deen daendo hinhodinodintro 
- Urlar, Crosanachd an Doill, Campbell Canntaireachd MS. 
CHAPTER TEN 
SouND FrELD 
10.1 Towards Immanence 
If metallurgy has an essential relation with music, it is by 
virtue not of the sounds of the forge but also of the tendency 
wilhin both arts to bring into its own, beyond separate forms, 
a continuous development of form, and beyond variable 
mutters, a continuous variation of matter: a widened 
chromaticism sustains both music and metallurgy; the musicaL 
smith was the first "transformer." [Plateaus, p.411] 
Within this allusion to Pythagoras' discovery of harmony through 
the transforming machines of the smith's forge, we can discern a definition 
of the chromatic which is only tentatively sounded in Smith's Imaginary 
Machine. Here, DeleuzejGuattari compare sound to metal as two media which 
are malleable through the transformative abstract machine of the musician 
and the metallurgist. In each art, one is faced with a surface of 
undifferentiated matter- the "common matter", which an abstract machine 
can hook into and manipulate. DeleuzejGuattari write that "metallurgy is 
the consciousness or thought of the matter-flow, and metal the correlate 
of this consciousness" [ibid.], and reading this sentence analogously, we 
can begin to consider music as the consciousness of the sound continuum, 
an cl equivalently, sound as the unconscious of music. Consciousness is 
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produced from the unconscious sound-stream[!] through the agency of: 
musical abstract machines, such as the voice or the synthesizer. As we will 
see, however, this unconscious is not a plan(e) of origination such ."is 
Freud's conception. It does not pre-exist the musical conscious as the 
origin of its surfacial movements, but has to be actively composed. As 
DcleuzejGuattari write, Freudian psychoanalysis (like most musical critique 
which also falls under the heading of "analysis"), claims that surface 
pl1e.nomena are produced from "a genetic axis or overcoding structure, and 
makes infinite, monotonous tracings of the stages on that axis or the 
co!lstituents of that structure" [ibid., p.l3]. These forms aim to uncover an 
originary substructure (unconscious, ursatz, pitch-class set, etc.), and, 
to coin a term, can be put under the heading of arche-analysis. The 
alternative which DeleuzejGuattari propose is schizoanalysis, which 
[1] The conception of fluid here is not at all the same as that in Carlyle, who 
posited the circulation of melodic essences which penetrate throughout on 
entire system to bind all units together as an organism. The flow which 
DeleuzejGuattari suggest here is not in the sense of penetrational flows, 
or the semiotic spurts of phallogocentrism, but more in the direction of 
what Luce Irigaray suggests in The "Mechanics" of Fluids. Again, it is a 
question of sound and signification, in establishing the phallogocentrism 
of traditional theoretical discourse, the "mechanics of solids": "And yet 
that woman-thing speaks. But not 'like,' not 'the same,' not 'identical with 
itself' nor to any x, etc. Not a 'subject,' unless transformed by 
phullocratism. It speaks 'fluid,' even in the paralytic undersides of that 
economy. Symptoms of an 'it can't flow any more, it can't touch itself .. .' Of 
which one may understand that she imputes it to the father, and to his 
morphology. Yet one must know how to listen otherwise than in good 
furm(s) to hear what it says. That it is continuous, compressible, dilatable, 
viscous, conductible, diffusible, ... 11 [This Sex Which is Not One, p.lll] 
"Fluid- like that other, inside/outside of philosophical discourse- is, by 
nature, unstable. Unless it is subordinated to geometrism, or(?) idealize<i. 
Wornan never speaks the same way. What she emits is flowing, fluctuating. 
Blurring. 11 [ibid., p.112] Following the general drift of this theoretir.al 
wilieu, one could claim that Others (and not only of gender or sexuality) 
are rhizomes until they become arborified as Objects in opposition to <"'i 
controlling Subject. In other words, it is the shift from the indefinite 
article (an Other, one among many) towards the definite article (the Othec, 
one in opposition) which represents arborification. 
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"rejects any idea of pretraced destiny" [ibid.]. Unlike the arche-analytic 
search for unity i.n an originary plan(e) of organization (tracing back to 
the root), schizoanalysis is the moving among surface multiplicities 
(mapping the rhizomes); 
In both psychoanalysis and its object, there is always a 
general, always a leader (General Freud). Schizoanalysis, on 
i.lte other hand, treats the unconscious as an acentered 
system, in other words, as a machinic network of finite 
automata (a rhizome), and thus arrives at an entirely 
different state of the unconscious. [Plateaus, p.18] 
Against the Freudian conception of the unconscious as the 
producing origin of the conscious, then, in schizoanalysis, "the issue is to 
produce the unconscious[ ... ] the rhizome is precisely this production of 
the unconscious." [ibid., p.411] Unlike music analysis which shows a static 
reality beneath a transient surface, and unlike deconstruction which shows 
the surfacial movements of an allegedly static reality, schizoanalysis is the 
ac:live production (rather than merely demonstration) of that surfaciality 
(and again, note the Peircean intertext): "Schizoanalysis, or pragmatir.s, 
has no other meaning: Make a rhizome ... [p.251] Let us continue, then, in 
schizoanalytic mode to consider the point at which the abstract machine 
takes us through the rhizome, and into the production of the unconscious 
stream of music. 
Deleuze/Guattari claim that "metal is neither a thing nor an 
organism, but a body without organs." [ibid.] The same is also the case for 
sound in its movement beyond the rhizome; sound is neither a thing nor an 
organism, but a "body without organs": the rhizome represents the 
loosening of root-structures (a first point of organic collapse), but as we 
h.3.ve seen, nevertheless still contains knots of arborescence as provisionctl 
points within its coagulations of lines of flight. An abstract machine, 
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however, can begin to further loosen these flying lines, and place all of the 
elements on a single surface of continuous variation. This surface hns 
body, but is not an organism - there is no structural development which 
serves to organize its organs into a tree. Sound, like metal, is a body 
without organs C'BwO"), and to an extent, the rhizome itself can be read 
as a BwO; "the sound block is the intermezzo. It is a body without organs" 
[p.297]. The rhizome represents the moment at which the musical organism 
loses its organizational tree structure, and becomes a sonorous body 
breaking free of coordinates. Its organs are placed in a new relationship 
to each other; rather than stemming from a common root, or developing 
fr·om each other, they begin to continually vary from each other, according 
to the operation of abstract machines. It is in this sense that the BwO ea n 
be seen as "without organs"; 
ll is not at all a question of a fragmented, splintered body, of 
organs without the body (OwB). The BwO is exactly the 
opposite. There are not organs in the sense of fragments in 
relation to a lost unity, nor is there a return to the 
undifferentiated in relation to a differentiable totality. There 
is a distribution of intensive principles of organs, with their 
positive indefinite articles, within a collectivity or 
multiplicity, inside an assemblage, and according to machinic 
connections operating on a BwO. [Plateaus, p.165] 
Here we read the attempt to distinguish the BwO from a merely 
anurchic or chaotic miasma. If it does represent one stage in the 
"deconstruction" of the organism, a stage "beyond" rhizomatic 
proliferation, then it highlights the fact that deconstruction is not a 
question of a simple fragmentation of unity, or of an approach to the 
r11erely homogenous. Because the surface of the BwO is operated on by any 
number of abstract machines, there is in a sense an assemblage, or network 
of machinic connections which works against the stratification induced by 
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organics, and encourages lines of flight to develop within their own field 
of coordinates. Once more, lines of flight do not exist as tracings within 
pre-established coordinates on a Cartesian graph, but constantly vary as 
they make their own mappings of a BwO •s surface. Cartography rather than 
Cartesian graphology. In this, the "organs •• of the BwO take on the aspect 
of intensities within a field: .. forms become contingent! organs are no 
longer anything more than intensities that are produced, flows, thresholds, 
and gradients ... [p.164] At this stage, we begin to approach sound as an 
immanent multiplicity, a body which is not an organism, but a BwO whose 
surface is full of sonic lines of flight - a garden full of weeds. Each of 
these rhizomes upon the BwO arises from its surface through the action of 
an abstract machine. In a musical BwO, for instance, one can produce a 
sound-rhizome with the aid of a synthesizer, setting each line of flight in 
variation with itself and others. When the voice or the synthesizer is 
considered in relation to timbral transformation, they effectively set up 
the timbral parameter as a BwO. This body can then become a field of 
intensities which constantly evolve, where 11 forms become contingent" on 
their line of flight between different states. In the move away from 
coordinates in an axiological space, or graph, the abstract machine which 
assembles the BwO takes sound from the extensiona1 towards the 
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in tensionall21. 
The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and 
distributes them in a spatium that is itself intensive, lacking 
extension. [ ... ] It is nonstratified, unformed, intense matter, 
(
2
J There have been certain arguments which claim a stylistic specificity for 
these two terms, centring in on the concept of timbre; characteristica1ly, 
the argument runs that Western Classical music is essentially extensional, 
by virtue of its developing variation procedures, and adoption ol: 
standardized timbral structures, all of which are placed within the axiology 
of notation, whereas Popular musics are essentially intensional by virt.\lc 
of their inflexional approach to timbre which is considered 
untranscribable. Andrew Chester's article in New Left Review 62 (July-
August 1970) makes this claim with an ontology designed to stratify music 
into distinct categories of Classical-Jazz-Rock; "Western classical music is 
the apodigm of the extensional form of musical construction. Theme and 
variations, counterpoint, tonality (as used in classical composition) are ill L 
devices that build diachronically and synchronically outwards from basic 
musical atoms. [ ... ] Thus a basic premise of classical music is rigorous 
adherence to standard timbres, not only for the various orchestral 
instruments, but even for the most flexible of all instruments, the humon 
voice. Room for interpretation of the written notation is in fact marginal. 
[ ... ] Rock however follows, like many non-European musics, the path of 
inlensional development. [ ... ] The history of jazz is largely a transition 
from one to the other" [Second Thoughts on a Rock Aesthetic: The Band, 
pp.78/9] This theory has more recently been criticised by Richard 
Middleton in Studying Popular Music [pp.116/7], who cites Peter van dt!C 
Mcrwe's Origins of the Popular Style as a demonstration of the 
intertextuality of the supposedly discrete categories of Folk, Jazz, Populcn-
and Classical, although Chester himself mentions (in a footnote) that 
electroacoustic music is an example of classical intensionality. However, i1S 
we have seen with various examples provided by DeleuzejGuattari above, 
there are intensional, rhizomatic aspects accessible at many points within 
Classical music per se. Even Schumann, for instance, can be found to 
operate rhizomatic lines of flight which break extensionality: "the madnr.ss 
of Schumann: the cello wanders across the grid of the orchestration, 
drawing its diagonal, along which the deterritorialized sound block moves" 
[Plateaus, p.297] Specifically in terms of timbre, Deleuze/Guattari provide 
several examples from contemporary music, including Berio's Visage and 
Dieter Schnebel's Glossolalie [p.96]. Middleton's reading of van der Merwe 
can also be read as yielding extensional styles within the Popular, such ~s 
"Victorian parlour song". The latter is thoroughly dealt with in Derek 
Scott's The Singing Bourgeois: Songs of the Victorian Drawing Room and 
Pnrlour, which continuously attests a stylistic and generic multiplicity: 
"The desire to categorize a particular portion of all this as \Victorid n 
parlour song' by reference to an arbitrary selection of musical and literary 
criteria has created a \parlour song' consensus in its own way as 
misleading as the tfolksong' consensus attacked by Dave Harker. It is to 
nvoid such categorization that I call this book The Singing Bourgeois ... 
[The Singing Bourgeois, p.viii] 
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the matrix of intensity, intensity = 0; but there is nothing 
negative about that zero, there are no negative or opposite 
inl.ensities. Matter equals energy. [Plateaus, p.153] 
At this point, the BwO begins to resonate with all the 
transformational intensities of contemporary physics, which in itself draws 
a line of flight across the classical opposition between matter and energy, 
le.:1ving behind a full BwO of the cosmos. Within this "entire" BwO, however, 
we have all of the BwOs which constitute the BwO of music, of philosophy, 
ar1cJ so on. Each BwO can be considered as a field of intensifies, a field of 
rhizomes in continuous variation on the same surface of a common matter, 
whether this common matter is considered as a generalized sound-stream, 
a timbral field, etc. This brings us to the meaning of the book's title: A 
'J'housand Plateaus; "A plateau is a piece of immanence. Every BwO is made 
up of plateaus. Every BwO is itself a plateau in communication with other 
pluteaus on the plane of consistency. The BwO is a component of passage." 
[Plateaus, p.158] Thus, just as the organic field is structured into strata, 
the field of immanence is a-structured into plateaus - the difference 
between solid and fluid relationships. And if resonance as sympathetic 
vibration can been seen as "what institutes the stratified system" 
[ Pla tea. us, p.57], represents the beginning of the arborification of the BwO, 
then the plateau can be seen as "a continuous, self-vibrating region of 
intensities", much like Smith's otosynthetic ear. [Plateaus, p.22] 
In this way, the BwO can be described as a field of immanence- a 
site for the individuation of rhizomatic intensities, and this distinguishes 
it radically from the idea of a plan(e) of organization. Indeed, 
DeleuzejGuattari also refer to this field of immanence as the plane of 
consistency. While the organizational plan( e) is inherently bound up in the 
identity of the organism, the plane of consistency is a body without 
organs [JJ. While the plan(e) operates through structuration, in the plane, 
"there is no structure, any more than there is genesis" [ibid., p.266]. This 
is the immanent field of intensities in continuous variation, or continuous 
individuation. In other words, the field of immanence is the garden fulJ of 
rhizomes: the field of musical weeds which tug at the roots of the 
ontological tree, whether those roots are considered to be melodic or 
harmonic. On this field, we find "haecceities, affects, subjectless 
individuations" [p.266], and this is a significant lexical conjunction for 
DeleuzejGuattari to make. At this extreme location beyond arborescence, 
not only do we find ourselves in the immanent milieu of de-structuration, 
bu L this is all expressed through an association between the Enlightenment 
concept of the affect and John Duns Scotus, concept of haecceitas: "the 
plane of consistency contains only haecceities, along intersecting lines." 
[p.263] The distinction, then, between a plan( e) of organization and a plane 
of immanence is the difference between teleological structures and 
[J] The connection between the BwO and the idea of a plane of consistency, 
within the context of a non-organicist field can also be found to an extent 
i u Lyotard, s concept of the "great ephemeral film", the spreading-out of 
which is given in the graphic opening of Libidinal Economy. "Open the 
supposed body and spread out all its surfaces: not only the skin with each 
of its folds, wrinkles, scars, with its great velvety planes 11 [Libidinal 
Economy, p.l (MS. translation by lain Hamilton Grant)]. This gradual 
opening out of a body as an introduction to libidinal economy becomes a 
co11trast to the "organic body of political economy (itself initially 
assembled from differentiated and appropriated parts, the latter nevee 
being without the former)" [ibid., p.2]. Equally, it is a demonstration of the 
fact that there is no 11 libidinal theatre 11 - in other words, no 
"representative chamber 11 [p.2] within a libidinal economy. 
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affective haecceitiesl
41. In this way, the rhizome, the line of flight, 
indeed, the whole movement which ruptures structuralism become!::; 
e11capsulated as much by Scotian haecceitas as by Derridean differance. 
Perhaps more so, since it has already been suggested that the 
JJeleuzianjGuattarian version of post-structuralism can be seen as going 
further in several respects than the Derridean version. It should also he 
noted, however, that one of Derrida's crucial precedents, C.S. Peirce, takes 
an almost Deleuzian/Guattarian interest in haecceitas, calling it the 
"ultimate fact" of differential specificity. [Principles of Philosophy, p.221] 
For Peirce, it is also a question of the relationship between haecceitas and 
indeterminacy as "facts not calling for and not capable of explanation. 
[41 Wordsworth's critique of the weedy Smith and Hume could not be more 
resonant here, but if we can add Duns Scotus to the list of Caledonirtn 
rl1izomes, then perhaps there are also aspects of the original "dunce" to 
be unearthed through further DeleuzianjGuattarian readings of the 
Enlightenment. The concept of the Nature-Culture opposition so crucial to 
Rousseau is rejected on the plane of immanence: "We therefore call it the 
plane of Nature, although nature has nothing to do with it, since on this 
plane there is no distinction between the natural and the artificiaL" 
[Plateaus, p.266] In a parallel move, but from 1767, Adam Ferguson writes 
against the whole series of Rousseauist concerns which characterized much 
Enlightenment thought, whether in terms of time, place, culture, class, etc.: 
"If we are asked, therefore, Where the state of nature is to be found? we 
rnay answer, It is here; and it matters not whether we are understood to 
speak in the island of Great Britain, at the Cape of Good Hope, or the 
Straits of Magellan. While this active being is in the train of employing his 
talents, and of operating on the subjects around him, all situations arc 
equally natural. If we are told, That vice, at least, is contrary to nature; 
we may answer, It is worse; it is folly and wretchedness. But if nature is 
only opposed to art, in what situation of the human race are the footsteps 
of art unknown? In the condition of the savage, as well as in that of the 
citizen, are many proofs of human invention; and in either is not any 
permanent station, but a mere stage through which this travelling being 
is destined to pass. If the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less; 
and the highest refinements of political and moral apprehension, are not 
moce artificial in their kind, than the first operations of sentiment and 
reason." [An Essay on the History of Civil Society, p.8] Note also the 
emphasis on the individual as a milieu in a passage between states: a 
specifically Deleuzian/Guattarian concern, which also links Ferguson in 
wilh Deleuze's text on Spinoza - Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 
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Indeterminacy affords us nothing to ask a question about; haecceity is the 
ultima ratio, the brutal fact that will not be questioned." [ibid., p.221] 
Following on from this, Peirce moves from a consideration of ultimate 
specific differences towards a critique of philosophy as totalizing meto.-
discourse; 
we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the 
universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any 
given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to 
the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing 
whatever. [Principles of Philosophy, p.222] 
In this rejection of the Platonic tendency, Peirce calls for a return 
to Scotus' idea that "the ultimate specific difference is simply to differ 
fr·orn everything else" [S]. It is the this-ness of entities which should be 
studied, and not their derivation from a source located upon a plan(e) of 
organization. 
[S] Although he could hardly have predicted the contemporary Parisian 
interest in Scotus some 650 years after the original dunce taught there, 
Peirce is well aware of his significance within the age-old de bate between 
the realists and the nominalists (which Norris claims is also the basis of the 
contemporary scene - cf. Chapter 1), writing that he "first stated the 
realist position consistently, and developed it with great fullness and 
a I> plied it to all the different questions which depend upon it. His theory 
of 'formalities' was the subtlest, except perhaps Hegel's logic, ev,~r 
broached, and was separated from nominalism only by the division of a 
hair." [Principles of Philosophy, p.79] Further, "the Scotists had almost 
undisputed supremacy in almost all the Universities having gained it by 
their superiority in logic. They therefore appeared as the old fogeys whom 
the Humanists had to fight. The latter called them Dunces after their 
master Duns Scotus. But for the first generation of the Renaissance c'l 
Dunce was far from meaning or suggesting a stupid person. The title 
rather conveyed the idea of a man so skilled in debate on the wrong side 
as to be a terror to the pure humanist upon whom he might fall." [ibid., 
p.418] 
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10.2 Two Silences (Soundproof Rooms and "The Great Cock Question"} 
It is undou~ted~y John Cage who first and most perfectly 
dep.loyed th1s flxed sound plane, which affirms a process 
ar;a1nst all structure and genesis, a floating time against a 
pulsed time or tempo, experimentation against any kind of 
i r1 Lerpretation, and in which silence as sonorous rest also 
marks the absolute state of movement. [Plateaus, p.267] 
In Cage's compositional abstract machine, the plane of immanence is 
the site of composition. In his work, an attempt is made to connect in with 
the field of sound as a distribution of intensities, each charting their own 
individuation as components of that surface. For DeleuzejGuattari, Cage's 
music is haecceitas in sound - affective process. On the sound field, there 
is no spatiality as such, and thus no opposition between presence and 
a l>~;ence, no possibility of a dialectics of presence or even of its 
de construction: "silence as sonorous rest ... Thus one can only map speeds 
and slownesses in the processes of ha.ecceitas, rather than tracing 
developments from sound to no-sound [61. Cage's conception of silence, 
then, provides an image of the sound field at a moment of relative rest. The 
field does not disappear in silence, its sounds merely slow down, without 
negating the general process of continuous variation. For Cage, silence 
[6] This mapping of motions is named by Deleuze elsewhere as ethology: 
"Spinoza's ethics has nothing to do with a morality; he conceives it as on 
e t.hology, that is, as a composition of fast and slow speeds, of capacities for 
affecting and being affected on this plane of immanence. That is why 
Spinoza calls out to us in the way he does: you do not know beforehand 
what good or bad you are capable of; you do not know beforehand what a 
body or a mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given 
combination." [ Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, p.125] Deleuze then continues 
tu consider ethology within the context of .. a plane of musical composition, 
a plane of Nature [ ... ] Uexktill, one of the main founders of ethology, is a 
Spinozist when he first defines the melodic lines or contrapuntal relations 
that correspond to each thing, and then describes a symphony as on 
immanent higher unity that takes on a breadth and fullness ('natural 
composition'). This musical composition comes into play throughout the 
Rfhics [Spinoza's]" [ibid., pp.l26/7]. 
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became not an empty space, but a BwO at rest. His experience in the 
anechoic chamber demonstrated that merely to be alive is to produce 
sound, to be always within a sound milieu; at the very least, even if all else 
is erased, the ear is always connected to the sounds of the nervous system 
and the blood in circulation. Cage's silent room was full of sonic intensities, 
with the body as a machinic assemblage of the field of immanence. Merely 
to be alive is to be necessarily placed within an immanent milieu in the 
sound field. Hence, the famous "silent" piece which, while composed empty, 
yet fills up with unplanned sounds -we are always already in the middle 
of our own continuous performance of 4'33", continuously destratifying 
beyond its temporal structurel71. 
There is another form of silence, however, which attempts to 
submerge the plane of immanence below a ground, and turn it into on 
organized plan( e). It is highly significant, for instance, that while Carlyle's 
silence was planned in opposition to Cage's and was composed of a desire 
to annihilate sound, it nevertheless yielded the same practical results. 
Richard Garnett referred to "his nervous horror of noise", and this fenr 
of rhizomatic proliferation makes a stark contrast with Cage's acceptance 
[71 Allhough the piece is conceived as being in three movements, and has 
an ostensibly stipulatory length implied in the title, Cage viewed the idea 
of this apparent arborification of immanence as a structure to be 
continuously rhizomed: 11 SST: 4'33" doesn't necessarily last that long, does 
it? So how long is the 'Binkies' new version? JC: We don't know, 'cause 
they're using \inner clock'. SST: Right, so they're just deciding on the 
SJ'ot. JC: They won't decide, they'll just do it. Each one will make three 
silences, and leave the performing area after the third silence. They'll 
come in, also, individually, not as a group, and when no-one is there, 
they'll have finished. I think it might last somewhere between 5 and 10 
minutes, rather than 4'33". SST: Right, but it's nevertheless been 
programmed as4'33". JC: Yes, David Tudor once said that he saw no reason 
why a piece called 4'33" should last four minutes and thirty-three 
seconds." [John Cage and the Glaswegian Circus, p.3] 
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[Life of Thomas Carlyle, p.103]. As we have seen, Carlyle's obsession was 
with a melodic origin, but one so pure that to trace one's way back onto its 
or·borescent plan(e) was to first pass from sound to light and then to 
essence and spirit. Thus, the attempt to reach this origin begins with the 
weeding out of unwanted sounds. This took an extreme turn with Carlyle, 
and Froude's Life documents this nervous horror with many instanc0.s. 
Fir·stly, we have the problem of the neighbours at Cheyne Row, whether the 
"the young lady next door [ ... with ... ] her fatal piano" [ Froude, p.431], or 
Honca, the neighbour whose coughing made Carlyle "annoyed at the mere 
noise of it!" [quoted in Froude, p.521] Yet the invalided Ronca's noise 
proliferated further into what Froude names "the great cock question [ ... ] 
Morning after morning the horrid clarions blew." [Froude, p.519] After 
complaints, Ronca supplements his stock with further cocks, until Carlyle 
bursts out, flaming-forth in a terrible vatic song of war, that "'Those 
Cocks must either withdraw or die,' he cried. 'That is a fixed point'" 
[ Froude, p.519] The neighbours were not the only ''horrid clarions" which 
had to be brought to an arborescent "fixed point"- the street was also full 
of sound-rhizomes; "Organ-grinders never ceased to plague Carlyle" 
[ Froude, p.688]. More often than not, the machinic grinder of Carlyle's 
hearing-organs was "a vile yellow Italian" [quoted in Froude, p.519]. As 
Sophie de Morgan recalled: "I have seen him rush out of his house in his 
morning wrap, sending a torrent of words, not descriptive of the state of 
the blest, over two Italians who were playing an orchestration opposite. 11 
[Threescore Years and Ten: Reminiscences, p.231] Finally, in 1853, Carlyle 
organizes a plan(e) to combat such aural weeds, and at great expense 
attempts to build a silent room, whose only windows look skywarns, 
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towards the light-filled heavens. But ... 
Ach Gott! I am wretched, and (in silence) nearly mad! [ ... ] 
Mnsons (who have already killed a year in my life, in a too sad 
manner), are again upon the roof of the house, - after a 
dreadful bout of resolution on my part, - building me a 
souNDLEss ROoH! "The world, which can do me no good, shall at 
least not torment me with its street and backyard noises." 
[ ... ] I seem to be sinking inextricably into Chaos. [quoted in 
Froude, p.521] 
The noisy chaos continues, and the soundless room - the final 
solution for the "great cock question 11 -fails to exclude the weedy field of 
immanence. As Jane Welsh Carlyle wrote, 11 Alas! and the silent apartment 
has turned out the noisiest apartment in the house." [quoted in Froude, 
p.520] For Thomas, however, the silent room becomes a truly "dreadful 
enterprise, that proved, the chaotic element throughout: - a true Satan's 
Invisible World Displayed." [quoted in Froude, p.520] The failure of the 
plan to make the audible inaudible results in a making visible of satanic 
immanence - Carlyle singularly fails to penetrate beneath the surfaces of 
the actual. Immanent surface becomes a barrier erected before the truth 
of underlying reality. The attempt to make essences visible reveals only 
further substances. Smith, who also writes of the "chaos" of immanence, 
would attempt a harmonization of these sounds, using his Imaginary 
Machine to provide chains of meaning. Carlyle, however, has no desire for 
a coming-to-terms with the actual, attempts to annihilate it, and fails 
miserably. This failure effectively amplifies, increases the intensity, of his 
experience of dissonance -heavenly melody is not made manifest, and he 
is left in dread of a hellish manifestation. Carlyle's soundless room, then, 
engenders a fear of the immanent because it demonstrates the same 
p~inciple to him as Cage's anechoic chamber - one cannot escape sound, 
one is always already in the milieu of the sound field. For the aesthetics of 
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arlJorescence, this is a chaotic, even satanic result, but for immanence, it 
is not the triumph of one appositional term over another in any sense; it 
is in fact, what Peirce described as the brute fact of ha.ecceitas. 
Given that Carlyle's attempt to assemble silence as an anti-sound is 
based on the attempt to submerge the plane of immanence below a ground, 
and arborify it into a plan(e) of organization, the question arises as to 
wlwt his failure represents in terms of the relationship between 
arborescence and immanence. Does his failure represent the symmetrical 
opposite of his attempt? Deleuze/Guattari hint that the plan(e) may not be 
so much one of a naturality of the idea of organized structure. The plan( e) 
of organization may in fact turn out to be a violent act towards the plane 
of immanence: 11 As Cage says, it is of the nature of the plan( e) that it fail. 
Precisely because it is not a plan(e) of organization, development, or 
formation, but one of non voluntary transmutation. 11 [Plateaus, p.269] The 
p]an(e) of organization is the attempt to master haecceitas, mould it into 
structures which it would not have otherwise found. In this way, the 
plan(e) becomes more one of metaphysical suppression, and as such, 
encounters resistances. Rhizomes will always continue to re-emerge from 
beneath the ground, so that the idea of the plan(e) "must necessarily fail 
for it is impossible to be faithful to it" [Plateaus, p.269]. 
The .. metaphysical" play between the two planes can thus become the 
site of a more actual, compositional play; "Certain modern musicians oppose 
the transcendent plan(e) of organization, which is said to have dominated 
all of Western classical music, to the immanent sound plane, which is always 
given along with that to which it gives rise 11 [p.267] Boulez' distinction 
between the smooth and the striated becomes implicated here, with the 
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srnooth operating as a form of BwO, and the striated as an organizational 
plan(e): "the smooth is a nomos, whereas the striated always has a logos, 
the octave, for example. 11 [p.478] DeleuzejGuattari pick up on the 
distinction between nomos and logos as that between the nomadic movement 
of a line of flight, and the logical development of lines within a tree-
structure. To adopt a smooth nomos is to vary one's position continuously; 
the striated is that which intertwines fixed and variable 
elements, produces an order and succession of distinct forms, 
and organizes horizontal melodic lines and vertical harmonic 
planes. The smooth is the continuous variation, continuous 
development of form; it is the fusion of harmony and melody 
in favor of properly rythmic values, the pure act of the 
drawing of a diagonal across the vertical and the horizontal. 
[Plateaus, p.478) 
Thus, the striated is the operation of the axiology of the score, the 
arborescence of musical structures, the adoption of the logos whir.h 
encourages closure at the octave, but also allows the division which the 
whole debate between Rameau and Rousseau was based on. In this sense, 
it is also the precondition of Derrida's deconstruction in Of Grammatology. 
The alternative is the diagonal line of flight: 11 Smooth space is filled by 
events or haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is 
a space of affects" [p.479]. The smoothness and consistency of the field of 
immanence of sound - the BwO of sound - is a field of sonic haecceities. 
According to DeleuzejGuattari, Boulez' compositional abstract 
machine is concerned not with a single form of space, a choice between the 
smooth or the striated, but with "the communication between the two kinds 
of space, their alternations and superpositions" [Plateaus, p.478]. Equally, 
they claim that as a historian of compositional technique, his interest is in 
sl~owing examples of the composer who "invents a kind of diagonal running 
between the harmonic vertical and melodic horizon." [Plateaus, p.296] 
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However, Boulez himself has described the compositional relationship 
between the two axes not as a rhizomatic displacement, but within 
specifically arborescent lexis: "Pitch and duration seem to me to form the 
basis of a compositional dialectic, while intensity and timbre belong to 
secondary categories." [quoted in Wishart, On Sonic Art, p. 7] Ironically, it 
is Trevor Wishart, perhaps the most DeleuzianjGuattarian of English 
composers at least, who has delivered the most intense critique of Boulez' 
arborescent tendencies, and which we can oppose to the reading which 
Deleuze/Guattari make. In his On Sonic Art, Wishart proposes a 
compositional shift from the lattice-oriented geometry of the score towarrls 
the ideas of continuum and stream. This is achieved through a substitution 
of the model of discrete pitch structures by the model of timbral multi-
dimensionality, much as DeleuzejGuattari suggest in the shift from strata 
to plateausl8l. 
Thus, we can ask of the relationship between the plan(e) of 
organization and the plane of immanence- "which Boulez?", the rhizomaUc 
Boulezof DeleuzejGuattari's reading, or the dialectical Boulezof Wishart's? 
If Cage's work with silence represents the plane of immanence, and if 
St.ockhausen's work represents the plan(e) of organization, then Boulez 
could be placed between these two planes, but in what form does the 
[B) A further irony, however, is that Wishart provides a highly 
phonocentric critique of the idea of writing, which he blames for the rise 
of lhe arborescent structure of the score: "Writing, originally a clever 
mnemonic for recording the verbal part of important speech-
communications between real individuals, soon grew to such a degree as to 
dominate, to become normative upon, what might properly be said. Divorced 
f r·orn the immediate reality of face-to-face communication, it became 
objectivified [sic], generalised, and above all, permitted the new class of 
scribes (whether priests, bureaucrats or academics) to define and control 
what might 'objectively' be meant." [On Sonic Art, p.8] 
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IJoulez milieu appear? Does the middle ground represent the becoming-BwO 
of the organism, or the being organized of the body of immanence? As we 
have seen, a certain pseudo-deconstructive path can be traced between 
these two planes, one which initially unearths the rhizomatic movements of 
the structural root, turning them from points on a graph into lines of 
flight outwith the axiology of the graph, these lines coagulating into 
sound-blocks, or sound-rhizomes proper, and gradually, through the 
agency of an abstract machine such as the synthesizer or the voice, these 
sound- rhizomes can be set in truly continuous variation not only from 
each other, but also from themselves. At this moment, we have reached the 
field of immanent sound, the sonic BwO, with the sound-rhizomes blending 
through a common matter into a network of intensities on a common surface 
- a field of haecceitas. If we were in a simply deconstructive mode, the 
gradual flattening out of sound onto this field would perhaps represent 
our- anti-telos- our goal would be this system of non-goals, and we would 
affirm the nature of experience as that which lies in the milieu or middle, 
ralher than the origin or the telos. However, just as Deleuze/Guattari can 
be read as having developed a version of supplementary differance within 
the rhizome, and then to have extended the programme towards a fully 
surfacial immanence, so too they reject the idea of the originary 
supplement. If we were to take the plan(e) of organization as the origin 
and the plane of immanence as the ultimate supplement, then there would 
ctlways be the danger of reading the plane of immanence as some form of 
hyper-origin. One step towards seeing how DeleuzejGuattari deal with this 
issue - which in a Derridean system would threaten the return of closure -
is to consider the possibility that although we can certainly move from 
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arborescence to immanence, the converse is also just as certainly true. If 
this will return us to a meta-dialectic between two planes, we will have to 
retrace our steps carefully[9]. 
10.3 Return from Immanence 
In the pseudo-deconstructive movement from arborescence to 
immanence, the concept of the abstract machine provided a crucial moment 
of passage from the post-arborescent rhizome towards the field of common 
matter. The abstract machine, then, is a mechanism for movement from one 
state to another; it "plays a pivoting role." [Plateaus, p.142] However, it is 
certainly not the only form of machine which DeleuzejGuattari theorise, 
and it is also not the only machine which can act as a pivot between states. 
While the synthesizer effectively opens a rhizome up to further 
possibilities of non-arborescent transformations, other machines exist 
[9] As was noted in Chapter 1, Jean Molino refers to the concept of 
immanence in Musical Fact and the Semiology of Music. Significantly, Molino 
makes reference to the concept of music as a "polymorphous reality" 
[Musical Fact, p.113], and alludes to the idea that "there is never a self-
contained, stable system" [ibid., p.121]. Yet rather than affirming a 
multiplicity of plateaus on a plane of immanence, such as DeleuzejGuattari 
propose, Molino opts for the more rigid model of "stratifications of strata" 
[ibid., p.148]. In other words, there are three strata within the musical 
"symbol" constituting the semiological"tripartite division". Molino defines 
the "immanent" level as "an object- matter subject to form" [p.130]. Here, 
the confusion of immanence and stratification becomes evident. For 
DeleuzejGuattari, immanence is not a question of matter-form constructs -
"instead of imposing a form upon a matter: what one addresses is less a 
matter submitted to laws than a materiality possessing a nomos." [Plateaus, 
p.'108] However, Molino then goes further down the structuralist path by 
invoking dialectics itself: one first separates off the "neutral", "immanent" 
level from the other two strata, establishing "a description of the 
phenomena in which the conditions of production and reception of the 
message are not involved" [Musical Fact, p.146]. This, of course, is the 
equivalent of isolating a piece of immanence from the general plane of 
consistency - in other words, stratifying a plateau, imposing a form upon 
an intensive materiality. 
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which are capable of reversing the process: "Machines are always singular 
keys that open or close an assemblage, a territory." [Plateaus, p.334] In 
this context, and with many resonances of Smith's mechanics, we can trace 
towards the concept of the desiring-machine; "Desiring machines an~ 
binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of rules governing 
associations: one machine is always coupled to another. The productive 
syuthesis, the production of production, is inherently connective in 
nature: 'and ... ' 'and then ... "' [Anti-Oedipus, p.5] It is all a matter of 
connection. Just as in Smith's imaginary mechanism of the intervallic chain, 
desiring machines align themselves into sequences which create larger and 
Jcn·ger connected networks until all that we hear is "the continual whirr of 
machines" [Anti-Oedipus, p.2]. Equally, we can note that the mode of 
connectivity operated by the desiring-machines is, like Derridean 
supplementary logic, an additive one - not the conjugation of the verb "to 
be" which one expects from originary thought (and the attendant 
ontological copula of the "is"), but the conjunction achieved through the 
spatia-temporal articulation of the "and ... and then ... ". DeleuzejGuattari 
term this additive connection productive synthesis, or simply the 
production of production. 
However, the concept of the supplement was derived, somewhat 
circuitously, from the mechanisms of harmonic theory, and it has been 
shown above that within the harmonic interval, there is often a 
relationship to the fundamental root. This is the process by which sound 
is divided into structures of consonance and dissonance, resulting in a 
basically ontological system. Carlyle, for instance, even managed to 
incorporate the image of harmony within his determination of melody, by 
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concentrating on precisely this organization of harmonics within the law 
of a most tree-like root. DeleuzejGuattari point to precisely this aspect of 
in l.ervallic chaining in claiming that: "Desiring-machines make us an 
organism" [Anti-Oedipus, p.8]. In this, we can see a repetition in a new 
lexical register of the critique of the supplementl1°1. This critique can be 
written from a reading of harmonic theory, but also from transposing the 
originary opposition of melody-harmony into the opposition voice-machine. 
Such a critique has been traced above. 
DeleuzejGuattari implicitly but continually move us from pseudo-
Derridean situations towards alignments more redolent of a post-structural 
reading of Adam Smith's specific theory of the ear. Just as we can rend 
Smith's theory as an attempt to move from deep structures to surface 
resonances, DeleuzejGuattari describe a point of collapse for the system 
of lhe resonating desiring-machines. The very great desire for continual 
connection, disconnection and reconnection results in the fact that 
11 desiring-machines work only when they break down, and by continually 
breaking down." [ibid.] (In this we can discern a similarity with the 
"necessary" failure of organizational plan[e]s.) The continuity of the 
supplementary permutation of terms inevitably results not only in the 
assembly of specific networks, but also in their disassembly - "The 
automata stop dead and set free the unorganized mass they once served 
tu articulate." [ibid.] We have already seen in Smith that connection is also 
a matter of articulation, and that articulation was the hinge by which 
[lO] As we have already seen above, just as the supplement and the rhizome 
have an intertext, so too, the rhizome is inherently bound up with the 
concept of desire: "it is always by rhizome that desire moves and 
produces." [Pia tea us, p.14] 
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objects from a chaotic miasma are aligned together in harmonic chains. 
Smith's chaotic miasma, can be read (given certain lexical provisos) as this 
"unorganized mass" which the desiring machines articulate in binary 
fashion (llJ. Just as the desiring-machines are based in production 
through connection, they can also connect themselves into an anti-
production, and this is the disjunction of the harmonic system which 
occurs at the point of contact with the field of the immanent BwO: 
An apparent conflict arises between desiring-machines and 
the body without organs. Every coupling of machines, every 
production of a machine, every sound of a machine running, 
becomes unbearable to the body without organs. Beneath it.s 
organs it senses there are larvae and loathsome worms, and 
a God at work messing it all up or strangling it by organizing 
it. [Anti-Oedipus, p. 9] 
The BwO is no organism, because an organism represents an 
organization and hierarchization of organs, a series of defined 
relationships which determine the functions within the whole of the 
components. An organism is thus created by the desiring-machine which 
cu ls into, penetrates the BwO, slices it up into separate organs, assigns 
functions to these organs, and then aligns them structurally according to 
slratified functions: the desiring-machine turns plateaus into strata. 
According to Deleuze/Guattari, the "opposition" of the organism and the 
rrwchine, which constitutes Carlyle's retort to Smith, relies precisely on the 
reflexivity of the two within the opposition. While the organism is 
inherently bound up with the plan(e) of organization, the machine also 
partakes of the stratification, the intervallic movements and penetrations 
[ll) But let us also not forget that Carlyle describes the plane of immanent 
"noise" as a "chaos", in line with Smith's usage. The distinction between 
tli.e two, then, is not in their definition of the "out there", as much as in 
their approaches to the value of the 11 0Ut there 11 and their subsequent 
solutions to its chaos - Smith harmonizes, Carlyle melodizes. 
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which occur in the construction of arborescence[12]. It is the very 
existence of the metaphysical interval which is at stake in this opposition, 
and thus also the opposition between harmony and melody, instrument and 
voice, and so on. Organics needs the existence of the interval in order to 
produce its closure, while the organicist desiring-machine needs the 
concept of penetration in order to slice immanence up into intervallic units. 
Viewing mechanics from the vantage point of organics, harmony represents 
a structural swerve away from the ultimate penetration of essences 
required for the binding of organs into a singular organism. In this sense, 
il is a step towards immanence, and in this capacity we can cite an abstract 
machine such as the synthesizer. Nevertheless, while the synthesizer con 
to ke sounds and begin to place them on the plane of consistency, from the 
other direction, it can be seen as the beginning of the segmentation of the 
irnrnanent field. Thus, it is effectively the penetration of the BwO by the 
[l 21 One of the few anglophone musicologists to cite DeleuzejGuattari 
(although only acknowledging Guattari in parentheses) is Richat'd 
Middleton, who devotes around half a page to them out of some 300 in 
Studying Popular Music. He first characterizes them, along with Lyotard, 
as simply "philosophers of desire", and incorrectly summarizes their 
position as one which merely "sees the human organism as a collection of 
'desiring-machines'" [Studying Popular Music, pp.258/9]. Associating this 
with the more crass concepts of desire in the rock scene of 1968, Middleton 
labels it as a component of a generally "vulgar Freudianism" [ibid.], 
apparently unaware of the radically anti-Freudian ramifications of a book 
titled Anti-Oedipus. However, Middleton also appears to run the risk of 
confusing the concepts of the desiring-machine and the BwO. He claims 
that "a writer like Deleuze [sic], flattening the dialectic into congruence, 
can picture the body as a machine .. [ibid., p.287]. These misunderstandings 
on Middleton's part evidently stem from his own arborescent view of the 
idea of the situation: .. Adorno's (1976: 52) view is preferable to this; at 
leclSt he acknowledges the organic/mechanical dialectic .. [ibid., p.294]. 
However, do not DeleuzejGuattari point to the fact that the machine 
occupies a position within the arborescent ground of the strata? In 
particular, their statement that "Desiring machines are binary machines" 
[Anti-Oedipus, p.5], would appear to problematize Middleton's reading, 
before we even take on board their assertion that "Desiring-machines mal\.c 
us an organism" [Anti-Oedipus, p.8]. 
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dP.siring-machine in order to introduce intervals and harmonic 
organization which produces the organism. 
However, "the body without organs is not the proof of an original 
nothingness, nor is it what remains of a lost totality" [Anti-Oedipus, p.8]. 
Equally, the BwO is not an undifferentiated origin such as that which 
Rousseau has proposed, since such an origin is precisely the central term 
in an organism. The BwO is not originary, but merely one stage in a 
continually refracting process. While it can be positioned as "prior" to the 
action of the desiring-machines, and be acted upon by them, it can also be 
produced as the collapse of their mechanisms. 
Just as the unconsciousness of Vespasian provided an interruption 
of the Emperor, s semiotic flow, so too the BwO represents the disjunctive 
interruption of phonocentric organization and control; 
In order to resist organ-machines, the body without organs 
presents its smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as a 
barrier. In order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted 
flows, it sets up a counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated 
fluid. In order to resist words composed of articulatP.d 
phonetic units, it utters only gasps and cries that are sheer 
unarticulated blocks of sound. [Anti-Oedipus, p.9] 
This repulsional BwO (Vespasian as an abstract machine which 
constructs a sonic field of immanence) represents the attempt to disrupt 
the structures of semiotics which connect together the concepts of sound 
and meaning, signifier and signified. This disruption, however, does not 
occur through the mechanism of the interval, as a reading within Derridean 
supplementarity suggests. There, we have the image of the division of an 
undifferentiated mass, and an originary articulation of spacing within the 
self-proximate. In order that the interval operates, however, it m\lst 
reconnect that which it divides, and thus risk the collapse of the system 
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back into unity- division risks dialectics, the machine risks the organism. 
This is the risk which a harmonic supplementarity takes, and it is the 
condition of the binary-oriented desiring-machines. It is the stratification 
of the BwO into ontologically differential layers (signifier, signified, etc.) 
which is achieved by the dividing-machine. 
On the nomadic surface of the BwO, there is no place for the logos 
to unproblematically take root within the proliferation of nomoi (although 
it can divide and rule the BwO by force). The BwO stands in a certain 
opposition to the concept of stratification. 
To the strata as a whole, the BwO opposes disarticulation (or 
n articulations) as the property of the plane of consistency, 
experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, 
never interpret!), and nomadism as the movement (keep 
moving, even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, 
desubjectification). [Plateaus, p.159] 
Thus, the system faces in two directions. On the one side, we face 
the plan(e) of organization (Carlylean "permanency"), on the other, the 
plane of immanence (Carlyle's "nomadism, continual change" [The Nigger 
Question, pp.778-9]). Our means of passage from one to the other in either 
direction is determined by the forms of abstract machines which we 
assemble. An abstract machine such as a synthesizer "places all of the 
parameters in continuous variation" [Plateaus, p.109], and thus 
rhizomatizes roots towards the common matter of immanence. On the other 
hand, a desiring-machine can slice up the body without organs into 
separate bodies-as-organs, and then stratify those organs (organize 
them), and thus finally "make us an organism" [Anti-Oedipus, p.B]. In fact, 
the two planes are locked in a continual struggle; "The plane of 
organization is constantly working away at the plane of consistency, 
always trying to plug the lines of flight [ ... ] Conversely, the plane of 
consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organization, 
causing particles to spin off the strata" [Plateaus, p.270]. Here, we have 
Ute image of one plane flying away from the other, which is constantly in 
pursuit. While the plane of consistency pulls particles away from the 
plan(e) of organization turning them into lines, the plan(e) responds by 
pulling lines back down to be rooted as points. On one end of this system, 
there is a field of immanent sound constantly pulling away from, for 
instance, a compositional plan which attempts to stratify it according to the 
structure of the series, the structure of tonality, or even simply the 
axiology of the score. The real question becomes one of the precise, 
technical relationship between these two planes. As DeleuzejGuattari write, 
"why does the opposition between the two kinds of planes lead to a st.iJl 
more abstract hypothesis?" [p.269]. Yet they trace their way even further 
down this path when they claim that; 
In fact, the opposition we should set up between the two 
planes is that of between two abstract poles: for example, to 
the transcendent, organizational plane of Western music 
based on sound forms and their development, we oppose the 
immanent plane of consistency of Eastern music, composed of 
speeds and slownesses, movements and rest. [Plateaus, p.270] 
So if there is actually an opposition between two abstract poles- the 
transcendent and the immanent - are we not dealing merely with a new 
repetition at another level of the same appositional structure which we 
have been tracing throughout? If this is so, then is it also the case that 
musical events are merely the product of some dialectic between these two 
planes (as Boulez suggests despite DeleuzejGuattari's reading)? At this 
juncture, we have reached perhaps the greatest point of convergence 
between Derridean deconstruction and the post-structuralism of 
UeleuzejGuattari. Just as the reliance of harmonic supplementarity on the 
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di~;sonant relation to the root always already threatens closure as much as 
differance, and thus a merely dialectical difference, so too the opposition 
of two forms of planes potentially threatens to provide a closure at a 
further level. DeleuzejGuattari provocatively write that "we invoke one 
dualism only in order to challenge another." [Plateaus, p.20] As we will see, 
however, this invocation is potentially more provocation than evP.n 
provisional dialectic. The question is overtly acknowledged: "Have we not, 
however, reverted to a simple dualism by contrasting maps to tracings, ns 
good and bad sides?" [Plateaus, p.13] 
It is then argued that while a rhizome can indeed be re-rooted, and 
ttwt even the lines of flight which coagulate to form a sound block can be 
separated back out and reconnected to points on a graph, the 
deconstructive reversal of this arborescence, the movement towards 
immanence, is 11 not at all symmetrical" [ibid.]. In other words, to view the 
becoming-immanent of sound as the absolute structural reversal of 
arborification is to mistake the crucial distinction between the tracing o.f 
terms and their mapping. The 11 structure" of becoming-immanent is 
precisely not the form of point-to-point tracing which is effected by a 
simple, symmetrical reversal of the teleological programme of a return to 
the root. To move from an immanent multiplicity back towards a plan(e) of 
or·ganization inevitably involves the tracing back to a single originary 
point. That root will have a transcendental structure, remaining identical 
no matter how many times one traces back to it. The nature of the immanent 
plane, however, is not static - it is a continual flux, its surface contains 
haecceities, and yet has a certain haecceic movement in itself. The nature 
of the "abstract pole" of immanence is continuous variation, and so the 
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cli--:tinction between the two planes is not that between "two opposed 
morlels", but that between static model and continual process; "It is n 
question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and 
of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and 
starting up again. No, this is not a new or different dualism." [Plateaus, 
p.20] In this way, what one reaches is not a series of structurally 
or·g·anized strata, but a continually varying network of plateaus, endlessly 
re-composing themselves and each other, relating concentrically ratht'!r 
Utan in a single line between points. Once more, as with Smith, a certain 
refraction is evident as one term elides with another: "A plateau is a piece 
of immanence. Every BwO is made up of plateaus. Every BwO is itself a 
plateau in communication with other plateaus on the plane of consistency. 
The BwO is a component of passage." [Plateaus, p.158] Here a distinction 
is made between the plane of consistency and the BwO. This distinction 
does not. hold in the usual, structural sense of distinction. As we have 
seen, the plane of consistency "is" a BwO, and vice versa. However, BwO's 
are both composed of and compose plateaus. Several BwO's, then, as 
themselves plateaus, can compose another BwO. In this way, the questions; 
"Does the plane of consistency constitute the body without organs, or does 
the body without organs compose the plane? Are the Body without Organs 
aud the Plane the same thing?" [Plateaus, p.507] - have no permanent 
meaning. Our only means of distinguishing different BwO' s, or planes of 
it1110anence, are inherently transitory, as soon as we move into immanence. 
Thus, the distinction between the plan(e) of organization, say a Platonic 
Ideality, and the plane of immanence, or to coin a phrase, the platea unic 
actuality, becomes, as DeleuzejGuattari hold, non-symmetrical. One cannot 
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trace one's way towards immanence, since, as soon as one realises one's 
placing as a milieu within immanence, there is no originary point, and no 
point of telos. There is thus no axis to traverse. 
It is the distinction between the middle and the ends. With Carlyle, 
\-\:'t' saw how it was possible to attempt the grounding of immanence in a 
transcendental silence; "all we need to do is to sink the floating plane of 
immanence, bury it in the depths of Nature instead of allowing it to play 
freely on the surface, for it to pass to the other side and assume the role 
of a ground" [Plateaus, p.269]. Although this particular project of Carlyle's 
failed, it can be shown how arborescence can potentially be forced into a 
lJosition of success. However, even this success will be transitory, as the 
model of arborescence is continually put into variation by the process of 
immanence. Again, symmetry is not present: in order for the plan(e) of 
organization to take control, a plane of immanence is submerged- belol'l 
the surface. The non-symmetrical "opposite" of this, where the plane of 
immanence returns, is achieved when the plan( e) of organization is put into 
the middle of a non-spatial, intensive "surface 11 • In other words, the 
success of arborescence is based on the establishment of an above-below 
axis, whereas the success of immanence is un-rooted in the continuous 
variation of a pseudo-spatiality. In other words, although the limit of the 
success of arborescence would be the annihilation of immanence 
(impossible, and hence the "failure" of all plans), the success of immanence 
i~; not based in the annihilation of arborescence, but simply in the 
incorporation of its duality as one instance within a generali?.ed 
ruultiplicity. Structures still occur, but as knots within a field, knots which 
occasionally suck their rhizomatic neighbours into a centralized system, 
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yet will inevitably fragment and dissolve back into the general immanence 
at any given moment. Conceived as a transient principle within a process, 
tlren, arborescence would not "fail" as a necessary experience (the 
DeleuzianjGuattarian reading of Boulez may amount to just such a 
couception: the dialectic as localized and not as a general rule). However, 
as we saw with Carlyle's "failed" plan, the "failure" to produce an ant.i-
tr·rtnsience, effectively the loss of its possibility, resulted in even more 
emotional torment than the desire to establish it in the first instance. 
At another level, if we considered the de-processing of the field of 
immanence, we can see that we move from the "generalized" plane of 
consistency through the plateaus towards the strata. If we can call each 
specific plateau a "piece of immanence", and if all plateaus, whether planes, 
H":Q's, rhizomes, or whatever can thus be seen as "pieces of immanence", 
then it follows that even organized plateaus - strata - are simply "piecr~s 
of [structured] immanence". In this sense, consistency is immanent even 
to structure: "The plane of consistency is always immanent to the strat.a; 
the two states of the abstract machine [eg. synthesizer or desiring] always 
coexist as two different states of intensities." [Plateaus, p.57] The abstrnct 
rrtcH.:hines themselves, then, can also be read as plateaus/pieces of 
immanencejintensities within the general milieu of the plane(s) of 
consistency. The relativity of terminology in this field depends upon the 
position from which any given situation is considered. Just as an abstract 
r11dchine can be read from two directions - its opening or closing of an 
assemblage- it takes on two states in itself, and thus potentially forms two 
different states of intensity. To be able to differentiate between intensities 
upon the plane of consistency, it is always already the case that a certnin 
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tracing has been drawn across its map, but equally, the structural 
divisions within a plan(e) of organization always already imply potentials 
of motion and change. 
I>errida's claim is that structures always already rupture. This 
follows from the fact that they are produced by the extension of a point o E 
self-consistency - a univocal origin. In Of Grammatology, it is enough for 
Derrida to have strategically shown the self-rupturing of the self-
consistent. DeleuzejGuattari also question the ideality of a univocal point 
of origin. Yet they also claim a certain univocality for the field of 
consistency: 11 it is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocality" 
[Plateaus, p.266]. The distinction is that this plane of univocality is, 
firstly, not a point but a field, and secondly, is not originary._However, in 
order to proceed from this plane towards an originary plan(e), rupture is 
also necessary (the slicing-up of the BwO by the desiring-machine). In this 
sense, the undoing of both planes is the introduction of the intervAl. 
ner-rida demonstrates a limited movement away from the arborescent 
plan(e). DeleuzejGuattari demonstrate several movements between both 
planes, and in both directions. 
For the plateaunist, it is always "a question of method: the tracing 
should always be put back on the map." [Plateaus, p.13] This marks the 
connection between plateaunism and deconstruction- not only is the stage 
of reversal merely provisional, but displacement is acknowledged ns 
neither end, non-end, or an-end. In a sense, the plateaunist can claim that 
immanence is always already in place, but the divergence with Derridean 
deconstruction comes at the point where the plateaunist acknowledges the 
ability of the originary organism to return: it is always already possihle 
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fur re-rooting to take place, and this can be accompanied by force, political 
(Carlyle) or methodological (Stockhausen), or even by default (Smith). rt 
is therefore a question not of merely de constructing, but of actively 
resisting reconstruction: "it is so important to try the other, reverse but 
Jlonsymmetrical, operation. Plug the tracings back into the map, connect 
the roots or trees back up with a rhizome." (Plateaus, p.14] From the 
s patio-temporal logic of the supplement- and of the desiring-machines and 
the Imaginary Machine - which establishes the "and ... and then ... ", we 
relocate at the a-location of the BwO, the plane of consistency. In 
immanence, we have not an articulation of space and time ( differance), hHt 
a non-spatial surface, an intensive 11 spatium" (here, the trace-structures 
of language try to re-root the attempt to "map" the intensional). The logic 
of lhe "and" is thus established, outside of the idea of a seriality and 
(hence) direction of time: 
move between things, establish a logic of the AND, overthrow 
ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and 
beginnings. [ ... ]The middle is by no means an average; on the 
contrary, it is where things pick up speed. Between things 
does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing 
to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a 
tr-unsversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, a 
stream without beginning or end that undermines its banl\.s 
and picks up speed in the middle. [Plateaus, p.25] 
There is a choice to be made, and DeleuzejGuattari constantly 
canvass our support to choose the flight away from roots towards 
immanence, all the while reminding us that attempts will be made to ground 
this flight. The political is thus elided with the aesthetic, just as much as 
it is in Carlyle or in Rousseau, but here for quite alternative reasons: 




[Plateaus, p.8] Deleuze/Guattari acknowledge that it is 
not just enough to point to immanence or to unearth it, or even to be self-
satisfied and claim its actuality (de-centred verity); one must actually 
compose i~, in all the multiple senses of that verb, and full realization that 
arborescence will always be pulling one back into the centre: "We 
ourselves were unable to do it. We just used words that in turn function 
for us as plateaus." [Plateaus, p .22] Pieces of immanence, assembling, 
disassembling, splitting, melding, with two directions for each action, 
towards an arborescent univocity with its claims to originarity and control, 
or towards an immanent univocity with its claims to nothing and 
everything. Mapping these processes is what constitutes the activity of 
schizoanalysis: not the quest for the unity beneath the multiple, but the 
movement between multiplicities. 
In more basic terms, what we approach in post-structuralism is the 
difference between opposition and difference; while opposition 
presupposes difference, the reverse is not symmetrical- difference does 
not presuppose opposition. Equally, while opposition is also a reduction of 
difference to a binary relation, difference only ever begins with the 
number two, but then rapidly expands from that moment into an extant 
multiplicity. 
fl 3I Michel Foucault writes in his preface to Anti-Oedipus: "The Christian 
moralists sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul. 
Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, pursue the slightest traces of fascism 
in the body." [Anti-Oedipus, p .xiii] Notably, Foucault elsewhere writes 
"Perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian." (quoted in 
Carrell, Paraesthetics, p .198] 
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;10.4 Wildly "Rigorous 
A~; we have seen, Deleuze/Guattari are not an instance of the 
"wildness" that Christopher Norris accuses post-structuralism of. Indeerl, 
the flight from structuralism which they represent has many intertexts 
with the idea of a rigorous deconstruction; their concept of destratification 
demands a certain degree of care. "Staying stratified - organized, 
signified, subjected- is not the worst that can happen; the worst that Cii n 
happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which 
brings them down on us heavier than ever." [Plateaus, p.16l] 
JJestratification - the movement from the strata towards the plateaus - is 
not the sign of an abdication of responsibility, but a reason for sobriety, 
and "much caution is needed to prevent the plane of consistency from 
becoming a pure plane of abolition" [Plateaus, p.270]. According t.o 
Deleuze/Guattari, "wildness" risks a number of undesirable BwO's, such 
that the crucial question is: "How can we fabricate a BwO for ourselves 
without its being the cancerous BwO of a fascist inside us, or the empty 
BwO of a drug addict, paranoic, or hypochondriac?" [Plateaus, p.163] 
Following this line of thought, one could easily turn the question on the 
various theories which have been considered above. For instance, what of 
the surfacial repulsion of phonic penetration represented in Chapter 6 by 
a Smithian reading of the Vespasian situation? Deleuze/Guattari comment 
011 a similar example that "this repulsion of desiring-machines by the body 
without organs [ ... is ... ] the real meaning of the paranoic machine: the 
desiring-machines attempt to break into the body without organs, and the 
body without organs repels them, since it experiences them as an over-all 
pt~r·secut.ion apparatus." [Anti-Oedipus, p.9] It seems that the declaration 
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of one's own nomos must be handled carefully if one is not to risk, with 
Vespasian, the construction of a paranoic system, completely cut off from 
circulation. 
Different types of rhizomatic movement have different affective 
capacities, their own modes of haecceitas, as a simple comparison betwcr~n 
the two great indeterminacy-rhizomes of John Cage will show: music and 
mycologJ'· While there is inherently a mode of indeterminacy involved in 
wltich fungi a mycologist will be able to collect on any given foray, the 
compositional (culinary) methodology necessarily requires arborescence 
(unlike musical composition) in order to control these most rhizomatic of 
plants: "if you use indeterminacy in connection with the gathering and 
eating of mushrooms, you might kill yourself." [John Cage's Practical 
Utopias, p.471] However, it is clear that there is no carte blanche available 
within musical composition either, if the equivalent dangers are also to be 
avoided here. As DeleuzejGuattari write, the principle of rigorous 
rne t.hodology must be extended into the musical compositional field, too: 
Sometimes one overdoes it, puts too much in, works with a 
jumble of lines and sounds; then, instead of producing a 
cosmic machine capable of 'rendering sonorous,' one lapses 
back to a machine of reproduction that ends up reproducing 
nothing but a scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing 
all sounds. The claim in that one is opening music to all 
events, all irruptions, but one ends up reproducing a 
scrambling that prevents any event from happening. All one 
has left is a resonance chamber well on the way to forming a 
bluck hole. [Plateaus, p.344] 
In the attempt to create a truly sonorous body, the manipulation of 
sonic lines of flight must ensure that they do not merely result in an empty 
arborescence, an empty representation, a re-sonance. The destratification 
of representation does not entail a mere antithetical negation - to do so 
entraps the sonorous body within a dialectical struggle against 
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representation, and reformulates it as a negative term. What is required is 
the transgression, not the transcendence, of structure. 
In a similar manner, an irresponsible performance of Cage can easily 
turn into a black hole, becoming pointless or even worse (and many do). As 
Cage has complained; 
last night, .Five was played incorrectly. I didn't enjoy it. I'll 
tell you qu1te frankly; I was unhappy, even disturbed. It was 
actually improvising - it had nothing to do with my work. I 
know what Karlheinz Stockhausen would have done; he wou Id 
have shouted 'STOP!' Now why wouldn't I do that? This 
morning, I knew perfectly well what I should've done. I 
should've interrupted them and explained to the audience 
that the piece was not being played correctly [John Cage and 
the Glaswegian Circus, p.5] 
Indeterminate performance techniques, in their rhizomatic, haecceic 
pr-ocess, are matters for increased rigour, and not its inverse. What one 
attempts through this rigour is to avoid turning the sonorous body 
towards a state of rigor. Equally, while a certain level of rhizomatic 
movement will enhance (even be necessary in) a performance of Bach or 
Chopin, too much will inevitably entail a certain pointlessness. Turning the 
arborescent structures of the score into lines of flight is not achieved 
through a lack of respect to the haecceitas of the piece - one does not 
proceed by destroying style and throwing the piece into an aesthetic black 
hole. Destratifying Chopin's Preludes for piano does not mean turning them 
into an empty representation of Cage's Preludes for prepared piano. On the 
contrary, it means carefully and precisely hooking into the lines of flight 
which the piece assembles as its very "this-ness". In this, one does not 
leave technique behind; in fact, one relies all the more on its rigour: "Your 
synthesis of disparate elements will be all the stronger if you proceed with 
a sober gesture, an act of consistency, capture, or extraction that works 
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in a material that is not meager but prodigiously simplified, creatively 
limited, selected. For there is no imagination outside of technique." 
[Plateaus, p.345] Just as deconstruction does not imply a destructive 
negativity, so too destratification does not result in a plane of obliteration. 
Hather, the imaginary machine with which one assembles a field of 
immanence must be constructed according to a precise technical rigour. 
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IN (-)cONCLUSION 
I suppose it is written that any one who sets up for a bit of 
a philosopher, must contradict himself to his very face. For 
here I have fairly talked myself into thinking that we have 
the whole thing before us at last; that there is no answer to 
the mystery, except that there are as many answers as you 
please; that there is no centre to the maze because, like the 
ft11nous sphere, its centre is everywhere; and that agreeing 
to differ with every ceremony of politeness, is the only "one 
undisturbed song of pure concent" to which we are ever 
likely to lend our musical voices. 
- Virginibus Puerisque, Robert Louis Stevenson, 1881. 
IN(-) CoNCLUSION 
DIALECTS OF IMMANENCE 
the choice between two strategies: 
a. To attempt an exit and a deconstruction without 
changing terrain, by repeating what is implicit in the 
founding concepts and the original problematic [ ... ]one risks 
ceaselessly confirming, consolidating [ ... ] that which one 
allegedly deconstructs. The continuous process of making 
explicit, moving toward an opening, risks sinking into the 
autism of the closure. 
b. To decide to change terrain, in a discontinuous and 
irruptive fashion, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by 
affirming an absolute break and difference. Without 
mentioning all the other forms of trompe-l'oeil perspective in 
which such a displacement can be caught, thereby inhabiting 
more naively and more strictly than ever the inside one 
declares one has deserted, the simple practise of language 
ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on the oldest ground. 
[Margins of Philosophy, p .135] 
In the precipitous year of 1968, Derrida outlines two deconstructive 
strategies which are also risks of deconstructive failure- reconstruction. 
How does one break with metaphysics, ontology, dialectics? Either one 
works on them from within their own terms, or one attempts to make a clean 
break, jumping sideways in to a new field. However, by both manoeuvres, 
one is defined in terms of a relation to that which one allegedly leaves. For 
instance, either: (a) ontology collapses under its own weight and produces 
differance (all the while risking a dialectical return to ontological 
difference); or (b) in leaving ontological territory, one risks locating in its 
that which is not ontology, the non being of ontology (again risking a 
dialectical relationship to ontology as its antithesis). 
In Chapter 1, it was shown that a rigorous deconstruction, although 
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flaunting its relationship with a host structure, should not be reducible to 
it. In Chapter 2, Derrida's deconstruction of melody was shown to invoke 
the concept of harmony as the indecida.ble in Rousseau's ontology, and 
thus the deconstructed harmony of supplementarity was produced as its 
unwanted but inevitable by-product: the originary supplement. The 
question was not so much of how far Derrida escaped the structures of 
Housseau's ontology, but the far more pressing issue of what his precise 
relationship was to the concept of harmony. He did not delineate this os 
fully as that of .. writing", and given this (quite understandable) deficit in 
his text, it was easy to argue that the grammatological programme wos 
subject to a very real risk of attack from this angle. From that point on, 
it was argued that not only could 11 harmony 11 itself be construed as a 
dialectical system, but that it could also be seen to operate through the 
logocentric action of a penetrating semiotic essence. The 11 result 11 of that 
tangentially Derridean reading was the realisation in the context of Smith 
that if the penetrational element of harmony was dropped, it was possible 
to assemble a form of sympathetic vibration which presupposed a certain 
deconstructed autonomy, and thus originarity. In other words, it wc1s 
shown that, if the penetrational semiotic can be disrupted by the 
intervallic supplement, it could equally be disrupted by the action of a 
"self-vibrating region of intensity .. such as the Smithian ear-plateau. 
Through a consideration of Carlyle's attempt to revise the Rousseauist 
n1oment precisely as a guard against the kind of attack Derrida launches, 
it was shown that penetrations both theoretical and political could be 
perpetrated in order to actively suppress the interval. Equally, Carlyle 
proposed a thorough-going penetration of the surfacial concepts nf 
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SHlithian autonomy. All of this was achieved through the closure 
represented by an in ward, rather than outward conception of harmony -
unison as telos, actively fought for. Under the weight of such violent 
closure, the adequacy of the Derridean field was thrown into question: 
even if the text of ontology could be held to self-deconstruct in the hands 
of a Derrida, would this be of any consequence to the warrior fighting to 
bring a bout the origin as telos? Equally, by this stage, so many versions 
of harmony and melody had been delineated that the simple allegiance of 
the supplement to the harmonic and the origin to the melodic could not 
hold. Neither could the extension of this opposition into the field of the 
machine-organism opposition suggested at further lexical registers by the 
opposition of Carlyle to Smith. Finally, DeleuzejGuattari's account of 
sur-vival under and resistance to the idea of the organism was invoked as 
an active supplement to the Derridean notion that the text of ontology self-
deconstructs: the field of immanence must be actively maintained, since 
there will always be those attempting to bind its plateaus into a stratified 
organism. 
Yet despite the potential setbacks for deconstruction represented 
by the threat of reconstruction, it is a question of necessity for Derrida: 
"It goes without saying that these effects do not suffice to annul the 
necessity for a tchange of terrain."' [Margins, p.135] The means which he 
proposes is a further problematization of the field- the combination of the 
two strategies outlined above which threaten at every point to be a 
reconstitution of "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" analysis; 
A new writing must weave and interlace these two motifs of 
df~construction. Which amounts to saying that one must speak 
several languages and produce several texts at once. [ ... ] 
what we need, perhaps, as Nietzsche said, is a change of 
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"s lyle"; and if there is style, Nietzsche reminded us, it must 
be plural. [Margins, p.135] 
Certainly, a radical multiplicity of strategy is one of the most 
commented-upon characteristics of A Thousand Plateaus, and the ghosls 
of Nietzsche can be heard laughing throughout its labyrinthine passages. 
Equally, however, the multiplicity of DeleuzejGuattari's style can hardly 
be said to be generated entirely through the weaving and interlacing of 
only "these two motifs" of Derridean deconstruction. 
Perhaps one of the problems of deconstruction specifically as it is 
laid out in Of Grammatology is a certain negativity which is adopted in 
relation to Rousseau. No doubt this derives from the necessity of engaging 
a whole range of morally-charged issues in Rousseau's text- since Derrida 
must operate at a level immanent to the text, it is perhaps no surprise that 
he begins to take a "deconstructed" moral tone himself. We read of 
Rousseau's paranoias, perversions, and so on. One gets the feeling that 
Rousseau is wrong in some way; what Derrida demonstrates is Rousseau's 
failure - the failure of originary logic to contain its Other. To be sure, 
Derrida does this in order to demonstrate the principle of supplementary 
affirmation, the joyous Nietzschean play of the world, and so forth, but we 
only reach this affirmation through the provisional stage of a reversal of 
Rousseau's terms - the positivity of negation. Hence our affirmation is 
afflicted with the shadow of its own provisional negative. This is the 
problem of erasure: the deconstructed supplement nevertheless goes 
under the same name as its undeconstructed self (hence the always already 
of the "scarequotes" ). 
Worthy of note in this context is the famous critique by Paul de Man 
in The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida 's Reading of Roussnii 11 
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(1971). Under the aegis of the deconstructive claim that the text contains 
its own self-deconstruction, de Man claims that the "fissures" in Roussen u 
ar·e in fact anything but abberations which threaten to annihilate an 
increasingly paranoid system: indeed, they are precisely the point of the 
system. Hence, "There is no need to de construct Rousseau" [Blindness and 
Insight, p.139]; 
Why does he [Derrida] have to reproach Rousseau for doing 
exactly what he legitimately does himself? According to 
Derrida, Rousseau's rejection of a logocentric theory [ ... ] 
"could not be a radical rejection, for it occurs within the 
fr-amework inherited from this philosophy and of the 
'metaphysical' conception of art." I have tried to show instead 
that Rousseau's use of a traditional vocabulary is exactly 
similar, in its strategy and its implications, to the use Derrida 
consciously makes of the traditional vocabulary of Western 
philosophy. What happens in Rousseau is exactly what 
happens in Derrida [Blindness and Insight, p.138] 
In the "light" of this "insight", what is at stake in Of Grammatology 
is a certain disingenuous attempt to read Rousseau in the same way that 
he reads metaphysics, whilst denying his ability to move beyond its 
structures. As we have seen, Derrida elsewhere openly acknowledges the 
problem of "his own" failure to lexically and conceptually escape from 
metaphysics. The question for de Man is, then, one of why Derrida is so 
hard on Rousseau, when he (Derrida) is potentially at least guilty of t.he 
same failure? 
As David Wood writes, '"erasure' is no protection" [The 
Deconstruction of Time, p.311]. Yet, according to Wood, "the fact that 
deconstruction cannot do it does not mean that it cannot be done in a way 
responsive to its insights." [ibid.] The "it" referred to here is indubitably 
not the same "it" which Christopher Norris reads as the truth of 
deconstruction. Norris hopes for a "less sceptical and troublesome" 
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couclusion for deconstruction than that offered by such post-
structuralists as DeleuzejGuattari [The Truth AboutPostmodernism, p.224 ]. 
Perhaps this is the crucial strategic difference between Derrida and 
DeleuzejGuattari: instead of a certain negativity (no matter how 
provisional) with respect to the host text (such as Rousseau), the 
plateaunic approach is more one of identifying the indecidables as 
aHirmational within the host text as such. The focus is thus not so much 
on the strand of tradition which attempts to inhibit the points of structuro l 
rupture, but on the strands of traditional thought which have at various 
moments attempted to release it. Thus, with DeleuzejGuattari (and 
particularly in Deleuze,s "own" texts) we find an alternative canon set up 
which includes a series of minor philosophers, or philosophers of minority. 
"The notion of minority is very complex, with musical, literary, linguistic, 
as well as juridical and political, references." [A Thousand Plateaus, p.105] 
We have already noted the majority of the tonal and the minority of the 
modal, the dissonant, etc.; the minority of Cage in preference to the 
majority of Stockhausen. Equally, in the plateaunic cannon (not canon) of 
minor philosophers, we find such as Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Hume and 
Bergson, through to Nietzsche. In the context of the current programme, 
we could add to this list Adam Smith in particular. Indeed, it was in the 
DcleuzianjGuattarian context that the readings from Smith were given in 
Chapters 5 and 6, "prior" to direct engagement with DeleuzejGuattari 
themselves. Perhaps, then, if it is a question of deconstruction inhabiting 
and therefore being subject to the movements of a specific text, it simply 
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becomes a strategic matter of which kind of text one engages withU1. 
The term "deconstruction" often takes a negative orientation. The 
vernacular negativity of the term can be provisionally dismissed for its 
conceptual inelegance, but the more technically-assumed negativity cannot 
be denied in the context of so many statements such as those of Derrida 
cur-rently under consideration. The former negativity is (technically) a 
non-problem, the latter is precisely a component of the whole problemat.ic. 
If we wish to radically interrogate structure (for instance, to show the 
failure of structuralisms to maintain their own self-integrity), then there 
are all too many texts which we can target in an endless regression of what 
will inevitably be seen as opposition (and thus, as Spivak has pointed out, 
recoverable to the canon's insipid rate of absorption). If, however, we 
choose a moment within the ostensibly logocentric "epoch" which itsP-lf 
re presents an attempt to move through structure (no matter how limited 
this attempt is), then perhaps this moment can be subject to a 
deconstructive acceleration: not necessarily within deconstruction 
"itself", but (with Wood) "in a way responsive to its insights ... In this 
manner, the problematic of being caught up in what one uses to 
demonstrate a delimited field becomes less of a problem. 
There are ramifications for this approach within the field of critical 
[l) This is not to unproblematically assume DeleuzejGuattari as 
"deconstructors", although they sometimes blur the distinctions 
themselves, as in the following passage, where one of their models of 
destratification is specifically associated with deconstruction: "regarding 
the active or practical notions of decoding, of deconstruction, and of the 
work as a process, the reader is referred to the excellent commentaries of 
Daniel Charles on Cage" [Anti-Oedipus, p.371] Note, however, that 
"deconstruction" as decoding is not used here in the sense of analysis (the 
uncovering of fundamental codes), but in the sense of "the idea that there 
is no longer any code." [ibid.] 
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musicology. Much of what could be placed under this heading has tended 
to take as its point of negativity the tradition of criticism and theory 
which asserts the values of aesthetic autonomy and absolute music 
(McClary, 1991 [21; Citron et al, 1993; etc., etc.). Often, however, the 
relationship between the "autonomous" and the "social" is defined as one 
of opposition or conflict and therefore subject to dialectical resolutions of 
one kind or another (Molino 1975; Middleton 1990; Subotnik 1991; Shepherd 
1991; Moore 1993; etc). Perhaps the most forceful critique of the absolutes 
of autonomy from a declared deconstructive position has been provided by 
McClary. She has, for instance, written of the necessity for showing 
rhetorical and narrative structures to be operative within absolute music, 
these narrative structures operating through the conflict between a One 
and an Other which is controlled by means of a dialectical "Master 
Nar-rative" [Feminine Endings, p.55]. Her project is to delimit this dialectic, 
and to deconstructively demonstrate the operation of differentials within 
"autonomous" instrumental music. McClary argues that aesthetic autonomy 
attempts to inhibit the concept of the affect, to reduce the corporeality of 
music not only by rejecting the voice in a move towards the instrumental, 
but by negating the possibility of representational codes within 
instrumental music itself. Hence, she uses rhetorical/narrative codes 
within the instrumental as a deconstructive lever to displace the claim that 
[2] McClary refers to the work of Lorenzo Bianconi as a pretext to this move 
(Feminine Endings, p.35; Said also refers to McClary's reference here -
Musical Elaborations, p. xv1). In several respects, the current text could 
further cite the work of David Johnson as a "common sense" approach to 
i.lte problem not only of autonomy-vs-social, but also high-vs-low culture 
distinctions. Ironically, Johnson's thesis derives in large part from a 
br·oadly empirical approach to the highly intertextual praxis of 
Enlightenment performers, composers and audiences in C18th Edinburgh: 
cf. Scottish Fiddle Music in the Eighteenth Century. 
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music operates entirely outwith the social field. 
However, as we have seen with the simplification of the field which 
DP.r-rida relies on, there are not unproblematic distinctions to be made, and 
if we consider the distinct moves away from Rousseau which are suggested 
by Derrida, Smith and Carlyle, we can see that several problems emerge. 
In (Derrida's) Rousseau, a reaction against the instrumental is the claim 
that its mode of representation is inauthentic, essentially non-
representational. However, as Derrida shows, it is precisely the inauthentic 
nature of sonic representation which can be used as a deconstructive lever 
against the whole edifice of Rousseau's obsession with mimesis. In Smith, 
the concept of the affect is turned to a highly energized form of 
supplementary connection which exceeds the idea of representation to the 
point where the originarity of an instrumentally-induced affect is 
(deconstructively) extreme. Indeed, Smith's reinscription of the affect 
(which can be read as the negation of Rousseauist representation) is in 
fact an argument along the lines of DeleuzejGuattari against representation 
in general. This is achieved by asserting what in some sense can be read 
as an aesthetics of autonomy, if "autonomy" is read in a "deconstructed" 
form as the auto of the nomad's own nomos. With Smith, we are in the field 
of the auto-nomos- even the otonomy of the ear: the nomadic law of that 
which is not organically tied to a self-expanding centre of signification. 
Yet there is another ( "undeconstructed") aesthetics of autonomy-as-
such, which reinscribes the whole problematic of representational 
penetrations and essences, circulations of semiotic flows. With Carlyle, we 
rnove against the Smithian forms of auto-nomos and otonomy, and deny the 
power of the intervallic or haecceic affect in order to reassert a further, 
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I brutally energised form of originary logic. With Smith, we are in the region 
of an autonomy which presupposes a generalized field of specific 
differences, but with Carlyle we are in the centre of an autonomy which 
presupposes a unified field where difference is defined as opposition to a 
central law. Two forms of autonomy - one achieved through the sonic 
affect, the other through phonic representation reduced to pure presence 
by force. 
Just as Smith's form of the auto-nomos can be described within the 
terms of DeleuzejGuattari's .. self-vibrating regions of intensity .. , or 
plateaus, so too it can be linked in to various ostensibly indeterminist 
statements by John Cage. For instance, when asked specifically about 
11 rnusic which 'speaks' - intentional music", Cage's answer was that; 
a sound by vibrating does what is its nature to do: it acts like 
a sound, instead of acting like a word, or something that it 
isn't. It acts like something that it is, which is the vibration. 
[ ... ] we don't know what music is or could be, but we imagine 
that it could be paying attention to vibratory activity, and 
thut's not such a slight thing to do. [John Cage and the 
Glaswegian Circus: an interview around Musica Nova 1990, p.5] 
Here, Cage maps a space which has an intertext both with 
indeterminacy and the allegedly purely aesthetic, yet specifically within 
the context of a critique of phonocentrism. Both Smith and Cage tend 
towards the DeleuzianjGuattarian concepts of plateaus, of bodies without 
organs, and, more profoundly, the concept of generalized immanence. 
Thus, there are two ways in which the idea of a non-representational 
sonic affectivity can be constructed or read: autonomous in the sense of 
an organicist aesthetics of spirit; or autonomous in anything but the pure 
sense -the sense of the self-declared nomos by a multiplicity of nomadic 
affects upon an immanent surface: a plane of haecceitas. In our attempts 
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tu deconstruct logocentrism by showing its gestures towards 
representation, we would do well to recall Derrida's deconstruction of the 
logocentrisms of representational song, and the fact that this is carried 
out through a gesturing towards the very practises of instrumental music 
which allowed the transcendental departure into the concept of absolute 
music. However, the deconstruction of sonic autonomy through t.hc 
acceleration of representational ruptures is not a symmetrically opposed 
or reversed operation to the deconstruction of phonic representation 
through the acceleration of sonic ruptures. Equally, it is not necessary 
that we somehow unite the two operations through the action of a dialectic. 
It is always a question of strategy. 
In deconstruction, one works within the framework in order to op~n 
it out into a plane of immanence. It is upon that plane that a new form of 
synthesis can take place - not that of the resolution of opposites, but t.he 
synthesis which occurs within the "thought synthesizer", the sound 
synthesizer, or the "happy new ears" of John Cage and Adam Smith. Tn 
dialectics, one moves within a limited sphere where the resolution of 
opposites constantly acts to recapture elements at a perceived periphery, 
restoring them to the control of a universal meta-language rooted in the 
logos. 
In following the movement of a deconstruction, one exchanges the 
dialectical for a multiplicity of dialects - no longer a unified sphere of 
signification according to a central term, but an immanent field of multiple 
differences. In moving from transcendence to immanence, we exchange 
opposition for differance, identity for haecceitas, the voice of uni(s)on for 




and yet, this conceptualising. Creating a distance 
alr·eady. Only a couple of days since the first sounds and now 
here he was attempting to get away from it, from the actunl 
physicality of them. That was hopeless. That was the kind of 
thing he always seemed to be doing nowadays. The totality of 
it: the totality of it; the way the sounds had been the other 
night, or was it last night, the way the actual sounds had 
been, that was it - that was that! 
- A Disaffection, James Kelman, 1989. 
APPENDIX 1 
NOTES s UPPLEMENT ARY T 0 EPIGRAPHIC MATERIALS 
The following supplementary notes include translations and 
glossaries of terms from certain texts quoted above which are not in 
English. Most of the quotes in Scots are comprehensible to the reader of 
English not only in terms of sense, but also poetically and idiomatically, 
sintply with the aid of a glossary. However, in order to shorten each 
individual glossary, some basic points of Scots can be stated here: 
(1) the plural often takes the form -is, rather than simply -s; 
(2) the past tense is often indicated by -it, rather than -ed; 
(3) verb forms can take the suffix -and, or -an, as well as -in and 
-ing; 
( '') the English vowel o often remains in its older northern form, a, 
as in warld for world; 
(5) the English -ght remains in the earlier germanic form -cht, as in 
thocht for thought, and richt for right, 
(6) in Middle Scots, the more latinate quh- has not yet given way to 
the Modern wh-, as in quhen for when; 
(7) the vowel ou is pronounced oo, as in French. 
John Duns Scotus, p.iv: 
the ultimate specific difference is simply to be different from 
everything else 
See also the note on MacDiarmid below. 
Adam Smith, p.iv: 
From The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.145. This anti-dialectical 
sentiment is considered in Chapters 5 & 6, which deal specifically with 
Smith's work. See also the note on MacDiarmid below. 
JI ugo Ball, p. v: 
The instrumentalization of the voice! Taken from what Hans Richter 
( Dada: Art and Anti-Art, p.42] named as Ball's first 11 abstract phonetic 
poem", Gadji Beri Bimba (1916). Lines 11-12 read as follows: 
gadjama bimbalo glandridi glassala zingtata impoalo ogrogoooo 




~o bert Henrys on, p.l~ 
stanza 30: 
quilk - which 
Tlld ppamound - Lat. ma.ppa mundi 
seiss - seas 
sc1 ule - pun on two senses of soul, and sole. 
Stanza 31: 
leirit - learned 
tonis proportionat - proportioned tones, ie. harmony. 
duplare - Lat. dupla, harmonic proportion 2:1, or octave. 
triplare- Lat. tripla, 3:1, perf. 12th, or compound 5th. Naturally, the first 
two tonis proportional to leirwould be the duplare and the triplare, 
Ute first and second harmonics of the natural harmonic series. 
emetricus- according to H. Harvey Wood's notes in his edition of Henryson, 
there are two possible meanings, both with Greek etymologies and 
neither certain: (1) proportion; (2) of or relating to measure or 
measuring. Perhaps, after learning the basic proportions of tonal 
harmony, Orpheus is now learning the second branch of harmony -
temporal proportion, or simply metre, the possibility of dividing the 
basic pulse into bar-groupings. More simply, perhaps, the basic bent 
which announces the division of time by a regular ratio? Wood also 
suggests a scriptal error based on the Greek term epitritus, which 
would give the proportion 4:3, and thus the perfect fourth. This 
would give one line of text referring to octave, fifth and fourth, and 
therefore makes a certain amount of poetic sense. However, there is 
another way of deriving poetic sense from this stanza, if we accept 
the rhythmic translation of the term. Henryson would be unlikely to 
confuse a more obviously rhythmic term for a harmonic one. Equally, 
as will become clear, Henryson will make a claim that the intervals 
and proportions in this stanza can be used to generate further 
symphonyss, or intervals, including the perfect fourth. 
enolius - Gk. hemiola, the proportion 3:2, or in harmonic terms, the perfect 
fifth. One then questions why Henry son would use two terms for the 
perfect fifth ( duplare and enolius) unless he was attempting some 
for-m of flowery redundancy. Given that the term follows a possible 
indicator of temporal organisation ( emetricus), we could interpret 
this hemiola as the medieval rhythmic device, where, in 6/4, for 
instance, a division of the bar as two groups of three is replaced by 
three groups of two, ie. two dotted minims giving way to three 
minims. 
eik- also 
q uudruplait- Lat. quadrupla, the proportion 4:1, which tonally, would give 
the interval of 2 octaves. However, if emetricus, ennolius and 
q ua.druplait form a rhythmic, rather than harmonic series, then the 
last term could simply be .. quadruplet .. , or four in the time of three. 
Thus, as with the harmonic series of octave-fifth, Henryson would 
be describing a rhythmic equivalent of the harmonic series, 
beginning with the basic pulse, or metre, and then moving into more 
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cornp~e~ r:hythms: the alternation of metrical principles, and then the 
su bdlvlslon of smaller, sub-metrical durations. This interpretation 
a l.'-;o makes poetic sense - in the first, harmonic series, the second 
term ( ~uplare) has the proportion 3:2, and thus the rhythmic hemiola 
(ennollus) becomes, through exactly the same proportional numbers, 
the temporal equivalent of the perfect fifth. In this poetic 
exploitation of a symmetry which reduces two musical phenomena to 
one underlying proportional rule, Henryson is being both learned 
and very much of his time. 
epoddeus - Gr. epogdous, difference between 4th & 5th, ie. Maj.2nd, 9:8. 
Henryson refers to its affective quality as rycht hard and curius. 
In other words, dissonant in comparison with the previously-
mentioned consonant intervals. 
thir- these 
sex - six 
componyt - composed 
clerkis - scholars 
N.B. Stanza 31 can thus be translated into (unpoetic) English as 
follows (if we also ignore idiomatic translations of terms such as rycht and 
clerkis, and retain the original grammar): 
"There learned he tones proportioned, 1 as octave, fifth, and metre, I 
hemiola, and also the quadruplet, I wholetone right hard and curious; I of 
all these six, sweet and delicious, 1 right consonant five heavenly 
symphonies I composed are, as clerks can devise. 11 
The names of the five heavenly symphonies, or combinations of sound, are 
listed in the subsequent stanza. 
Stanza 32: 
diatesserone - Gk. dia tessaron, 4:3, perfect fourth. 
wiss- know 
dyapasone - Gk. diapason, 2:1, octave. 
semple - simple 
dowplait - double 
dyapenty - Gk. dia pente, 3:2, perfect fifth. 
dyss - dis-, or double, as in Cassiodorus' delineation of intervals in the 
Institutiones ( c.550-562), where he describes "the consonance 
disdiapason, that is double diapason" [Source Readings, p.89]. Thus, 
11 dyapenty, componyt with the dyss 11 is a disdiapente, or two perfect 
fiClhs, ie. major ninth. 
makis - makes (make) 
multiplicat - multiplied 
mellefluat - mellifluous 
N.B. It is significant that in this stanza, Henryson moves away from 
Latinate terminology to describe intervals and towards Greek forms. It will 
bf! noticed that the Greek dia means through. In this connection, dia pente 
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can also mean through a fifth, ie. a scalic run through the intervall11. Tn 
this way, Henry son has moved from the static Latinate harmonic concepts 
which represent intervals in purely spacial terms, towards an emergent 
form of melodic construction in the scales between two notes. Here we can 
thus read, yet again, the narrative of spacial harmony's proportion.-11 
entelechation into the rhythmic realm, to form melody. As we can read in 
the last line of the stanza preceding the quoted passage, melody is the 
eclucat.ional telos of Orpheus' passage through the intervals between the 
planets: "Thus from the hevin he went onto the erd, 1 Yit be the way sum 
melody he lerd.'' (lerd = leirit). In this, Henryson's poetic structure which 
describes Orpheus' learning of music theory from abstract proportions 
through harmony and into melody forms a direct analogue of Alexander 
Malcolm's ontology of harmony as laid out in his Treatise of Harmony some 
2:~0 years later. Surely this realisation, and the sheer music-theoretical 
complexity and density of this poem lead one to question precisely on what 
i.erms we should accept Henryson's statement in stanza 33 that "in my lyfe 
I cowth ne vir sing a no it". He evidently had an acute theoreticol 
knowledge, even if he does disavow any practical ability with the voice -or 
is this merely the conventional rhetorical device of self-deprecation? Many 
sources refer to him as a dominie in Dunfermline, and according to Wood, 
Henryson taught at the Sangschule of the Benedictine Abbey (although, 
nolably, John Purser does not make any reference to a Sangschule in 
Dunfermline at all in Scotland's Music, and accepts Henryson's seJE-
deprecation uncritically [p.64], despite the fact that he quotes exactly the 
same three stanzas discussed here). A half-century later, this particulor 
Sangschule produced the composer John Angus, whose work appears in 
both the Wade Partbooks, and the 1635 Psalter. Surely, it would be worth 
considering the possibility that Henryson, aside from teaching grammar in 
the Sangschule could have taught music at some stage, perhaps even have 
written on music? As recent experiences in Scottish musicology have 
demonstrated, stranger things have happened. 
ha'e - (hae) have 
hauf- half 
aye- always 
whaur - where 
ken- know 
!:fugh MacDiarmid, p~~ 
Lines 141-144 of A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle (1926). MacDiarmid 
here asserts the distinction between resolving an opposition at a mid-
point, and accelerating an opposition outwith its own limits in order to 
show its structure as that of a loop -lines 153-156 read: "For I've nae faith 
[l] A 1 though it should a 1 so be noted that the author of The Art of Jfusic cl earl¥ uses 
these Greek-derived terms in a harmonic sense: "Quhat is ane canone? It 1s a ne 
in~litutione of noittis or wordis direckit be the arbitar of the compositor schawand be 
diverss signis the augmentation and diminucion of figuris and be exmplis of resolutione 
OJ>ynnand the enigmateis of ab.scuir tenor~s and sang is 1 quhi 1 ki.s be qiapenth~, 
diatessaron 1 and diapason sang1s or tenor1s up or down for tha1r prop1r p1acls 
h;trmonica 11 do is deduce and remov." [An Anonymous Scot t.ish Treatise, Vo 1. I I 1 p. 83] 
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in ocht I can. expla_in, I And stert whaur the philosophers leave aff, I 
Content to ghmpse 1ts loops I dinna ettle 1 To land the sea-serpent's sP-1' 
wi' ony gaff ... (ocht- aught; stert- start; ettle- intend; sel' - self; gaff-
babble) This idea of a loop was next delineated in To Circumjack 
Ccncrastus (1930), and as MacDiarmid wrote: 11 Cencrastus is the 
fundamental serpent, the underlying principle of the cosmos. To 
circumjack is to encircle" [quoted in Whaur Extremes Meet, p.150]. In this 
sense, the idea in Thistle is to circumjack an opposition. The question is 
thP-n one of whether or not the traditional reading of this movement as 
dialectical is final. MacDiarmid himself presents a range of possibilities, 
clHiming, for instance, that the "Caledonian Antisyzygy" and the 
"Dialectical Process" were "one and the same thing" [ibid., p.153]. However, 
his passion for Nietzsche is also well-known, and fits in with various 
statements he made concerning the Scotist concept of haecceitas, such os 
his claim to be "constantly on the qui vive for every trace of that peculiar 
individuality which Duns Scotus called haecceitas" [ibid., p.80]. A further 
potentially anti-dialectical passage which has extreme resonances of Gilles 
Deleuze's Coldness and Cruelty is to be found in lines 513-516: "Masoch and 
Sade I Turned into ane I Havoc ha'e made 1 0' my a'e brain." (ane - one; 
a'e - one: note the split in two forms of the same word) Likewise, Deleuze 
writes against the .. complementary and dialectical unity" [Masochism, p.13] 
represented by the concept of sadomasochism, and proposes a more Scotist 
approach to psychoanalysis in line with the concept of schizoanalysis 
outlined in Chapters 9 & 10: "In place of a dialectic which all too readily 
per·ceives the link between opposites, we should aim for a critical and 
clinical appraisal able to reveal the truly differential mechanisms" [ibid., 
p.14] of Masoch and Sade. The question of MacDiarmid's approach to the 
connectivity of two terms is complex, as he moves through several forms: 
dic=1lectics, taoism, antisyzygy, and, as is argued here, potentially even 
deconstructive approaches. If the latter is taken on board, then the 
critical tradition built around the work of Kenneth Buthlay's edition of 
Thistle, and also Catherine Kerrigan's study Whaur Extremes Meet, 
requires careful critique, not least because of its philosophical naivete in 
assuming that all bi-polar relationships are necessarily dialectical (in a 
Deleuzian reading, for instance, the Tao is not a dialectic- cf. A Thousand 
Plateaus, p.157, where the Tao is described as a BwO or field of immanence, 
a non-transcendental plane). It must also be considered, however, that, as 
But.hlay and Kerrigan point out, MacDiarmid associates the image of the 
thistle with that of the Carlylean Igdrasil at various points through the 
poem. In many senses, then, MacDiarmid's A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle 
engages the vast majority of the metaphysical issues at stake throughout 
the current text, constantly placing conflicting positions side-by-side. The 
ultimate question then becomes one of whether or not the whole is merely 
congealed into a single unity by the naive dialectics so popular with 
MacDiarmid criticism, or if he achieves a form of multiplicity on a plane of 
immanence. Is MacDiarmid really a dialectical materialist or is he in fact a 
neleuzian Scotist? Rather than a fully organic world-tree, is the thistle not 
a weed, a rhizome? 
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pavid Lindsay, p.4~ 
From the penultimate stanza of the classic play in Metropolitan 
Scots, Ane 8atyre of the Thrie Estaitis (1552), p.163. 
ilk - each 
avance - advance 
go.- go 
b]aw - blow 
ane- a 
brawll - branle 
quha- who 
Charles Rennie Mackintosh, p. 9~ 
From Seemliness (1902), published for the first time in Charles 
Rennie Mackintosh: The Architectural Papers (1990), p.224. These 
statements resonate with those concerning architecture, music, and 
masonism in the work of John Clerk, and, by implication, Alexander Malcolm 
and harmonic theory in general. 
James Thomson, p.134 -- . 
From lines 370-378 of Spring (1728), the first of the four poems 
Thomson wrote under the general heading The Seasons, first published as 
a whole in 1730. The Samian Sage is, of course, Pythagoras, and the "vita 1 
scale" is the Great Chain of Being which intervallic ontology assembles. It 
should be noted, however, that rather than finding "High Heaven" at the 
subterranean fundamental, one here finds it inverted to the highest 
harmonic. Nevertheless, in a completely onto-dialectical closure, one would 
expect to find one's beginning in one's end anyhow. 
Thomson's general use of English is also worthy of note. As J.C. 
Bryce writes in his Introduction to Smith's Lectures on Rhetoric, his 
"highly Latinate diction has often been remarked on: as was that of his 
fellow-countrymen in his own century. The Scotticisms against which 
Scottish writers were put on their guard, as by Hume and Beattie, were 
partly of this kind, and have been attributed to the Latin base of Scots 
Law as well as of Scottish Education." [in Smith's Rhetoric, p.15] If we can 
say that Thomson's language is alike to "clouds with vernal showers 
distent" [line 146], syne aiblins we micht interponethat sicna unforleitand 
pn1tticks maun be indorsate. 
Somhairle Mac Gill-Eain, p.17_5 
In anglophone languages, known as Sorley MacLean. Craobh nnn 
Tcud translates literally as Tree of Strings, but is also one of the Gaidhlig 
names for the clarsaich, or Gaelic Harp. Mac Gill-Eain's own translation into 
English of this stanza, no.4, is as follows: "The tree of poetry I is in bands 
of steel, 1 in the cleft rocks, I in the notch of anguish: I the green foliage 
j s 1 under the fierce abusive eye: I the Tree of Strings is I in the 
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extremity of grief." [From Wood to Ridge: Collected Poems 1 0 Choille gu 
Bearradh, p.5l] 
~obert Burns, p.17~ 
From stanza one of Burns' Letter to J--s T--t, Gl--nc--r (1786), in 
Poems and Songs [pp.l79180]. There are a number of Burns' poems which 
make reference .to contemporary thinkers, but significantly, an earliP.r 
r:oe~'. Remors.e, lS headed by t~e statement "I intirely agree with that 
JUdl?Ious Philosopher M;. Sm1th in his excellent Theory of Mornl 
Sentiments, that Remorse 1s the most painful sentiment that can embitter 
the human bosom." [p.27] Perhaps much of the negative critique of 
Enlightenment thought which Burns delivers in his songs and poetry falls 
within the context of the traditional genre of poetic back-biting known os 
i.he Flyting. 
Alasdair Gray, p.21~ 
Lanark, p.494. Anyone who doesn't know their way around Gray 
doesn't know what postmodern literature is. 
Aneirin, p.25~ 
From Y Gododdin ( c.600). Aneirin was a Celtic bard from the ancient 
Welsh-speaking kingdom of Gododdin, now the Lothians in South-East 
Scotland, with its capital at Din Edyn, ·later translated into Gaidhlig as Dun 
Eideann, and into Anglian as Edinburgh. The Gododdin relates the 
culture's final great battle to maintain its independence from the pagan 
Anglo-Saxon tribes of Deira, now Yorkshire. The battle took place at 
Calraeth (Catterick), and only three of the Celtic host survived, the poet 
being one of them. In A.O.H. Jarman's translation, this stanza comes out as: 
"It is a grief to me, after toil, I Suffering death's agony in affliction, I And 
a second heavy grief to me I To have seen our men fall headlong. I And 
long sighing and lamentation I After the fiery men of our land, I Rhufon 
and Gwgon, Gwion and Gwlged, 1 Bravest in their stations, mighty in 
conflict, 1 may their souls after battle be welcomed I in the land of heaven, 
the home of plenty." Following this defeat, the Anglian kingdom of Bernicia 
extended northwards to include the territories up to the Firth of Forth, 
and it is from the language of these settlers that modern Scots derives. 
Many of the defeated "Welsh" of Gododdin moved over to the West coast 
"Welsh" kingdom of Strathclyde, where the poet Taliesin worked, as weJl 
as figures such as St. Kentigern and St. Ninian, and, according to some 
sources, St. Patrick himself. Strathclyde was still Welsh-speaking by the 
tur·n of the Twelfth Century, by which time it was a devolved satellite of 
the Gaidhealach mainstream of Scotland, which had now also overrun the 
Anglian territories in the South East. 
424 
SRrouston Breviary, p.291: 
Through his breathing, a little torch is soothed from envy, and 
kindled in Scotland without material fire. 
The Saint referred to here is, of course, Kentigern, founder of the 
ci ly of Glasgow, who was of royal stock from the Welsh-speaking kingdom 
of Lothian, or Gododdin (cf. previous note). The text comes from a 
mi.lnuscript long known to scholars of Medieval Latin, but only recently 
brought to the attention of musicology by John Purser's realisation thiit 
ils poetry was in fact set to a large amount of Celtic Plainchant, with 
services to Kentigern as the main content. A similarly neglected manuscript 
is the C13th Inchcolm Antiphoner from Inchcolm Abbey in the Firth of 
Forth, which has services to St. Calumba. The author is currently 
translating texts from these MSS. into contemporary Scots. 
Patrick Geddes, p.332 
From Geddes et al, A First Visit to The Outlook Tower(1906). A visual 
representation of the Arbor Saeculorum was published in Geddes' magazine 
The Evergreen, Spring 1895. Geddes, of course, is one of the crucial 
precedents for both the Green movement and the self-determination 
movement in Scotland. 
Crosanachd an Doill, p.367 
This is reprinted in Comunn na Piobaireachd's Piobaireachd, Vol.3 
[p.98], where the title is translated as The Blind Piper's Obstinacy. 
However, if crosanachd is taken not as "obstinacy", but in its other 
rneuning of "satirical poetry", and if we accept the fact that the title 
actually makes no reference to a piper, then we could perhaps better 
translate it as Satire of the Blind, where blindness also signifies ignorance. 
The text given here is in the traditional cainntaireachd system of 
oral notation used by pipers as a means of signifying pitches and 
ornaments through a conventional system of syllables. Thus, following the 
Nether Lorn Canntaireachd used as standard by Comunn na Piobaireachd, 
"hin" signifies a low A preceded by a high G grace note, "en" a low A with 
a high E grace note, "dan" the same with a high D, etc. 
The other main example of the sonic voice in Gt:tidhealach music is the 
use of what Smith would have termed "unmeaning" words, such as those 
to be found at the end of each verse in Mairi Nighean Alasdair Ruaidh's 
Cl 7th satiric song, Mairearad nan Cuireid (Mairearad of the Tricks): "Hi 
riri o hiri o hi o" [Gaelic Songs of Mary MacLeod, p.12]. Such chants can 
also be found as collective choruses, and the Popular contemporary Irish 
composer Enya alludes to them throughout her work; they are found, for 
example, in her English-titled Gaelic song The Longships: "Hi-ri-u I Ho-ro-
ho I Ho-ri-u I Him-o-ro-ho" [Watermark, 1988]. 
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!lo bert Louis Stevenson, p.40~ 
The closing lines of the essay Crabbed Age and Youth, in the 
collection Virginibus Puerisque (1881), p.106. Elsewhere in this collection, 
Stevenson makes a particularly Scotist comment: "The world in which we 
live has been variously said and sung by the most ingenious poets and 
philosophers: these reducing it to formulae and chemical ingredients, tho:;e 
sli'iking the lyre in high-sounding measures for the handiwork of God. 
What experience supplies is of a mingled tissue, and the choosing mind has 
much to reject before it can get together the materials of a theory." [Pan's 
Pipes, in Virginibus Puerisque, p.262] Just as The Strange Case of Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde deals with the problematics of dual identities, perhaps 
there is a case for a post-structuralist reassessment of its antisyzygy in 
the light of such sentiments- building, for instance, on Elaine Show alter's 
work on Stevenson's sexuality in her Sexual Anarchy: Gender & Culture at 
the Fin de Siecle (1991). But what happens to the idea of the Jekyll-Hyde 
psycho-duality when we go further than simply pointing to the oft-cited 
fn1ctured narrative, and place it simultaneously within the milieu of an 
experiential "mingled tissue"? Further, with reference to the theories of 
DeleuzejGuattari (Chapters 9 & 10), what of the laceration of this BwO by 
the "choosing mind's" attempt to "get together the materials for a theory" 
through a process which results in this dualistic assemblage of desires 
known as Jekyll/Hyde? And what are the consequences for the opposition 
of machine to organism in Jekyll's perception of Hyde as "something not 
only hellish but inorganic"? [The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 
p.53] Is this a simple opposition, or a division of difference? 
James Kelman, p.4 ~.~ 
From A Disaffection (1989) [p.9], which traces the collapse of 
affectivity (social, aesthetic and political) in the life of a schoolteacher, 
Pn lrick Doyle. This is most significantly underlined by his discovery of a 
pair of scrap metal pipes which he takes home to make music, only to 
become more and more alienated from them, largely through his continual 
preoccupations with the Pythagorean metaphysics of sound. He continually 
all.empts to inhabit immanence with them, but always comes up against 
theoretical static: "He looked at the pipe. He sat back down on the settee. 
He was doing it wrong he had to do it right, the playing, before anything 
else the conceptualising especially especially the fucking conceptualising 
the bastards, the fucking fusty webs; he blew a note and it was not 
correct, he blew a note that was not correct; he was not blowing a note that 
'''as correct. He laid down the pipe." [ibid., p.223] 
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APPENDIX 2 
1\rBLIOGRAPHY OF ScoTTISH WRITINGS oN Music 
Research here is still tentative, and so the informed reader may 
discover omissions in the following, not least in the case of Gaidhlig texts, 
none of which are included. The author is still learning the language, and 
is not yet at a sufficient level to fully engage. This is, however, a majoc 
future project, and the omission (not exclusion) requires acknowledgement. 
ALISON, Archibald, 1790: Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste 
(Dublin). 
ANON., c.1580: The Art of Music (MS. 4911 in BM, transc. In Judson 
Maynard, An Anonymous Scottish Treatise, Ph. D., Indiana University, 
1961). 
___ , c.1802: An Encouragement to the Cultivation of Church Music, by 
a Preacher in the Church of Scotland (MS. Dc.8.16. in EUML). 
ARMSTRONG, Robert Bruce, 1904: The Highland Harp (Edinburgh). 
___ , 1904-08: Musical Instruments (Edinburgh). 
ATKINSON, J.G., 1900: Scottish National Dances (Edinburgh). 
AUSTIN, John, c.1802: A System of Stenographic Music (Glasgow). 
BAPTIE, David, 1883: A Handbook of Musical Biography (London). 
___ , 1889: Musicians of All Times (London). 
___ , 1894: Musical Scotland Past and Present (Paisley). 
___ , 1895: Sketches of English Glee Composers Historical, Biographical 
and Critical from about 1735-1866 (London). 
, 1846-: A Descriptive Catalogue of upwards of 23,000 Secular Part-
Songs (MS. in BL Reference Division). 
BARR, Samuel, 1861: The Theory and Practise of Harmony and Composition 
(London). 
___ , 1859: Singing at Sight Simplified (Glasgow). 
BASSANTIN, James, C16th.: Musica Secundem Platonem. 
BEATTIE, James, 1776: An Essay on Poetry and Music as they Affect the 
Mind (Edinburgh). 
, 1778: Letter on the Improvement of Psalmody in Scotland 
---
(Edinburgh). 
REGG, James snr., 1808: Treatise on the Use of Organs and Other 
Instruments of Music in the Worship of God (Glasgow). 
BEGG, James jnr., 1866: The Use of Organs and Other Instruments of Music 
in Christian Worship Indispensable (Glasgow). 
, 18-?: Instrumental Music Unwarranted in the Worship of God 
---
(Edinburgh). 
BLACKIE, John Stuart, 1889: Scottish Song: Its Wealth, Wisdom, and Social 
Significance (Edinburgh). 
BRECHIN, William, C19th: Vocal Exercises, Rounds, etc., in the Stave Sol-fa 
Notation, forming a short course of Lessons in Sight Singing in the 
I<ey of F. 
, C19th: Exercises in Sight Singing. 
---
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HREMNER, Robert, 1756: The Rudiments of Music (Edinburgh). 
___ , 1758 (attrib): Instructions for the Guitar (Edinburgh). 
___ , 1777: Some Thoughts on the Performance of Concert Music, in 
Schetky, "Six Quartettos, op.6" (London) 
1.\ROOMFIELD, William Robert, 1863: The Principles of Ancient and Modern 
Music, deduced from the Harmonica] Numbers of Antiquity, with 
exemplifications (Aberdeen). 
BROWN, Colin, 1874: Music in Common Things: Analysis of a Musical Sound, 
and the Production therefrom of the Musical Scale (?Glasgow). 
___ , 1876: Mathematical and Musical Relations of the Scale, she wing the 
Principles, Construction, and Tuning of the Natural Fingerboard 
with Perfect Intonation (?Glasgow). 
__ , 1870: Music in Speech and Speech in Music (Glasgow). 
BROWN, ..James Duff, 1886: Biographical Dictionary of Musicians: with ~ 
Bibliography of English Writings on Music (Paisley). 
___ , 1893: Guide to the Formation of a Music Library (London). 
___ , 1901: Characteristic Songs and Dances of all Nations (London). 
___ , and STRATTON, S. S., 1897: British Musical Biography 
(Birmingham). 
BROWN, JOHN, 1789: Letters Upon the Poetry and Music of the Italian Opera 
(Edinburgh). 
BHOWN, Robert, 1860: The Elements of Musical Science (London). 
___ , 1863: Rudiments of Harmony and Counterpoint on a New Method 
(London). 
_ __, 1865: An Introduction to Musical Arithmetic, with its Application 
to Temperament (London). 
·---' 1893: Paisley Burns Clubs, 1805-1893 (Paisley). 
, 1889-90: Paisley Poets, with Brief Memories of them, and Selections ---
from their Poetry (Paisley). 
, ?: also a work on Gaidhlig Salm. ---
BROWN-BORTHWICK, Robert, C19th: Art in Worship. 
, C19th: The Praise of God. ---
-· ____ , trans., 1877: H. Barbedette's Life and Works of Stephen Heller 
(London). 
BHUCE, Thomas, 1726: The Common Tunes; or Scotland's Church Musick 
Made Plain (Edinburgh). 
BUCHANAN, Thomas, 1828: Physiological Illustration of the Organ of 
Hearing, More Particularly of the Secretion of Cerumen and its 
Effects in Rendering Auditory Perceptions Accurate and Acute 
(London). 
BURNETT, James (Lord Monboddo), 1773-92: Of the Origin and Progress of 
Language (Edinburgh). 
CAMPBELL, A., 1854: Two Papers on Church Music, read before the 
Liverpool Ecclesiastical Musical Society (Liverpool). 
CAMPBELL, Alexander, 1798: An Introduction to the History of Poetry in 
Scotland (Edinburgh). 
, 1816; Travels in the Border Country in Search of Folk Music (MS. ---
La.II.378j2, in EUML). 
CAMPBELL, Donald, 1862: A Treatise on the Language, Poetry, and Music of 
the Highland Clans, with Illustrative Traditions and Anecdotes, and 
Numerous Ancient Highland Airs (Edinburgh). 
CAMPBELL, ,John Francis, 1880: Canntaireachd: Articulate Music (Glasgow, 
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foes. ed. Steve Sweeney-Turner, Glasgow, 1989). 
CANDLISH, Robert Scott, 1856: The Organ Question: Statements by Dr. 
Ritchie and Dr. Porteous for and against the Use of the Organ in 
Public Worship (Edinburgh). 
CARL YLE, Thomas, 1828: Burns, in "Edinburgh Review" 96. 
___ , 1831: Luther's Psalm, in "Fraser's Magazine" 12. 
_ , 1852: The Opera, in "The Keepsake", 1852. 
CARMICHAEL, Peter, 1860: Science of Music Simplified (Glasgow). 
CAUMICHAEL, S., 1878: Dictionary of Musical Terms and Elementary Rules 
(London). 
CARNIE, William, 1854: Psalmody in Scotland, a Lecture (Aberdeen). 
, 18-?: Teacher's Indicator. ---
CHAMBERS, Ro bert, 1862: The Songs of Scotland Prior to Burns 
(Edinburgh). 
CHAPMAN, J., 1818: The f\1usic, or Melody and Rhythmus of Language 
(Edinburgh). 
CHEYNE, Edwin, 1879: The Amateur's Vocal Guide and Voice Trainer 
(Glasgow). 
CLARKE, James Paten, & THOMSON, A., 1835: The Choir (?Glasgow). 
CLERK, John, 1892 (post.): Memoirs of the Life of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik 
(Edinburgh: Scottish History Society). 
COLVILLE, David, & BENTLEY, George, 1864: Graduated Course at 
Elementary Instruction in Singing, on the Letter-Note Method. 
CORRI, Domenico, ?1787: A Complete Musical Grammar (Edinburgh). 
COUTTS, W. G. ("Ithuriel"), 1877: Scottish versus Classic Music, and the 
Ethical and £sthetical Aspect of the Question (Edinburgh). 
CROMAR, Alexander, 1856: A Vindication of the Organ -a Review of the Rev. 
Dr. Candlish 's publication entitled "The Organ Question" 
(Edinburgh). 
CRUICKSHANK, J., 1851: Flutina and Accordion Teacher (London). 
CURRIE, James, 1858: The Elements of Musical Analysis (Edinburgh). 
, 18-?: A First Musical Grammar (Edinburgh). 
DAL YELL, John Graham, 1849: Musical Memoirs of Scotland, with historical 
annotations, and numerous illustrative plates (Edinburgh). 
DAUNEY, William, 1838: Ancient Scottish Melodies from a Manuscript of the 
Reign of King James VI., with an Introductory Inquiry illustrative 
of the History of Music in Scotland ( "Skene MS." reprint) 
(Edinburgh: The Edinburgh Printing & Publishing Co.). 
DAVIDSON, Peter, 1871: The Violin: a Concise Exposition of the General 
Principles of Construction, Theoretically and Practically Treated 
(Glasgow). 
DA VIE, James, 18-?: A Compendious Introduction to the Art of Singing, 
Comprising the most Useful Scales and Examples (Aberdeen). 
, 18-?: Scales for the Voice (?Aberdeen). 
D_E_W_A_R_, Daniel, 1812: Observations on the Character, Customs, 
Superstitions, Music, Poetry, and Language of the Irish and on some 
of the causes which have Retarded the Moral and Politir:nl 
Development of Ireland (London). 
DIBDIN, James C., 1888: The annals of the Edinburgh Stage with an Account 
of the Rise and Progress of Dramatic Writing in Scotland 
(Edinburgh). 
DTCK, J.C., 1903: The Songs of Robert Burns, Now First Printed with the 
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Melodies for which they were Written. A Study in Tone-Poetry 
(London). 
___ , ed., 1908: Notes on Scottish Song by Robert Burns Written in an 
Interleaved Copy of The Scots Musical Museum (London). 
I>RYSDALE, George John Learmont, 1914: Scottish Composers, in "The 
Dunedin Magazine", iii, 15 (Edinburgh). 
DUN, Finlay, 1829: Solfeggi and Exercises upon Scales, Intervals, etc. [ ... } 
to which is prefixed an Introductory Discourse on Vocal Expression 
(London). 
__ , 18-?: Analysis of Scottish Music (?Edinburgh). 
DUNCAN, Gideon, 1755: True Presbyterian, or a Brief Account of the New 
Singing, its Author, and Progress in General. 
DYCE, J.S., ?1890: Life, Correspondence and Writings of William Dyce (MS. 
in Aberdeen Art Gallery). 
EBSWORTH, Joseph, 1844: General Index to First Hundred Vols. of the Music 
in the Library of the Edinburgh Harmonists' Society (Edinburgh). 
FAIRBAIRN, James, 1832: Elements of Music: Part I., Melody, containing an 
explanation of the Simpler Principles of the Science. Part II., 
Harmony, with Appendix on the nature and causes of sound and the 
consonance and dissonance of intervals, as arising from one system 
of vibration (Edinburgh). 
"FIONN": cf. WHYTE, Henry. 
FLEMING, Alexander, 1808: To the Lord Provost of Glasgow, the two 
following Letters are respectfully addressed, on the subject of the 
Organ which[ ... ] was introduced into St. Andrews Church, Glasgow. 
To which are added Remarks on the Rev, James Begg's Treatise on 
the Use of Organs (Glasgow). 
___ , 1808: Answer to a Statement of the Proceedings of the Presbytcty 
of Glasgow relative to the Use of an Organ (Glasgow). 
FLEMING, John, 1821: An Inquiry into the Compositions with which the 
Praise of God should be Celebrated in His Public Worship 
(Edinburgh). 
FORBES, G. H., ed. 1882: The Ancient Missal in the Possession of the 
Baroness Willoughby de Eresby (Edinburgh). 
FHASER-HARRIS, D., 1899: St. Cecilia 'sHall in the Niddry Wynd (Edinburgh: 
Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier). 
GERARD, ALEXANDER, 177?: An Essay on Genius (Aberdeen). 
____ , 1756: An Essay on Taste. With Three Dissertations on the Same 
Subject. By Mr de Voltaire, Mr D'Alembert, Mr de Montesquieu 
(?Aberdeen). 
GIBSON, James, 1869: The Public Worship of God: its Authority and Modes, 
Hymns and Hymn Books (Glasgow). 
GJ RVAN, John, 1763: The Vocal Musician, Part I. The Grounds of Music 
(Edinburgh). 
GLEN, David, 1881: David Glen's Highland Bagpipe Tutor (Edinburgh). 
GLEN, John, 1900: Early Scottish Melodies (Edinburgh: J. & R. Glen). 
, & MACBEAN GLEN, Thomas, ed. ARNOLD, Myers, 1985: The Glen ---
Account Book, 1838-53 (Edinburgh: EUP). 
GLEN, Thomas MacBean, ?1870: A New and Complete Tutor for the Great 
Highland Bagpipe (Edinburgh: J. & R. Glen). 
GHAHAM, George Farquhar, 1816: An Account of the First Edinburgh 
Musical Festival, held between the 30th of Oct. and 5th. Nov., 18l5, 
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with an Essay containing some general observations on Music 
(Edinburgh). 
___ , 1817: Elements of Singing, written for the Edinburgh Institution 
for the Encouragement of Sacred Music (Edinburgh). 
___ , 1817: General Observations Upon Music, and Remarks Upon Mr. 
Logier's System (Edinburgh). 
____ , Music, article in 7th and 8th Ed.s of 11 Encyclopcedia Britannica 11 • 
___ , 1838: Essay on the Theor~v and Practise of Musical Compositinn, 
with Introduction and Appendix (Edinburgh). 
GRAHAM, Maria, 1852: A Few Words on the Formation of the Major and Minor 
Scales, in a Letter to her Pupils (London). 
GRANT, James, 1814: Thoughts on the Origin and Descent of the Gael: with 
an Account of the Picts, Caledonians, and Scots; and Observations 
Relative to the Authenticity of the Poems of Ossian (Edinburgh, 
Inverness & London: Archibald Constable). 
GREGORY, John, 1763: Discourse Ill (Edinburgh) (cf. Johnson 1972). 
GHIER, William, 1835: The Musical Encyclopcedia.: a. Collection of English, 
Scottish, and Irish Songs, edited by J. Wilson, to which is prefixed 
an elaborate essay on the first principles of Music (London). 
GRIEVE, John Charles, ?1875: The Harmonium: how to Use It (Edinburgh). 
GRIGOR, Alexander, 1883: Hints and Maxims to Players on Pianoforte, 
Harmonium, etc. (Glasgow). 
GUNN, Anne, nee YOUNG, 1803: An Introduction to Music; in which the 
Elementary Parts of the Science, and the Principles of ThorouglJ-
bass and Modulation, as Illustrated by the Musical Games and 
Apparatus, are fully and familiarly explained, with Examples and 
Complete Directions for Playing the several Games (Edinburgh). 
___ , The Elements of Music (Edinburgh). 
GUNN, John, 1789a: The Theory and Practise of Fingering the Violoncello, 
containing rules and progressive lessons for attaining the 
knowledge and command of the whole compass of the instrument 
(London). 
___ , 1789b: A Treatise on the Origin of Stringed Instruments (London). 
___ , 1793: Art of Playing the German Flute on New Principles (London). 
, ?1795a: School of the German Flute (London). ---
, ?1795b: An Essay, with copious examples, towards a more easy and 
scientific method of commencing and pursuing the study of the 
Pianoforte, with the Principles of Thorough-bass and Musical 
Science (London). 
---, 1801: An Essay, Theoretical and Practical, on the Application of the 
Principles of Harmony, Thorough-bass, and Modulation, to the 
Violoncello (Edinburgh). 
___ , 1807: An Historical Enquiry respecting the Performance on the 
Harp in the Highlands of Scotland, from the earliest times until it was 
discontinued a bout the year 1734; to which is prefixed an account of 
a very ancient Caledonian Harp, and of the harp of Queen Mary 
(Edinburgh). 
G UNNYON, William, 1879: Illustrations of Scottish History, Life and 
Superstition From Song and Ballad (Glasgow). 
H/\DDEN, James Cuthbert, 1888a: Handel (London). 
, 1888b: Mendelssohn (London). ---
___ , 1898: George Thomson, the Friend of Burns: his Life and 
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Correspondence (Edinburgh & London). 
___ , 1899a: Chopin (London: Dent). 
___ , 1899b: Haydn (London: Dent). 
___ , 1907: The Great Operas (London). 
·--' 1908: The Operas of Wagner (London). 
___ , 1909: Master Musicians (Edinburgh and London). 
-··----' 1910: Favourite Operas from Mozart to Mascagni: Their Plots, 
History and Music (London). 
____ , 1913a: Composers in Love and Marriage (London). 
___ , 1913b: Modern Musicians (Edinburgh and London). 
H/\TELY, Thomas Ledgerwood, 1860a: Lecture on Music of the Scottish 
Reformation, in "Tricentenary Proceedings" (?Edinburgh). 
___ , ?1860b: Historical Lectures on Psalmody, with Illustrations 
(?Edinburgh). 
HENDERSON, George, 1901: Lady Nairne and Her Songs (Paisley: A. 
Gardener). 
HENDERSON, Thomas Findlay, 1906: "Charlie he's My· Darling" and Other 
Burns' Originals, in "Scottish Historical Review", Vol.3, No.10, 171-8. 
H ENDERS ON, William, 1901: Richard Wagner, his Life and Dramas: a 
Biographical Study of the Man and an Explanation of his Work (New 
York & London: Putman). 
HEWITT, Daniel Chandler, 1828: New Analysis of Music (London). 
_ __, 1860: The True Science of Music; being a New Exposition of the 
Laws of Melody and Harmony (London). 
HOGARTH, George, 1835: Musical History, Biography, and Criticism, being 
a General Survey of Music from the Earliest Period to the Present 
Thne (London). 
___ , 1838a: Memoirs of the Musical Drama (London). 
---, ed., 1838b: Testimonials in Favour of Mr. George Hogarth, 
Candidate for the Professorship of Music in the University of 
Rdinburgh (London: J. Moyes). 
___ , 1851: Memoirs of the Opera in Italy, France, Germany, and England 
(?London). 
___ , 1842: The Songs of Charles Dibdin (London). 
___ , 1852: The Birmingham Festival of 1852 (London). 
, 1862: The Philharmonic Society of London, from its Foundation in 
--1813 to its Fiftieth Year, 1862 (London). 
, 18-?: The Life of Beethoven (London). 
HOLDEN, John, 1766: A Collection of Church-Music, consisting of New Setts 
of the Common Psalm Tunes, with some other Pieces; adapted to the 
several Metres in the Version authorized by the General Assembly. 
Composed with a view to render the just Performance of each part 
more easy to Learners; and the united effect of the whole more full 
and pathetic; and also exemplify some new Discoveries in the Scale 
of Music. Principally designed for the use of the University of 
Glasgow (Glasgow). 
___ , 1770: An Essay Towards a Rational SJrstem of Music (Glasgow, 
Calcutta 1799, Edinburgh 1807). 
HOME, Henry (Lord Kames), 1761: Elements of Criticism (Edinburgh). 
HONEYMAN, William C., ?1890: The Violin: How to Master It (Edinburgh: 
?Kohler). 
--- , ?1891: The Secrets of Violin Playing, being Full Instructions and 
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(Edinburgh: Kohler). 
___ , 18-?: The Young Violinist's Tutor and Duet Book: A Collection of 
Easy Airs, Operatic Selections [ ... ] and full directions tor Paren Is, 
Pupil, and Teacher; the whole arranged on an entirely new principle 
(Edinburgh: Kohler). 
___ , 18-?: The Violin: How to Choose One (Edinburgh: Kohler). 
___ , 18-?: The Strathspey, Reel, & Hornpipe Tutor. Being a Concise 
Analysis of the Peculiar Method of Bowing these Compositions 
(Edinburgh: Kohler). 
__ , 1898: Scottish Violin Makers, Past and Present (Newport-on-Tay). 
____ , (post.) 1922: Strathspey Players Past and Present (?Edinburgh: 
Larg & Sons). 
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KENNEDY, David, 1887: Singing Round the World, in M. Kennedy, "David 
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John Cage's Practical Utopias 
John Cage in conversation with Steve Sweeney Turner 
Cage is a featured composer at Musica Nova in Glasgow this month 
John Cage has always been associated with the mul-
tiplicity of life- whether in his work as composer, poet, 
artist or performer, his taste in friends such as Marcel 
Duchamp, Merce Cunningham, Robert Rauschenberg, 
Pierre Boulez, Yoko Ono or John Lennon, his approach 
to methodology in using chance, choice, computers, or 
the J-Cizi11g, or in his interest in mushrooms, Zen, 
gourmet macrobiotics, or world politics, his personal 
influence on readers, listeners, lookers, or fellow eaters 
is always deep. One thing, however, lasts as the 
ever-present trace of his actions, and that is the 
all-pervading notion of indeterminacy. Whether in his 
early elegiac melodies, the famous 'silent' piece, the 
uncompromising chaos of the 60s, or the more recent 
ironies of random opera, Cage has always preached a 
humble approach to the world, reminding us that 
desires and intentions too often get in the way of 
experiencing 'no matter what eventuality', and that 
Joyce's character 'Here Comes Everybody' may, finally, 
point the way to the new consciousness he hopes for. 
It seems to me that o11e of the problems with i11determi11ate music 
may be that we don't really k11ow how to talk about it yet on its 
own terms; there isn't really a critical discourse to engage with 
it. 
Mmm. Ha ha ha ha. I think it's in the field of anarchy. 
You can do it there- start there. Read the life of Emma 
Gold man. Two volumes. Living my Life. Ha ha ha ... The 
old ideas, the determinist ideas, have to do with the 
Nineteenth Century, and if you read the book that the 
Huddersfield Festival put out, it places Boulez, even, in 
that situation with respect to Beethoven - continuing 
the main stream. But, uh, there's another way of looking 
at things, which sees that the main stream has now 
gone into delta. And beyond that into ocean. And 
there's a multiplicity of possibilities rather than just one 
principle one. When I was young there were two ways 
of going - one was Schoenberg, and the other was 
Stravinsky. But now you can go in any direction at all, 
even your own direction. 
Yes; in that Huddersfield Festival blurb you ·were presented as 
Cage and Boulez: 'Divergent Leaders of Tlze New', which 
suggests that old situation. 
Yeh, it's sort of silly, becuase it's an idea of Yes or No, 
and we already agreed that it's more like ocean- many 
possibilities ... life is quite, em, complicated. 
But when you say 'critical', a 'critical basis', you're 
speaking of a decision about values, I suppose; but the 
values exist not outside of us, but inside of us, and 
particularly in indeterminate work. Maybe the desire is 
unnecessary, so that we don't need any basis- we have 
the basis in us already. It's built- in. Ha ha. You can't 
prove it to anybody, either. But I don't think we need 
criticism in the first place. You can get to language by 
going to the beginning of the words about indetermi-
nacy: I've written a good deal about it, so has Christian 
Wolff, but you see, the desire to have a language in 
order to have a criticism is perhaps not necessary; it's 
related to laws and theory, and so forth ... and 
indeterminacy is precisely not related to those things. 
Sure, but to establish i11determi11acy you have to step back from 
the traditio11al values that music Jzas adopted - that is 
11ecessarily a theoretical sta11ce, surely? 
You're taking a different point of view, yes? Changing 
your mind from the determinist position to a non-
determinist position. The determinist position has been 
that each performance is an approach to an ideal. Okay? 
The indeterminist position is that each performance is 
necessarily what it is, and you'd better listen while it's 
going on, otherwise you'll miss it. Mm? And I prefer 
that point of view; I think it's more appropriate to 
20th-century living than the other one. The other one 
has a kind of an assumption of progress towards a 
non-existent, or an imaginary, goal, rather than the 
Now-Moment. The indeterminist position is all con-
nected with seeing how things are at the moment when 
you're experiencing them. 
Yes, and the other fine tlzi11g about indeterminacy is that so 
many views are possible! How do you see your 11otio11 of 
i11detenni11acy differi11g from others, particularly those in 
Europe? For i11sta11ce, people like Karlhei11z Stocklzausen, 
Comelius Cardew, you k11ow? 
How we're different? I haven't studied that. I don't 
think Karlheinz studies what I do ... and Cornelius is 
dead! Ha ha ha. So I really don't know what's happen-
ing ... 
However, it's often suggested that Stockhause11 was influenced 
by your work, by your visit to the Darmstadt Composition 
School i11 the late fifties? 
Right. No, I think people know perfectly well what 
interests them. And at one time Karlheinz and I would 
talk and exchange ideas. You know the story about the 
talk about singing? Well, he was writing a song for 
Cathy Berberian, who I later also wrote for, and he said, 
'if you were writing for a singer, would you write music, 
or would you write for the singer?' And I said, 'I would 
write for the singer', and he said, 'well that's the 
difference between us, because I would write music'. So 
then he wrote this song for Cathy, and he asked her to 
whistle. And she can't whistle. So that's the difference 
between us. Hmhmhmhm! 
Ha ha ha! So how does your indetenninacy differ from 
Carde1.o's? 
I don't know, in those terms. He wrote an article against 
what I was doing, and I never objected to it ... or never 
wrote in opposition to it. Later, he saw me in Berlin, and 
he said, 'I may have made a mistake in writing that 
article about you'. And I said nothing. 
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Ul111l1 ... Altllolt~l' l"uc read yo11 polcmicisi11~ a~ai11st Cardcw 
i11 Conversation Without Feldman - with Gcoffrcy Bar-
Hard, a11d it seems that the /Jc~itlllill~ and tile end, to p11t it that 
way, is a/lout Cardcw, tmd what yo11 saw as tile iiiCOII-
sislcllcics, or perhaps failllrcs of Cardcw's work. 
I haven't read that recently ... We had quite a lot of 
difficulty· toward the end: he was employed, for 
instance, once, to play a piano part in my piece called 
HPSCHD and he made a point of not doing his work 
well, and that kind of situation made difficulty for us. It 
seems to me unprofessional, if you accept payment to 
do something and then don't do it. I think it actually 
bound up with my practical side; I found that what 
Cornelius was doing didn't help the Revolution as 
much as he would have liked it to help, hm? And it also 
didn't help music, hm? Because his music became less a 
discovery and more and more the revival of nineteenth 
century practises. 
But also, i11 a sc11sc, a11 a11alysis of Victoria11 English music, 
based 011 political grounds. 
I had liked and followed a great deal of Cornelius's 
work, and he was a very, uh ... I really haven't studied 
my thoughts about that ... or come to any ... I don't 
feel as though I have a point of view, but if I have, I'm 
afraid it is a little bit against, as you say, in the Geoffrey 
Barnard. 
Ulwh ... How do you feel about the book Stockhausen 
Serves Imperialism? You know that, yell? 
That's Cornelius, isn't it? I didn't like it. It was an attack 
on the part of Cornelius against people who were doing 
their work. And, instead of doing his own work, he got 
involved in attacking other people who were working. 
Hm? So that he didn't do himself any good, or them any 
good. I think ... it was negative action - that's what I 
really object to. I think people should act affirmatively 
and do what they believe. I think Cornelius failed to do 
that when he attacked other people, including me. And 
he even said to me that he thought he may have made a 
mistake, but he didn't admit that it was a mistake to 
attack Stockhausen. I didn't pay much attention. 
Because it wasn't based in ... 
... in affirmative action. 
Ulwh. How do you reconcile your Utopian 50s and 60s views 
on affirmative politics with the experience of the last decade? 
I don't try to reconcile it with American politics, if that's 
what you're saying. I've been all along, very clearly 
against American government. I'm a Thoreauvian 
anarchist: I don't vote ... I look forward to the time 
when no-one else does, either. 
Do you not think that there may be certain directions that you 
could use your vote in that would L'Ventually generate that? 
No, no, I don't. 
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Does that speak more of Amcrica11 politics, or do you thi11k there 
arc possibilities for it clscwllcrc? 
Government in general ... I think we have more serious 
problems that government is not able to solve. 
You mca11 ecological, a11d so 011 ... 
All those things. We're almost ruining the whole globe 
in our interest in government. We have I think it is 158 
separate governments in a place where there should be 
only the solution of problems, otherwise we're all going 
to 'em, skip the ... whatever it is. 
Yelz, so would you be for some kind of world council in that 
sense? 
Not involving politicians, but involving intelligent 
people. I'm talking about the problems, and solving the 
problems. And we generally solve problems by getting 
people who know something about the materials 
involved. Governments are concerned with power, and 
money, and neither one of those things is important. 
The important thing is to keep the thing working. And 
the solutions to that have been put forward, as I've 
pointed out in my books; by Mcluhan and Fuller, and 
there may be better, or improved versions of those now. 
Full never gave a fixed idea, he gave an indeterminate 
idea, that could change as the possibilities changed. I 
have no confidence in government, of any country. 
I repeat, then, the life of Emma Gold man; it's the basis 
of my text calledAnarclzy, which is just now published in 
the Booknell Review ... 
But would you say that in terms of centres of power or that kind 
of analysis, do you 11ot think tlzat a dissolutio11, a disintegration, 
a11d an increased tllmzber of d~volvi11g centres of power 011 
increasingly more specific geograplzical bases would actually be 
a step towards tlze kind of tlz i11g that you've always talked about? 
Instead of America, well ... instead of Washington and 
Moscow. For instance, within Britislz politics, it's often sug-
gested that Wales, Scotland and Nortlzenz Ireland become 
disengaged from Westminster, and so on. 
No, it won't do any good. No. The first step will 
probably be, as it is being, a joining together of 
differences. Like the joining together of East and West 
Berlin now.It was in the nineteenth century that all the 
principalities of Germany formed a nation, and the 
same thing happened in Italy. We're moving toward a 
European coming-together, and then what we need is a 
world coming-together, but not a splitting-apart. 
Well, speaking within the Scottish vi~wpoint, the notion is a 
holistic fragmentation, basically; independence from England, 
but within Europe. 
I know, the whole thing is so complicated that it doesn't 
look as though we're going to have the sense to find a 
solution. But if each person, if each country by separat-
ing from one another, they also separated from govern-
ment ... but they won't do that. If they would, then I 
would be all for it. I've already done that as an 
individual. 
Ulzull, but surely, the b'reater number of centres of power, tlze 
less megalomaniac each centre, and the greater the possibility of 
moving towards that? 
-------------·-·--·-·---~--.............. __ _..'--------------·------
Yell, bill implicitly bllilt i11to tile 11olioll of a score is allfllor-
sllip. 
Uh, only if it's a fixed relation of the parts, but if there are 
several parts and there's no fixed relationship, then 
there's nothing built-in. No fixed relation built in. 
Bill it call still be a11 illfluellce. 
Of course, but it's only because it's practical, that it 
doesn't in any way determine what happens. 
Wl1ere would you put improvisation in this, then? 
Improvisation is quite another thing and is something 
that I want to avoid. Most people who improvise slip 
back into their likes and dislikes, and their memory, and 
they don't make any ... they don't arrive at any 
revelation that they're unaware of. 
So is your o·wnllotion of tlze function of tlze composer associated 
with that of Buddhist disciplines, in that there is an irreleva11ce 
in an activity, so that it becomes simply a matter of doing 
something which requires discipline for its owll sake? 
Well, I'm not exactly sure that I see eye-to-eye with 
what you're saying but it's in that direction. It's since 
1952, which is nearly forty years ago, I don't write any 
fixed relation of parts. Ha ha ha! No, I do everything 
very precisely, and what I'm interested in is having 
each thing be uniquely itself, and not in terms of 
improvisation. If I write an improvisation, I, uh, write 
specific limitations for the improvisation so that it leads 
the musician into a situation with which he's 
unfamiliar. 
Do you find a correspondence behveen tlze notion of tlze score 
and that of koan? 
A score, you see, is a fixed relation of parts, so I don't see 
any relation between that and koan. 
On tlze other hand, you've written scores ·wlziclz lzave been 
non-fixed relationships of parts. 
No, it's a misuse of the word 'score'. A score is a fixed 
relation of parts. We say 'score' and 'parts', distinguish-
ing the fixed relation with the unfixed. The koan 
presents a problem which can't be solved, but what I'm 
doing is giving something that can be done, hm? 
It can be done, but that's not the same as a solution, surely. 
Why not? Because what it's about is giving directions 
for the making of music. The koan is involved not with 
the making of music but the coming to enlightenment, 
and it's working with mental processes, and I'm not 
dealing with that. I'm dealing with sounds. It's the 
difference between going out to the world of relativity, 
and going ... the koan goes into the absolute. It's 
involved in Buddhism with enlightenment, and all I've 
been doing is, uh, working with music. 
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Sure. So what ·would you say tile fullctioll of the score per se 
is? 
I think it's a way of writing to strangers, people whom 
you don't know, giving them the directions for how to 
do something when you won't be present. Hm? 
So ill that sellse, you're killd of illterested ill tlze notioll of 
presence? 
No, I know that I'm going to die, and I won't be here, 
and I'm writing these letters to people I don't know. Ha 
ha! Who may be interested in doing what I suggest ... 
they're almost bound to be. 
Why do you say tlzat? 
Well, because I've become so notorious. It's almost 
certain that someone will be interested. I was in-
terested, and it looks as though others vvill be. 
Steve Sweeney Tumer, an emergent exponent of the 
bodhran, earlier this year directed in Edinbwgh a 
Scottish version of Cage's Roaratorio, entitled Rielibo-
gie a Jacobite circus on King James VI's 
damwnologie. 
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JOHN CAGE'S GLASWEGIAN CIRCUS 
A n interview by Steve S weeney Turn er 
John Cage was o ne of the featured com -
posers at las t year 's Mus ica ova in the 
Cultura l Capita l. it was his second vis it to 
Scotl and to hear the Whistlebinkies pe r-
form hi s Scouish Circus, which he wrote 
for them on his previous trip in 1984 . I 
asked him how he'd got on with Glasgow's 
new music f estival: 
I'm glad to have been he re , and I enjoyed 
the compos itio n wo rkshops very muc h. It 
gave me an opportunity to hear what 
young people are do ing; music which I 
didn ' t kno w. I was also de lighted to be 
able to go to a moor to the north o f the city 
and hunt for mushroom . 
that 's apt to be Romantic, because it " talks", 
whereas music which does o me thi ng i not so 
apt to be Romantic. By "do ing something" I 
mean be ing a proce s which is in ac ti on. I think 
Mac Millan has spoken several times about 
Process Music, so that he probably has a proc-
ess in m ind, and that makes hi m think o f h is 
work as not being Romantic . 
lt' soften said of American music that it's more 
eclectic than traditional. as is European mu-
sic. How far would you say that ' s tm e of your 
OW /1 \\'0 rk ? 
I don ' t think o f myse lf as choos ing amo ng a 
seri es of po ib ili ties- I'm try ing to work ju t 
w ith sou nd. Eclec ticism means to me choos-
ing a nu mber of d ifferent things o r way o f Did you fi nd anything interesting while 
you were up there' The Whistlebinkies writing , for ex press ive purposes , and that yo ur 
Oh , I like all mu shrooms, and we fo und some l didn ' t know. and 
some I did know. I cooked one of them , which was a boletus . I ' m 
no t exactly sure which one, but it was one l knew. It had a tanned 
cap and a rough stem which had sort of spo ts on it. 
What was your reaction to the music of the other f eatured 
composers ' 
Well, wh at wa so beautifull y expressed in Wolfgang Rihm ' s 
mu ic i that no i e i as we lcome as mu sica l sound. ve ry rich 
e perience come from getting to know Wolfgang· mu sic as 
much a l have . I th ink hi s mu ic has to do with a love of pay ing 
atte ntio n to ound c ry c lo ely. But of the o the r com po crs who 
are here a t u ica ova; l think of James Mac Mill an · work and 
igel 0 borne ' wo rk a qui te Romantic. 
That's im cresting. hecause MacMillan told me that he's quite 
annoyed at heing labelled "Neo-romamic" . 11 ·hcreas he sa11· 
Rihm ' s work as bordering on that. 
Ye .we li.actuall y thesec la ification . a youpo int o ut. aren ' tto 
the liking of the people who' re put in them! 
J-101·e you e1·er consciously auempted to he undassl}i'ah/e Your-
self? 
1 o. l don ' t c l a s ify . I don't th ink l do. l do . l suppo~c . some ti me ·: 
l think of ·ome mu ic as in volving omc thing lil..c "~pcec h" . and 
sty le is no t a s ingle s tyle. But I do n ' t have tho e purposes. I reall y 
wan t the sounds to be themselves, and to make some kind of 
di scove ry. And I think that I'm engaged in th at kind o f ac tivity. 1 
don ' t think of it as fallin g into Eclec tic ism , or Ro mantic, o r 
C l a s ic i m . Othe r people would have to think in those te rm . Fo r 
instance , o ne o f the critics , speaking of me in the Gl asgow Hera ld , 
says that it must be rathe r odd to be o n exhibit while you ' re s till 
a li ve . I im agine he mean that it must be odd for me, but it 's not 
odd fo r me- it' s odd fo r him ; it 's odd for him fo rme to be o n ex hibit 
while I ' m still ali ve! I don ' t expect to be o n ex hibit whe n I'm dead 
e ithe r! 
So ho 11· d id you like the Whistlebinkies' concert ' 
\ e ll, they're just lovely. They were p laying music tha t they 
kno w. but whe n they were not playing any th ing, they al o did it 
beautifu lly ! ln thei r performance of 4 '33 " I wanted to show that 
a g roup is no t o ne th ing . l asked them to do it as seven indi vidua ls. 
The direc tions I gave them were that the si le nces should be 
be t\ ee n ' 33" and 2'40" , but shou ld be measured by an ·'i nner 
c lock". " Inner c lock" i apt to be lower than a rea l c lock. I mean 
to say. take longe r. 
i t' s also l'el'}' similar. then. to 11 ·ha1 You 11 ·ere doing with them in 
Scou ish Circus - taking them all apart from each 01her. 
Righ t. That' s what you mi ght ca ll my "po litica l" attitude; toward 
,;oc ie ty in gene ra l. ln Scouish Circus. l simpl y asked the m to do 
\\' hat they do. ot to do it togethe r. bu t in circus, so that each 
John Cage's Glaswegian Circus (Cont'd) 
musician becomes an individual , rather than part of a fixed group. 
So that they're playing different pieces , and if they find by chance 
they 're playing the same piece, they should play it in a different 
tempo. I've done that not only with Scottish music, but also with 
Irish music, in connection with Roaratorio. 
Do you actually have any Irish blood in you, way back? 
Unfortunately not. I'd like some! Cage itself is an Engli h name. 
I think I have a bit of Scots blood, though I don't know where 1 got 
that idea, but the idea I got growing up in the family was that there 
was some Scottish blood,some French,and pos ibly some Swedish, 
because my grandfa ther's name was Gustavu Adolphus 
Williamson Cage Ill. 
Were you interested in Celtic Folk music before you did "Scouish 
Circus" and "Roaratorio", or was it an effect of tlwt? 
Well,! didn't have the kind of interest I now have since Roaratorio 
- I got to know much more about it because of that.! had very good 
musicians to do it, and now the Whistlebinkies want to come to the 
United States, and if I can see a way to bring that about, J"Il do it. 
I think they'd like to do the Scouish Circus, but it would be nice 
for them to do the traditional music, too. There are a number of 
Iri sh bars in New York City that I think would be open to Scottish 
mu ic! I u ed to listen to Joe Heaney's singing in one on !4th 
Street. I li ked Mick Broderick's and Judith Peacock's [of the 
Whistlebinkies] singing, too. They don't sing entimen tally, nor 
did Joe Heaney. They sing straight, and with some kind of dignity. 
Is this something you think characterises Scouish and Irish music 
in general? 
Yes, and it's that quality of people doing their work well, which 
I admire. I like that social tradition of music, it' s just that I don't 
like ail the people playing in the same music together. That's why 
I made a music-circus for them! You know th at I 'm devoted to the 
notion of individuals' 
Women in Music 
"Beyond Biography" is the title for the Seventh International 
Congre s on Women in Mu ic, to be held in Utrecht (The 
etherland ) between May 29th and June 2nd 1991. The pro-
gramme of the congre swill include ten pre entations of papers 
on the theme "Beyond Biography", fifteen concerts. meetings and 
an information centre. 
During the congres a meeting will be organi ed among variou 
women and music organisati on in order to found a European 
network. Common experiences and problems in the field of 
managemen t and policy and the improvement of contacts between 
the national organisation will be discu ed. The goal is to work 
towards a European centre for women in music, which can link up 
with the American branch for the IL WC. For further detail s. 
contact: Stichting Seventh International Congre son Women in 
Music, Swammerdam traat 38, l 091 RV Am terdam, The 
etherland . 
ENSEMBLE EXPOSE 
The next concert in the Edinburgh Contemporary Arts Trust 
1990- 1991 season will take place at 8.00pm on Wedne day 27th 
February in the Queen's Hall, Clerk Street, Edinburgh. It will 
feature Ensemble Expose in works by Roger Redgate, Richard 
Barrett and Peter elson. 
En emble Expose was formed in 1984 by the young English 
composers, Richard Barrett and Roger Redgate . Since then it has 
been principally active on the Continent, giving regular concert 
and broadcasts in France, Holland, Germany and Sweden. En-
semble Expose also has its own concert eason in London and 
featured recently on BBC Television's Omnibus programme. It is 
attrac ting a fast-growing following now in this country for it 
unique instrumental virtuo ity and for its commitmen t to the most 
challenging of con temporary mu ic. lt attracts some of the best 
young performers in Europe including. in thi s concert, the young 
Scottish piani t l ames Clapperton . 
Though both still in their early thirti es. Ri chard Barrett and Roger 
Redgate are among the leading con temporary composers in 
Europe. regularly performed and commi sioned by the principal 
European ensembles. Their music di plays a pecial and exhila-
rating ort of virtuosity, frequently placing the performers in the 
kind of extreme situations found in the most progressive jazz and 
free improvisation, though the music is always strictly composed. 
Their sounds are challenging but al so thrillin g. The programme 
includes the fir t perforn1ance of Ficril'e Music, spec ially com-
miss ioned by Ensemble Expose from the Scotti sh composer. 
Peter elson. This is a dramatic work to a tex t by the young lri h 
playw right, Roderick McDevitt. All in all, this concert is a very 
spec ial musical event. 
Leda record Foulis 
The Leda Trio. who las t March launched the 
Scotti h Mu~ i c Information Centre· s new edi tion 
of the Six Sonatas for l' iolin and Keyboard by 
David Fouli ( 171 0- 1773) have recently recorded 
some of the sonatas for compact di c. The re-
cording. for the Fife-ba ed Springthyme label. 
will contain Fouli · onata in A.£ and F major 
as well a five delightful sonatas from James 
0 wald'sAirsfonheSeasons (c l755)- The Lily. 
Th e Nighr-Shade. Th e arcissus. The Snee:eworr 
and The Lilac. It will be avai lable later in the 
The Leda Trio 
spring. 
On Monday 18th February at 7.45pm in the 
Queen · Hall, Edinburgh. th e Trio - Peter 
Campbell Kelly (v iolin ). Kevin McCrae(cello) 
and Kather ine Thompson (piano) - will be per-
forn1ing Kenneth Leighton·s Trio opus 46 with 
Haydn's Trio No 39 in G (Hoh X\' :25- Gypsy 
Rondo) and Brahms· Trio in 8 Opus . The 
Leda Trio has recently commisioned a work 
from Edward Harper. to be premiered in the 
Aulllmn . 
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Hddie klcGuire L~ knoum not on~)' 
for his u•ork as a "clas .. '\ical" 
compose/~ but also jbr bis long 
inuoluement with the folk scene, 
spec{flcal()' with the \VIJL'\tlehinkies, 
zubose latest album bas recent()' been 
released In the 'seventies, bt~'i 
classical work gained a zuide 
audience tbrougb bis cbamber music 
piece 7i"ilogy (Rebirtb- Interregnum 
- Liberation) wbicb claims a piL•otal 
position in bis deL'elopment, not on(l' 
as a compose1~ but also as a political 
animal. His commitment to benejlt 
gigsfm· causes from Central America 
to Barnsley has earned him a zue/1 
deserued reputation for political 
actiuism tbrougb the pe1jormance of 
music. 
This is the first in a series of intel'\iews 
\\ith modem composers, conducted by 
Steve Sweenev Tumer. The Second, to 
appear in C~ncrastus No. 40 \\ill be 
with Thomas \\1ilson. 
16 CENCRASTUS SPRING 1991 
The Whistlebinkie' s Art 
A Conversation -with 
Eddie McGuire 
Steve Slueerzey Turner 
[I] hear the \X'histlebinkies are doing an imprmisation un(ler Cage's direction in i\lusica Nova this year. 
Yeh, we're going to do the John 
Cage concert doing a piece ... were you at 
that imprmisation in Edinburgh? 
No, but I beard about it. \\"illtbis be tbe same 
kind of tbing? 
Yes, bm hopefully more concrete, more along 
the lines of a piece which he \VOuld put a title 
to. Going to try and get him to write it d0\\11 
and call it a piece and also maybe ... well, a 
piece of mine and a piece of traditional music, 
and we'll do a \·ersion of that 4'33" - nobod\' 
else seems to want to do it. · 
A Folk l'ersion for ensemble.' \Fill tbe 
improt•isalion lake tbe form of sometbing like 
" .. , ... Circus On ... "or an improl'isation 
as such? 
l':o, it'll be a piece in its own right, I think; an 
imprmisation based on his instn.ctions for a 
traditional Scottish group. 
So ll'ben you did it before, tl'ere you 
improl'ising tl'ilbin a Scots Folk musiwl 
language? 
Yes, the main difference between that and 
what \\'e usually do it that e\·eryone was 
playing independently of one another, and all 
the strJnds of melody were w~t\'ing in and 
out together; we cr~ned spaces for the other 
instnunents to be heard - that was one of his 
instntctions ... but to let the music freely 
wea\'e, e\'en if it was in different keys. 
1-/ou· far did be restrict tbe relationsbips 
betzceen you? 
\\'e were just to stand widely spread; we were 
to play a certain number of minutes, and take 
a break for a lesser number of minmes, and 
pby independently. It was more like ins· 
tn.ctions to be independent, but fining into 
the whole at the same time. Well, we'll see if 
he comes up \\ith any other suggestions, if 
he's going to make the piece a concrete one. 
I tl'as interl'ietl'ing tbe Irish guys zcbo do 
Roaratorio ll'ilb bim, and tbey were saying 
tbat in a zt•eird sense Cage bas brought 
something back to tbe Irisb tradition tbrougb 
Roamtorio in its u·orking zl'itb a jlexibili~r of 
rbrtbms- in c1 beterophonic sense, I suppose. 
Noirin ni Riain, tbe singer, was saying tbat 
because of tbe zcay tbat Folk music:~ been 
re(ring more and more on being 11olated. in 
comparison witb its oral past. witb all Ibis 
kind ofjixed 414. 6'8. all tbal t'e'J' metriwl 
kind of idea about it, u·bat Cage bas done 
tbrougb Roaratorio L" brought a kind of 
beteropbonic jlexibili~l' back to it. Is tbat 
sometbing tbatyouji.!lttl'itb tbr:" improt'r:'XIIion 
piece? 
Well one comment on what we were doing -
I lam ish I Ienderson said, in fact, that it 
sounded like him walking into one of the 
earliest Folk fesit\'als that he had gone to, I 
think maybe Kinross, or Aberfeldy, and 
hearing all the different Folk musicians 
playing together at once - different tunes, in 
different corners of pubs. In fact this idea has 
influenced a current piece of mine ... 
\\"ould Ibis be a Folk or a Classical piece? 
Well, it's a combination of both, because the 
Academy of l\lusic commissioned me to write 
a piece for their junior orchestra, and I 
thought I would do a piece calk'<.! Scollisb 
Dances and I'm basing this on a dozen or 
more tunes that I've written o\'er the past 15 
years. But at the beginning I do try and create 
that image of Folk festi\'al. You come into it in 
the early e\·ening from a distance, walking 
O\'er fields, approaching this festival, and you 
h~tr the music, the !hues and the fiddles all 
playing away in the distance and you hear all 
the tunes sounding at once. gradually getting 
louder ... 
Is Ibis an image tbat you're pulling ouer, or 
does Ibis actual~!' bapjNn as tbe people are 
tcalking tbrougb tbe door; I mean does tbe 
piece start before tbe audience arril'e? 
Oh, no, it doesn't, but it does start 
imperceptibly. \\ith one high harmonic note 
on the double basses. and the instnunents 
em<.:r one by one playing different tunes, 
playing all the tunes of the piece. But 
eventually, as we get closer to the festi\'al, and 
into it, we h~tr each indi,idual instnunent 
doing its own solo, and groups or instruments 
playing, until we lea\·e at the end of the 15 
minute piece, and it's fart_.,,·ell again, and all 
the mass of sound comes back again and it 
fades into the distance. So although this piece 
consists of com·entional. traditional Scottish 
tunes that I h:l\'e written in that stvle, it has this 
framework which is a Cagei:m. idea, so it's 
both \'el'\' traditional combined, or 
contrasting \\ith those more experimental 
ideas. 
/loll' does tbe -'1'11Cbronisation ofparts tl'Ork. 
L'\ tbat rigid or}lexible? 
It's all fully written out. Apart from one or t\vo 
small places. \\'here there's a climatic moment 
and the whole orchestra is pb~ing \\ildly, and 
I just let them go on a bit in their \\ildness, 
and a signal of some t~1)e brings them to a 
halt. 
77.u:,· is obl'ious~r one ll't~l' of a.,._imilating tbe 
Folk mu/ tbe Classical in Scotland. but ill 
general. ll'bat problem . .; do you encoullter ill 
trying to find tl'bere to ll'ork tl'itbill tbese ltt'O 
areas. because you bal'e separate idenlilies 
Eddi e McGu ire 11 8urn s Night in Mo s co w" 
as Folk perfo rmer, and Class ical composer' 
They're coming 10gether mo re and mo re in 
recent yea rs, but at first, ma~·be IS years ago, I 
joined the Folk group and fo r se,·er.tl years -
19 3 onwards - I regarded that :tS an 
apprent ice hip in Fo lk mu ·ic, and they were 
quite separ:ne. 
So ll'ere you orig inallr classical(l' trained.' 
I don't like the phrase .. before the age o f 5, 
my first music:tl influences would ha,·e been 
nw f: tther pla~·ing the ,;o!in. well , fiddle - he 
only knew a few tunes - and singing in a male 
,·oice choir who did some Gaelic 
arrangements as well, but I sort o f rejected 
that for Rock 'n' Roll, in my rebellious ea rly 
years; Eh is Presley, Bill I laile,·. :md it \V<Isn't 
until after being in London and going to 
Sweden for a year, where people asked me to 
pia)' co tti sh Folk music, that I realised that 
was omething I hould become mo re deeply 
invo lved with. I swrted off composing :tS a 
hobby, as a separate :tcti,·iry from school 
music and just by luck I had enough music 
written of my 0\\11 accord to get accepted by 
the i\c tdemy of 1usic 111 London, which W':l5 
the only place that dtd composition :tS a first 
study for first year students. When I " :IS there, 
1 wasn 't really taught Ci:Lssictl music in the 
sense that my composition teacher would set 
me prOjL'Ct to do m~· 0 " 11 pieces which I 
brought each week :111d he obsetYed and 
critici,.L'tl them from th<.'ir 0 \\11 ·t:lntbrcls. So I 
could ~ay th: tt I missed out on Cl<lSSical 
tr..1inmg. "o I :1\·oid sa~ing that J'q~ been 
classically trained, because there han;: been ·o 
many Other influences. lt " :1s after le:l\ing tO 
teach the Out..: and I do pl.1y a hit of I:Lssical 
music now, but it 's :!1" : 1\·s be..:n mainly 
COill JXlsing m,· own music :md pla~ing Folk 
rn u~ic 
Do you et·er hon• tl.w e.\'flt•rh•nce. f>nrticulor/J• 
outside Scotlflltd ll'ith y our music tbot bos 
SOl/If! Jdnt/ 1!( Fo/J..• 11 1{)11/. tbtll ill t/.>e 
IJI/ (1 1"1/tlliOIItlf (()Jitll'IJI{XWt l/:1' 11/IISiC (0111 
mtmity tbere's a kind of condescention 
towards u•riting music ll'bicb is national(!' 
.\pecific in a traditional context.> 
Well there certain!)' 'vas in London in the late 
'60s and the early '70s and in other places in 
Europe, in tockho lrn , fo r example. at the 
music academy there, '"here the main influ-
ences on the compo ers, the main "in" 
composers were Stockhausen, 13oulez. Die 
Reihe - the music magazine from D:1rmst:1dt, 
people used to wdy that - and to tal seri:l.lism, 
and the m::tthemalic:tl approach. 'p :me! 
coming at that time in the late '60 · were ideas 
of Cage \vhich were quire di:unetrically 
opposed to this, em .... it could be termed 
elitism .. . And the new music coming from 
America in terms o f Terry Riley, and Steve 
Reich, although it wa ·n't umil the mid '70s or 
the bte '70s that I became full~· aware of and 
found a very refreshing inlluence in Ste,·e 
Reich. Especially, say, 1\lusic for 18 ,\1usi ians 
... but I wa aware and played in Terry Riley' 
music - for example, In C, in the l:lte '60s -
and this started off in m~· mind ~~ gener:tl 
rejecLion of total serblism :me! the 13oulez· 
tockhausen way, and return to tOnality which 
generally beam1e a world·"ide mo,·ement. 
So in a sense. tbrougb tbat, you }01111d a route 
totcard Scollisb Folk music. 
Yes, the route has ·imilarities "irh the 
1inimalists in America in the sen ·e that th..:ir 
process·music uses small elemems which 
relate to what I would call their own popubr 
music, their own ethnic music " ·hich m:l\· 
ha,·e its roots in jazz, Pop music . 
Wbile i(-; som etimes said tbat /Jritai11 mtber 
tban America defines Hock 111/tsic if 110tbing 
else. 
Benj:unin 7 ... oh. yell. 1 see' I la ha' Y..:s. bur I 
" :1sn't suggesting Rock music so much :ts ti lL' 
little phrases th:u :m~ used in Stc,·e Reich's 
music. I h..:ar thl·s..: phraSl'S in Copl:lnd. 
som..:rimes. :md in 
, \a roll. or Stell'ort.> /la ba-' 
I la ha. i\aron1 And I hear these littl ..: phrases in 
,\1otown music, and manv o ther American 
popular music forms. So I - ob,iously not 
being American, but Scottish - ldtthat i f I was 
going to take upon myself this refreshing 
inlluence o f J\ti nimalism, which I had I een 
doing :m~'':l\ · since the early '70s inclepen· 
dent ly, then the m:uerial that would fo rm the 
bricks o f this stuff " ·ould be Scottish material 
"i1ich I h:1d he ome pr..tetic:t ll)' im·olved with 
an)~'~ l)' and couldn' t get out o f my mind; 
sitting beside a h:1gpipc player in the 
\X'histl..:binkies seems to inst:tll a sense of 
drones and pipe pl11~1 s..:s, which you can't get 
rid of. And so th:u " : 1s rh..: basis o f my 
approach to .\1im i m:l l i~m . which I went 
rh rough more of a ph:1se of in th..: late '70 · -
early '80s. ,,·irh pi..:ces like Quintet. F: L~t Piece 
3 l\1 r viob and guit:l r, :1nd some o ther ones. I 
made a S)'mholic ge~ture in the e:1rly '70s o f 
:1b:mdoning discordan t music :md writing :1 
piece ca lled 'f'll'eit·e 1\'7>ite , ote l'ieces }or 
fJir11tos \Yhich ju~t U~l·d the whit ..: no res of the 
piano and could be for m:my pi:lnos, all 
pb~ing simult:mcousl\ '. So this " : 1s a sort of 
inlluence of Cage and of Terry Riley at the 
time. And from th:ll, I added the spice of 
discords, here and th..:rc. so th:ll in a piece 
ca lled Rebirtb " ·hich \'\~ I S :111 e:1rlic r piece 
reborn and wh:u I i<Xlk<.:d on as :1 r..:bi rlh o f 
m,· own musical sl\'k t<x>k these l'icmems o f a 
mixture of tonality " 'it h tit..: spice of 
discordant and s..:ri:d inllu..:nccs coming 
through, f() r dr.u11:1tic effect. 
1\"ould ) '011 soy. tben. tbot Ibis ,:, 1/'bere tbe 
COIIh'III{IOI'IIIY T:ddie .1/cG'uire /J<'RI'I II .> 
Ye~. I still h:1rp b:1ck to thos..: times: I haven't 
bell~1yecl th:n fre:hne~s. I hope. Hehirtb 1 .L~ 
me ~ettill!( nur my itk-:1~ : 11 "~IS supposed also, 
:L~ w..:!l :1s the rebirth o f till' mu~k:li style of :1n 
t':lriier piece. :~l ~o to ~'mholisl' the re,·o· 
lutinn:1ry r..:~ur~..:ncc llf tl l<>~l' \'l':lrs - d:ning 
from thl' 1ictof\· m ·er :\ llll'l ·ic:~ h\' the Viet· 
ll.lllll'~l· : I "~IS im·oh·l'li in the· :m ti.\'ietn:llll 
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\\'ar movement ~vhen I w;~s a stu~lent in I'' seems like a l'l'l)' mucb tacked-on surface. 1 
London, and NeiJ~r~l~ was wnttc::n dunng that mea~r. you can't u•ake up one morning and 
period, up_ to 197·1. I her~ \\:as_ a l()t of rc::ncw;tl scq· 'tiJI:-; r:-; a ci~v of culture·: You've got to 
and hope 111 the world Sol'lahst mo\'ement at ctetturl~l' b,ti/d that i11 biston•. Not to mention 
that time, which may not have kept going - ha tbe question 'W11ose Cultw:e?" 
ha! - which may ha\'e diminished somewhat! Yes, I think Britain is a proletarian count!)', 
. . complete~)' el·apm-clfed' but the illusions foisted by the dominant 
Ye.~. there's been some setbacks! But at that ideolo~'Y ha\'e made people forget their roots 
time there was what you might call "Re\'O· and aspire to illusions. 
lutionary Optimism" - it turned out to be So bolt' do you see Scotland as Clll insular 
rather harder work than onl' irnagined! And u11it fitti11g into tbr:-; broad sfJC!Ctrum? 
there was the f{mnation of 111.'\': optimistic \\'ell. nn the one hand, .I'm a strong exponent 
JXIrtiL's . . . of Scottish music - traditional music -
Are u·e talking ahout mte optimr:,·tic .\'cottr:,·b thr, 'llgh the \\'histh.:binkics and through its 
par~v in particulor bere? inlhu.:nce on the music that I \\-Tite down. but 1 
Oh, no, I w~1s <alking abom the world make e\'ery effort not to allow that to become 
Communist mon:ment, ha ha! And the a parochial, narrow·minded expression, 
Cultural Revolution in China which turned out because it's almost :L<; if the music is pointing 
to be again, not wholly positive. It did inspire to the fact that for people in the world, there's 
some renew<ll of idealism, at the time, and one world, because there's such great and 
that's found in my piece Rebirtb which \'\'aS deep connections between the expression of 
followed by another two pieces - filler· the different far.flung peoples of the world -
regnum and a piece called Liberation which like Chinese pentatonic music has got great 
quotes sume Vietnamese Uberation Front similarlities with the Gaelic song of the West 
themes. So with those pieces, I set out my of Scotland, and the female singing styles are 
ideas on the ideal way forward. son of the very similar, too. And Peter Cook of the 
ivlarxist ideal, maybe. I didn't feel obliged to School of Scottish Studies has made us all 
repeat that in e\:ery piece thereafter - I don't aware of the bagpipes of India. In a recent trip 
agree with the idea of bcwing to paint a red to Jerusalem with the SNO chorus, Rab 
flag in e\'Cf1' painting. as some people in the \\'allace - the piper of the Whistlebinkies -
Cultural Revolution did, so therefore, I ha\'e and I \iSited, and tutored, and played \'\ith a 
wriuen pieces like String Quartet, which Palestinian pipe band who were playing on 
de,dops from a purely musical idea . . . ancient Scottish bagpipes dating from maybe 
\:lriuus quintets and orchestral pieces, which, fifty years ago, which had to be fixed up a bit. 
alth(>ugh they are abstract music, still, should, But thev didn't realise these instruments thev 
for the listener, car11· the same inspirational were piaying were of Scottish origin ... s; 
quality as in my more directly idealistic that amounts to Sa)ing that around the world, 
. 1ieces. Folk music, far from being a parochial and 
1U ll'bere u·oztld you say tbe political n:uionalistic thing - nationalistic in the narrow 
1 inflection ofrour music bas moued since tbat sense - is in fact a mind·broadening thing 
optimistic period - I mean we'ue gone which unites Humanity, because there's so 
tbrougb a t'el)' pessimr:-;tic period and it looks many common connections that go - up to 
like it migbt get ez·en more pessimistic m·er tbe now, maybe - h:\\"e gone unnoticed, and I 
next ten years. >ou u•ere talking about a think it's our duty as a Folk group, and mine 
kind of Internationalist jlm•our to tbings at as a composer to point these out in 
tbat point . . . interesting ways. So that comes back to your 
\\'ell, I haven't abandoned these ideas; I just question about Scotland - my attitude, politi· 
feel that the struggle for them is harder now, callv, would be that it should not become a 
and that duriug the years of continual par~chial question, or a narrow nationalist 
staf\-ation of the Arts, just to be creati\'e was a question, and I would put the question of 
posith·e, if not re,·olutionaf1' step - just to class before the question of nationality. So 
keep that going, to keep the spark alive ... I therefore, in the ambulance dispute, in the 
ha,·e not abandoned the strong class feeling miner's strike, in the dispute that I w:L'> 
that I grew up \'\ith, and that has implications involved in with the BBC orchestra in 
for us no\v follo\'\ing the Year of Culture in GhL'>gow going on strike, solidarity Britain -
Glasgow- my comment on th:u would be that \\ide among working-class organisations was 
if you're building a hope of great cultural the answer, and I think it would be tragic to 
renaissance, it cannot be built on nothing. and cut these at the border. It would weaken the 
if \·ou'w removed all the wealth - cr~Hing working ci:L<;S in its long·term attempt to 
in~lusuv, then the candv·floss-culture may create a societv in its 0\'\11 interest. I'm not so 
colbps~ sooner than you "may think. sure if That~herism wouldn't prefer the 
Scottish working class to get out. 
lt:, obuious tbat Ki1t11ock am 't afford it to.' 
\\"1Jicb ma}' he tbe same kil l of tbing, in tbe 
end... · 
So, I feel im'Oived in the various struggles 
through the coming together of composing 
and the Whistlebinkies through the 
\\'histlebinkies we can directly appeal to an 
audience, and although we don't sing directly 
politicised songs, our music - instrumet raJ 
music - h:L'> played a role in trade union anJ 
other e\'ents of struggle. 
/(t; llece.wtri(l· illben.•nt{l' political - just 
because c!f 1/'bat it i:•: ll'bere r:.; comes from. 
and u•bo does it ... If I could ask you in a 
capaci~)' as tl spokesman for tbe 
\'(1Jistlebinkies. do you image yourselues as 
comingfrom any particular area ofScotlcmd 
- for instance, you btwe a bodbrcm player. 
Now that's sure{v mudJ more of cl W'est coast 
tbing - connecting it zl'itb Ireland, or some 
king of input of lrr:"b population into a11 area 
like Glasgow. 
Well, the Whistlebinkies have little bits of 
uniqueness- ha ha!- andoneofthemisthat 
we have very varied backgrounds of the 
members in the group. \\'e come from all 
over the central belt - Stuart, the concenina 
player, comes from Edinburgh and works in 
Unlithgow - he's involved in consef\-ation; 
Peter Anderson, the drummer, who's the 
drum major of the Wallace Stone pipe band 
near Falkirk, and he is a gas safety engineer, 
and he's taken pan in world <:hampionship 
drumming; further to the West, !\tick 
Broderick (bodhran) lives in Arran ... some 
of the time ... and both !\lick and I have one 
Irish parent; we have an orchestral violin 
player, and an orchestral harp player with us, 
and the age groups va11· from the early 
twenties to late forties, and the male and 
female combination is :llso quite good. So a 
\\ide slice of Ilumanity is represented in the 
group. We have slightly varying political 
outlooks between the members of the 
group, bm we always tf1' to reach a 
concensus if we're asked to play for various 
struggles, or various campaigns or things -
we have to discuss whether we do it or 
not. 
1t seems like a l't'IJ' egalitarian state! We'l'e 
been talking about tbings in a l'e')' 
/nternationaiL.;t context. wbilst being tl'itbin 
tbe Scottisb tradition and reacbing out - in 
a sense do you see sometbing like tbe 
pe11tatonic scale as an image of a trelliS· 
national commrmi011 oftbe proletariat? 
Maybe not so specific to one aspect of 
music, but there's many aspects that form 
common understanding between the 
peoples, and music is one of the great non-
\·erbal communicators. 
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John Cage and tl1e Glaswegian Circus: 
an interview around Musica Nova 1990 
We would do the interview in the circle. It was 
clearing-up time after yet another rehearsal in the 
Henry Wood Hall, Glasgow, and I was following 
a slow-movingJohn Cage of78 years up the stairs 
as he cmbarassingly held doors for me and 
explained the tight schedule he was bound by. He 
has now visited the U.K. three times in one year, 
taking in the Huddersfield, Almcida, and 
Glasgow's Musica Nova festivals, all in the middle 
of his usual jet-setting around the world which 
occupies the greater part of his year. With such 
tight schedules and a time-consuming specialised 
diet, it is incredible that he grants interviews at all. 
His usual answer- based, as ever, in his infamous 
non-intention - is: 'because people ask me to!' 
Non-intentionality has been his basic aesthetic 
position since at lc~st the 1950s, and as I found 
out, he's still finding fresh nuances there. At least 
when he's got the time to sit down at his desk. l¥1zy 
does he do it? 
Why do I do it? Well, this trip is the last one until 
next June, and it began \vith the invitation from 
Mathias Bamert, who I have a friendly feeling for, 
and so I said 'yes' when he invited me. One thinks 
that when one accepts an engagement, thcrc'll be 
time to continue one's work, but I more and more 
sec that that's not the case, and so I will be more 
inclined to not travel, because I have less time now 
than I had formerly, and it's harder for me to do 
simple things like walk! My doctor says I 
shouldn't carry anything heavy, so now I have a 
chariot for my luggage, but that means that when I 
come to stairs, I'm confronted with a serious 
problem to solve. Also my food takes a lot of time 
in preparation. 
l¥1zerz you're 011 tour, do you cook all your orvu food, 
giveu the special lltlture of your diet? 
Mhm. But it's simple - just beans and rice; 
vegetables. I've been invited t\vicc here to Indian 
restaurants, and I take along a doggy-bag, so I 
have beans and rice, and curries. 
Do yotl fiud it's ~rttiug easier to accomodate your diet 011 
tour these days? 
I think it is easier, yes. Though in Huddersfield, I 
became quite ill. I didn't know, actually. what 
things to put together, and I got to eating muesli 
which had both dried fmit and nuts, mixed in with 
the grain, and it turns out that those things arc 
impossible to digest together. Did you know that? 
So my digestion was getting very poor. I think I' m 
getting along better· on this trip than I did when I 
was in Huddersfield. But that tour was (1uitc 
exhausting, going from one part of the world to 
another, Japan and so forth. But as I've gottcn 
older, I've recognized the fact of where I've 
chosen to live as being home. I know the dishes in 
which I cook at home, and I know all the plants 
that arc growing there that I've put around; l feel 
at home there. And certainly I can do better work 
there. or more work. 
So what lwt~c you writtcu rcccutly, iu bcttl'ccu 
touriu.~? 
I'm currently finishing the Frccma11 Etudes, but I 
can't take them \vith me on a trip like this, and I 
won't get them done until December, so I've 
taken another piece \\~th me which isn't so 
complicated. Right now I'm working, I mean 
even this morning, on a piece called Ouc 7 because 
it'll be the seventh time I've written for one 
person, and I'm actually writing for myself to give 
a kind of performance when I return from this 
trip. When I do return, I '11 have almost immedi-
ately to give the pcrfonnancc. So I'm preparing it 
now! 
Is this a vocal piece? 
Yes. Now, you sec, I vocalise quite a lot; I have 
arthritis, so I can't play the piano any more, but I can 
vocalise \vithout any damage to myself! It could 
involve a bit of theatre, objects moving around. I 
don't know whether it ,vill. I also wrote a mesostic 
called 11ze First Meetirzg of the Satie Society. 
Is that au iuveuted society? 
Yes, and Satic is the principal member! It's a birthday 
party for him ... Everyone brings him a present, and 
the presents they bring arc mesostics! 
Does he like them? 
Well, he rep li es. You know- the things he sa id ' I 
have a li st o f the d iffcrcm things he sa id , and after 
each prc cm he says one o f these things, like 'When I 
was young. people told me: You '11 sec when you're 
fifty. I'm fifty. I've see n nothing. 
vVhat kind o( i l ~// ll fi i Ce IVOIIId yo11 .<ay cHic has had 011 
yo11r m11sic' 
I don't know! Because his mu ic was so simple and 
mine is so co mpl ex, so I don't know, but I hope 
there 's some influence. 
So how are yo11 '''riting m11sic thesl! 'days? You seem to 
use, more and more, the jloc.;am andjctsam of history as 
materials, prescntt•d in a new context, _i11xtaposed with 
others. Like the Folk ''"'sic in Roa ratorio and Scottish 
Circus, or the arias in the Europcras. 
Well, that's one thing I do do now, this Circus 
idea, but I'm also using time brackets which arc 
very flexible and also very large so that there's so 
much freedom of pace. you know. What happens 
happens at a very unspecific time. And it works 
just beautifully in relation to the other time 
brackets. I'm very pleased ''~th it. And I think my 
music has changed. 
It strikes me thc~t time is pahaps yo11r me~ in concem out ~( 
the parclmt:tcrs of sou ti el. 
Uhuh, more than pitch. bccau c. you sec, time 
includes noi c. o that that leaves the field open to ail 
kinds of sound. r.nhcr than just 'o-callcd 'musical' 
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sound. And a few years ago, I went to Leningrad in 
Russia, and I met Sofia Gubaidulina, who heard a 
piece of mine where the musicians used watches, 
and she said she liked the music, but didn't like the 
watches, and that I should remember that there 's an 
inner clock. So, when it's praaical, I do remember 
that, and in the case of the Scouish Cira1s, I'm using it. 
I used it also for a piece called 1i1'o which is for rwo 
pianos, and there the rwo part arc related not in any 
fixed way, but by some kind of' inner clock' that the 
pe rformers have to use. 
Have yo11 srip11lared any time restrictions for Scottish 
C ircus? 
One-third music and two-thirds silence, or half and 
half, something like that. But then if you, say, had 20 
people doing that, you'd want less mu icon the part 
of each one . Probably, the thing to do would be to 
fmd what seems to be the right density, and have rwo 
faaors which you multiply and then come out to the 
right number. But it's not very fl.xcd, because the 
traditional Scottish pieces are also changing time-
lengths from say three minutes to five minutes, or 
they're one minute repeated several times. We' ll sec 
what happens. The Whistlcbinkies arc also going to 
do the silent piece, in a fom1 for a group of people, 
which is not a single group, but which is seven 
different people. So they'll come in using not a 
watch, but what we might call ' the umer clock', and 
they' ll make three silences. That is to say, they'll pick 
up tl1ei r instruments and not play them. 
4 '33" doesn't necessarily last that long, does it? So how long 
is the 'Binkies' new version? 
We don't know, 'cause they're using 'i.Jmer 
clock'. 
Right, so they're just deciding 0 11 the spot. 
TI1ey won't decide, they'll just do it. Each one will 
make three silences, and leave the perfonni.ng area 
after the third silence. They' ll come in, also, 
individually, not as a group, and when no-one is 
there, tl1ey' ll have ftnishcd. I think it might last 
somewhere between 5 and 10 minutes, ra ther than 
4'33". 
Right, b11r it 's nevertheless been programmed as -f33". 
Yes, D avid Tudor once said that he saw no reason 
why a piece called 4'33" should last 4 minutes and 
thirty-three seconds. 
Quire! So how do you see the d!fference i11 tenllS ~( 
orga11izatio11 berwee11 the idea ~( the 'i1111er dock' a11d rhe 
idea ~( divisio11 by seco11ds, a11d divisio11 by crotchets? 
Well , the difference is that the watch gives an 
objective , regular second . We don 't know what 
the 'inner clock' does, but it ce rtainly doesn't give 
you something outside yourse lf. And when two 
IlL·-
people arc doing that together, it becomes 
probably two different points, not a single point. I 
don't know, but that's what I think! 
So it's a fairly rccet1t del!dopmeut iu your work? 
It's current! 
Do you see your work as progressiug through a sequeuce 
~{ differcut periods? Because it could be said that we 're 
seeing you move from, iuitially, metric, through objective 
time schemes, through these time 'wi11dows', up to a kind 
of subjective time. 
I'm not sure that it's different- when I get a new 
idea, or what I think is a new idea, I discover very 
shortly that it's a repetition of an old idea. For 
instance, in working with flexible time-brackets, 
an action can be made within a particular period 
of time, and the end within a particular period of 
time. And while I think of it as being new, it's hard 
to say that it's different from the rhythmic 
structures previously. 
l11ith the 'imemal clock' idea, is it not a daugcr that 
desires aud iuteutious, which you 're uormally very 
outspokeu agaiust, will actrwlly prevail on precise 
timings, atzd er'e'z lead to someoue choosiug to act at a 
certain point to fit i11 with somebody else at tlze same 
time? 
Uhuh. It's a very interesting problem, and I 
haven't yet come to the end of it. I don't know 
what to do about it, but I'll keep doing a few 
things until I come to a conclusion. 
So how far are you towards working it out? 
I don't really know! I remember Morton Fcldman 
wrote some pieces in which three pianos were all 
playing the same material, but each one at his own 
speed. And I happened to be one of the pianists for 
a performance in Berlin, and I played so slowly 
that I was left behind the other pianists for quite a 
long period. That stopped Morty from ever writing 
that way again! So something like that might 
happen to me, that would oblige me to change. 
But I'm looking now to the possibilities ofletting 
the clock be 'inner', rather than objective. 
It seems to make things more Jle:cible in some senses, 
because it's very difficult to couut time accurately aud 
subjectively. That reductiou of precision must appeal to 
you, but tlze problem of a kiud o_{improvisation remains, 
and you're normally agaiust what people mean by 
'improvisation', because of its iuvolvemeut with the 
performer's taste, memory, mzd so on. 
Now I've found ways of improvising which keep 
people from doing that. They are things having to 
do with time, and pitch. If you give yourself a 
period of time in which you could make, say, one 
sound in a certain field of pitch, say, then what's 
going to happen is something which you don't 
have in mind, and you just might discover 
something. 
So in a way, it's like providing swmbling blocks for au 
improviser. 
You could say that, yes; making it impossible to 
just do what you already know. 
Discovery is still very importatzt to you tlze,z? 
It is. My work is experimental, almost always. I'm 
still doing that. I just look to discover something if 
I can, rather than reassert tradition. I think the 
people who arc reasserting tradition arc involved 
in speaking, or communicating, and they're not so 
involved with sound. I think of myself as not 
being mummified, as one of the critics put it, but 
as though I'm just as alive now, and will be until I 
die, as young people who arc alive. So that the 
ideas I have now are not out of date, but arc part of 
the date. So I have no feeling towards conservatism. 
but always to making some kind of discovery. so 
that there is still discovery in the air. I think I'm 
not the only one with that spirit. 
Do you fiud it's get tin ... (! easier to discoller thiugs, or more 
d~{frcu!t? 
It's getting easier. I can now write quite quickly. 
Is that because of methodology that you '11e adopted? 
No. I think it's because of my age. 
bz wlzat seme? 
In the sense of being 78! For instance, I used to 
search for ideas, but I don't any longer. 
So if you're ~iscoveriug more tltau you used to, but dou 't 
look for ideas any more, what would you say it is that 
yorl're searclziug for now? 
I think it's coming close to harmony. You can hear 
that in my piece called Five. 
Hou' could it be descn·bed as moving towards ltannony? 
I wouldn't describe it, I'd just do it. It wouldn't be 
a harmony that has laws - tonic, dominant; but it 
would be a harmony that includes noise. 
A lot of composers are now speaking about trying to 
recover tradition, rather titan discover new definitions per se. 
How do you view tlzat yourself as a way forward? 
It's more like Stravinsky - I've tried to make a 
discovery. I think ofhistory as remaining the same 
all the time; having a richness of differences in it. 
Isn't that what's really true? That we don't all go to 
the left and then to the right, but that while some 
of us arc going to the left, some arc going to the 
right? Don't you think all of those things coexist? 
People so often mention the '60s, the '70s, the '80s 
- I don't know why it shou ld be in tens! That's 
rather lazy. People tell me that there's an interest 
in conservatism now. I take it th at conserva tism 
means 'speaking'. At one point I made a kind of 
di stinction fo r myselfbctwccn music that 'speaks' 
and music th at 'acts', o r does something, and I 
prefer things th at do things rather than speak, and 
so much music does speak . 
VVI1eu you talk of music which 'speaks' - intentional 
music - do you mean that it acwally achieves or just 
mistakenly attempts speech? 
Well, for the perso n who uses it to speak, it 
speaks, I'm sure. In his programme notes, James 
MacMillan, for instance, tells us what he succeeds 
in doing, docsn ' t he? He says , 'thi s is very 
convincing'' So if you have that intention, you do 
everything you ca n to make it heard . It seems to 
me , th at if you're going to speak, then you should 
spea k. So words of some kind are important. 
Would you say chat music which speaks acts by default 
mlyway? 
No, when I say act, I mean something else. I mean 
that a sound by vibrating does what is its nature to 
do: it acts like a sound, instead of acting like a 
word, o r something th at it isn't. It acts like 
something that it is, which is the vibration. So I 
sa id towards the end of my talk, 'we don ' t lmow 
what music is o r cou ld be, but we imagine that it 
cou ld be paying attention to vibratory activity ', 
and that's not such a slight thing to do. According 
to Immanuel Kant, in the Critique of Judgement, 
there are two things that do that, that don't need to 
have anything else at their basis in ord er to move 
us deeply, and that is music, and the other is 
laughter. Those two things can move us very 
deeply, simply because they change their vibration. 
I find it interesting that you melllion Knnt 's book orz 
aesthetics, giveu your usual preference for eastem 
ideas. 
Mhm , it's welcome to know that it's quite 
profound to listen to so mething which has 
nothing at its basis! Which is an oriental idea: 
nothingness, zrvana, etcetera. 
How do you react wherz peiformers play your work 
withou t committing themse/11es to a conscientious 
peifonnance according to the rules you've set for che 
piece? 
Well, last night, Fi ve was played incorrectly. I 
didn't enjoy it. I'll tell you frankly; I was unhappy, 
and even disturbed. It was actually improvising-
it had nothing to do with my work. I know what 
Karlhcin:z. Stockhausen would have done ; he 
would have shouted 'STOP!' Now why wouldn't 
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I do th at' Thi morning, I knew perfectly well 
what I should've done. I should've interrupted 
them and explained to the audience th at th e piece 
was no t being played co rrectl y, th en told the 
players what to do. They might not have under-
stood, th ough, ~nd certain ly they were rehearsed 
to do it incorrectly. Whether I would have 
succeeded, I don' t know. But I kn ow that I should 
have interrupted th em. 
I've often seen pc~(ormcrs cake your pieces fo r '"lcuous 
jokes. 
I guess music has a good deal to do "ith one's 
mind, and if you ge t the idea th at something's a 
joke, it' s hard to change it. The reason it' s a joke is 
becau e it' s not like anything else that th ey do. I 
mean, for them , that 's why it 's a joke . A Dutch 
musician once told me that when you ha ve a 
hundred people, which is what you have with an 
o rchestra, it 's hard to cha nge that many people's 
minds. You might be able to change a few of them, 
but you can' t change all of them. 
VVI1a1 would you say clze perfonner's responsibilities are? 
I don' t know wh at to say ... What I' ve done is to 
write music, and what I hope is that it \vill be 
played as it is written; where there arc frecdoms, 
the frecd oms are taken there, rather than every-
where. When one w·ritcs music, one writes sounds 
and ab cncc oi sou nds on the part of that player, 
and when the y don 't pay attention to those 
differences . then it doesn't seem to be something 
that you want . On the othe r hand, you can't speak 
6(_ 
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of their responsibilities. I mean to say that any 
responsibility that anyone has is either followed 
or not followed, and very frequently, it's not 
followed. For instance if I'm cooking, I might 
bum something~ all sorts of things can go wrong, 
and for different reasons, so you can speak of 
responsibility, but you don't always get a perfect 
result. One of the things, actually, that is specific 
about music, about the performance of music, is 
that social situation; even if it's a solo, it involves 
an audience, so that it's got to do with the 
interaction of people, too. That doesn't happen 
with painting; the artist can finish his work in his 
own studio, completely. 
Yes, the actiou betweeu makiug aud recciviug is wt o.ff 
there. 71u·s social aspect to music seems to be particularly 
brought out iu your pieces such as Scottish Circus, 
where the pe~{onners are all iudepeudeut of each other. 
Right. That's what you might call my 'political' 
attitude; toward society in general. I don't vote. I 
don't like the idea of a bigger number of people 
winning. Thoreau didn't vote, either; he was 
opposed to democracy, and so was Schoenberg. 
He thought it was a very poor idea. You see, he 
objected to quantity being the controlling factor, 
rather than intelligence. 
It so1mds like that COilld be au almost Nietzschean 
Sclroeuberg! Have yo1l ever had auy problems about your 
political ideas? 
No, and unlike Thoreau, I pay my taxes, not 
because I admire government, but because I want 
to go on \\rith my work and not be disturbed. In 
my writings, I speak against government, and 
every now and then, against the government of 
the United States. Once, the U.S. government 
thought that my music was oriental, so when they 
were fighting the war in Indonesia, they took my 
Three Dances for two prepared pianos and beamed 
it towards Bali to explain to them that we love the 
Orient! I wasn't paid for it, and I was poor, then. I 
didn't know where the next money was coming 
from. I look forward, as Buckminstcr Fuller did, 
to the removal of the 153 sovereignties, and the 
approach to the world as a whole, and the solution 
of problems that confront all of us, which arc now 
very serious. I was delighted I could drink and 
cook with the water here in Glasgow. In New 
York, I have to buy water in which to cook. It 
seems to me we should recognize that as the real 
problem, rather than continue letting our leaders 
fight one another. 
You ojteu say tlriugs against the idea of nations and 
traditions, but )'Oil enjoy arrd work with Celtic traditioual 
music. 'Wiry's that? 
It must be in the blood. Unfortunately, I'm largely 
English; I think the name is English. So, as an 
Englishman, I wish I were Irish! I think I have a bit 
of Scots blood, though. I'll sound very inconsist-
ent now, but those things arc bound up with a kind 
of social past, rather than the past of individuals, 
and you know that I'm devoted to the notion of 
individuals, rather than· society, but I' m often 
inconsistent; I like this social tradition of music. 
As far as the idea of individuals goes, I like them 
not so much when they're expressing their 
feelings, as when their work is ambiguous to such 
an extent that they leave room for the listeners to 
make up their own minds about what they're 
hearing. Which isn't the case, of course, \..rith 
traditional Irish or Scottish music. You sec, when I 
said that I didn't want to come to the ceilidh, that 
was because of the fixity, or finishcdncss of 
traditional music; it doesn't leave anything for the 
listener to do, except enjoy it, not in his own way 
very much, but in the way of the whole society. so 
to speak. But it is fun. I used to go and hear Joc 
Hcancy singing in a bar on 14th Street in New 
York; he lived in Brooklyn, and he sang in my 
Roaratorio. He's dead now, but Mick Brodcrick, 
who sings in the Whistlcbinkics, knew and 
admired him. I like Mick Broderick' s singing, too, 
and Judith Peacock, who also sings with them. 
They don't sing sentimentally, nor did Joc 
Hcaney; they sing straight, and \\rith some kind of 
dignity. It's that quality of people doing their 
work well that I admire. 
I'm surprised to discover your iuterest iu your geuealogy, 
because it's mrotlrer facet 4 traditiou, surely? 
Well, that's what we arc in the United States- if 
we have any past that's back far enough, we like to 
find out what it was. If we just came from France, 
or just came from Czechoslovakia, we'd know 
perfectly well that that's what happened, but if we 
didn't, then we \Vondcr where we did come from, 
you know? I've even thought that my grand-
mother was partly American Indian. Her name 
was Minnie, and we always thought it was short 
for Minnic Haha! She had long black hair, which 
never turned grey; even when she was about to 
die, she was still just jet-black hair, just like an 
Indian, and it fell from her head right to the floor, 
it was quite amazing. 
Do you tlriuk that this American desire to find their 
European or other roots is acwally an expression of a 
national paranoia about being Americau? 
Oh, yes, and a certain guilt, if you like, about our 
treatment of the Indians. Now to that, and our sort 
of mediocre solution of the Blacks, we add our 
policeman attitude toward the whole world- it's 
terrible! I should think sometime people will get 
angry at the mere sight of us! 
8 Johu Cage aud the Glaswegiau Cirws: 
J¥cll, certt~iuly i11 Scotftmd, with the N.A.T.O. uudear 
submaritze bt~sesjust up the Clyde from Glasgow, and iu 
the Forth, opposite Ediuburgh, it explaius why there's 
such a stroug uatiotwlist, awl atlti-Americatl fccliug 
here. Did you kuow about the bases? 
Really? That's terrible, that's really awful. But 
that's plain stupidity, dangerous stupidity! 
So they want Scotland to become independent 
from England to be equal in Europe? That should 
be done, I think. As long as there arc nations, but I 
wish there weren't so many nations. Or I mean 
that I v.rish that whole idea would disappear. It 
doesn't show signs of doing that yet, except in 
commerce and economics; Coca-Cola doesn't 
care about the boundaries of any nations. 
Ou the other hand, it can be argued that they're just auother 
facet of Americmz alltural imperialism. 
Yes, but it's the same v.rith other things, such as 
French wine; they don't care about the difference 
benveen two nations. And Glenfiddich can be 
anywhere! That's the saddest thing for me -finally 
to come to Scotland and not be drinking at all. But 
ifl did drink, you see, I go to excess in most things, 
I just drink too much. They say it's very dangerous 
for someone who's given it up to have even a 
drop. He's very apt to give up giving up, then, and 
with pleasure, so it's better that I don't! Now I 
don't miss it, really, but it's just strange to have 
loved it so much and to be where it is ... but we can 
say that it's everywhere! There's no place where 
single Malt doesn't flow! 
So, given your strict adherence to the macrobiotic diet, 
how did you rationalize your taste for Wlzisky? Because 
it's 'macrobiotic' to the extent of comitzg from graius? 
Actually, I thought in those terms, yes! And I also 
thought that when I drank Guinness in Ireland! 
Isn't it said to be 'good for you'? But actually, I'm 
afraid it isn't! Seaumas, the Uillean pipes player in 
Roaratorio, is dead now - he drank too much 
Guinness! He could hardly record for me; he had 
to go to the toilet all the time! Then Joe Heaney 
died, too. He wasn't drinking any longer, but he 
had done, and brought himself close to the 
grave! 
Give11 your predilectiou for tiOII-illleutiouality aud so 
forth, do you ha11e auy desires or iute11tiom about your 
owu death? 
Well, I don't really sec how I can, because it's not a 
decision that I will be taking. It'll happen 
regardless of my desires and intentions. I'll just 
have to accept it however it happens. I wonder ifl 
will... 
Are you plamziug t~uy more pieces which use Scottish or 
Irish material? 
I might, but I'm not, actually. The next piece I 
may write does have to do v.rith an Irish subject, 
but it's not Irish Irish; it's out ofJoycc, and it's for a 
festival in Switzerland, where his work and my 
own work will be the subject of the festival. 
They've asked me to make a piece about Joyce 
that connects him with Zurich, where he died, and 
where he didu 't write his last work, which was to 
follow Fimzegaus Mlc1ke. It was to be, some people 
imagine, on the subject of ocean, because 
Fimlef?alls l¥ake is about the river going to the sea. 
So my work would be called Ocem1, and I don't 
think it would have specifically Irish elements in 
it, but it would have the ocean elements in it. I've 
been told of an oceanographic institution in 
Baltimore where I could go and hear many sounds 
of the ocean, which I would probably combine 
with instruments, using this kind of harmony that 
I call Anarchic Hannony, that can include noises. 
You've said that music used to be i11 a situatiou ofclzoositz.~ 
betweeu two streams- Sclzoeuberg or Straviusky- aud 
tzow we 're i11 a situatio11 of delta mor1i11g out towards 
ocea11. So is this piece tryiug to t~chieve that uext state- of 
oceau? 
Yes, I must say, it is in my mind, but I haven't 
thought of it in that context, and I don't think I 
would make that explicit. I mean to say that I 
wouldn't make the river, and the delta, and the 
ocean; I'd just stay in the ocean! Maybe evaporate 
a bit! 
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Tbomas Wilson is American by 
birtb, frisb by descent, Scollisb by 
nurture, and International ill 
inclination As one ofScotland:'> 
most actiue composen;, be bas 
beld posts in many mc(jor 
cultural institutions, Scollisb and 
Brit isb, as tue/1 as bal'ing hL\· 
music beard intenzationa/0 '· 
Nouember .J988 saw bim signing 
a deal of mu! ual e.Ycba nge 
between tbe Scollisb Society of 
Composers and the RostOl' on Don 
brancb of tbe Russian Un ion qf 
Compo ·er; under whose au:;pices 
Wilson 's Piano Concerto and bis 
Fourth String Quartet receiued 
their Souiet premieJ~\· !bat 
December. 
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Composers, Cash and 
Cosmopolitanism 
A Conversation with 
Thomas Wilson 
Steve Sweeney Turner 
Thomas Wllson 
bat l'alue would you sny societ)' 
puts 0 11 tbe composer today. in 
P!'rtiwlf'!r·. ll'bere do ~bey stand M 
jar as lije 111 Scotland s concerned? 
Well , it' · a ,.e1~· ' ~lr ied situation. Looking at it 
from a stricti\· mercc:n:u~· point of ,·iew, and I 
don't suppose that am· composer does look at 
it like that, o rhemise he wouldn't do the job 
he' doing, bur the composer is grossly 
underpaid for hi · labours. Society doesn't 
realh· \:tlue the compo er enough ro pay him 
properly. \\ 'e h:l\'e consider.1ble help from 
lxxlie · uch as rhe Arts Council , it has ro be 
·aid and also from commi: ioners of our 
~·o rk . In Ill\ ' own case r,·e bet:n ,.e1v fortunate 
- l'\'t~ been. commissioned sre:tdil~· for the 1: r 
~·enty years or so, since the mid· ·ixries, bur I 
don't think many people ha,·e lx'en :l.; 
fonun:ne :l.; I ha,·e been in that respect. 
1 don't think rh:n the commiss ioning system 
necessarily ope 1~11es ag:1insr \vh:n you might 
c:1ll the "spontaneity principh.:", because if 
you're sen ·ible about it , ,·ou can so arrange 
m:nrers rhar you get commissions that you 
"~mr ro get, and wrn down the or hers- if \ 'OU 
h:1,·e a particular yen ro {Hire :1 ·rring quarter, 
for example, then you let it be kn0\\11, so ro 
speak, that you "~Ill! ro, and somebody rakes 
you up on it. That's the kind of principle, bur 
it doesn' t :1h' : 1ys \\'Ork, of course. 
The compose r's Silllation as far :1.< 
·corbncJ's concerned is , .e 1~· good loc:tlly, , .e1~ · 
good from the point of ,·i e~· of Scorl:tntl. 
because it's ex rremelr :lcti,·e. I can' t speak so 
much for Edinburgh, bur I li\'(: in Gl:1sgo\\', 
:md Gl:tsgo"'· · :1bsolureh· jumping. 
Do you jind tbings bm •e nccdemted since 
Clasgoll' 1990.' 
Yes, I rhink they ha,·e ro some exlenr. I don' t 
think :tn~·lxxl~··s terribly sure quire \\'har 
direction 1990 might lead in. I think there :1re 
some, you might :1,·, resen:nions about the 
facl that quire a lot of the major commissions 
for 1990 seem ro h:1,·e gone ro English 
compo ers. That hasn't, I think, gone do,Yn 
terribly well in these pans, :md 1\·c.: got a 
certain ~mparhy for that point of view, I ha,·e 
ro ·ay. llowe,·er, I think 1990 could well 
int roduce another element imo rh~ Scouish 
COmJXlser's existence, which might hopefully 
l:tsr longer than 1990 itself. 
A.; f:tr as the · onish composer , ;s-:·1·\iS 
Engl:tncl is concerned, il 's still something of a 
bank, lx.~ause, one or t\\'0 exceptions ap:111 , 
rhe English perception o r Scoui ·h musici:ms or 
composers seems ei ther to ignore them JX)iitL'· 
ly or :n any r.ne nor m pay anenrion ro them of 
the kind that I consider thL'\' desem.:, bec:1use 
\\'<: h:1,·e ,·ety good comJXlsers Ji,ing here. 
.. , 
~ : 
In tbe context of tbe Nationalist:-; 
ol'ertures to Scotland in /:'urope do you jind 
tbat there is o di.J}i:rem.:e belll'een tbe ll'ay 
tbal tbe Scouisb comfJoser is dealttl'itb on tbe 
continent as opposed to in l:'np,lmzd? 
Oh, I think \'l'J'Y much so. Scottish 
composers in fact are making, increasingly, 
an impact upon other countries. Their music 
is being performed there much more widely. 
1\l\' own music's been performed all O\'er the 
\\';)rid, really, and it's become increasingly 
frequent in recent years, in places like 
Canada and the States, Germany and France, 
and Russia,.Japan, and so forth- these arc all 
beginning to take interest, and there is no 
sense there of this kind of funny 
discriminatory I Iadrian's Wall - type of 
principle which seems to operate in the fairly 
parochial set-up that we ha\'e in this country 
[in which there is no more parochial place 
than the south-east of England]. Ilowe\'er, 
it's not true of e\'erybody, I mean there are 
plenty of people down in England who arc in 
fact very interested indeed and ha\'e gi\·en 
considerable encouragement to people like 
myself; I will engage fairly soon upon a 
trumpet concerto for John \\'allace, of the 
London Sinfonietta, for example. Pl:tces like 
the Cheltenham Festi\·al ha\'e played my 
music, the City of London Festi\'al, the Ilenry 
\X'ood Proms and the B.B.C., of course, in 
large quantities, antl \'arious <>ther 
establishments like the Royal Northern 
College and the Guild-hall. These are 
instances of this principle which l'\'e drawn 
your ~mention to operating the other way 
around, in fact, and they don't percei\'e it in 
this segregated way that is ne\'ertheless a fact 
of life for Scottish composers. I think 
probably that it's also true to say that the 
Scottish composer may be doing quite well 
in some respects at the moment in the sense 
that people up here, performers up here, are 
taking an active interest, but we could do 
\\'ith a good deal more than we're getting. 
Do you tbink tbat one problem in tbis z:-; 
tbat contemporctl)' music is not recti{J' 
gelling out and about as mucb as it could do 
to do some self-publici(}' and actual~}' 
demonstrate to tbe public that it is 
a m ilable? 
Well, I think that's part of it, yes, although in 
recent years there ha\'e been one or two very 
good musical educators - people who are 
able to talk to the public about modern 
music and possibly their own \vork in 
particular and engage the public's interest as 
a result. That plus the fact that all the smaller 
ensembles - the string quartets, the string 
orchestras, and individual solo performers -
are all, to gi\'e them full credit, vel)' interested 
indeed in what Scottish composers are 
doing. So I think from that point of \'iew 
things are quite good, but the financial 
situation's not right, and if anything it's 
getting worse, because the restraints 
imposed by the present Go\'ernment are 
such that the Arts are feeling the pinch, all 
round, and music's no exception. 
Do you feel tbat giuen tbe money tbe Arts 
Council bm.re, boll'et•er mucb tbat is. it ll'Ould 
be more fruitful to sbare it out in a dijj'erent 
way to present policy, tcbicb seems to be to 
aim money primarily at /be larp,e 
institutions in tbefirst instance, and tben see 
tl'bclf:., lejijiJr et·ei)'Oile else? 
\\'ell, I suppose that, trying to look at it from 
t.heir point of \'iew, and han: some sympathy 
for the difficulties that the\' no doubt 
encounter, I suppose that is th~ natural wa\' 
of doing it. \Vhen you ha,·e major customer~. 
then they're going to get a major share of the 
cake, unless you simply say, "well, this major 
customer's not going to get any more", and 
that \\·ould clearly be a destructi\'t: mow. too. 
I mean, nobod\' wants to see the end of 
Scottish Opera, ~)r the S.:\'.0. or whate\·er. So 
I don't see am· wa\· in which \'OU could do it 
other than th;tt. \\~'hat's need~d. howe\'L'r, is 
more mone,·, so that the,· can in fact still 
satisfy the n~eds of the maior customers, hut 
also cater for some of the descrYing smaller 
"clients" who need support ,·ery much, 
perhaps e\'en more. At the present time, they 
are not getting the support that they need; 
the composer is increasingly getting less 
support, simply because of the restraints on 
public money going into the system in the 
first place. 
\\'7.Jell more people listen to music than 
et·er before. tbrougb records and otber 
ell!ctronic media. it seems strclll/ .. W tbat 
classical music sbould he, in comparison 
ll'itb otber S(l'les. e..O'ectit·e~l' on tbe decrease. 
Do you tbink tbere :" mzytbinp, !bat classical 
music could learn ji-om tbe tl'll)' tbat rock 
music. for e.\·ample. is so/cl~ /3ecause tbat:.; 
ll'bat it boils dolt'n to. real!)·. 
\Veil, first of all, just to qu~trrel with one of 
the things \'OU said, I don't think classical 
music's ~>n ·the decrease. If an)1hing, I think 
it's on the increase, because despite the 
financial diftkulties \\·e\·e been talking 
about, the number of performances is 
growing. \X'hether or not there are any 
lessons to be learned from the kind of 
marketing skills of the ro~k musicians ... I 
suppose there are, theoretically, because 
they're good at it. On the other hand there 
are all sorts of reasons why is doesn't 
happen, and one of them is money. 
But rock is flnmzciai~J' selfsupportinp,. 
tl'IJereas classical music is. by tbe ll'Cl)' tbings 
are organised. dependent 011 suhsic~J'. 
That's right; it's either dependent on subsidy, 
or increasingly, on some form of 
sponsorship. And that means to say that you 
have to be dependent, as it were, on the 
good will of others. But generally, that is the 
situ~uion we're in, whether you like it or not 
- that is it. l don't myself think, you see, that 
classical music and rock music can be 
compared; that's not to say that I take a lofty 
\'iew and condescend to the rock musicians, 
not at all; but what I do say is that there's 
some kind of difference in capacity to appeal 
to a wide audience, and that's where the 
money comes from. 
So you tbink tbere isfimdmuental~l' a root 
dijj'erence. tbat jar more people u•antto buy 
rock records tban classical records, and go 
to rock concerts tban classical concer/.'i. 
Oh, I think there's an ob\ious statistical 
difference, that far more people want to buy 
rock records than classical records, and go 
to rock concerts than classical concerts. 
But vou u•ouldn 't &I)' that's reducible to 
just m-arketing tecbniqiws. 
i\o, I don't think it is, although that aspect 
could be irnpro\'ed, no doubt. I mean you 
can sell people anything through skillfull 
adwnising, I suppose, but it doesn't seem to 
me that rock music makes for a bridge into 
classical music terribly readily. 
Do you see any space bere jiJI' f>r~ssih/e 
inletjhcing ll'itb tbe mecms adopted in fhlk 
music. particular~)' in tbe context of tbe 
Scotlisb tmdition and any relation it bas to 
l'Our ou·n ll'Ork? 
\\'ell my own upbringing was strongly 
influenced by folk music. Although I speak 
with a pronounced Scots accent, my own 
antecedents are entirely Irish, though I think 
of m\'self as a Scot. I'm an in-comer in that 
scns~. so the Scottish musical tradition, 
which I admire immensely, is not re~tlly my 
tradition. lla\'ing said that, there are, I think, 
a number of people who are writing in that 
way at the present time and showing the 
increased influence of folk music as it's now 
known - folk music seems now to mean 
something different to what it did before, ie. 
something pretty old which had sur\'i\'ed 
from the past- now it's as it were, hot off the 
drawing board, \'cry often. Adopting that 
\'ie\\· of it - that it's going on and being 
\\Titten at the present time - that's quite 
\';tlid, I think. ~ly feeling about it is quite 
complicated; I don't want, really, to take 
some piece of wonderful folk music and tart 
it up like a piece of classical music, because I 
think you ruin it in the process. 
So you don't see mzy place jbr S(l'listic or 
et'ell CrOSSOl'et:.;;? 
Oh, there's all sorts of room, but the room is 
not for what you might call explicit cart)'· 
O\'er. I la\'ing said that, it very much depends 
on indi\'idual cases. When you're t~tlking in 
general terms such as we are at the moment, 
you tend to say things such as I've just said 
and you immediately think of exceptions. I 
mean I ha\'e written arrangements of folk 
tunes myself, because people asked me to, 
and I'm reasonably pleased with them. 
So bou· do you place tbem? \\''biciJ .'i(J•/e 
ll'Ould J'OU Sal' tbeJ' reside in? 
Oh, th~y resitie in ;t strJe which is compatible 
with folk music. 
\\'1.Jat about tbe National context ofyour 
main ll'Ork? 
In some way, I do believe that the music a 
person writes is deeply influenced at some 
intuiti\'e, subliminal le\'el by the place in 
which he lives. and the kind of experience he 
has had and the culture he participates in. My 
music is Scottish, simply because I live here, 
and because I think here, and because I react 
here, and I would regard that as being an 
absolute article of faith as far as I'm 
concerned. So I would say, yes, I do write 
Scottish music. But if you ask me to prove it, 
if you ask me to say how it is Scottish, you 
know, \vhere the "Scots Wha Ilae element 
is, I'd say, well it isn't there, you've got to 
look for it elsewhere, in some other <L<ipect, 
but if you know what you're looking for, 
you'll find it, because it's there. Of that I have 
no doubt whatsoe\'er. Does that answer your 
question? 
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A Contemporary Tradition 
An interview with David Johnson, by Steve Sweeney Turner 
When 1 visited David Johnson at his 
Edinburgh nat, I found this stalwart of the 
Scott ish music scene hard at work on yet 
another collection of fiddle tunes. and more 
than generous with a variety of caffeine-
bearing l iqu ids and excellent Indian cuisine. 
As we sat in his sparse kitchen watching the 
curry bubble , he instructed me to ask "the 
hard quest ions " which face the 
contemporary collector of tradit ional music. 
Wiry should we, at the end qf the 
twentieth century, care at all about this 
traditional musicJrom the eighteenth and 
ninereenrh centun'es? 
Well . this stuff isn' t 'historic' in the way 
th at some types of classical music are; 1 
think that once one gets into traditional 
music. the division between past and 
present isn't so great. The past is still alive, 
and the present is connected to the past. 
After all. we are the descendants of the 
people who wrote and played this at the 
time it was new. We tick in the same way 
that they did . And the music keeps 
developing; for example. there's a set of 
'The Hen's March Ower The Midden' which 
we've got in the new collection, that's 
derived from the set in the )im Hunter book 
published in I 979, but in the course of the 
last twelve years. it's had edges rubbed off 
it , it's had things smoothed our. People have 
simplified the Hunter version without losing 
the essence of it, so we're picking up 
something that's been creatively modified 
during the eighties, and publish ing it again. 
111 this S!:nse. your work isn't motivated 
by aJeeling qf nostalgia which leads you 
backwards to try and discover some kind qf 
authentic original which should be held up 
as an unassailable tmtlt, but much more 
the presentation qf a contemporary image 
qf a living genre. 
Certainly. yes! And there are bits of 
creative work which have gone into the 
book; the piano accompaniments are my 
own work, apart from borrowing a few hints 
from earlier accompaniments. 
How would you say that this aspect qf 
your collections relates to your work as a 
composer per se? Is it on a similar level? 
Yes I think they form a spectrum. 
Obviously, arranging is easier- you're not 
35. 
Oh. well. enormously. You could sit in a 
library looking at pieces of music and 
hearing them in your head until the cows 
come home. and get all sorts of things 
wrong. Also. 1 have to confess that the joys 
of sitting in libraries have worn off by this 
time in my life, whereas getting up and 
playing it to an audience, having the fun of 
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'The Four Poster Bed' from Book 2 of the' t., ; 
collecllon b<lieved to be or early J S!h etnrury 
English origin. the rune has been 'traditional' 
In SCo!land for several generations. ;rhls ' ~ 
version from young Edinburgh nddler Sophfe 
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. dennitcly NOT on the belly or 1he instrume nt , as rradhionally! 
starting from a blank sheet of paper in the 
same way. I think I learn a lot from editing. 
which feeds my com posit ions. and certainly 
being a composer already makes edit ing a 
lot easier. 
You've also spent a lot qf time 
performing these pieces as a 'cellisr wirh 
the McGibbon Ensemble; how would you 
say that practical experience has 
i'!fluencedyour research? 
meeting people for rehearsals. and finding 
out what a piece sounds like ; this is similar 
to the fun of having composed a new piece 
that you haven' t heard yet. Finding one in a 
library and taking it along to a rehearsal 
and getting it played is very exciting. the 
feeling of the stuff coming alive. coming off 
the page. 
Your presenr collecrion is very eclectic. 
For insrance, as well as rhe reels and su!lf 
you'd expecr, rh ere's also an arrangemenr 
JorJourJiddles qfa psalm rune, and so 
Jonlt . This kind qf practical eclecricism 
seems characrerisric qf all your work. 
Where would you say it comesJrom? 
David johnson (righ t) in rehearsa l with colleagues Edna Arthur. violin and Bryce Gould , 
lnrp ichord. 
I suppose a general interest in Scotland, and 
feeling that I myself was not brought up in 
any one bit of Scotland -this is what comes 
of being born in Edinburgh; if one had been 
born. say, in the Western Isles, you'd know 
you belonged to a particular bit of Scotland, 
but Edinburgh is "cosmopolitan". From 
another point of view. this collection is not 
setting up to be a "narional monument". it's 
not trying to include everything. It 's only 
got quite a small number of wnes in it 
really. Some volumes run 10 a hundred 
tunes. but we've only got rwcmy per 
volume. I wanted to make the contents as 
varied as possible. remembering thar some 
of the users will be young child ren who are 
not going to sit down and play a hundred 
tunes one after another; they're going to 
have to learn them one at a time rather 
slowly and perhaps painfully. and I wanted 
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to make sure that all the tunes were first 
class. that each one was worth having. and 
there would be variety. 
What contribution would you say these 
tunes make to expanding the technical 
repertoire if people learning theJiddle? 
I would have thought they'd be very 
useful. All Scottish fiddle music is good 
stuff. technically. Playing Scots fiddle music 
couldn't do anything to anyone's technique 
except improve it, and we've got them 
graded. so the book starts with the easy 
pieces. There arc one or two of the 
transcribed piobaircachds that my violinist 
colleague, Edna Arthur. has kept saying. 
"this is a marvellous bowing exercise- we 
must put this in!" Once you've mastered 
this, you could play nearly anything. Apart 
from that, I think it might draw Scottish 
music to the serious attention of children in 
the kind of families where they would not 
get Scottish music thrown at them. Perhaps 
showing. among other things, that the 
Scottish way of writing for the violin is just 
as good as the classical ways, and is 
nothing anybody need be ashamed of. or try 
and push into the corner or sweep under the 
carpet. 
Are there any new pieces in the 
collection? 
Yes. there are one or two, actually. The 
main one is a piobaireachd called 'Failte 
MhicGilleain' [McLcan's Welcome]. which 
has come out of a manuscript made in 
Edinburgh in 1740, in a violin arrangement. 
This itself is far older than any surviving 
bagpipe text, and has never been published 
until now, so here. we're putting something 
new onto the market which no-one has had 
access to except readers in the National 
Library of Scotland. 
Do you see yourse!f as some kind qf 
representative or ambassador Jor the 
Scottish Folk tradition? 
Not exactly; I think in some ways. I'm 
simply doing my own thing as a creative 
artist. using Scottish traditional music as 
the medium in which I'm doing it. In other 
ways, making a collection like this would be 
no use unless it were of use to other people. 
So it's got to hold together as a collection 
which lots of people in Scotland would 
appreciate, would want to use. which would 
give them things they otherwise wouldn't 
have. putting my knowledge of the Scottish 
past to some sort of use. so that it becomes 
something that will be useful to the people 
at the other end. Particularlv. this is a book 
for children. In one sense. I. suppose I'm 
trying to make something. give something 
to the people of Scotland. 
DAVEJONES 
Davc was born in Brecon on 29th December 
1940, the second son of a shopkeeper and 
his wife and grew up with a love of life. He 
went to Postern and Pendre School and was 
a member of Brecon Cathedral choir where 
he developed his love of music and his 
ability as a singer and musician. He went on 
to Christ College in Brecon where he played 
rugby for the First XV and it must have 
been his influence because. with Dave in the 
team, Christ College beat Llandovery, their 
arch rivals for many years. for the first time. 
After he left Christ College Dave went to 
work in the laboratory of British Nylon 
Spinners at Pontypool where he decided that 
his vocation and future was in teaching so 
he went on to St. Luke's Teacher Training 
College at Exeter where he obtained a 
teaching degree. Whilst at Exeter he met 
Sandra and like Dave she was a good singer 
with a love of folk music and dance and 
they were well regarded as a singing duo in 
and around the clubs and festivals in the 
area. Dave was now a member of the EFDSS 
and it was through that organisation that he 
met Bill Rutter who was the director and 
leading light of Sidmouth Folk Festival and 
this had a profound effect on Dave's future 
direction in the folk world, for Bill 
convinced Dave that running anything was 
just a case of careful planning and putting 
the right people in the right place at the 
right time, an art which Dave developed and 
perfected over the years. 
Dave and Sandra were married and Dave 
got a job at Whitecross School in Hereford 
and they decided that Ledbury was the place 
that they wanted to live. so there they 
bought a house and set up home. At this 
point Dave decided that the local folk scene, 
for what it was, needed shaking by the shirt 
tails and dragging into the 20th century and 
characteristically of Dave he set about 
gently persuading and nudging the right 
people into the right place at the right time 
and so started the great folk revival in the 
West Midlands. Davc with the help of a few 
friends, started up Hereford Folk Club under 
the auspices of the EFDSS and he and 
Sandra were two of the resident artists. Out 
of this Dave and some friends decided to 
form the Hereford Morris Men and, after a 
while, encouraged a few of the more 
geographically distant members to start up 
clubs in their own areas. which are still 
going strong today and will remain a 
testimonial to Dave's ability to encourage 
others to have a go. 
It was then that Davc decided that the 
dance side of the local scene Jacked 
something. so he and Sandra decided to run 
a ceilidh in Ledbury which. through their 
hard work and planning. turned into a very 
successful series of not only dances but 
instructionals as well. with some of the 
country's top instructors being brought in to 
teach all forms of traditional dance and many 
hundreds if not thousands of people have 
these instructionals organised by Dave. to 
thank for their ability to dance today. 
With the arrival of their first child 
everyone thought that this would curtail 
Davc's activities. but not one bit, as with 
everything else Dave just made a list and 
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the family went everywhere they wanted to 
and nothing had changed. 
During this time Dave and a few like-
minded people decided that the time had 
come to organise themselves into a group 
that could represent and promote their 
mutual interest and so the WMFF was born. 
Out of the WMFF. Bromyard Folk Festival 
emerged one night after Davc had been 
talking to Bill Rutter who encouraged him to 
have a go, and not being a man to shirk 
from any challenge in which he believed, 
Dave sat up all night and planned the first 
festival. Despite the worries and fears of 
Dave's peers his meticulous planning and 
perpetual optimism paid off and today BFF 
is one of the finest folk festivals in the 
country and has to its credit started many of 
the top international folk artists off on the 
right road to success. 
About 20 years ago Dave and Sandra 
decided that they had outgrown their little 
house in Ledbury and would like to move to 
a bigger place where they could bring up 
their children in more open and spacious 
surroundings. and so they moved to New 
Mill House at Putley and had great plans for 
its restoration and improvement which they 
methodically and meticulously carried out 
over the years. Sadly some 10 years ago 
Sandra tragically died leaving Dave with a 
young family to bring up. but in all his 
personal grief and loss he set about 
planning and re-organising his life to face 
up to the challenge he could see ahead and 
to his great credit brought up four fine 
children. 
Some years later Dave met Annie and 
deciding that they both had a lot in common 
with the same goals in life, decided to get 
married. 
Throughout all that had been going on. 
Davc's other passion in life had been quietly 
and methodically worked on and that was 
the research into the roots of the Welsh 
Border Morris Dances and Traditions. 
Several people had tried to collect these 
traditions but came upon a stone wall of 
silence from the old men because they 
attacked the job from the front, but Dave 
with his gentle manner and endless patience 
won these old men over and this enabled 
Dave to write the first and only 
authoritative book on the roots of the Welsh 
Border Morris which is now the finest 
reference book on the subject. 
Dave and Annie now decided that the 
time was right to renovate Putley Mill. After 
the usual careful planning they set about 
the arduous task of renovating the mill with 
an aim to opening it to the public as a 
working museum and education centre. And 
then to complete the family along came 
Ceinwen. Dave and Annie were then complete. 
Very few men in history have left this 
world a better place than they found it. But 
Dave was one. 
DOUG ISLES 
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POETRY FOLK JAZZ FICTION 
composers there live very differently from 
the way we do. for example, materially, 
they have much more than Scottish com-
posers have; they have a Composers' 
House, which belonged to a Russian prin-
cess who was asked to vacate it in 1917, and 
it was given over to the composers and 
writers of Rostov, they have a well-staffed 
office, sanctuaries, a dining hall, concert 
hall, practise facilities, beautiful garden, a 
composers' bus with a diver, so I don't 
think they realise how well-ofT they arc in 
comparison to us. 
And how did they receive Voyager? 
Well, it was well-received. I think they 
found it quite Avant-Garde, but I don't 
regard myself an an Avant-Garde com-
poser. I found many of the composers 
there were writing in quite traditional lan-
guage - still much use of Folk song, and 
"stetched" tonalities, as it were. 
Is this because of the pressure of Gov-
ernmental policies, or has that aspect dis-
appeared? 
It's hard to say- I think in the past it 
was, but there's an emergent group of 
composers who wouldn't have anything to 
do with that. See, I don't think that mu-
sic's censored as much as painting, or po-
etry, or dance; music is the most elusive of 
the art-forms. You simply can't get a por-
nographic piano sonata. I suppose a song 
could be. 
When we hear of censorship of music-
I'm thinking of Hindemith, his opera 
Mathis der Malerwas banned, not because 
of the chord structures or the rhythmical 
impetus, but because of the political refer-
ences, the hero-versus-the-state, and the 
same music was made into a symphony 
and didn't offend anyone - I think it's 
associations beyond music which cause 
offence to the State. 
However, I didn't find any of that in 
Russia nowadays, I found a very warm at-
mosphere. No "schools" or anything like 
that. 
What you said about not seeing your own 
music as Avant Garde- what do you see as 
the role of traditions or "schools", if you 
like? 
You know, I sec much music as tradi-
tional music, and I don't think that tradi-
tion is a bad word at all. I can't think of any 
composer before, say, 1960, who, to me. 
isn't traditional. I don't know how people 
say, you know, that "Avant Gardc" is talk-
ing about Varcse, or Ives or Schoenberg-
thcse are traditional composers, they were 
born about a hundred years ago, for good-
ness' sake! 
So what were your own concerns in the 
'sixties, given that many people still think 
of that decade as the most Avant Garde in 
musical terms? 
Did I tell you about the Piece fur Er;f. 
Well, the Piece fur Egg had ... you know 
how you can blow an egg out? And with 
pipe cleaners, I made these two feet, and 
eh, put it back in this six-pack of eggs. It 
was actually escaping from composition, 
you see; I made a Celtic cross on the lid, 
and presented it as my piece to my tutor 
Bentzen, and he opened it and played a 
few sepulchral chords, and he thought this 
was great. He said, "Ah, piece for egg! I 
play it at my next concert!" So then there 
followed Piece fur Banana, Piece fur Apple, I 
So how do you actually reconcile these 
kinds of things that were going on in the 
'fifties and 'sixties to your present work-
I mean in terms of style, aesthetics and so 
forth - how do you place it? 
Well, it's so easy to fall into the trap of 
comparing it as if it's a species of animal. 
It's evolving and getting- God, it's almost 
nineteenth century- sort of better, some-
howl It might be going one step forward 
and two back, I don't know. When I was in 
my twenties I used to try and avoid sound-
ing "Scottish", because a lot of the com-
posers of the generation before - no of-
fence, I like their music-wrote "hcedrum-
hodrum" music for the concert hall. Now 
I was obviously Scottish, but I wanted an 
international language. I wanted to ac-
quire a language which would'nt just 
talk to people about Jigs and Reels and 
Strathspeys. I wanted to talk to people in 
other cultures. Later, in the 'seventies, I 
began to use ancient psalm singing. I think 
I was the first composer to use this - the 
psalm singing of the Free Kirk, where they 
use a style of hcterophony, where they're 
all singing in unison, but they all embel-
lish the line. And a lot of composers have 
done this since ... but I think my First Sym-
phony- the slow movement, 1974 - was 
the first Scottish work to use this in a con-
temporary way, where I wrote out propor-
tional notation, and had mordents in 
boxes, and all the rest ofit. I was fascinated 
with this sound which gave a little scope 
for ... not improvisation, but choice, con-
trolled chance within the line. But I had to 
be quite sure of my ground ... goodness, 
I'd used Egyptian melody, and perhaps I 
was a wee bit worried about seeming paro-
chial. Now I don't care, I'll use a Scottish 
melody or a Hindustani melody, or what-
ever, if I like it. But I don't espouse Nation-
alism. I think Nationalism can be a curse. 
I would be more for an international egali-
tarianism. And that aside from music, I 
think it's stupid to be innately proud of 
your 0\\11 nationality. That's the road to 
hell ... 
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~~SIC AND DECONSTRUCTIO~ 
_Some Notes on the Usage of a Term 
~teve Sweeney Turne~ 
_[1) Presupponit Parlicue (Intervertit)[l] 
This prefatory parafling, or trifling evasion, can be put under the 
heading of the term text in a traditionally literary sense. However, the 
sense in which textuality is used as a concept in deconstruction is much 
broader and much less exclusive. As Barbara Johnson has written, 
"nothing, indeed, can be said to be not a text." [Dissemination, 
Introduction, p.xiv] Textuality could be defined as the potential for cross-
references; the potential difference of connectivity. And with the 
connective and cross-referential field coming under the heading ot 
intertextuality. However, it should not be assumed that intertextuality is 
the sole preserve of the deconstructionist. It is, rather, a more prevalent 
textual condition recognized by many forms of contemporary theory, 
including post-structuralism and postmodernism in general. This common 
ground, however, should not be taken as a symptom of an alleged 
homogeneity of contemporary thought. It is important to make careful 
distinctions between, for instance, the terms deconstruction, post-
structuralism, and postmodernism. These terms are not wholly cognate, 
although they evidently have significant intertexts (for instance, a post-
structural situation can "result" from a deconstructive reading of a text; 
a postmodern technique may be based on an assault upon structure, etc.). 
The text which follows, which is here presupponit - assumed 
beforehand - is an attempt to give a compressed reading of the text of the 
term deconstruction. Space allows, however, for only a very specific and 
rigorous usage of the term, and this will readily be understood to fall 
under the heading of Derridean deconstruction, rather than Richard 
Harland,s "Anglo-Saxon" version with its emphasis on paradox. The validity 
of "Anglo-Saxon" in this context is questionable to say the least. The 
current author would suggest an erasure of the term through a political 
deconstruction of its over-coded determinism, but neither should we 
replace it with Christopher Norris, term "Anglo-American" either. What 
follows is more of an anglophone text, with neither an English nor an 
American vision; an anglophonic text which opens with the possibility of 
decentring the hold of a specific dialect over the whole a1~lophone world -
a hold all too often presupponit without question (a possibility 
nevertheless kept in reserve for the time being). The lead which the 
francophone tradition of deconstruction gives to this proposed anglophonc 
[l] These Scots terms translate as follows: presupponit - presupposed, assumed 
beforehand; parlicue - resume of speeches at closei intervertit - intercepted, 
appropriated to another than the original purpose. cf. the Derridean debates around the 
paradoxical status of prefaces: "The preface would announce in the future tense [ ... ] 
tbe conceptual content or significance [ ... ] of what will already have been written." 
[Dissemination, p.7] 
[2] Kindly allow a provisional suspension of the issue of the phonic in general. "Let 
us proceed slowly", as Derrida has not often said, but written. 
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tr·_adition leads it in an othe~ direction, indubitably having many intertexts 
wtth the Anglo-Saxon verston, but n~vertheless coming under as Derrida 
might suggest, an 11 other heading 11 tJJ. ' 
~usic & DeconstructioJ! 
Deconstruction is a current critical term often misunderstood within 
academic musical circles. I would like to explain its context from the 
position of being both a deconstructionist and a musicologist. 
The term deconstruction is often misused as a more impressive (and 
supposedly trendy) way of saying analysis. Let's take a brief look at the 
definitions we can ascribe to these terms - deconstruction and analysi.c;. 
Ian Bent defines analysis as follows: 
Musical analysis is the resolution of a musical structure into 
relatively simpler constituent elements, and the investigation 
of the functions of those elements within that structure. 
[Analysis, p.l] 
Note the structural closure suggested by the term "resolution". Note 
also the implicitly reductive nature of the process whereby this closure is 
achieved. Bent's comments suggest that analysis is a form of structural 
and functional summarization of a text, in order to more easily comprehend 
that text. Analysis is a form of explanation here, setting itself up externally 
in relation to a text, in order to more or less objectively describe its 
workings, but this description, through its summarizing process, being 
also a form of reductive closure. 
However, consider the following definition of deconstruction by 
literary critic, Barbara Johnson (and let us not forget that deconstruction, 
as with so many contemporary critical practises which tantalize music 
theorists begins as a literary critical form); 
The de-construction of a text does not proceed by random 
doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful teasing out 
of warring forces of signification within the text itself. 
[Dissemination, p.xiv] 
Here, Johnson makes two si,~ificant departures from the concept of 
analysis as proposed by Bent . With deconstruction, we are not 
concerned with the resolution of a text into constituent elements, but with 
the "careful teasing out" of significatory fissures "within the text itself". 
This location of deconstructive praxis is a significant difference to 
analytical thought. Deconstruction positions itself not externally to a text, 
as analysis often does, but at the same level of signification as the text, 
being, as a process, immanent to that text. Deconstruction does not 
[J) cf. Derrida's Th~ Other Heading: R~flections on Today's Europe, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, U.S.A. 
[4) However, Johnson's remarks preceding this quotation point to a furth~r ruptur~ in 
the definition of analysis, this rupture perhaps evoked through the prec1se techn1cal 
m~aning of the term in a musical context. 
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summarize the workings of a text into t t• 
workings of a text in d t a s a lC plan, but hooks into the 
. t ' ?r er 0 re-work them, creating at the same time a 
new 1n ertext. Analys1s leaves a text ·nt t t• 
d · . · . · 1 ac , ere a 1ng a new parallel ~scr~phv~ and summarized text; deconstruction affects a text directly, 
affechng 1t through a process of react1'vat1• g d h 11· •t · · · t . . n an re-c anne 1ng 1 s 
signlflca ory processes: Analys1s 1s a critical act which has a point of 
closure,. a telos or flnal goal, represented b Bent's c ne t f 
"re sol ubon" whereas d t t• . Y 0 ep 0 
' econs rue 10n 1s a process without necessary closure. 
In Jacque.s Derrida's classic text Of Grammatology, we can read the 
standard techn1.ques of ~he deconstructive process. To summarize (but 
ho~~-fully .to avo1d analy~1s), Of ~ram_matology is an assault upon a certain 
metaphysical moment wh1ch Derr1da identifies as a trace throughout rnobt 
of Europ~an (and non-European) thought. This moment he terms 
logocentrLsm, "the metaphysics of p~onetic writing" (Of Grammatology, 
p.3_J, and dea~s at length with the writings of the Genevan Enlightenment 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau under the heading of this term. The 
main focus of Derrida's text is Rousseau's Essay on the Origin of 
Langllages which Treats of Melody and Musical Imitation (Paris, 1753). 
Housseau's argument is represented by the idea that language is primarily 
located in a vocal origin, and that writing is a debased supplement or false 
representation of speech which, in a sense, castrates the immediacy of the 
virile voice's power by introducing a dangerous interval between speaker 
and addressee, by splitting signification into what semioticians describe 
as the referent and the signifier. Derrida exposes a series of 
contradictions within Rousseau's theory, and through processes of 
conceptual reversal, he rewrites Rousseau's theory to stress the 
importance of the supplement rather than the origin, the signifier rather 
than the referent. However, this is not a simple reversal, as the concept of 
the supplement is used to overwhelm that of the origin and include it 
within its own structure, so that, in other words, the concept of the 
referent is shown to be a structuralist myth, all referents being in fact 
nothing more than additional signifiers with yet further signifiers behind 
them. Thus signification breaks out of its structuralist mode, indeed, 
breaks out of traditional concepts of structure per se, becoming a vast 
system of continually moving particles, a process without beginning or 
end, without origin or telos. Signification as constant motion. 
If one were in the foolish business of summarization, one could 
summarize the process of deconstruction as consisting of three stages -
engagement, reversal, and displacement: 
Ill Engagement - re-energize the internal terms, concepts and 
processes of the text, identify the metaphysical oppositions upon which the 
text is based and hook into their workings. As Derrida has written, one 
"operates ac;ording to the vocabulary of the very thing that one delimits" 
[Of Gramma tology, p.xviii]. He characterizes deconstruction as "a discourse 
which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the 
deconstruction of that heritage itself" [ibid.]; . 
Gl_ Reversal - reverse the polarity of the text's metaphys1cal 
opposition~, having the effect of provisionally maintain~ng the. structure, 
but destabilizing it from within its own terms. De~r1da wr1tes ?~ the 
appositional metaphysics which provide the foundahons for trad1honal 
theories being based on "a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls 
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the other (axiologically, logically etc ) h ld th · · · 
d t t th . . . , · ' o s e supertor posthon. To econs rue e opposthon 1s first [ ] t th [ 
hierarchy. [ibid., p.lxxvii) ... o over row renverser] the 
UJ Displacement - here the d t b"l· t· .. . . . . es a 1 1za wn of the opposthon from 
'"' 1th1n carrted out d urtng the stage of reversal · t d d b · th· . . . 1s ex en e y ustng 1s 
1nsta b1hty to move beyond the structure of th t h · 1 ·t· . . . e me ap ys1ca oppos1 1on. Derrtda describes th1s stage as "the 1·rrupt1·ve f , , • J emergence o a new 
concept, a c~ncept w:uch no longer allows itself to be understood in terms 
of the prev1ou~ reg1me [system of oppositions]." (ibid.] In specific 
refer~n.ce to h1~ .deconstruction in Of Grammatology of Rousseau·'s 
oppos1hon of or1g1n. to supplement, speech to writing, Derrida has 
commented that the final stage of displacement "allows for the dissonant 
emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the 
received order and invading the whole sphere of speech". [ibid.] 
Of Grammatology does however, include sections dealing with the 
de bate between Rousseau and Ram eau over the issue of whether melody or 
harmony was the ontological base line in music, and this debate is shown 
to be a corollary of that around origin and supplement. For Rousseou, 
rrtelody, in line with the idea of vocal signification becomes the prime 
metaphysical generator of music - melody is the natural, vocal origin of 
music. For Rameau, harmony and therefore instrumental music is the 
primary element. Here we can see a conceptual clash between the organism 
represented by Rousseau's originary voice, and the machine, represented 
by Rameau's instrumental harmony. Derrida draws through the arguments, 
exposing the attempt by Rousseau to show that melody has a linear, organic 
structure, rather than a scalar, harmonic one. Rousseau aligns harmony 
and instrumental music with writing - ie. as a debased representation, or 
"dangerous supplement" to melody and vocal music. His objection lo 
harmony is due to its intervallic mechanism which corrupts the possibility 
of direct, organic representation much as writing does, by splitting 
signification into referent and debased signifier. As with the speecM vs. 
writing opposition, Derrida deconstructs Rousseau's melocentrism by 
desta bilizing the concept of melody from within its own structural 
assemblage. 
To summarize briefly (and to therefore invite the analytical danger 
of ludicrous over-simplification), melody is shown to have as it.s 
precondition the operation of pitch differences and therefore a harmonic 
underlay. Once more, the supplement and the signifier are shown to he 
operative within the body of the fallacious origin or referent. In oth~r 
words, there is no referent, only signifiers in constant intervallic 
movement. . . . . 
Effect of deconstruction: both terms of an oppos1hon are der1vat~ve 
of each other (further, and not only each other), regardless o.f .any cla1!11s 
to the contrary encoded into the delineation o~ the oppo~1t:on .by lts 
author. Deconstruction hooks into this delineahon and dehm1~s lt. The 
operation of an opposition is thus shown to be based not on (for Instance) 
the generation or determination of one term by the other, ~u~ on c'ln 
undeclared principle which frames and runs through the opposthon. The 
[5] · · 't' p 1 de Han's term which is a relative of /1elocent.rism is Flemlsh-Amerlcan cr:l lC alu three terms articulate the milieu of 
Derrida's logocent_rism ahnd phofnoc~gn;;[{f~~tlo1n. cf. de Han's Allegories of Reading. Rousseau's ontolog1cal t eory o s1 
I~ 
ontological ~if~erence which the opposition is based upon is itself an 
a~tempt to h~1t ~hat Derrida terms dittera.nce - spatial and temporol 
d 1 f fe~e~ce (differing ~nd deferring combined). This anti-concept is what 
Derr1da s deconstruchons uncover in their delimitation of those traditional 
th_eoretical systems which attempt to limit or erase the disruptive force of 
d1fferance. 
Thus, we can see that, due its processes being based in concepts of 
language, deconstruction is perhaps most applicable to music as a critical 
approach to music aesthetics. Aesthetics is a form of philosophical text 
constituted by the processes of writing, and is thus open to treatment as 
a literary construct. Quite how deconstruction can be applied to an actual 
musical text, a score, is a far more complicated issue than space allows for 
here, and may in some senses not even be possible anyhow; besides, that,s 
the role of analysis! 
Regardless, the reliance of Derrida,s deconstruction of Rousseau 
upon a traditional aesthetic debate within music itself points to interesting 
intertextual possibilities between the critical theory not only of music, but 
also of literature and philosophy. The ditfera.nce inscribed within 
deconstruction is musical. 
Perhaps an agenda for a critical musicology could be to hook into the 
workings of differa.nce and its allied concepts in the other fields of post-
slructuralism and postmodernism. To follow Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard, thus 
shifting from deconstruction to the postmodern: "Let us wage a war on 
totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the 
differences and save the honour of the name." [The Postmodern Condition, 
p.82] To cadence on another easily-fo~mulated sl~gan (remembering ~11 t~ 
while that slogans and cadences are Inherent friends of ~tructurah~m . ) 
- displace the centrality of (the) structural (in) mus1cology. Th1s IS 
critical. 
[b] such is "our" critical language. 
5 
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To be a pop theori st is not an imposit ion on an 
essentially irrational. Dionys ian an-form. it"s an 
option robe raken up. on all sides of the communica· 
tional divide- as anist. critic or audience.! 
Patrick Kane, lead inger w ith pop band Hue & 
Cry, identifies a communication divide between th~ 
production and th e reception of popular mu sic. 
Underlying this divide i a more fundamental dis-
tinction between crit ica l theory and popular prax is. 
and Kane· aim is to harmonise the two ("a little 
metatheory in your messaboogie can surely be no 
bad thing' l). What is the nature of thi s divi si n. 
and how effecti ve are some of the methods f r it> 
harmonisation which remain consonant with both 
mu icology and popular mu ic? After a couple of 
decades of applying the ry to this 'Dionysian an -
form ', where are 1 e now?J 
Kane is hardl y the first to rea li se the neccessi ty 
of bridging the gap; indeed, it is a recurring issue 
throughout the recent history of popular music 
studies. lt was not always so. In the Enlightenment 
we can find example where popular mu sics ar~ 
unsclfcon sc iously described in terms of their affec-
ti vit y as much as ·classica l ' musics (cf Adam 
Smith's Of the imitati1·e arrs). It eems that the 
question of the viability of theorising popular music 
is a modern one.J 
Perhaps the pectre of Theodor Adorno pre ides 
over the diviOe. A the arch musical M arxist he has 
sometimes a sumed biblical stature for M arxist theo-
ri st of popular mu i . with their frequent obesession 
with the image of the ·popular-a -proletarian'. How 
inconvenient then that he attacks popular mu ic thu ·: 
'Popular music, jazz included ... does not achieve ... a 
sublimation, but is a somatic stimulus and therefore 
regressive in comparison with aesthetic aurorromv.' 5 
Of course this really amount to claiming little more 
than that popular music does not conform to 19th· 




For Dave Harkcr, the arch dcbunker of such values, there is a need 
to open a study of popular music with a justification of popular 
music scholarship- 'Who needs a book on "popular song"? Isn't 
that one area where we arc all of us experts? Won't a book like this 
degenerate into a spiritual autobiography; or won't it try to lay claim 
to yet another area of social life for trendy academics?'6 (The sim-
ple answer in socialist terms is, of course, that academics arc work-
ers too). Clearly, Adorno's elision of Marxism and aesthetic autono-
my is a headache for the socialist popular musicologist. 
But perhaps we no longer rt:quire such Marxist guilt in the face of 
this 'Dionysian · form. At the recent inaugural meeting of the Critical 
Musicology Group in Sheffield University, popular music studies 
was described as one of a number of 'more established areas of musi-
cal study'. along with 'music analysis, music aesthetics (etc.!)' .7 If 
this is so, why does the current MT editor feel it necessary to com-
missioning an article on popular music in this ostensibly classical 
journal? Clearly. communication across the divide is at issue. 
The questions arc put on both sides of the debate. The real ques-
tion, however, is one of how musicology can pop the question, if by 
that we mean not only to put the question, but also to explode its 
duality, and to frame it within a context unique to the popular, 
rather than merely importing inevitably hostile contexts? 
C. !will sacrifice everything- rhyme, reason, sense, sentiment, to 
catchiness. There is. let me tell you, a great art in making 
rubbish acceptable. ' 8 The sentiments of music hall songwriter 
Felix McGlennon would seem to be an admission from within 
capitalism that Adorno was right. But does popular music con-
sist solely of such 'sacrificial rubbish' strewn across the inau-
thentic altar of the capitalist mass-media? McGlennon's exten-
sion of Adorno · s concept of the 'popular-as-proletarian· appears 
to fall into the pattern of 'proletarian-as-trivial'. But as even 
Adorno acknowledges, popular music is not generically homoge-
nous. What he refused to accept was the possibility of an aesthet-
ic as well as generic heterogeneity, although he does admit that 
some consider jazz to partake of aesthetic autonomy ('contrasting 
Beethoven and jazz - a contrast that has already become undefin-
able for some musicians'9). If we consider the possibility of an 
'art-vs-pop' divide within the popular itself (based on autonomy-
\'s-function. serious-vs-trivial, or any other similar formula) then 
it is easy to find its proponents within the jazz field, such 
as Avril Dankwonh: 
pop music has onlj th~ sknd~rest direct connection with jazz. Pop 
musi~: is popular. It is the 'music of th~ people' ... Jazz is not for the 
mas~es: it is a minority int~rcst -just like 'classical' music .10 
For Dankv.·onh. r-.tcGlennon's conception is correct. but jazz. 
with its aspirations of concert hall obscurity. difficulty. and exclu-
si\ity. steps beyond music hall popularity. And although Adomo's 
quotation above comes from a 1970 text. and Dankworth's from 
196g, they both avoid the similar implications of the new approach 
to aesthetic autonomy represented at that time by progressive 
rock.tt The significance of progressive rock in this context is that, 
much like jazz hefore it. it set up an ·art-\·s-pop· axis within the 
popular itself. In other words. not only to di,·ide jazz from popular. 
Apri/f<)<).J 
.. --------------- --·-------------··-· ----
~ut to extend the division to within Dankworth's definition of 'pop' 
llself. As Andrcw Chester wrote, 
The biggest obstacle in the path of rock criticism is the notion of pop ... 
Pop denotes a cultural, not an aeMhetic object... For rock, the struggle 
for artistic autonomy was won by the mid-'sixtiesl2 
These arguments around the aesthetic status of both 'jazz' and 
'rock' as distinct from 'pop' were not so much a case of a Marxist 
debate around authenticity, whether racial or class-based, but one 
around the traditionally bourgeois concept of autonomy. The new 
rock aesthetic can be argued to be derived from 'middle-class' 'art-
music' values - large-scale forms; structural complexity; rhythmic, 
tonal and textural innovation; virtuosic performance; the 'heavy' 
issues of metaphysics, psychoanalysis. humanity. ideology. etc. (cases 
in point would be King Crimson, Yes, Pink Floyd and Frank Zappa). 
The complexity of this music is not in question to anyone who has 
ever attempted to transcribe a Frank Zappa guitar solo. Irish sean-nos 
or Japanese shakuhachi are eac;y by comparison. Indeed, it is possible 
to view this complexity as a popular analogue to the contemporary 
line traversed by the Total Serialism-New Complexity axis, with, for 
instance, Stockhausen, Femeyhough and Zappa occupying a pscudo-
druidic status. However. is complexity a valid criterion in deciding 
whet.her or not progressive rock. jazz. etc. arc 'serious' enough to mer-
it academic study? If it can be argued that some popular genres 
involve such 'classical' values, then surely we can fairly unproblemat-
ically plug them in to our extant classically applied discourse?U And 
would this mean we can still reject 'trivial' pop music? 
Some studt:nts and lecturers of popular music do indeed appear to 
follow just this line of thought, whether consciously or not. My 
own experience of teaching on a BA degree in popular music is that 
the most vocal students often prefer to study Zappa than Madonna, 
and others have noted the same. Alf Bjornbcrg indicates that the 
Danish university's approach to popular music is inevitably based 
on the valorisation of aesthetic autonomy due to its obsession with 
the analysis of notation, and that curriculac should balance between 
the 'musician attitude' and the 'scholar attitude' .14 Again, we come 
up against the division between practice and theory outlined by 
Kane. If the 'scholar attitude' can be found in our university 
approaches to popular music, however, so can its inverse. 
The anti-analytical attitude of popular music users (and many 
students remain little more than this) is by now practically prover-
bial. Kane alludes to the 'fuck analysis- let's dance!' attitude, and 
points out that this in itself is a theoretical position. IS However, 
taking anti-analysis as a theoretical position, Mt:ltzer argues for a 
more radical possibility in such conceptual nihilism: 
'So what?' is ... a fine aesthctic judgement for two reasons. because it 
sums up a valid experience and leaves the work itself untarnished ... In 
fact. why not judge art by its sheer stubbornness. defiance of any and 
all objectitication? 16 
Indubitably. Meltzer comes close to post-structuralism in this 
statement. but it remains the position of a theorist and hardly deals 
\vith the untheoretical pseudo-nihilism of a hostile 'musician atti-
tude·. Evidently, neither Kane nor Meltzer have ever tried these 
arguments out on a group of popular music students suffering from 
217 
-
an anack of ~uch an '<llti-
tude'. If the y had , th ey 
would know that it still pro 
vide' no rca~on s again~t the 
an ti -analytical drive . What 
i ~ needed io; not on ly a 
rati o nale for introdu c in g 
musicology into the popu-
lar li eld , but also one which 
accomodates the reverse 
position. Hostilities will be 
encoun tered on both sides 
of the divide, and any argu-
ment for a popular mu~ i co l ­
ogy will have to be able to 
justify itself in two direc-
tion s at once. From one 
point of view. popular 
music (even including jau 
and rock) is too tri vial to ~tudy. and. from the other, the act of study 
is irrelevant to a form of mu~i c which has done very well so far 
without the help of the academy. So ho" do we reconcile such 
'culture clash'?IJ 
T he concept of trivialit y ha s been central not only in the objection to the academic study of popular music. but also to 
the argument. of those popular mu sic scholars" ho seek to valorise 
a speci fic popular genre by associating it with erstwhile 'classical· 
va lues, thus raising it to a ·cJassi al' status. ormally those who 
argue for the study of 'trivial' pop mu -; ic (that which is not nccccs-
sarily structurall y compkx in harmonic terms. etc .) ha"e tended to 
identify its significance in social terms. it was just such an altempt 
to place rock music sociologicall y'~ which prompted Andrew 
Chester to proclaim rock's aesthetic autonomy.'9 ·relative· though 
he claimed that to be. Simon Frith i-; an interesting example of such 
a sh ift. claiming in the late 70s that popular music's meaning \\as a 
function of its consumption.~o but moving on to call for a considera-
tion of the more technic:~ I aspects of popular music. ~' 
At present. the baltlclines arc being drawn within popular musi-
cology to begin to displace the traditional hegemony of sociological 
;~pprO.tlhC ;~nd attempt tn tkal direct I~ "ith what llan Moore has 
dc\Cnh.:d as the ·primar~ tc\t' nl popular mustc.~~ \\'htle anal) ucal 
approachc to this ·pnm<~r) tc\1· are as ~et relatl\el) unde,dopt·d 
111 rclauon to thme dcstgnctllor l·lasstcal nntste. attempts ha1e been 
made tn tmpon cl.ts~lcal .tnal) ''' uno the popular tie id. Thi, is 
p<l tbk 1f one tal..es cat.: 111 chnostng an apprnpriate combination of 
anal) tt cal model and pnpular gcnn:: Rtchard 1\litldleton e1en acco-
mndate' chcnJ...:rian anal~'" 10 popular mustc: 
There '<'Cill' no re·''"" "h) Schcn~a Jn.li'''' could not lx applied tn 
popular 'ong' goH~rncJ h~ !'ulh .. 'tlonal-ton;ll pn'll.:~''l.!' nineteenth cc:n· 
lUr) l)l}C\, for C\;Hnph!. nr nuht T111 Pan ~\ lk~ ong.,.~• 
thcr examples ol such cross-n,er application can easil~ he 
tmagined. but ,cvcral que'''""' arise from such de' clopment ""a) 
I mm sociological hcgcnHHI) Ill\\ ards tmlst<:nlog~ f" 'r '"· 1-ltddk-
:! I H 
ton (following Peter van 
der Merwc~•) stresses the 
connections between the 
popular and the classical 
not in order to valori. e the 
one by it association with 
the other. but in order to 
ask questions about musi -
cology in general. M id -
dleton, howe1•er. i. not 
arguing for a 'melting-pot 
theory' but rather a 
'dialectical approach' 
where connections are 
made between both popu-
lar and classical genres 
and theories.lS Indeed, 
his notion of a tntly criti-
cal musicology is one 
which is completely circum. cri bed by the concept of dialectics. 
I would like to agree here" ith Middlcton that the liberal-human-
ist melting-pot i-; not an intellectually challenging strategy. and also 
I \\Quid like to agree that we require a critical approach to musicol -
og) itself. Howe1er. I would suggest that the crucial point of 
engagement is not that of dialectics. but of deconstmction26 Until 
"e ha1e aclequatel} questioned the assumptions which underpin the 
musicological di\'idc \\'C arc hardly in a position to orientate our-
,eiles. Dialectical critique may allow new formations to occur, but 
dialectics are al\1ays subject to the possibility of relatively simple 
cleconstruction-; thetmcl ves. 
To begin" ith. as is wdl known. if we clcconstruct the theoretical 
milieu surrounding the concept of 'trivial' pop music we simply 
find a bourgeois theory of aesthetic autonomy attempting to val -
ori,c itself by subjugating a form of music which is in fact simply 
different. rather than ncccessarily of a lower va lue. As we also 
already know. to accept the charact~ristics of 'trivial' pop music as 
\'a lid ~xpressions of an ae,th~tic. and to approach them analyt ically. 
is also to question music analysis as a discipline. If our current ana-
l) tic a I techniques are inadequate to the task of engaging with 'triv-
ial' pop pieces. then perhaps they tell us less about classical music 
than a more mature form of analysis might. In this way, to elabo-
rate Mdllcr'> carli~r point. if we consid~r 'trivial · pop's 'sheer 
\luhbornes · in the fa e of analysis, then this can lead to a crisis 
"ithtn and deconstruction of the analytical programme. How 'tri\'-
ial' is pop mu-;ic then'' 
:\ladonnJ is a tigure "ho indubitably come under the heading 
of the term ·pop·. rather than ·rock' or anything else. and her 
mustc is often held up a~ preci el) an example of pop mu ic's 
·1ri1 ialit1 ·. "het her in terms of its alleged lack of authenticity or 
it ' ·ommercial succc". Indeed. many would apply !cGiennon·. 
,elf-critique to it. Signilicantly. though. Madonna has recently 
hccn attracting considerable allention from variou aspec ts of con-
tempnrar) thcor~. mainly of the post modern variety and in rela-
tnlll not to her mu<ic hut to her stage acts. visual repre entations. 
h ri<:'. etc. On~ musicologist however who has specifically dis -
:u"cd the m11 .1ic of this pop icon is usan 1cCiary. McClary 
\\OrJ.., 10\\:ll'li' the tkcon<truction of Western musical discourse in 
1\f'ril :vc;.; 
·! 
general, whether popular or modern, whether theoretical or com-
positional. and she has argued that Madonna's song 'Live to tell' 
in particular engages compositionally with the dcconstruction of 
certain rhetorical oppositions encoded within the structure of 
western harmonic practice. 27 Equally, she argues that the mini-
malistic 'art-pop' 2x musician Lauric Anderson deconstructs con-
cepts through their ironic postmodcrn juxtaposition with binaristic 
harmonics. Not wishing to confuse dcconstruction with postmod-
crnism, however (the two terms are not cognate). there is a great 
deal to he said for the direction in which McCiary is moving. In 
approaching the problem of the musicological divide from a 
deconstructive position, she has neatly outlined the power of 'triv-
ial' pop to question the tenets of 'serious' theory; she effectively 
underlines that a specific pop piece may be in fact a reading, or 
deconstruction of, the allegedly universal values and associations 
of European tonal rhetoric. 
However, we must be careful here not to take these points as 
general - the claim is not that pop music as a genre deconstructs 
the whole European tradition. Deconstruction is not in the busi-
ness of making totalising statements; the role of deconstruction is 
precisely to interrogate such constructs. Its strength lies in its 
refusal to fall back into stable generalities; it offers one means of 
disassembling the communicational divides between popular and 
classical theory and practise. 29 Not in order to throw the whole 
into a single homogenised mass, but to find routes of passage 
between the various points in the remarkably differentiated mess 
which we call 'music'. 
Further, and the specific character of musical signification which 
has been at the basis of the arguments around aesthetic autonomy 
presents different problems to those encountered in the more trav-
elled fields of deconstruction, whether philosophical, linguistic or 
political. If such a direction is taken up. musicology stands a 
decent chance not only of updating itself, but of advancing the 
boundaries of cultural theory in general. We may yet again find 
ourselves with the Paterian idea that 'all art tends toward the condi-
tion of music' .Jo If we do, then this time, it \vill not be within the 
strictures of 'absolute music'. but within the conceptual milieu of 
post-structuralism. Let the silen.ce roar forth. 
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5,,mc: r.uher h;~sic concep1s from Enlighrenmenl musk theory. I rc:fc:r rhe reader ro Dcr· 
rida's deconstrucrion of Roussc;lU (Jacques Dc:rrida: Of gram11wll>logy [Bahimorc:. 
1976J). where the d;~sh hclwecn the ri\'aJ onloJogies of melody and h;~nnony ht'Comes 
one: of rhc sires of pnx!uclion ot' Dc:rriJ;~'s dassic dc:~.·onsrrucli!lnisl con.:epl of dif-
}i'r<lll<"<' (Sic\'e Swecnc:y-Tumc:r: op. cit.). 
Tlu• l\lu,..i•·•al Tiul<'" ::!ICJ 
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An Cuibhle M6r 
~~rili ngual Terrain in Scottish Political Son& 
J1J Contex_t: "Aneirin Sang_]t'~ 
Truan yw gennyf, gwedi Budded, 
God.d~f gloes angau trwy anghyffred, 
Ac e1l trwm truan gennyf fi gweled 
Dygwyddo ein gw,))'r ni ben o draed 
- Y Gododdin, Aneirin, c.600 A.n.l71 
An:irin's Gododcfin, written around 600 A.D., represents the first 
song wh1ch has surv1ved from the geographical area now known os 
Scotland, and across the surface of this opening moment of historical 
articulation, the politics of language are inscribed. This "oldest Scottish 
l>Oem", as Kenneth Jacks on has put it [Jacks on, p.ix], is not, however, 
written in Scots or even Gaidhlig, but in an early form of Welsh - a 
Northern dialect known as Cumbrian - spoken throughout Southern 
Scotland during most of the first millennium. 
The political function of Aneirin's song was to record the final 
pivotal defeat of the Welsh Celts of the Lothians against the Anglian and 
Saxon invaders of the South. Throughout the C7th A.D., the political 
administration of South-East Scotland was increasingly annexed by the 
Angles of Northumbria, and the subject Welsh culture was gradually 
pushed back to the other Scottish "Welsh" kingdom of Strathclyde, with its 
capital at Dumbarton, or Din Brython - Fortress of the Britons. 
If, in C7fh South-East Scotland, Anglian was becoming the language 
of power, and Welsh was becoming increasingly the language of a subject 
population, then subsequent invasions and migrations complicated the 
si l uation further by the opening centuries of the Second Millennium. In a 
study of the place-names of West Lothian, John Garth Wilkinson describes 
the extant language pool there in the Cl2th as consisting of the following, 
in likely order not of population of speakers, but of political status; 
(7] 
LATIN, in the church; NORMAN-FRENCH, by the nobility; an 
early form of MIDDLE ENGLISH, by their servants and others; 
GAELIC, by some landowners; and CUMBRIC, possibly still 
spoken in parts of this area [ ... ] - if not, it was J?robabl?' 
spoken in neighbouring Strathclyde and Peeblesh1re ~n~1l 
around 1200. It is just possible that some NORSE was shll In 
It is a grief to me, ~fter t9il~ 
Suffering death's agony 1~ affl1ct1on, 
And a second heavy gr1ef to me 
To have seen our men fall headlong 
(trans. A.O.H. Jarman) 
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use [West Lothian Place Names, p.5][8) 
Inscribed across the geo-linguistic map of Scotland are traces of 
political and cultural struggle, recorded in place-names in folklore but 
also in literature and law. For instance, in William Dunb~r's famous iate-
C15th Scots poem, The Flyting of Dunbar and Kennedie his 
autob~o?'raJ?hical ch~racter berates, in quite racist terms, a poet fr~m the 
then Gtudhhg-speaklng South-West (this territory being no longer Welsh-
speaking). The Gaidhlig speaker is described as "Iersch brybo\,l.r baird, 
vyle beggar with thy brattis, I Cuntbittin crawdoun Kennedy" ['JJ. And of 
Gaidhlig itself, R~n bar's character remarks that "A ne law land ers wald mak 
a bettir noyis.. . 
Such linguistic prejudice has often been translated into political 
action, however, with the many punitive laws against G~lidhlig as a medium 
for State education. In the late Cl9th, for example, it was possible for 
Gaidhlig children to have their necks and wrists clamped in heavy wooden 
blocks for the crime of using their own language at school (llj. 
None of this, of course, takes account of the civil wars, invasions, 
and capitalist exploitations which have helped to hinder some languages in 
Scotland and promote others. 
At the initiation of these processes of struggle, lies the text of 
Aneirin's Gododdin, a song in a language no longer even considered 
Scottish. However, this fourteen-hundred year-old song connects three 
concepts: language, music and cultural struggle, three concepts which 
survived Aneirin and his culture to remain lodged in the cultural nexus of 
Scotland throughout history. As Hamish Henderson has written; 
Scotland, like Switzerland, is -and seems always to have been 
- a tmulti-ethnic' country, and the various strands of its 
popular tradition necessarily reflect this chequered linguistic 
past. [Alias MacAlias, p.78) 
This paper concerns itself with the nexus of concepts .thrown up in 
Aneirin's Gododdin, not so much in relation to their etymological past, but 
in terms of the linguistic practices current in contempor:ary popular: so~g · 
Scotland's three contemporary languages will be taken 1n turn- Gtndhllg, 
Scots, and English. 
(8] f h c b · 1 nguage in contemporary Scots (beyond 
Perhaps t~e main legacyf oth t erdu~yi~~n m:aning one~ also surviving in Northern place-names) 1s the usage o e wo . .' .. .. 
F.nglish agricultural dialects from Cymr1c t1mes as yan · 
(9] Irish thief-poet, vile beggar with thy brats~ 1 Cunt-infected coward Kennedy 
[10] A Lowland arse would make a better noise. 
• 1 • of the 1872 Education Act marks. an [11] As Kenneth HacKinnon wr1tes, 
1 
The. P.asslngd use of Gaelic within the educat1on 
important turning point .for thhe reco:ln~~~lic a:as actively discouraged in the schools· 
system. Under the new reg1.me~ t e U?e 0 1 ish teachers was common - as was . the The appointment of Engllsh-speakl.ng or E~g in schools The device of the malC:{e-
punishment. of children for speaklng Gafll~sed to stigmatise and physically to punl~h 
crochaidh~ a stick on a. ch?rd,hwas 1omi~n ~ts use is reported as late as the 1930s 1n 
t~~l~~?,n[~~~~~~n~ ~a~~~~ ~nF~t~r:cp~gsp~ct, p.75] 
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_[2] "Taisbean do chanan" 
Runrig's Sraidean na Roinn-Eorpa- Streets f E · 
· f G:o...'dhl' ' 1 · 0 urope- g1ves an Image o at 1g s p ace 1n the world of the late C20th. It begins; 
Chuir mi mo chul ri Lunnain 
An samhradh air m'aodann 
'S mi air sraidean mor na Roinn-Eorpa 
I have put my back to London 
The summer on my face 
And I,m on the great streets of Europe 
.. An image _of .the Gaidheal, rejecting London and all it represents 
(p?hh~al co~str1cbon -: ~urophobia, colonialism, the imperial past, etc.), 
reJechng th1s for a mulbhngual Europe where 11 am Babel ur", the new Babel 
opens up freedom for the Gaidhlig language; 
Thusa tha meanbh, bi ladir, bi alainn 
Taisbean do chanan, bi buan 
You that are small, be strong, be beautiful 
Reveal your language, be everlasting 
This is one of Runrig's many programmes: taisbean do chanan -
reveal your language. The very act of writing in this language, regardless 
of the political content of that writing, signifies at the political level in 
itself. Simply to write, to sing in Gaidhlig, is an act of protest against 
rnarginalization, protest against the denial of basic language rights, 
protest against the old self-colonizing ideologies which proclaim the 
language dead, irrelevfint to contemporary concerns. As Sorley Maclean, 
also a native of Skye jJ, advanced Gaidhlig poetry wholesale into the 
Modernist moment and beyond, Runrig performed the act of injecting 
Gaidhlig into contemporary forms of popular song - the Rocfi
3
flbum, the 
Rock video, the spectacle of the large-scale stadium gig, etc . 
Perhaps the most significant track in the sense of a politicized 
signification in otherwise 11 neutral 11 lexis is An Cuibhle Mor (The Grci:tt 
Wheel). Here, the image is one of time's wheel turning across the landscape 
of the world, and of Scotland. Gearing down from the global to the personn l 
(a favourite technique of Sorley Maclean's), the song opens an image of 
journey. The text is printed as prose: 
(in Runrig's own translation) - Tonight the road reaches out 
before us and the present time is the only time we have. Many 
[l 2] Raasay. 
[13] For instance, in 1991, the album The. Big Whe.el reached .no .. 4 in theh U .. ~. ~lb~\i 
charts within one week of its release, achieving Gold status w1t~1n a ~ont (1 s o~ 
not be for got ten, h?wever, that Runrig Econii
1
steJ?t lih! esaatmu;~e~~gh~~ofran~~~ F~~~~~r~ 
Network Charts than 1n the U.K. charts)· qua y, ~n f b L h L ond to a 
s~ 11 i ng concert ever was theird obne-tday B.eglhttaneon( H{g;u;:Pef1n~d~c;[ Edlnb~~gh 3:st 1 e. 
crowd of 50,000, soon followe y wo n1 s 
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are the days that have gone. The wind blowing through the 
dust o.t th~ earth. Many are the days that the sun rose 
011 
us. 
8tand.1ng 1n the barley when we were young. Joyful. Joyful. 
Runn.Jng through the fields as they grew. Ripe. Golden. 
Look1ng towards the open skies waiting for the journey. 
This journey, however, is one of the validation of experience 
through language - a taxonomic affirmation of the Gliidh!ig landscape 
throughout the whole of Scotland. For Gaidhlig speakers, the experience 
is one of a secret knowledge shared amongst initiates - for the non-
Gaidhlig speaking Scot reading the lyrics along with a first hearing, it is 
a journey through well-known lands through a foreign and yet eerily 
familiar vision. In simple one-word sentences, Runrig stab out the 
nomenclature of a secret and yet readily apparent geography, but a 
geography which soon overspills its borders and carries the listener 
beyond the present and back into the realm of the Great Wheell 14l; 
Glaschu. Dun Eideann. Inbhirnis. Sruighlea. Steornabhagh. 
Obar Dheadhain. An Gearasdan. Dun Deagh. Lunnainn. 
A'Ghearmailt. Eirinn. Ameiriga. An cuibhle mor cuibhle mor. 
Glasgow. Edinburgh. Inverness. Stirling. Stornoway. 
Aberdeen. Fort William. Dundee. London. Germany. Ireland. 
America. The great wheel great wheel. 
Here, the anglicization on erstwhile Celtic place-names in Scotland 
is reversed, and a Gaidhlig line is drawn across the impositions of English 
language maps of Scotland. It is an act of reclaiming a whole culture, a 
listing of its nodal points in the landscape, and a restoration of their 
actual, hidden identity. 
However, as is common amongst many contemporary Rock musicians 
in Scotland, Runrig are often involved in more directly political work. From 
their 1988 album, The Cutter and the Clan, the opening track, Alba 
(Scotland) bears witness to the feelings of many following the previo~Js 
year's general election, in which the ~ories w~re returne~ to power. 1n 
Scotland yet again, purely on the bas1s of thetr comparatively mass_1ve 
English constituency. Alba calls for a socialist Scotland, all ~he t.1me 
tugging at Gaidhealach memories of the long struggle for land r1ghts, 
Ach 'se sealleadh leointe is gann 
Tha an seo aig ceann thall an linn 
Talamh alainn nan daoine 
Fhathast an lamhan duine no dithis 
Which, in their own translation is "But it 1S a wounding and a hollow 
[
14] · ·r· t throughout Celtic culture, and Th~ image of the wheel is, of course, s~{~1 alsc~aonciations. In Capercaillie's 1991 
other contemporary bands. also make u.se of 1- . e for the album cover, but also enters 
album, Delir1um, t~e Celt1c whGeel 1 pr?v 1~f~na~f 1~h;Gaidhealtachd. In an English-languagfe into a polemic aga1nst the de- ae lClza · e of the wheel as temporal tr0:ce o 
tr-ack, Waiting for ~he Whe.e.! t.o Turn_, the ~m~g"Here come the Clearances my fr1end I 
G.lidhea 1 ach cu_l ture 1.s as ~v1dent 1 ?; lna Ri~r/t·e fee 1 the breeze from the storm to come si I ently our h1story .1s comltng1 t~e, ~e e w~iting for the whee 1 to turn". 1 and up and down th1s coas 
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sight I Here as we reach the end of th 
people I Still in the hands of the t e,ce;tury I T~e beautiful soil of the 
constitutional issue, the song contin ew ·t ~ mor: direct relevance to the 
accountability in the Tory adrninistra~·es 0 
1 
~scrlbe the lack of democratic 
Scottish parliament on any basis; wn, w nch refuses to re-establish the 
Cuibhlean stolda mu dheas 
Nc1 fasaichean a tuath 
An taigh-mor falamh an Dun-Eideann 
Gun chumhachd gun ghuth 
Wheels at a standstill 
The wastelands in the north 
The empty House in Edinburgh 
WUhout authority without voice 
Ag~in, after the 1992 general election, when 75% of Scottish voters 
vu led agatnst the Conservative Unionists and for part· h' h dL 
t 't t' 1 · . ' 1es w 1c propose cor:s .1 u 1ona remed1e~, Rvnr1g are again writing of the em t Parliament 
Ihnldtngs on Calton H111l15J. In Ard (High) however th P y · 
f h . , , e message 1s one o ope, 
Ard: blar nan daoine 
Ard: guth is saorsa 
Ard: tha sinn gluasad 
Gu h-ard theid sinn suas 
High: the struggle of the people 
High: a voice and freedom 
High: we are moving 
Upwards we will reach 
Despite constant setbacks to the constitutional movement which the 
elections of the eighties and early nineties merely summarize, Runrig's 
position is to attempt not so much an overt critic.i.~rn of the establishment 
as an inspiration of the ascendant establishmentll 1. 
However, it cannot be said that Runrig write purely in Gaidhlig. It 
is surely a significant commercial fact that, as Gaidhlig bands become more 
popular, the proportion of their first-language tracks gradually reduces. 
In Runrig's case, the breakdown across the years (excluding instrumental 
tr-acks) is as follows: 
[
1
S] Refurbished and awaitin$ their occupants since the 1979 Devolution Referendum, when 
the Westminster government 1gnored a majority vote for devolution. These empty and yet 
dP-mocratically empowered buildings are a potent symbol for the constitutional movement, 
symbolizing both the intransigence of Westminster, and the apathy of elected Scottish 
M.P.s. 
[16] It should also be noted that Runrig are not S.N.P. activists, but ardent Labour 
supporters, and are thus at least in the party-political sense, aligned ~ith devolution, 
r~ther than independence. However, many Labour su~porters do. ~ndee~ advocate 
independence, but have a revulsion for the S.N.P., and h1s party-pos1t1on d1d not stop 
sjnger Donnie Munro being one of the signatories of the Art1sts for Independence group 
prior to the 1992 genera1 election. Other members included P.at Kane of Hue & <:ry (and 
tl1e S.N.P.), Ricky Ross of Deacon Blue, and writers such as L1z Lochead, Alasda1r Gray, 
and James Kelman to name but a few. 
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llunrig Play Gaelic (1978) 
Heartland (1985) 
The Cutter & The Clan (1988) 
Searchlight (1989) 
The Big Wheel (1991) 
Amazing Things· (1993) 
11 out of 11 
4 out of 11 
2 out of 10 
2 out of 12 
2 out of 10 
3 out of 11 
This is hardly impressive when compared to Welsh language bands 
such ~s .Jes~, or Llwybr Llaethog, whose 1990 album BE? (WHAT?) works 
cxclus1vely ~n Welsh, the o~ly English coming from ironically placed 
samples. Wtnle most of Runng's Scottish (let alone their international 
audience) have little knowledge of Gaidhlig, it surely remains the case that 
their reputation is as standard-bearers in the struggle for the 
continuation and expansion of Gaidhealach culture. Perhaps the power of 
Capital is at work even within the revolution? 
Taisbean do chanan gu dearbh - reveal your language indeed. 
[3] 11 include English, and go beyond it" 
Given the fact that Scots is still - in all its heterogeneity of modes -
the majority language of Scotland, it is ironic that it receives le~s 
institutional recognition than the comparatively minor language Gaidhlig. 
For instance, while it is possible now to receive a State Primary education 
through the medium of the Gaidhlig language, there is no structure in 
place to provide the majority of Scottish students an education through 
their own native tongue. Equally, while we now have Gaidhlig medium T.V., 
radio and newspapers, no such media are available in Scots. Strangely, the 
representation of the language in the Rock arena is also limited, 
particularly considering the vast corpus of Folk song which has been a 
mainstay of the language (along with its literature) for centuries. 
The linguistic status of Scots is also a painfully lengthy moot 
topic [l? 1. For instance, is one speaking a language in its own right, o~ 
merely a dialect of English, when one says "A umnae owre fasht Wl 
[l
7J Halcolm Youngson in an article in Chapman's HacDiarmid Centenary Issue, ho~~~ed 
with the following ass'ault a~ainst HacDiat:mid: "Let us be c~ear: there 1s no sue 1~1.f 
as a Scottish language. It 1s true ~hat 1n Sco.tland certa1n words and usages .. P[~e"pj~ 
that are not common to standard Engl1sh, but th1s does not make 1t.a language. ..a 
for Respite From the. "Ai bl_ins, ~chlool( 'th<;hapmanh ~: /lf~s['p9JJ1 i~ea?i~~e) t~~dn~~~~I~~e~fi~ 
nature of the author of th1s art1c e 1s was 1 . . ' · t 'th 
f~ct that the grammar of the fir~t se1nten0ce imp 1lipe:o~~~~ G~~e~~!~ d~;st~~f ~~;ts ;~ff;;.~ such arguments must be taken ser1ous Y · ne rea ' ' k ~ t h 
1 fiir ~oo often fr~m being pr~nounyed dup~~ by ewritii~e w~ha~~ nroetatl~e.~.· i:f~ti~ ~c~d:mi~ 
~;~~fb}ii~~Ywo~i~1 b~ea;~~idedp~~paesch0:lar :hoapro~o~nce~o~~v~~e ~~~1~~:~~ 1~3~rii~k~~ 
Ca~tones~ wi thl .noh)wo~k~ng /no~h~~g~'i ~~ rr~guliasntgtc gdi'stinctive~ess, its. occupaqon of 
~ntes (;n. Eng 1s. o ;-cbo s,d db the Border its individual history, lts own d1alect 
1ts own d1alect-1s~and OUlf e Y f"t ature the ancient loyalty of the 
v<Jriation, its var1ed use. 1n a remarkable 1 er as.~el.l as the fact that since the 
Scottish people to the not1ondoftt~et1co~~tl~~~~a~~~e _all of these are attributes of 
sixt.eenth century Scots has~ ope e. 1 Scots ic to be seen as much more th~n a. language rath~r than fa Ed1a{echt." ~1-~~f~~;c~·se Scots ~Dictionary, p.xiii] Surely th:~:s 
s1mply anothe~ d1alect o ng_1s · t d f net_ regardless of whether or not Scots 1s 
whole debate 1s ontology at 1ts mos e u. 1 t (along with all languages and all accorded the status of 1 an~uage. or c;>f dla ec use the term Scots, and recognize the 
dia 1 ects, it is bot)ll _, bo.th s_1de~ ln thlfs:r;;:r;~tis 1 a be 11 ed within its taxonomy. Scots existence of a sp~c1f1c l1ngu1stlcbprac d re<1ardl ess of its institutional status. exists as a prax1s, and th1s can e agree b 
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-' t "[lB]? Th bl . 
L:lOn . . e pro ~m Increases as we mo~e from the field of spoken 
Scots 1n to what Ham1sh Henderson has defined as "Ballad-Seats" - the 
formal mode of ~cots reserved for epic Folk Ballads and so forth. 
Henderson ?escr1bes Ballad-Seats as a linguistic praxis which "grazes 
~Jalla~-.Enghsh al?n~ the wh~le of its length, and yet remains clearly 
tdenhflable as a d1shn~t folk-hterary lingo." [Alias MacAlias, p.53] In other 
words, Ballad-Seats 1s an example of a form of "biJ.ingualism in one 
language" [ibid.] which "may be said to include English and go beyond it." 
[ibid.] The following stanza, from the ballad Thomas Rymer, gives some idea 
of this "bilingualism in one language"; 
But ye maun go wi me now, Thomas, 
True Thomas, ye maun go wi me, 
For- ye maun serve me seven years, 
Thro weel or wae as may chance to be. 
[Child 37A] 
Here, we have interpolations of English into the body of Scots, in 
such substitutions as "go" for "gang", "now" for "nou", "sev~n," for 
"seiven", "years" for "year", and, most noticeably, "to" for "tae"Ll'IJ. The 
slrength of Henderson's argument comes from his comparisons of the 
language usages of folk singers when singing as compared to speaking, 
and his research yields results such as those given above. 
In the contemporary ballad of a Clydeside shipbuilder who joins the 
Communists in the Spanish Civil War, Jamie Foyers, by Ewan MacColl, we 
can follow a similar process to that in Thomas Rymer. The following is a 
transcription of Dick Gaughan's version, from the album Dick Gaughan Live 
In Edinburgh; 
There wesnae his equal at work or at play 
He wes strong in the union to his dying day 
He wes grand at the fitba, at the dance he wes braw 
Aye, young Jamie Foyers wes the flooer o them aw. 
;lc;lc;lc;lc;lc;lc;lc;lcltlt 
He come hame fae the shipyerd, tuik aft his workin claes 
Oh A mind the time weel in the lang simmer's days 
He' said, "Think na lang, lassie, I'll come back again" 
But Young Jamie Foyers in battle wes slain. 
Here the same bilingual process can be observed, with the Scots 
' t 11 f 11 t 11 nto" basis using English forms: "work" for "wark .. , "s rong or s rang ' 
[lB] I ~m not overly bothered about/taken with that. 
· h. t as the following: But ye maun gang wi [19] The present author wou Id de 11 ver t lS s a.nz~ 1 For ye maun serve me seiven year~ me nou, Thomas, 1 True Thomas~ ye maun gang Wl m ~ 
1 Thro weel or wae as may chance tae be. 
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f 11 t " 11 0 11 f " " [20] G h , . . or ae ! c. me. or cam . aug an s vers1on of th1s song has a 
denser d1str1buhon of Scots forms than Henderson might describe as 
Ballad-Seats, and one reason for this may be the strong political sentiment 
which Gaughan portrays. Nevertheless, it can still be seen that (a) there 
are certain simple substitutions, and that (b) only two words are used 
which do not have direct tirnbral correlates in English: "mind" for 
"rem ern berll and "braw" for "fine/splendid/brilliant". This latter 
characteristic is, it could be argued, a further general characteristic of 
Ballad-Seats - ie. it is actually quite rare to find a large number of words 
which cannot be transposed from Scots to English by simple changes in 
spelling andjor pronunciation. We have here a li~l}}1istic practise operating 
very much in the space between two languages . 
We can also find further examples of Henderson's "bilingualism in 
one language" in contemporary popular songs in Scots. For instance, in 
f\1ichael Marra and Rod Paterson's The Bawbee Birlin (The Spinning 
Sixpence), we can again follow a very similar process as that in the 
medievaL ballad quoted above; 
0 the time will come so the auld man said 
When the servant slumbers in his mester's bed 
If he's no ower busy working overtime instead 
A' for the birlin' o' the bawbee o't 
Here, we have "so" for "sae", "working" for "workin"/"warkin"/ 
"warkan" etc., "overtime" for "owretime", and "instead" for "insteid~~. 
Here, we have a high degree of anglicized forms. As much as anything, the 
f th 1 · 1 traditions in both poetry and 
[21] This is perhaps. even more ~ruj o 1 e cu ~~Sl(1i.ke as the du'mb sunflower) by the 
song. For instanc~ 't lnA Ll yk ads rt veontug~m~~i~eqw~ can se~ a further form of bilingual ismj Cl6th court songwr1 er exan e u ' 
Lyk as the dum 
Solsequium 
With cair ou'reum 
Dot.h sorrow when the sun goes out of sicht, 
Hings doun his head 
And droups as dead 
And wi 11 not spread h · ht 
But louks his leavs throu langour of t e n1c · 
· 1 · h " oes" for "gaes" or "gangs", "not" Here we have the substitut1ons of Eng lS g si~nificantly Hontgomerie uses 
for "na" or '"nae", and "but" for "b~t :'.- ~ow~v~,r' mo:;,~ re id" while ~o doubt expecting 
"head", "dead" and "spread" for "held ' deld ~ndby the si~ger. This semiotic split 
th<lt the Scots forms would be those pronounfe med form can be followe~ mor.e clearly 
between the notated form of a word and the ~e~ 0~here we have the follow1ng v1sual non-
in the anonymous Pl eugh Sang of the same peno ' 
rhyme; 
For to deliver me be the heid 
The old ox Trip-free he be dead. 
"h . d" I "de id" ( 1 ater in the same song, t~e 
- which nevertheless is performedhas .el English forms "pleugh-head" I "Howdle 
Scots form "he id" is repla~ed by the, r .• rme ln . . 
bread", again, to be sun~ wlth Scots elh_).h is however, notated wlth ~nJ51lsh forms, 
This aspect of ll ~era~y Sl~t\h~ l~hol e' consideration of the blllngua 1 space 
provides a further COJ!IPhllcha~lhon. represented by Ba llad-Scots · 
between Scots and Engl1s w lC 1s 
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sung derives a Scottish feel from its setting to Niel Gow's classic Cl 8th folk 
tune A Farewell to Whisky, as well as the political nuances which recall 
Hobert Burn's song, A Man's a Man, For a' That, again, from the C18th. 
In Marra's own 0 Penitence, we even find two further modes of 
Henderson's "bilingualism in one language". Since the gradual decline of 
Metropolitan Scots over the last couple of centuries, one of the mainstays 
of the poetic and song traditions in Scots has been the use of local dialects 
of Scots. In 0 Penitence, for example, we have the vernacular Scots form 
"fae" in place of the more literary "frae" (from), and also substitutions of 
"haid" for "heid" (head), "thur" for "their" (their), etc. The use of local 
dialect here alongside otherwise Standard Scots has a further significance, 
however, as the song bears witness to the 1651 massacre in Marra's home 
town of Dundee propagated by the English Cromwellian invader General 
J'Y1onk. A local story has it that a boy from the town gave Monk all the 
in formation he needed regarding defense positions and, and Marra here 
interprets the feelings of the boy's father. In this context, the bilingualism 
of the switch from English "devil" referring to General Monk, to the Scots 
"deil" referring to the narrator's son, is significant. The actual "deil 
himsel" is approached in the narrator's own language, used effectively to 
set the English phrase in quotation marks, denying the English language's 
ability to bear witness to the Scat's experience. 
0 Penitence 0 Penitence 
0 harsh eternity 
Though Monk may hae the devils hands 
The deil himsel he sprung fae me 
In other words, in song, Scots often makes use of English practices, 
but continually recontextualizes them within its own terms. He~ders?n's 
concept has resonances within the writings of French theorists. G1l~~s 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari. In their text A Thousand Plateaus: Capliallsm 
and Schizophrenia, they posit a conception of languag~ where t.he 
distinction between language and dialect becomes problemahzed; 
The very notion of dialect is quite questionable. Moreover, it 
is relative because one needs to know in relation to what 
major language it exercises its function: for . exampl~ the 
Que becois language must be evaluated not o.nly 1n r~lahon to 
standard French but also in relation to maJor Enghsh, f~om 
which it borrows all kinds of phonetic and syntachc,al 
elements, in order to set them in variation. [Plateaus, p.102] 
Jn t.he case of Scots, one needs to acknowledge its connections not 
10 
only[ no English (which are primarily in terms of an almost common 
root 
22 
), but also to Gitidhlig, Cl 6th French, and Norse (not to mention 
Middle Dutch, etc.). If linguistic praxis is not fixed at any point, but is n 
watter of Henderson's process of mutual "grazing" of practises against 
each others' flanks, then the idea of a fixed ontology in language becomP.s 
meaningless. Language can only be defined in this manner according to its 
institutional status on the one hand, or its political usage on the other; 
Even politically, especially politically, it is difficult to see how 
the upholders of a minor language can operate if not by 
giving it (if only by writing in it) a constancy and 
homogeneity making it a locally major language capable of 
for·cing official recognition (hence the political role of writers 
who assert the rights of a minor language). But the opposite 
a r·gument seems more compelling: the more a language has or 
acquires the characteristics of a major language, the more it 
is u.ffected by continuous variations that transpose it into a 
"minor" language. [Plateaus, p.102] 
Jn other words, the "bilingual" process described by Henderson in 
Ballad-Seats, and which we have seen at work in Michael Marra's songs, 
can be set in the context of Scots being an institutionally "minor" language 
on the "British" level, which, through literary, musical and politically 
ver-nacular practises, nevertheless assembles itself as a "major" language 
at the national, Scottish level, to the point that it perhaps not so much 
grazes English along its side, but is itself grazed by English as a "minor" 
language which sets Scots in continual variation from itself. EquallJ:', Scoi s 
as a "major" language is set into variation by its own sub-groupings of 
[:?2] · · G. h 't s "Braid (Broad) Scots is not a Th~ Americal! 1 i te.r.:try cr1 t1c N~ncy KN {hsumb~i1ane Old Eng1 ish as modern Eng1 j sh 
dialect of Engl~sdh1; dlt Od1edvetogpleidsh r,oCTh~rGe.nder of lfodernism, p.278] !n fact~ trye 
dt-:ve 1 oped from H1 an s n · h b h _ modern Scots has 1 ts bas1s l n 
division to the roots goes .further .down t · e i~ufaxon: both derive from similar D~rk 
Angl ian, wherea;S modern. En~ l1~h ?as d1 ts ~f~:J to form the Angl o-Saxon nation from whlt.?h 
Age Germanic tr1bes, wh~ch 1n .ng an. com an invasion and alteration. However,_ 1n 
contemporary England 1s der1ved ~la Nor~ 1 ced the Welsh-speakers of the Loth1~ns Scotland I the ~ngl ians w_ho had prevJou~ u;. dlst~ea Ce 1 tic proto-f ederal construct Whlch 
(cf. y Gododdln) were 1n~orp9rate Wl ln after the C14th war of Independence, 
became Scotland under q3ldl)llg rtle. ~hortlfi'eld and the Anglian ethnic group slowly 
however, the 1 ast a 11-~a.ldh l1g par lam en wa~in themse 1 ves by the nome.nc 1 ature of the 
began to take the po 11 t 1ca 1 fore' bby now ,;r~a ots~' G~ idhl ig was sti 11 be1ng ea 11 ed Scots 
G~ ldhea 1 s - these Angl ians had now e~om\h~c 11 Ing'l is 11 of the Scottish Ang1 ians in the 
until around the C16th, how~vir, .. ~ ers~~ hence the present name of the language (even 
South-East finally tookhthe tlt eof f~lla~s and of the Doric). if it also goes under t e names ' 
11 
''minor" languages, such as Marra's Dund · · [23] 
there is no meaningful ontological distinct·onlabn tdlalect ... In this sense, 
.. d. 1 t•• A D 1 Ion e ween a language.. d 1a ec . s e euze and Guattari point t ''Th . an a 
does not have intralinguistic endogenouso~ 't e
1
re .1s no language that 
. ' , tn erna m1noriti .. (Pi t 
p.103] -even dialects have their sub-dialect d 
1 
es d eaus, 
i.u larger language-groups. In this line o;':!: e~~n anguages bel?ng 
definitions are only ever institutionally d t ou~ 'd then, onto!ogtcal 
• 1- 'ft e ermtne , are subJect lo 
precarious Sill s a,nd reversions when one l't· 1 
. d , - th .t14J . P0 l tea superstructure 
superse es ano er , and are ultimately incapabl f b · · 
to the constant mobility of linguistic praxis. e 0 eartng wttness 
_l3] Throw the ''R" Away? 
I've been so sn.d 
Since you said my accent was bad 
He's worn a frown 
This Caledonian clown 
I'm just going to have to hesitate 
To make sure my words 
On your Saxon ears don't grate 
Hut I wouldn't have another word to 
If I flattened all the vowels 
And threw the 'R' away 
say 
If it is possible to consider Scots song in the context of a 
[23] I . . . h pan 1nterv1ew Wlt the present author, Harra said the following about his song 
0 Pen1tence: H.H. :"I never at any stage of the game thought of that as bein Scots I 
only thought of it as beiry Dundeei whicp A'~ completely comfortable with, but in ither 
parts of Scotland ye c~n t get away w1th 1t, ye know? Ye can't ... seems like we huv 
tae ... I used tae.w9rk 1n London, ye know,,an A think tha~ hud a big effect. A wad •ae 
been a 1 ot. . . A JUlst hud tae. . . A fund 1 t a rea 1 stra1n, ye know, speakin Standar·d 
English, but ... writin that, it's not like Scots tae me. It's just like it's Dundee. So 
for actual Broad Scots, A doan know. A cuid never really ... tell ye very much about it, 
but Dundee." S. S. T.: Some thin that A find fascinatin 1s the way that when ye get two 
Scots speakers together in a formal situation like this - like there"s a mic sittin 
between us - they immediately fall back intae English. Like with ma bank manager, when 
we bump intae each ither on the street, it's aye guid Scots, but when we're on either 
sirlP. h1s desk, it's always perfect English." H.H.: Of course ye do, heh heh! -and very 
clearly, too! It's cause ye went tae school in Scotland, didn't ye! That's why it is-
ye were educatit in Scotland, so they won't let ye away with it. First th1ng le've 
gottae do, if ye're gonnae wipe out any kin o power at all, then ye get rid o the 
language. And that, they've very successfully done. So we end up tryin 'ae claw it aw 
back, know? Scots, when it's self-conscious, I find it cuid be Chinese, ye know, it's 
juist alien -not that the Chinese are alien, but ye know what A mean? And people are 
very self-conscious about it. Ye're not like that at home, ye know? A mean, youJre a 
iournalist, A'm a musician, we're meetin in a pub in Edinburgh at the Festival, and, as 
you say, we speak English. Ha ha ha ha!" S.S.T.: And feel uncomfortable if we're not. 
M.H.: Yeh, well, I don't like to do it as a gesture, at all. A spent so much time in 
London, A got fed up wi people sayin "Yew wot?" all the time, and so ye are actually, 
juist in a practical sense of bein able tae get through yer life, you speak Standard 
English!" [unpublished interview, 1992] 
[24] Some Germans consider Dutch a debased dialect of German in the same way that some 
Spanish consider Galician, and some English consider Scots. However, Holland has its own 
parliamentary state structure, and therefore valorizes Dutch as a language rather than 
a dialect {the Bavarians also attempt this within the ~erman federal. stFuctur.e) · 
Galician is practically Portuguese, and yet is ~onsidered a d1a~ect of ~pan1sh 1~ Spa1n, 
whi 1 e Portuguese is considered a language 1n Portugal, which aga1n.. has 1 t.s . own 
independent state structure. Scotland has only a miserable excuse {at t1m.e of wr.ltlng) 
for a state structure of any kind, certainly has ~o parliam~n~ ~although 1t ~as 1ts own 
)P.gal system), and is constantly viewed by Westm1nster pol1t1c1ans as a Feg1on rather 
than a nation. In this context, Scots can hardly hoi?e .to be seen as an.yth1ng .ot.her th::~n 
a dialect of English, until it has a greater recogn1t1on by the Scott1sh pol1t1~al and 
educational system, whether within the present sub-federal state structure or 1n some 
other future structure. 
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"bilingualism in one langu~ge 11 , then the same is also true of the English 
language songs produced 1n Scotland. The reputation of The Pr 1 · , . 
· t d h' hl . . oc atmet s 
IS cen re on a Ig Y specific Scottish identity. However the b 
t t f th . . , a ove ex .rac . -rom . e op.en1ng of their .song Throw the 'R' Away is plainly 
wrltte~ In En~h~h, Wit~ only o~1e dev1a~ion from so-called correct grammar, 
and thts deviation being an Internationally recognised vernacular turn 
with no s.pecific Scottish a~sociation. On the other hand, the text evidently 




who sings these words and the 11 Saxon ears 11 of the 
addressee who has apparently objected to something in the former's 
linguistic. practise. The key point here is not one of language per se, or 
even of dialect, but of accent- a certain accent of English which could not 
operate if the singer 11 flattened all the vowels 1 And threw the 'R' away". 
Here, however, we also become embroiled in the whole nomenclature of 
language, and its role in the distinction between Scots and English. For 
instance, although The Pro claimers write on the sleeve-notes "I", they sing 




(pron. wiz), and "to" for their sung "tae". This is the nebulous 
region between languages where words are held in common, but 
pronounced or spelt differently - consider the German word musik, 
pronounced practically the same as the French musique, both meaning in 
English and Scots, music. In the context of the Pro claimers' song, however, 
accent is the main signifier of the difference between the two identities of 
Scots and English - a difference which is articulated not so much through 
language in the strong sense, but through the manipulation of one 
language by another by means of its timbral transformation according to 
external rules. In the same way that one can identify a French accent in 
English, so the normal codes of timbral and rhythmic articulation in the 
Scots language can impose themselves upon the English language and, as 
Deleuze and Guattari hold, "set it in variation 11 • Here, Scots acts as a 
Deleuzian "minor" language which infects the very roots of English as a 
"major" language, turning it around on a new axis. Thus, the language 
wltich The Proclaimers use is a form of English which, in Henderson's terms 
is "grazed" along its flank by the timbres and ~hytf1ms of Scots! onl.y to 
become a subset of English. This subset of English 1s known to ltnguists 
as Standard Scottish English (the form of English now naturalized in 
Scotland as an indigenous language), such that it becomes a "minor" 
language form of the "major" English. . . . 
However, the heterogeneity of expertence 1n Engltsh does not stop 
there. As Pat Kane has written, 
Every time I open my mouth to sing I'm American. This is not 
a matter of choice. [Tinsel Show, p. 23] 
. . . t d' t' [l51 b t Kane writes here not of a national hngutsbc con ra 1c wn. , '.t 
of a personal lack of choice such as any late-twen~ieth cent.ury stnger l~ 
the West experiences. The homogeneity of the American verston of popul•=n 
[25] . . · tion as Edwin Huir did, who, in 
ie. Kane 1s not argu1ng. from the .same. po~~ture claimed that both Scots and 
di~cus~ing the. basis of a nat~on~l :cottds~h~ft~Scotla~d can only create a. national 
G~1dhl1g were 1na~e9uatt; to t { h~'s CP;~dicament p.lll]. Kane's comment 1s framed 11 terature by wr1 t1ng 1n Eng lS t. •




culture is now so widespread, that it has become a matter of pers 1 . 1 . h . t . ona 
exp~rt~nce w 1~c 1s no even questioned by the individual- to sing Rock 
mus1c 1s constdered naturally to sing with an American accent and 
vernacular. To open one's mouth to sing and to therefore be Americ'an to 
be singing in American English, is now an international condition. Thi~ is 
one. reason why The Procl~i~ers were so identifiable as having rebelled 
against the accepted condthon of Rock music - the situation is now so 
extreme that they di·d· not ev.en have to sing in a non-English language in 
order to make ~ P1~~flcal po1nt. All that was needed was a non-American 
accent of Enghsh . However, Kane asserts that subversion can be 
carried out at an even closer proximity to the new lingua tranca; 
Does one simply accept that to love rock'n'roll is to love 
America- or does one employ irony to enjoyably distance the 
music from the society, or even use its techniques to convey 
a critique of both American and British societies? [Tinsel 
Show, p.25] 
It is all a question of the direction in which this statement is taken, 
but before dealing directly with strategies it might suggest, and which will 
inevitably have a political agenda, it may be worth taking a glance at a 
recent damning critique of Kane and of the other Rock musicians, artists 
and novelists actively involved in the various constitutional reform groups 
which emerged in Scotland following the 1992 general election, accusing 
them largely of that form of fake nostalgic sentimentality known in Scottish 
literature as kailyard: 
Pat Kane, the singer with Hue and Cry, bends over backwards 
trying to render the socio-linguistic contradictions of the 
here and now by lingering around the doorways of old 
tenements and yodelling fairly juiceless 3-minute pop songs, 
revelling in the ulterior glory of Glasgow's superior reality. 
'Ma hame toon' and 'ma wee wean' run Kane's show: he's as 
sentimental as a lollipop [ ... ] Hue and Cry (who sing 'Mother 
Glasgow' and 'Rolling Home' with a straight face) and De.acon 
Blue (who sing 'Raintown' with a shameless one), const:tu~e 
the pop end of a new sweet urban Kailyard, the same behef In 
the virtues of normalcy and authentic, harsh, real Northern 
life help them- like their rural counterparts- t~ be attractc~i 
to independence like moths to the burner. [Hom1ng: The An~l­
Kailyard Aesthetic of Bill Douglas, Andrew O'Hagan, 1n 
Edinburgh Review, 89, Spring 1993, p.81] 
An accusation of adopting a kailyard aesthetic cannot be taken 
lightly by such a pro-active member of the S.N.P. as Pat Kane. O'Hagan's 
[26] · 1 • t · of the Americanization of Scottish The reasons behind The Procla1roers reJe~ 10~f Scottish Nationalism~ a gloss on 
popular culture are the welll~ravel}e~hpo{;f}~;ing· "In its powerless state~ Scotland 
whi eh. can be r~ad between th~ .Ine\h USe and NATO ~uc 1 ear frontier forces [ ... J The 
was Ideally situated for s~t1ng .e 1 d~s olitical situation stable[ ... ] In Americans have an i nter~st. 1n keep~ngthScoi ?-£- h ltate." [Britain's Secret War: Tart an these aims they have a w1ll1n~ ally In e r1 1s 
Terrorism and the Anglo-Amerlcan Stat.e~ p.18] 
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article makes a very clever attempt to turn the h 1 . l't' . 
· th · 1 d 't · w 0 e po I Ics of kailyard upon e1r 1ea - I 1s generally understood in t · 1 th · 
J• ~ t ( k' d . m os Circ es at kailyard 1 1 era ure a 1n of nightmarish linguistic Mills d B · 
C th) t d t b 1. an oon genre from the 19 s oo o e 1ttle the Scots language by ass · t' 't · · . . _ . ocia 1ng I primarily with 
children, cake obsessed old lad1es toothless peasant d 11 th · 
·f l' bl d 1 . ' . s an a o er forms o re 1a e an oyal subJects for a VIctorian imperi'al' t d' 0 Lt . . 1s au 1ence, 'Hagnn a empts t.o suggest that 1t was In fact a form of cultu 1 t' 1' 
-'1 t th' tl t· . t'll ra na lOna Ism, and 
t: 1a . 1 s aes 1e 1c 1s s 1 at large amongst today's nat· 1' t t• t 10na 1s ar Is s such 
as Rock bands Hue & Cry and D.eacon Blue, novelist William Mclllvaney, a~d 
phot.ogr·apher Oscar Marzaroh. In other words O'Hagan th . , accuses ese 
ar·hsts of the :ery same fo~m of cringing kailyardism that eventually 
spawned such films as Greyfr1ar's Bobby, Whisky Galore and p 'bl 
D · d ' ossi y evP.n r1ga oon . 
. However, the Michae_l Marra song which O'Hagan mentions Pat Kane 
co~er~ng '.Mother 8/fsgow, Is full o.f ironic ~anipulation of sentimental, and 
Unionist Imagery , not to menhon the Ironic positioning of Glasgow's 
own . creation myth, that of its C6th founder the "Welsh" Scot, St. 
Kenhgern, or Mungo; 
In the second city of the empire 
Mother Glasgow watches o'er her weans 
Trying hard to feed her little starlings 
Unconsciously she clips their little wings 
Mother Glasgow's succour is perpetual 
Nestling the Billy and the Tim 
I dreamt I took a dander with Saint Mungo 
To try to catch a fish that couldnae swim 
Here, the writer and singer (both Catholics of Irish extraction) take 
an ironic side-swipe at the sectarian traditions of Green and Orange 
Glasgow. The use of the word "weans" here could position us towards 
sentimentality in the kailyard mode, but the possibility of nostalgia is 
broken by the ironic contrasts between lexis and signification - these 
"weans" are the Orange and the Green, the Billy and the Tim of a vicious 
sectarianism succoured by the Victorian-imperialist principle of divide and 
rule. This is the legacy the empire leaves for the "weans" of its "second 
city". No peace here; the Bitter Suite of the album's title is pervasive. 
Equally, the lame fish of the contemporary, polluted Clyde contrast with 
the magical fish of the St. Kentigern myths. Here, Glasgow has fallen under 
imperial rule. It hardly represents the form of kailyard aesthetic which 
O'Hagan charges it with, unless one misses the ironic disjunction between 
lyrical content and the apparently saccharin techniques of the music - n. 
slandard technique in Marra's repertoire. 
Consider also another Glasgow song produced by a band which 
O'Hagan accuses of kailyardism. In the chorus of Deacon Blue's Fellow 
P 7] This song was sung at one of the constitutional pr_ote.st rallies in Gl~sgow's qeorge 
Square f o 11 owing the return of yet another Tory Un1on1st government ~n Westm1ns~er 
regardless of the fact that 75% of. the Scottish ele~torate voted for part1es suplort1na 
constitutional reform. A further 1rony was the del1very of the son~ on a sta~eh oqatc 
b~tween statues of Queen Victoria and Prince Al bert (replete w1 th Scott1s p1geon 
guano). 
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Hoodlums, we find singer Ricky Ross (an act· · 
constitutional movement) giving a version of Gla lVe. campalg~er in ~he 
. k th th' 1 sweglan experience whJch r ewor s e my 1ca Glasgow of hard-men and bo t-b · t · 
image bordering the political and the disposable;o oys ln o an unstable 
Fellow hoodlums and engineers 
The Union's south 
And we're all here 
I'm going up Buchanan Street 
With a box of fireworks 
And two bottles of Tizer 
. He~e, t~e ~omely ', childhood-oriented image of a Glaswegian soft 
drutk wh1ch, 1n 0 Hagan s terms could so easily slip into a kailyard' · 
l .d d 'th . . Ism, Js e 1 e Wl an ~r:spec1f1ed number of explosive goods and a hostilit 
towards the po_hhcal status quo within the context of a working clas~ 
sensus commun1s. Perhaps even the Tizer bottle contains something fizzier 
than pop? 
At the very least, the element of the Tizer bottle serves to relocate 
contemporary consumer culture within a specifically Scottish context, 
ra~her than the more prevalent American images of Coke or Pepsi. Even at 
th1s modest level, Ross appears to be working within Kane's idea of 
alienating the Americanized aspects of popular culture while using their 
techniques, resources, and language, and th~~ is taken even further by the 
slight hints of political danger throughoutl UJ. 
~onclusio~ 
When Political combustion ceases to be the object of Princes 
and Patriots, it then,[29fu know, becomes the lawful prey of 
Historians and Poets. 
To paraphrase Burns, who was after all more a song writer than a 
poet, when a community loses even its right to political self-determination, 
let alone the democratic means with which to achieve it, culture often takes 
over where institutional politics leave off. This is a concept heard 
throughout modern Europe, East and West, from Belfast to Bosnia, from 
Brittany to Bavaria. In the case of literature and song, the struggle fot~ 
cultural expression will inevitably be located in what is often referred to 
[:?B) More in line with the "inspirational" qualities of Runrig' politics, ~he final 
track of Deacon Blue's Seamus Heaney-titled album Whatever You S~yJ Say Noth1ng, has a 
fr:r more optimistic and expansive feel. All Over.the Wprld .1s a p~ace anthem of 
international freedom: "All over the world 1 the w1ld, w1ld w1nd I nps through the 
mighty words 1 we kept our se 1 ves from 11 A 11 over, this ear.th. I has never been str:ong 
1 All Jericho's walls 1 they gently fall 11 .I've been wa1t1ng for a golden, br1ght 
millennium 1 wakin early for the Union bonds be1n broken, then gone I all over the world 
[X4] 11 I've been searchin for a new, new song of freedom I where no flag of conquest 
)p, furled, my words are spoken 1 all over the world I all over th~ ~orld 11 I, I hear 
the sound 1 I, I hear the sound all over this land I people ar~ w~1t1ng I to enter the 
world 1 like a new-born baby 11 All over the world I where noth1ng s been learned I the 
flags are changin 1 so let freedom unfurl." 
[:?9] Robert Burns to Alexander Cunningham, 12-03-1791, quoted in Scotland's lfusic, 
p.202. 
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as The Language Issue. The expression of a culture need not take the form 
of a politica] doctrine, espouse? in a neutral language, but can easily, and 
perhaps more potently be ach1eved by a neutral doctrine espoused in a 
politically charged language. The mere existence of any expression in on 
institutionally threatened or subordinated language can act as a strong 
affirmation of a culture's alterity to a political status quo. However, 
following on from Henderson, Deleuze and Kane, it is also possible to see 
various ways in which political confrontations can be played out in the 
spaces between closely related languages, and also in the spaces between 
various layers of the same language. At this level, the politics of 
subversion can almost transform into a kind of linguistic guerilla warfare, 
sometimes paying more than just structural homage to Burns' concept of 
political combustion. 
It is all a question of context, and, in both the linguistic and the 
geographic sense, location. The C6th poet Aneirin was aware of these 
cultural and political dynamics when he wrote, like Burns, of the demis1
3
F{ 
a political system. We hear so often today of "the end o an auld sang" , 
but to translate Aneirin's words into the Braid Scots now spoken in his 
country, the rivers are full, and the flood has begun; 
A wyselike sang anent braw hosts; 
An eftir it ebbs, the river owrefletes. 
- Aneirin, c.600 A.D . 
. h P liament at the end of the last 
[30] Comment made by the Chancellor of th~ Scfott;ison ofr1707, dissolving.Parliament afd 
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